11.1.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 7/29

(Case T-576/15)

(2016/C 007/40)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: VIK Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft e. V. (Essen, Germany) (represented by: C. Kahle, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

annul, pursuant to Article 264 TFEU, the decision of the European Commission of 25 November 2014 in the proceedings ‘State aid SA.33995 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) — Germany — Support for renewable electricity and reduced EEG-surcharge for energy-intensive users’ C(2014)8786 final, published in the Official Journal (OJ 2015 L 250, p. 122), in so far as

in Article 1 and Article 3(1) of the decision, the defendant classifies the support of electricity production from renewable sources and the cap on the EEG-surcharge under the EEG-Act 2012 as new aid, and

in Article 2, Article 3(2), Article 6 and Article 7 of the decision, the defendant declares the incompatibility of the special compensation rule with the internal market and orders the recovery of the aid;

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law.

1.First plea in law: No advantage

The applicant claims that the special compensation rule does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since no advantage is granted to energy-intensive users by the cap on the EEG-surcharge.

2.Second plea in law: No selectivity

The applicant also argues that the special compensation rule does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since the condition of selectivity is absent. Energy-intensive users were not favoured over other users who are in a comparable factual and legal situation. In addition, the cap on the EEG-surcharge is justified on the basis of the nature and general scheme of the rule.

3.Third plea in law: No resources received from the State

In that regard, it is claimed that neither the nationwide compensation scheme nor the special compensation rule of the EEG-Act 2012 contained aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since there is no burden on State resources.

4.Fourth plea in law: No restriction on competition

In this respect, the applicant states that the cap on the EEG-surcharge merely serves to compensate for a competitive disadvantage which electricity/energy-intensive users must bear in comparison with sectors of users in other countries owing to the payment of the EEG-surcharge.

5.Fifth plea in law: Compatibility of the aid with the common market

The applicant claims that, if the cap on the EEG-surcharge were to be classified as aid, it would be compatible with the common market. The cap does not distort competition; rather, a competitive disadvantage for the users concerned is compensated for by this means.

6.Sixth plea in law: No new aid

The applicant also claims that, if the Court classifies the special compensation rule as aid, it is existing aid, to which the procedure under Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (1) is not applicable.

7.Seventh plea in law: Infringement of the general legal principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty

The applicant submits in that regard that, by approving the EEG-Act 2000, the defendant created a legitimate expectation, which is infringed by the final decision.

Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).