Provisional text

delivered on 5 June 2025 (1)

Case C‑111/24 P

German Khan

Council of the European Union

( Appeal – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Inclusion of the appellant’s name on the lists of persons, entities and bodies concerned – Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Interpretation – Concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ – Specific personal conduct in terms of influence over the Government of the Russian Federation – Examination by the General Court of the merits of the pleas in law challenging all listing criteria – Judicial economy – Effective judicial protection – Right to reputation – Ineffectiveness )

I.Introduction

This Opinion concerns an appeal brought by Mr German Khan (2) seeking to have the judgment of 29 November 2023, Khan v Council (T-333/22, EU:T:2023:758), (3) set aside. By that judgment, the General Court dismissed the action brought by the appellant, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, against:

–Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/429 of 15 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 87I, p. 44) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/427 of 15 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 87I, p. 1), (4) and

–Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022, L 239, p. 1), (5)

to the extent that those acts included the appellant’s name on the lists annexed thereto. By way of those acts, the Council of the European Union prevented the appellant from entering into or transiting through the territories of the Member States and froze all his funds and economic resources in those territories.

The present case is one of the first appeals brought before the Court of Justice regarding the restrictive measures adopted by the Council in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. (6) It mainly affords the Court, sitting as the Grand Chamber, the opportunity to establish the interpretation of the criterion laid down in Article 1(1)(e) and Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP, (7) as amended by Decision (CFSP) 2022/329, (8) as well as in Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, (9) as amended by Regulation (EU) 2022/330. (10) That criterion, commonly referred to as ‘criterion (g)’, provides for the listing of leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

The appellant argues inter alia that the General Court misinterpreted Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, (11) by concluding, in essence, that the fulfilment of the criterion contained therein does not require the Council to demonstrate any specific conduct or contribution on the part of the listed person, in particular in terms of influence over the Government of the Russian Federation, or to establish a link with the regime of that country. He further submits that the General Court wrongfully declined to examine the pleas in law put forward at first instance challenging his listing under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

This case is connected with Cases C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P and C‑35/24 P, which arise from the appeals brought, respectively, by Mr Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy, Mr Tigran Khudaverdyan, Mr Viktor Filippovich Rashnikov and Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin against the judgments of the General Court confirming the inclusion of their names on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures under Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. The Opinions in those cases are also delivered today, in which I focus on the specific matters which the Court of Justice has asked me to examine concerning inter alia the interpretation of the listing criterion contained in that provision, in particular in the light of the main common arguments put forward by the appellants.

II.Facts and procedure

A.Background to the dispute

The background to the dispute is described in paragraphs 2 to 18 of the judgment under appeal. For the purposes of the present Opinion, that background can be summarised by reference to the following undisputed facts.

The appellant is a businessperson of Russian and Israeli nationality.

On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/145. On the same date, the Council, acting on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, adopted Regulation No 269/2014. Both acts concerned restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

On 25 February 2022, the Council adopted both Decision 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145, and Regulation 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014, which modified inter alia the criteria according to which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be the subject of the restrictive measures in question.

Article 1(1)(b) and (e) of Decision 2014/145, in the version as amended by Decision 2022/329, (12) prevents the entry into or transit through the territories of the Member States of natural persons who meet certain criteria which are substantially identical to those set out in Article 2(1)(d) and (g) of that decision. That latter provision provides, in turn, for the freezing of funds and economic resources of natural persons meeting those criteria.

More specifically, Article 2(1)(d) and (g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, reads as follows:

‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:

…

(d) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine;

…

(g) leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine,

… shall be frozen.’

Regulation No 269/2014, in the version as amended by Regulation 2022/330, (13) requires measures to be adopted for the freezing of funds and lays down the detailed rules governing that freezing of funds in terms which are identical, in essence, to those used in Decision 2014/145, as amended. Article 3(1)(d) and (g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, essentially reproduces Article 2(1)(d) and (g) of that decision.

On 15 March 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted the initial acts. The appellant’s name was added to the list annexed to Decision 2014/145, as amended, and to the list in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, on the following grounds:

‘[The appellant] is a major shareholder of the Alfa Group conglomerate, which includes Alfa Bank, one of Russia’s largest taxpayers. He is believed to be one of the most influential persons in Russia. Like other Alfa Bank owners (Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven), he maintains a close relationship with Vladimir Putin and continues to trade significant favours with him. Alfa Group owners receive business and legal benefits out of this relationship. Vladimir Putin’s eldest daughter Maria ran a charity project, Alfa-Endo, which was funded by Alfa Bank. Vladimir Putin rewarded Alfa Group’s loyalty to the Russian authorities by providing political help to Alfa Group foreign investment plans.

He has therefore been actively supporting materially or financially and benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. He is also one of the leading Russian business persons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’

On 16 March 2022, the Council published a notice for the attention of the persons subject to the restrictive measures provided for in the initial acts in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ 2022 C 121I, p. 1).

On 21 March 2022, the appellant requested that the Council grant him access to the documents which had formed the basis of the adoption of the restrictive measures affecting him. The Council complied with that request on 29 March 2022.

On 1 June 2022, the appellant lodged a request for review with the Council.

On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted the maintaining acts, which extended the measures taken against the appellant until 15 March 2023, without amending the grounds for including his name on the lists at issue.

B.The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 6 June 2022, the appellant brought an action for annulment of the initial acts. Subsequently, the appellant lodged a statement of modification in order to amend the form of order sought in his application so as to include an application for annulment of the maintaining acts.

In support of his action, the appellant raised three pleas in law, alleging, in essence, first, lack of a legal basis for the adoption of the criterion contained in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, second, failure to observe the principle of proportionality and, third, manifest error of assessment. At the hearing, the appellant stated that, by means of the first two pleas in law mentioned above, he actually sought to raise a plea of illegality under Article 277 TFEU against Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. In addition, in his statement of modification, the appellant raised a fourth plea directed against the maintaining acts, alleging infringement of an essential procedural requirement and, in particular, infringement of the obligation to conduct a periodic review and the obligation to state reasons.

In the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the appellant’s action, citing the following reasons, among others.

First, the General Court rejected the appellant’s plea that the criterion provided for in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, was unlawful for want of a legal basis. In that regard, the General Court pointed out that the acts at issue were based on the Treaties and, in particular, on Article 29 TEU as regards Decisions 2022/429 and 2022/1530 and on Article 215 TFEU as regards Implementing Regulations 2022/427 and 2022/1529. Those acts therefore had relevant legal bases in the field of the common foreign and security policy. (14) Moreover, the General Court declared that Article 215(2) TFEU allows the Council to adopt restrictive measures on the sole condition that a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty provides for such measures. In the General Court’s view, if that condition is satisfied, Article 215(2) TFEU serves as the proper legal basis for the adoption of acts imposing restrictive measures, even on addressees who have no link with the governing regime of a third country. (15)

Second, as regards the alleged breach of the principle of proportionality, the General Court considered that the lawfulness of a measure adopted in fields which involve political choices can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue. According to the General Court, there is a rational relationship between (i) the targeting of leading businesspersons operating in economic sectors providing substantial revenue to the government, in view of their importance for the Russian economy, and (ii) the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case, which is to increase pressure on the Russian Federation and the costs of its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. Hence, the General Court concluded that the approach of targeting those persons must be regarded as consistent with that objective and cannot be regarded as manifestly inappropriate in the light of that objective. (16)

Third, as regards the alleged error of assessment in the application of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, to the appellant, the General Court considered that the criterion contained therein implied the concept of influence in connection with the exercise of an activity in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, without any further condition concerning a link with the regime of that government. In the General Court’s view, by that criterion, the Council sought to exploit the influence that the category of persons concerned is likely to exert on the Russian regime, by prompting them to put pressure on it to change its policy. The concept of ‘leading businessperson’ had therefore to be understood as referring to the importance of those persons in the light, inter alia, of their occupational status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more of the companies in which they pursue those activities. (17) As to the present case, the General Court stated that the Council had adduced a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence capable of demonstrating that the appellant was involved in an economic sector, namely the banking sector, which constituted a substantial source of revenue for the Government of the Russian Federation. (18)

In the light of the above considerations, the General Court concluded that inclusion of the appellant’s name in the initial acts in accordance with the criterion contained in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, was sufficiently substantiated. In that context, the General Court further stated that it was not necessary to examine the appellant’s plea alleging that there was insufficient evidence to justify the application of the criterion contained in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. (19)

III.Forms of order sought and procedure before the Court of Justice

By its appeal, lodged with the Court of Justice on 8 February 2024, the appellant claims that the Court should:

–set aside the judgment under appeal;

–annul the acts at issue;

–in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court;

–order the Council to pay the costs.

In its response lodged on 15 May 2024, the Council requests that the Court of Justice dismiss the appeal and order the appellant to pay the costs.

A hearing was held on 11 February 2025, at which the appellant and the Council responded to the questions for oral answer put by the Court of Justice, in particular as regards the interpretation of the expression ‘leading businesspersons’ in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and as regards the question whether the General Court should have examined the merits challenging all the listing criteria applied to the appellant by the Council in the acts at issue in the light of the judgment of 29 November 2018, Bank Tejarat v Council (C‑248/17 P, EU:C:2018:967).

IV.Assessment

In support of his appeal, the appellant relies, in essence, on seven grounds, alleging:

–first, that the General Court erred in law by not examining whether the application to the appellant of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, was well founded;

–second, that the General Court erred in law in interpreting the expression ‘leading businesspersons’ in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended;

–third, that the General Court infringed Article 215(2) TFEU;

–fourth, that the General Court’s interpretation of the expression ‘leading businesspersons’ in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, infringes the principle of legal certainty, the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business;

–fifth, that the General Court distorted the meaning of the evidence relied on against the appellant and infringed the obligation to state reasons;

–sixth, that the General Court erred in law by concluding that the banking sector constitutes a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the government, within the meaning of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended;

–seventh, that the General Court infringed the right to a fair hearing and the principle of equality of arms.

The Court of Justice has requested that the specific arguments regarding the interpretation of the expression ‘leading businesspersons’ in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, be examined, which essentially concern the second and fourth grounds of appeal. Moreover, the Court has requested an analysis of the appellant’s arguments concerning whether the General Court committed an error by failing to examine the merits of applying Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, to the appellant. Those arguments are to be found in the first ground of appeal. My assessment will focus on those main issues, on which the parties concentrated their oral argument at the hearing, as requested by the Court of Justice.

A.The second and fourth grounds of appeal

By the second and fourth grounds of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court misinterpreted the criterion contained in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. In essence, he takes issue with the General Court for finding that the expression ‘leading businesspersons’ in that provision does not require the Council to demonstrate any specific conduct on the part of the listed person, in particular in terms of influence over the Government of the Russian Federation, or to establish any link with the regime of that country. He argues that it is apparent from some language versions of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended – as in the case of the French-language version, which uses the expression ‘femmes et hommes d’affaires influents’ – that the application of that provision requires the existence of influential behaviour vis-à-vis that government or the existence of a link with it in order to exert that influence.

The Council disputes those arguments.

As is clear from point 10 of the present Opinion, Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, provides for the freezing of all funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by ‘leading businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’.

According to settled case-law, when interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also its context and the objectives of the rules of which it is part. That is, in particular, the case when the terms of the provision of EU law concerned make no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining their meaning and scope, which is the case here as regards Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. (20)

First, concerning the literal interpretation of the expression ‘leading businesspersons’, it is common knowledge that the word ‘businessperson’ refers to a person who works in business, typically at an executive level in a company. In addition, the word ‘business’ refers to the exercise of an economic or commercial activity. The term ‘businesspersons’ in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, therefore alludes to persons carrying out an economic or commercial activity within a company that they own or where they hold an important position. (21)

For its part, the word ‘leading’ is an adjective defined in English as meaning ‘very important or most important’. (22) Inasmuch as the expression ‘leading businesspersons’ is followed, in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, by the expression ‘involved in economic sectors’, the concept of ‘leading’ has to be understood as referring to the importance of the businessperson concerned in the sector in which he or she operates and the influence that that person might be capable of exerting within that sector, which is, in essence, the finding made by the General Court in paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal. Moreover, as stated in that same paragraph, the ‘leading’ nature of a businessperson may be established in the light, inter alia, of his or her occupational status, the importance of his or her economic activities, the extent of his or her capital holdings or his or her functions within one or more of the companies in which he or she pursues those activities. That finding is not specifically referred to by the appellant in his appeal.

It follows that, from a literal perspective, the General Court did not commit any error by essentially considering, in paragraphs 88 to 90 of the judgment under appeal, that all the Council is obliged to demonstrate in order to establish that a person is a ‘leading businessperson’ for the purpose of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, is that the person concerned carries out an economic or commercial activity and that that person is considered to be, in accordance with the elements described in paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal, a very important or the most important businessperson in the economic sector in which he or she operates, such as to be capable of exerting an influence within that sector.

It is true that some language versions of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, qualify the noun ‘businesspersons’ with a word equivalent to ‘influential’ in English, instead of ‘leading’. The appellant relies on that fact to argue that the businesspersons concerned by that provision must be capable of exerting an influence not merely within the economic sector in which they operate, but specifically over the Government of the Russian Federation itself.

However, in that regard, I recall that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the wording used in one or a few language versions of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all languages of the European Union. (23)

In the present case, I observe, in line with the explanations furnished by the Council at the hearing, that 12 language versions of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, essentially qualify the noun ‘businesspersons’ with a word which is equivalent to ‘leading’ in English. (24) In addition to those versions, some others employ a word that may be translated as ‘prominent’ or ‘principal’ in English, which, from a semantic point of view, mirrors the word ‘leading’. (25) The considerations put forward in point 34 of the present Opinion, concerning the interpretation of the expression ‘leading businesspersons’ in English, are therefore fully applicable to all of those versions.

By contrast, it is only the French-, Latvian- and Lithuanian-language versions that qualify the noun ‘businesspersons’ in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, with an adjective which in English would be translated as ‘influential’. That said, even in those languages, one of the main meanings of ‘influential’ is the quality of being ‘important’. (26) Consequently, in order to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, as required by the case-law cited in point 37 above, the French-, Latvian- and Lithuanian-language versions of the expression ‘leading businesspersons’ should be interpreted in the same way as the majority of the language versions of that provision, namely as referring to the importance of the businessperson concerned in the economic sector in which he or she is involved and within which he or she is capable of exerting an influence. The General Court did not, therefore, commit any error in paragraph 92 of the judgment under appeal, where it reached the same conclusion.

It follows from the above considerations that, from a literal perspective, the appellant’s argument that the expression ‘leading businesspersons’, as it appears in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, requires the Council to demonstrate specific conduct on the part of the listed person, in particular in terms of influence over the Government of the Russian Federation, or to establish a link with the regime of that country, is not well founded.

Second, as regards the contextual interpretation, I would like to recall, at the outset, that the listing criterion targeting ‘leading businesspersons’, as provided for in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, was first introduced by Decision 2022/329. That latter decision was adopted on 25 February 2022, that is, the day after the President of the Russian Federation announced a military operation in Ukraine and the Russian armed forces began an attack on that country. (27)

Moreover, it is important to point out that, before being amended by Decision 2022/329, Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145 already contained a listing criterion which essentially made it possible to target persons capable of exerting individual influence over the Government of the Russian Federation. That was, in particular, the case of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, which essentially referred to natural persons actively supporting, materially or financially, or benefiting from, Russian decision-makers responsible for undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. As already indicated in the present Opinion, (28) that criterion remained in Decision 2014/145, as amended, which suggests to me that interpreting Article 2(1)(g) thereof as requiring proof of influential conduct vis-à-vis the Government of the Russian Federation and a link with the regime governing that country, as the appellant argues, would simply be redundant and, therefore, not consistent from a contextual point of view.

To my mind, therefore, I do not consider that the contextual interpretation of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, supports the appellant’s argument.

Third, as regards the teleological interpretation, Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, forms part of a legal framework which enacted an unprecedented set of restrictive measures aiming, as the General Court rightly recalled in paragraphs 52 and 88 of the judgment under appeal, (29) to exert maximum pressure on the Russian Federation by increasing the costs of the latter’s actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

Those are indeed the objectives of the restrictive measures adopted against Russia as they are formulated, in essence, in the judgment of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council (C‑729/18 P, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 59), (30) which also cites the judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 123). (31) Both judgments concerned the interpretation of sectoral restrictive measures adopted in view of the actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, which preceded the attack on that country by Russian armed forces on 24 February 2022. (32) However, contrary to the arguments of the appellant, the objectives identified by the Court of Justice in those judgments remain valid for the interpretation of the individual restrictive measures at issue in the present case, bearing in mind that both sectoral and individual restrictive measures have been adopted within the framework of a common response to a situation that has deteriorated even further since the Russian attack, as recitals 10 and 11 of Decision 2022/329, amending Decision 2014/145, explicitly state. (33)

Against that background, I take the view, in line with the findings of the General Court in paragraphs 52 and 53 of the judgment under appeal, that the adoption of restrictive measures in respect of the leading businesspersons targeted by Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, can reasonably be expected to maximise the pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to desist from its military aggression in Ukrainian territory. After all, those leading businesspersons play a central role in maintaining the profitability of the economic sectors in which they are involved and which ultimately bolster the financial resources at the disposal of the Government of the Russian Federation to pursue its actions and policies. Consequently, by impinging on the activity of the leading businesspersons concerned, the restrictive measures at issue in the present case are likely to curtail the revenue that the Government of the Russian Federation obtains from the relevant sectors of its economy, thus increasing the cost of its military actions and limiting its ability to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

It follows that, as the General Court noted in paragraphs 54 and 89 of the judgment under appeal, there is a rational relationship between, on the one hand, the targeting of leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation and, on the other, the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case. Contrary to the arguments of the appellant, that relationship subsists even in the absence of specific conduct on the part of the listed person, in particular in terms of influence over the Government of the Russian Federation, or in the absence of a link between that person and the regime governing that country.

The teleological interpretation of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, does not therefore require a reconsideration of the textual and contextual interpretation of that provision, as set out in points 40 and 43 of the present Opinion. It in fact supports the view that the expression ‘leading businesspersons’ contained in that provision requires the Council to demonstrate only that the person concerned carries out an economic or commercial activity and that that person is considered to be at least a very important businessperson in the sector in which he or she is involved, thus being capable of exerting an influence within it.

As to the remainder, inasmuch as the appellant states that it is difficult to ascertain how listed persons should act in order not to be listed or to be delisted, it is important to point out that prominent businesspersons may be delisted if they can demonstrate that they have left the position that constituted the basis for their listing. Again, while such a position may justify the initial listing, it cannot result in the situation of the person concerned being fixed in time and in the periodic review exercise being deprived of any useful effect, unless the Council can still demonstrate a risk of circumvention, which is an issue not specifically raised by the present case.

In view of the foregoing considerations, none of the methods of interpretation defined by the Court of Justice’s case-law for ascertaining the meaning of a provision of EU law requires, as the appellant submits, the existence of influential behaviour by the targeted person vis-à-vis the Government of the Russian Federation or the existence of a link with it in order for a person to be classified as a ‘leading businessperson’ for the purposes of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

Consequently, to my mind, the General Court cannot be said to have committed an error of law or to have infringed the principle of legal certainty when interpreting the expression ‘leading businesspersons’ as provided for in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

The second and fourth grounds of appeal should therefore be rejected.

B.The first ground of appeal

By the first ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for declining to examine the pleas in law put forward at first instance challenging his listing under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. He submits that, even assuming that the General Court was right to conclude that that listing was well founded under Article 2(1)(g) of that decision, as amended, the fact that it did not examine his arguments relating to Article 2(1)(d) thereof infringed his right to effective judicial protection and his right to reputation. More specifically, the appellant argues that, where the act that is subject to challenge has different legal bases, the General Court cannot confine itself to examining the validity of only one of those legal bases. That is all the more so in the present case, where the criteria contained, respectively, in Article 2(1)(d) and (g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, target completely different situations.

The Council contests those arguments. It states that the approach taken by the General Court in the judgment under appeal was properly supported by the Court of Justice’s settled case-law. Furthermore, the Council objects to the distinction drawn by the appellant as regards the criteria contained, respectively, in Article 2(1)(d) and (g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. It maintains that both criteria are neutral since neither of them makes a value judgment about the behaviour of the person concerned or implies any censure by the Council of that person’s conduct.

) the Council based the appellant’s listing not only on the criterion contained in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, but also on the criterion contained in Article 2(1)(d) thereof. In essence, the Council considered that the appellant had actively supported, materially or financially, Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine, and that he had also benefited from them. As is apparent from the statement of reasons provided by the Council, (35) the grounds supporting that listing included the appellant’s close relationship with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the significant favours traded between them. The Council also relied to that end on the political assistance provided by Mr Putin to the Alfa Group, of which the appellant was a major shareholder, in order to develop its foreign investment plans as a reward for that group’s loyalty.

It is important to note that, in paragraphs 133 to 135 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that the ground for including the appellant’s name on the lists at issue, based on his status as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, corresponding to Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, was sufficiently substantiated. In that context, the General Court considered that it was not necessary to examine the merits of the other complaints raised by the appellant seeking to call into question the Council’s assessment concerning the appellant’s listing under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

According to the Court of Justice’s case-law, cited by the General Court in paragraph 134 of the judgment under appeal, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures and considering their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision.

That statement was initially formulated in the judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi <i> </i> (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), (36) in which the Court of Justice specifically referred to the reasons underlying the application of a listing criterion to the person concerned. If at least one of those reasons is substantiated and sufficient, then the fact that other reasons are not does not mean that that criterion is misapplied and, therefore, that the Council’s decision is unlawful. (37) In its subsequent case-law, namely in the judgment of 29 November 2018, Bank Tejarat v Council (C‑248/17 P, EU:C:2018:967), (38) the Court applied the same reasoning by analogy to the situation where one of the listing criteria – and not simply the reasons justifying the application of that criterion – is considered to be well founded in the context of an appeal. In essence, according to the Court, the ground of appeal relating to any additional listing criterion becomes, in those circumstances, ineffective, since the operative part of the judgment under appeal must be regarded as well founded. (39)

As to the present case, I would like to note, first and foremost, that the practice of the General Court in the field of restrictive measures does not appear to be consistent, as demonstrated by the pending cases in which I have recently delivered an Opinion (Timchenko v Council, C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:273, and Timchenko v Council, C‑703/23 P, EU:C:2025:274). In the judgments under appeal in those cases, the General Court did not rely on the Court of Justice’s case-law resulting, for instance, from the judgment in Bank Tejarat. It examined the lawfulness of the Council’s decisions at issue in the light of, on the one hand, Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and, on the other, Article 2(1)(d) thereof. That means that the approach taken by the Court in the present case may have significant consequences for the General Court’s decision-making practice.

That said, it is important to recall that, in an action for annulment, the ineffective nature of a plea which has been raised refers to the lack of its capacity, in the event that it is well founded, to lead to the annulment sought by an applicant. (40) Typically, an ineffective plea is one which criticises an aspect of a measure in cases where the measure may lawfully be based exclusively on other grounds or considerations. (41) In those circumstances, the principle of procedural economy allows the General Court not to examine such a plea, since it would in any event have no bearing on the lawfulness of the act at issue. (42)

In the present case, even if the General Court had found that the Council had misapplied Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, to the applicant, the operative part of the Council’s decision – which essentially prohibits him from entering into the territories of the Member States and freezes all his funds in those territories – would not have been affected and the acts at issue would still have had to be declared lawful. That is exactly the kind of situation referred to in the judgment in Bank Tejarat, which is based on the well-established premiss that the annulment of an act merely affects the operative part of the act which is subject to judicial review, not the grounds on which the institution concerned based its decision.

Moreover, even though the acts of the EU institutions enjoy a presumption of lawfulness, as the appellant claims, that presumption only extends to the operative part of the act in question, not to the reasons on which that operative part is based. This means that, where the General Court, for reasons of procedural economy, declines to examine the merits of one of the listing criteria applied to a person subject to restrictive measures, as is the case here, the Council’s assessment as regards an alternative criterion cannot be presumed to be endorsed by the General Court’s judgment. In that regard, I consider that the appellant is wrong to argue that the non-examination by the General Court of his listing under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, is capable of affecting his right to effective judicial protection.

In addition, it is true that, unlike the judgment in Bank Tejarat, the two listing criteria applied in the present case not only target different situations, but they are also significantly different in nature. As is clear from the first part of the present Opinion, Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, ultimately enables a person to be listed by reason of his or her involvement, as a leading businessperson, in a profitable economic sector for the Government of the Russian Federation. By contrast, Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, attributes to the listed person the conduct of supporting, materially or financially, or of benefiting from, Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine.

However, the different nature of the listing criteria applied to the appellant in the acts at issue is not capable of casting doubt on the conceptual considerations set out in points 60 and 61 above. Moreover, that different nature also does not convert those listing criteria into separate elements which may be severed from the remainder of the Council’s decision, thus allowing, in accordance with the Court of Justice’s case-law, (43) a partial annulment of that decision.

Finally, the Court has held that a person whose name has been included on the list of persons whose assets have been frozen continues to have at least a non-material interest in having that listing annulled in order to have the EU Courts recognise that he or she should never have been included on such a list, in view of the consequences for his or her reputation, even after the removal of his or her name from that list. (44) In that judgment, the Court confirmed that a person retains an interest, based on his or her right to reputation, in seeking the annulment of a listing decision by the Council even when, after a periodical review, that institution decides to delist him or her. However, the situation in the present case is different since, again, the examination by the General Court of an alternative listing criterion could not, in any event, lead to the annulment of the acts at issue. For that reason, and in line with the discussions held during the hearing, the remedy available to the appellant in order to protect his reputation is an action for damages, pursuant to Article 340 TFEU. (45)

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I am of the view that the General Court is entitled to conclude that, where one of the criteria justifying the listing of a person is found to be justified, there is no need to go on to examine the reasons underpinning an alternative listing criterion relied on by the Council as the basis for the same decision. Consequently, and since the General Court did not have to examine the merits of the listing under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the appellant is wrong to argue that that court committed an error of law.

The first ground of appeal should therefore be rejected.

V.Conclusion

In the light of the analysis set out in the present Opinion, I propose that the Court should dismiss the appeal as regards the second and fourth grounds of appeal, in so far as they concern the interpretation of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. In addition, I propose that the Court should dismiss the appeal as regards the first ground of appeal.

I express no opinion as regards the remainder of the grounds of appeal submitted by the appellant, or which party should be ordered to pay the costs pursuant to Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

—

1Original language: English.

2‘The appellant’.

3‘The judgment under appeal’.

4Together, ‘the initial acts’.

5Together, ‘the maintaining acts’, and, taken together with the initial acts, ‘the acts at issue’.

6See also judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180), and my Opinions in Timchenko v Council (C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:273) and in Timchenko v Council (C‑703/23 P, EU:C:2025:274).

7Council Decision of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).

8Council Decision of 25 February 2022 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1).

9Council Regulation of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).

10Council Regulation of 25 February 2022 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1).

11In the interests of brevity, references to the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, should be understood as referring also to the criterion laid down in Article 1(1)(e) of that decision and in Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended. See points 9 and 11 of the present Opinion.

12‘Decision 2014/145, as amended’.

13‘Regulation No 269/2014, as amended’.

14The judgment under appeal, paragraphs 31 and 32.

15The judgment under appeal, paragraphs 37 to 39.

16The judgment under appeal, paragraphs 51 to 56.

17The judgment under appeal, paragraphs 88 to 91.

18The judgment under appeal, paragraph 111.

19The judgment under appeal, paragraphs 133 and 134.

20Judgment of 20 March 2025, DL (C‑61/24, EU:C:2025:197, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

21See, in that regard, the definition provided by the Cambridge Dictionary; available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/businessperson.

22See, inter alia, the definition provided by the Cambridge Dictionary; available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/learner-english/leading.

23See judgment of 28 November 2024, Másdi (C‑169/23, EU:C:2024:988, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

24See the Bulgarian-, Czech-, German-, Estonian-, Croatian-, Italian-, Hungarian-, Polish-, Slovak-, Slovenian-, Finnish- and Swedish-language versions of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

25See the Dutch-, Portuguese-, Spanish-, Irish- and Romanian-language versions of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

26See, inter alia, the definition provided by Le Robert; available at https://dictionnaire.lerobert.com/definition/influent.

27See recital 9 of Decision 2022/329.

28See point 10 above.

29I would briefly point out that the findings made by the General Court in paragraphs 52 to 54 of the judgment under appeal, as regards the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures at issue in the present case, form part of that court’s assessment of the plea of illegality raised by the appellant at first instance under Article 277 TFEU in the light of the principle of proportionality. However, they are consistent with the finding made by the General Court in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, in its assessment of the interpretation of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, which enables all those findings to be taken together.

30See also judgment of 17 September 2020, Rosneft and Others v Council (C‑732/18 P, EU:C:2020:727, paragraph 85).

31See my Opinion in Timchenko v Council (C‑703/23 P, EU:C:2025:274, point 52).

32See Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 13), as amended, and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1).

33I should also draw the Court’s attention to recitals 2 and 4 of Decision 2022/329, which declare that the European Union remains ‘unwavering in its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ and refer to the need to adopt further restrictive measures imposing massive and severe consequences on Russia for its military aggression. Moreover, recital 10 of Decision 2022/329 states that the European Union’s response ‘[would] include both sectoral and individual restrictive measures’ as a response to the ‘unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by armed forces of the Russian Federation’. It is apparent from that statement that those two types of measures are intertwined elements pursuing the same aim.

34See point 13 of the present Opinion.

35See point 12 of the present Opinion.

36‘The judgment in Kadi II’.

37The judgment in Kadi II, paragraph 130.

38‘The judgment in Bank Tejarat’.

39The judgment in Bank Tejarat, paragraphs 60 and 61. The terms employed by the Court in those paragraphs appear to be ambiguous, as it refers to ‘reasons’, instead of ‘criteria’. However, it is clear from paragraph 57 that the Court refers to the listing criteria concerned in that case and not to the reasons grounding the application of those criteria.

40See judgment of 21 September 2000, EFMA v Council (C‑46/98 P, EU:C:2000:474, paragraph 38).

41See Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Evropaïki Dynamiki v ECB (C‑401/09 P, EU:C:2011:31, point 88).

42See Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in EFMA v Council (C‑46/98 P, EU:C:1999:547, point 10).

43See, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Commission v Council (C‑425/13, EU:C:2015:483, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).

44See judgment of 31 January 2019, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council (C‑225/17 P, EU:C:2019:82, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

45See, in that regard, judgment of 30 May 2017, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (C‑45/15 P, EU:C:2017:402, paragraph 49).