14 December 2017 (*1)

(Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice –– Request for a preliminary ruling –– Lack of jurisdiction of the General Court of the European Union — Appeal manifestly unfounded)

In Case C‑401/17 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 30 June 2017,

Double ‘W’ Enterprises Limited, established in Gibraltar (Gibraltar), represented by A. Rubio Crespo, abogado,

appellant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

The Kingdom of Spain,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of E. Levits, President of the Chamber, A. Borg Barthet and M. Berger (Rapporteur), Judges

Advocate General : M. Wathelet,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court,

makes the following

1By its appeal, Double ‘W’ Enterprises Limited asks the Court to set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 15 May 2017, Double ‘W’ Enterprises Limited v Kingdom of Spain (T‑899/16, not published, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2017:356), by which the General Court dismissed its request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU.

2By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 21 October 2016, the appellant brought an action seeking a preliminary ruling from the General Court, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, declaring that the Spanish tax law in force infringes Article 63 TFEU.

3By the order under appeal, the General Court, in accordance with Article 126 of its Rules of Procedure, dismissed that action on the ground of manifest lack of jurisdiction.

4The General Court recalled, inter alia, in paragraph 6 of that order that, under Article 256(3) TFEU and Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, it has jurisdiction to hear and determine questions for a preliminary ruling, referred under Article 267, in specific areas laid down by the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In that regard, the General Court pointed out that, as yet, the General Court has not been granted any powers in this respect.

5What is more, the General Court recalled in essence, in paragraph 7 of that order, that only a national court or tribunal may decide to suspend proceedings pending before it and to bring the matter before the EU Courts pursuant to Article 267 TFEU. It specified in that regard that the request by the appellant, a legal person governed by private law, can in no case confer on the present action the character of a reference for a preliminary ruling within the meaning of that article.

6In the light of those considerations, the General Court found that it had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the action brought by Double ‘W’ Enterprises and therefore dismissed it.

Form of order sought by the appellant

7By its appeal, the appellant claims that the Court should:

–set aside the order under appeal;

–interpret Article 63 TFEU;

–order the competent institutions to put an end to the discrimination to which it is subject, and

–confer on it the status of person in custody within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.

The appeal

8Pursuant to Article 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part.

9In the present case, it is appropriate to apply that provision.

10In support of its appeal, the appellant argues, inter alia, that the order under appeal must be set aside on the ground that the General Court did not take into consideration substantive documents submitted as evidence. It also asserts that that order errs in law and is unjust and vitiated by failure to state reasons. What is more, the General Court allegedly failed to comply with rules of procedure and was not impartial. Finally, the General Court, by the order under appeal, infringed not only EU law and civil law, but also the constitutional standards of the Member States.

11In that respect, it should be noted that, according to the case-law of the Court, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment or order which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (orders of 1 February 2017, Vidmar and Others v Commission, C‑240/16 P, EU:C:2017:89, paragraph 23, and of 6 July 2017, Vatseva v European Court of Human Rights, C‑231/17 P, not published, EU:C:2017:526, paragraph 12).

12In the present case, it is clear that the appellant’s appeal contains no statement of reasons and does not, therefore, satisfy the requirements set out in Articles 168 and 169 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

13Furthermore, it should be noted that the areas of jurisdiction of the General Court are clearly set out in Article 256 TFEU, as specified in Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In accordance with Article 256(3) TFEU, the General Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 in specific areas only, laid down by the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is clear from that Statute that no jurisdiction in that regard has yet been conferred on the General Court.

14Finally, even if, by its appeal, the appellant intended also to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, it must be pointed out, in any event, that that article establishes a procedure for direct cooperation between the Court and the courts and tribunals of the Member States, in the course of which the parties are requested to submit observations only within the legal framework established by the court making the reference. Within the limits established by Article 267 TFEU, it is thus for the national courts alone to decide on the principle and purpose of any reference to the Court of Justice (orders of 12 February 2010, Município de Barcelos, C‑408/09, not published, EU:C:2010:77, paragraph 4 and the case-law cited, and of 6 November 2014, Krikorian and Others, C‑243/14, not published, EU:C:2014:2357, paragraph 5).

15It is also settled case-law that it is for the national judicature alone and not for the parties to the main proceedings to bring a matter before the Court of Justice (orders of 12 February 2010, Município de Barcelos, C‑408/09, not published, EU:C:2010:77, paragraph 9 and the case-law cited, and of 6 November 2014, Krikorian and Others, C‑243/14, not published, EU:C:2014:2357, paragraph 6).

16It is clear that the request for a preliminary ruling was not brought by a national court or tribunal in the context of proceedings pending before it. Consequently, the General Court was entitled to declare that it had no jurisdiction and dismiss the action brought before it by the appellant.

17It follows that, pursuant to Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure, the appeal must be dismissed as clearly inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.

Costs

18Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those Rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.

19Since the present order has been adopted without the appeal being served on the defendant and, therefore, without the latter having incurred costs, Double ‘W’ Enterprises must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Tenth Chamber) hereby orders:

Luxembourg, 14 December 2017.

Registrar

President of the Tenth Chamber

ECLI:EU:C:2017:940

* Language of the case: English.