Provisional text

delivered on 10 March 2022 (1)

Case C-7/21

LKW WALTER Internationale Transportorganisation AG

CB,

DF,

GH

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bezirksgericht Bleiburg (District Court, Bleiburg, Austria))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters – Service of judicial and extrajudicial documents – Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 – Article 8 – Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 – Article 45(1)(b) and Article 46 – Order made in one Member State and served in another Member State in the language of the first Member State only – Legislation of the first Member State laying down an eight-day period to lodge an objection to that order – Right to a fair trial – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union )

1.This request for a preliminary ruling made by the Bezirksgericht Bleiburg (District Court, Bleiburg, Austria) under Article 267 TFEU concerns the interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU, Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 (2) and Articles 36 and 39 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, (3) read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and Article 4(3) TEU.

2.The request has been made in proceedings between LKW Walter Internationale Transportorganisation AG (‘the applicant’) and CB and Others (‘the defendants’), three partners in an Austrian law firm that represented the applicant in enforcement proceedings in Slovenia. After they did not lodge an objection to an enforcement order, served on the applicant, within the eight-day period laid down in Slovenian law, that order became final and enforceable so that the applicant had to honour the debt established in that order. In those circumstances, the applicant brought an action against the defendants before the referring court on the ground that they were liable, as lawyers, for the rejection by the Slovenian courts of the objection that they lodged out of time. On that basis, the applicant sought reimbursement of the amount that it was required to pay following the enforcement proceedings. In their defence, the defendants contend that the Slovenian legislation at issue is not compatible with EU law because it does not guarantee effective respect for the rights of defence of the addressee of a judicial document. Furthermore, they submit that that legislation is discriminatory because, in their view, it enables parties established in Slovenia to take unfair advantage of the special features of that legislation in comparison with parties established in other Member States.

3.The present case offers the Court of Justice the opportunity to develop its case-law on judicial cooperation in civil matters and, in particular, as regards the transmission of judicial and extrajudicial documents that must be served in another Member State. The Court will have to interpret the aforementioned regulations in such a way that the objectives they pursue are attained, namely to improve efficiency and speed in judicial procedures and ensure the proper administration of justice, without however weakening effective respect for the rights of defence of the addressees of the judicial documents at issue. (4) Since those regulations are not intended to harmonise the law of civil procedure as a whole, but rely on the procedures already established by the Member States by virtue of their procedural autonomy in order to ensure the transmission of judicial and extrajudicial documents in the area of freedom, security and justice, (5) the Court is called upon to examine the question whether the Slovenian legislation at issue complies with the requirements imposed by EU law.

II. Legal framework

4.Entitled ‘Refusal to accept a document’, Article 8 of Regulation No 1393/2007 provides:

‘1. The receiving agency shall inform the addressee, using the standard form set out in Annex II, that he may refuse to accept the document to be served at the time of service or by returning the document to the receiving agency within one week if it is not written in, or accompanied by a translation into, either of the following languages:

(a) a language which the addressee understands;

or

(b) the official language of the Member State addressed or, if there are several official languages in that Member State, the official language or one of the official languages of the place where service is to be effected.

3. If the addressee has refused to accept the document pursuant to paragraph 1, the service of the document can be remedied through the service on the addressee in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation of the document accompanied by a translation into a language provided for in paragraph 1. In that case, the date of service of the document shall be the date on which the document accompanied by the translation is served in accordance with the law of the Member State addressed. However, where according to the law of a Member State, a document has to be served within a particular period, the date to be taken into account with respect to the applicant shall be the date of the service of the initial document determined pursuant to Article 9(2).

4. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall also apply to the means of transmission and service of judicial documents provided for in Section 2.

5. For the purposes of paragraph 1, … the authority or person, where service is effected in accordance with Article 14, shall inform the addressee that he may refuse to accept the document and that any document refused must be sent to those agents or to that authority or person respectively.’

11.Under Section 1, entitled ‘Recognition’, of Chapter III, entitled ‘Recognition and enforcement’, Article 36(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 is worded as follows:

‘A judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure being required.’

12.Section 2, entitled ‘Enforcement’, of that Chapter III, includes inter alia Article 39, under which:

‘A judgment given in a Member State which is enforceable in that Member State shall be enforceable in the other Member States without any declaration of enforceability being required.’

13. Section 3, entitled ‘Refusal of recognition and enforcement’, of that Chapter III includes Subsection 1, called ‘Refusal of recognition’, and Subsection 2, called ‘Refusal of enforcement’.

14.In that Subsection 1, Article 45 provides:

‘1. On the application of any interested party, the recognition of a judgment shall be refused:

…

(b) where the judgment was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so;

…’

15.In that Subsection 2, Article 46 provides:

‘On the application of the person against whom enforcement is sought, the enforcement of a judgment shall be refused where one of the grounds referred to in Article 45 is found to exist.’

B. National law

16.Paragraph 1295 of the Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (General Civil Code; ‘the ABGB’) is worded as follows:

‘(1) Any person shall be entitled to seek compensation for loss caused by another person who caused that loss through his or her fault, whether the loss was caused by breach of a contractual obligation or was unrelated to a contract.

(2) Anyone who intentionally causes damage in a manner that is contrary to the accepted principles of morality shall also be liable; however, if this occurred in the exercise of a right, that person shall be liable only in the case where the exercise of the right had the clear purpose of harming the other person.’

17.Under Paragraph 1299 of the ABGB:

‘Anyone who publicly commits to the exercise of a function, art, trade or craft, or who voluntarily assumes a task requiring artistic knowledge or an unusual level of effort, demonstrates thereby that he or she believes himself or herself to be capable of the necessary effort and as having the requisite unusual knowledge; he or she must therefore be answerable where such effort or knowledge is lacking. However, where the person who assigned him or her the task was aware of the inexperience of that person or could have been so aware by exercising reasonable care, that person shall also be liable for the latter’s shortcomings.’

18.Paragraph 1300 of the ABGB provides:

‘An expert shall be liable also in the case where he or she inadvertently provides, in exchange for remuneration, detrimental advice in matters relating to his or her art or science. In any other situation, an adviser shall be liable only for damage which he or she knowingly caused to the other person by providing him or her with the advice.’

19.Article 9 of the Zakon o izvršbi in zavarovanju (Law on enforcement procedures; ‘the ZIZ’), concerning remedies and the territorial jurisdiction of the appellate court for enforcement based on an authentic document, states:

‘An appeal may be lodged against an order made at first instance, unless otherwise provided for by law. The remedy available to the debtor against an enforcement order granting the application shall be an objection.

An appeal and an objection must be lodged within eight days of service of the order of the first instance court, unless otherwise provided for by law.

A permissible appeal lodged in due time shall be served on the other party for response if the latter has also been served with the order of the first instance court against which the appeal has been brought.

An appeal may be brought against the order ruling on the objection.

Appeals and objections shall not have suspensory effect, unless otherwise provided for by law.

The decision on the appeal shall be final.

…’

20.Article 53 of the ZIZ, entitled ‘Objection as the debtor’s sole remedy’, provides:

‘A debtor may challenge an enforcement order made further to an application for enforcement by lodging an objection, unless his or her challenge relates only to the decision on the costs.

The objection must be reasoned. In the objection, the debtor shall indicate the facts on which his or her objection is based and adduce evidence, failing which the objection shall be deemed not to be reasoned.

…’

21.Under the heading ‘Objection to an order made on the basis of an authentic document’, Article 61 of the ZIZ provides:

‘An objection against an enforcement order made on the basis of an authentic document shall be governed by the provisions of Articles 53 and 54 of this Law …

If the objection referred to in the previous paragraph seeks to challenge the part of the enforcement order ordering the debtor to settle the claim, the objection shall be deemed to be reasoned on that point if the debtor sets out the facts on which he or she bases his or her objection and adduces evidence establishing the facts to which he or she refers in the objection.

…’

III. The background to the dispute, the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

22.The applicant is a company registered in the Austrian companies register operating in the field of international carriage of goods. The defendants are partners in a law firm based in Klagenfurt (Austria) which represented the applicant in enforcement proceedings in Slovenia.

23.In those proceedings, the company Transport Gaj d.o.o. sought the attachment of 25 debts owed to the applicant by various Slovenian companies. On 30 October 2019, the Local Court, Ljubljana (Slovenia) served on the applicant, by post, an enforcement order, in Slovenian, relating to the sum of EUR 17 610. That order was issued only on the basis of invoices, without seeking comments from the applicant beforehand.

24.That order was not received by the legal department of the applicant, through its internal mail service, until 4 November 2019. On 5 November 2019, following an exchange of information between the applicant and the defendants on the nature and consequences of the document communicated, the applicant requested that the defendants lodge an objection to the enforcement order. The documents that the applicant had sent to the defendants included a photocopy of the envelope showing that it had in fact received the order on 30 October 2019.

25.On 11 November 2019, the defendants lodged a reasoned objection to that order before the Local Court, Ljubljana.

26.On 12 November 2019, the defendants received from that court a request to pay court fees of EUR 55 within eight days, an obligation which was fulfilled in due time.

27.By decision of 10 December 2019, that court dismissed the objection as being out of time on the ground that it had been lodged more than eight days after service of the enforcement order.

28.The defendants subsequently lodged an appeal on behalf of the applicant against that decision, pleading that the eight-day period for lodging an objection was unconstitutional and suggesting that such a short period was not compatible with EU law. That appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, Maribor (Slovenia). Since the enforcement order therefore became final and enforceable, the applicant settled the claim in full.

29.In those circumstances, the applicant brought an action before the District Court, Bleiburg, against the defendants claiming that they were liable, as lawyers, for the rejection by the Slovenian courts of the objection lodged against the enforcement order and seeking, on that basis, reimbursement of the amount paid following the enforcement proceedings, namely EUR 22 168.09, which corresponds to the value of the principal debt plus interest and costs.

30.On 10 July 2020, that court issued an order for payment against the defendants in the amount claimed.

31.The defendants lodged an objection to that order.

32.In their defence, the defendants contend that the eight-day period laid down in the Slovenian legislation for lodging an objection to the enforcement order is incompatible with EU law, more particularly with Articles 36 and 39 of Regulation No 1215/2012, Article 8 and Article 19(4) of Regulation No 1393/2007, the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter. They also state that the information about the right to refuse service of the enforcement order, although enclosed with the letter, in German, was interspersed among the 12 pages of that order, Moreover, they submit that the order is not enforceable outside Slovenia, for the purposes of Articles 36 and 39 of Regulation No 1215/2012. Therefore, the fact that it is enforceable in that Member State constitutes discrimination within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU against the applicant, owing to the location of its registered office.

33.According to the referring court, the eight-day period laid down in the Slovenian legislation for lodging an objection against an enforcement order issued at the end of summary enforcement proceedings in which the application is lodged electronically on the basis of an authentic document – in this case, invoices – may incur the risk that the defendant is unable to lodge in due time a reasoned objection to that order. That is an even greater risk where the defendant is established in another State. Therefore, that period may be contrary to Articles 36 and 39 of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter. If such incompatibility were to be established, the Slovenian courts should not have taken that period into account in the enforcement proceedings. In that case, the objection would have been lodged in due time by the defendants.

34.In that regard, the referring court states that, in the case that gave rise to the judgment of 13 September 2018, Profi Credit Polska (C‑176/17, EU:C:2018:711; ‘the judgment in Profi Credit Polska’), the Court held, in relation to other instruments of EU law, that a 14-day period for lodging an objection to an order for payment issued on the basis of a promissory note, and the detailed procedural rules imposed to that end if that objection is not to be inadmissible, give rise to a significant risk that a consumer will not be able to lodge an objection or that it will be inadmissible.

35.As regards the interpretation of Article 8 of Regulation No 1393/2007, that court is uncertain as to when the period for lodging an objection to the document that has been served begins to run. In that regard, it considers that, in order to establish whether a right of appeal has been exercised within the period laid down in the legislation of the Member State that served the document, it is necessary to wait until the one-week period for returning the document served has expired.

36.The referring court also has doubts as to whether the period laid down in the Slovenian legislation for lodging an objection to an enforcement order is compatible with Article 18 TFEU, in so far as it considers that such legislation has a greater effect on defendants established in other Member States, who are obliged to take additional steps in connection with the translation of the documents served.

37.In those circumstances, the Bezirksgericht Bleiburg (District Court, Bleiburg) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Are Articles 36 and 39 of Regulation [No 1215/2012], read in conjunction with Article 47 of the [Charter] and the principles of effectiveness and equivalence (principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU), to be interpreted as precluding a provision of a Member State which provides for, as the sole remedy against a decision on enforcement issued by the court without prior adversarial proceedings and without an instrument permitting enforcement, and solely on the basis of the allegations of the party seeking enforcement, an objection, which must be lodged within 8 days in the language of that Member State, even if the decision on enforcement is served in another Member State in a language which the addressee does not understand, and the objection is already rejected as being out of time if it is lodged within 12 days?

(2) Is Article 8 of Regulation [No 1393/2007], read in conjunction with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, to be interpreted as precluding a national measure which provides that, upon service of the standard form set out in Annex II informing the addressee of his or her right to refuse to accept the document within a period of one week, the period also begins to run in respect of bringing the appeal provided for against the decision on enforcement served at the same time, for which a period of eight days is laid down?

(3) Is [the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU] to be interpreted as precluding a provision of a Member State which provides for, as the remedy against a decision on enforcement, an objection, which must be lodged within eight days, and that time limit also applies where the addressee of the decision on enforcement is established in another Member State and the decision on enforcement is not written either in the official language of the Member State in which the decision on enforcement is served or in a language which the addressee of the decision understands?’

38.The order for reference, dated 6 November 2020, was received at the Court Registry on 8 January 2021.

39.The parties in the main proceedings and the European Commission lodged written observations within the period laid down in accordance with Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

40.Pursuant to Article 61(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court invited the Slovenian Government, on 9 November 2021, to reply to questions. The written replies to those questions were lodged within the prescribed period.

41.Pursuant to Article 76(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court decided not to hold a hearing.

42.Service of the document which institutes the proceedings is essential in civil proceedings, because the defendant’s information depends upon it. In cross-border disputes, linguistic differences and the disparity in procedural systems constitute obstacles to the defendant being properly informed and, accordingly, to the principle of equality of arms between the parties. The EU legislature, aware of those problems, has regulated service of documents which instituted proceedings so as to make it more efficient. (7) Therefore, although EU law is intended to ensure the transmission of judicial and extrajudicial documents within the area of freedom, security and justice by relying on the procedures already established by the Member States, certain aspects have nevertheless had to be harmonised, in specific cases, in order to find appropriate solutions to the problems referred to above. (8)

43.That is the case of the right to refuse service of the document for reasons linked to an insufficient knowledge of the language in which the documents at issue are worded, as laid down in Article 8 of Regulation No 1393/2007, which constitutes a valuable mechanism for protecting the rights of defence of the addressee. In that context, it is also important to mention the right to refuse recognition and enforcement of a judgment, referred to in Articles 45 and 46 of Regulation No 1215/2012, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him or her to arrange for his or her defence. Since those measures of secondary legislation are intended to ensure the effective defence of the addressee of the judicial document, (9) it will be necessary to interpret them in the light of the right to an effective remedy, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter. The possible relevance of an interpretation of Article 18 TFEU stems from the need to remedy the disadvantages linked to the diversity of national legislation concerning civil procedure within the European Union. The interpretation of those provisions is the subject of the three questions referred by the referring court for a preliminary ruling.

44.An effective defence depends inter alia on the time available for that purpose, hence the need to lay down reasonable periods. That is the background to the problem relating to the eight-day period laid down in the Slovenian legislation. As set out in the introduction to the present Opinion, (10) it is for the Court to determine whether that period, and the detailed rules for calculating it, satisfy the requirements of the EU legal order. (11) Since the second question referred for a preliminary ruling relates only to the matter of when that period starts to run, whereas the first also refers to the duration of the period, I consider that the second question should be examined first.

B. The second question

45.By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 8 of Regulation No 1393/2007, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the period for lodging an appeal against a judicial document served in accordance with the provisions of that regulation begins to run upon service of that document. If so, that court seeks to ascertain whether those provisions must be interpreted as meaning that that period starts to run only from the expiry of the period of one week, laid down in Article 8(1) of that regulation, within which the refusal to accept a document must be communicated.

46.In my view, the answer to that question may be deduced from reading Articles 8 and 9 of Regulation No 1393/2007 together, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, as I shall explain below.

47.

Article 9 of Regulation No 1393/2007 lays down the criteria as to the date to be taken into account with regard to the service of the document. Paragraph 1 of that article establishes the principle that the date of service is the date on which the document is served in accordance with the law of the Member State addressed, in order to protect the rights of the addressee. As is clear from that provision (‘without prejudice to Article 8’), that principle applies where the addressee of the document has not exercised his or her right of refusal under Article 8 of Regulation No 1393/2007.

48.Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007 provides that the addressee of a document to be served may refuse to accept the document if is not written in, or accompanied by a translation into, either a language which the addressee understands, or the official language of the executing Member State or, if there are several official languages in that Member State, the official language or one of the official languages of the place where service is to be effected. Under that provision, it is for the receiving agency to inform the addressee, using the standard form set out in Annex II of that regulation, of his or her right to refuse to accept the document. The circumstances in which that information was brought to the addressee’s attention must be indicated in accordance with the certificate of service or non-service of the documents contained in Annex I of that regulation. Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007 also states the detailed rules for refusing to accept the document, namely, either at the time of service or by returning the document to the receiving agency within one week.

49.The Court has held that the right to refuse to accept service of a document stems from the need to protect the rights of defence of the addressee of that document, in accordance with the requirements of a fair hearing, enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950. While the main aim of Regulation No 1393/2007 is to improve the efficiency and speed of judicial procedures and to ensure the proper administration of justice, the Court has held that those objectives cannot be attained by undermining in any way the rights of defence of the addressees of the documents in question. (12)

50.It must be recalled that the Court has noted the importance of the ability to refuse to accept service of a judicial document, to the extent of recognising it as a ‘right’ of the addressee. (13) Moreover, it must be observed that the Court has emphasised the fact that ‘the receiving agency is required, in all circumstances and without it having a margin of discretion in that regard’, to inform the addressee thereof, ‘by systematically using for that purpose the standard form’ in question. According to the Court, communication of the standard form constitutes an ‘essential formality’. (14) Although the Court has not held that the failure to communicate that standard form constitutes grounds for invalidity, it has nevertheless stated that it constitutes a procedural defect to be remedied by the sender by sending the translation of the document in a language which the addressee understands or in the official language of the Member State addressed. (15) Regulation No 1393/2007 enshrined that principle in Article 8(3) thereof.

51.Consequently, it is apparent from an interpretation of Articles 8 and 9 of Regulation No 1393/2007, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, that, in a situation in which the addressee of the document to be served does not exercise his or her right to refuse to accept it, the period for exercising a right of appeal against the document thus served begins to run from the date on which the document was validly served.

52.I agree with the Commission that it is not necessary to defer the start of the period for bringing an appeal against a decision evidenced by a judicial document served in accordance with Regulation No 1393/2007 in order to ensure effective respect for the rights of defence of the addressee of a judicial document. It seems to me that those rights are already sufficiently protected by the ability of the addressee to refuse to accept a document which is not written in a language that is valid vis-à-vis that addressee. (16) Since, under Article 8 of that regulation, he or she is required to ‘react’ only at the time of service or to return the document to the receiving agency within one week, it cannot legitimately be claimed that disproportionate requirements for safeguarding his or her interests are imposed on him or her.

53.The circumstances of the case in the main proceedings do not seem to me to justify a different assessment. First, it is not disputed that the document to be served, namely the enforcement order, reached the applicant, and then the defendants, in Slovenian and that the applicant was informed of its right to refuse to accept it by means of the form in German contained in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007. Second, it should be noted that the applicant, represented by the defendants, did not choose to make use of that right, so that the date of service of that order should be regarded, in accordance with Article 9(1) of that regulation, as the date on which the applicant actually came into possession of that order, namely 30 October 2019.

54.Although the parties in the main proceedings claim that an alleged error of communication led them to believe in the beginning that the order had been served on 4 November 2019, they nevertheless do not dispute the fact that, after carrying out an internal check, they were able to establish that the enforcement order had actually been served on 30 October 2019.

55.Therefore, it seems to me that the applicant, represented by the defendants as legal representatives, knowingly waived a crucial right conferred on it by Regulation No 1393/2017. (17) Consequently, the applicant cannot validly allege an infringement of the rights of the defence solely on the ground that the period for lodging an objection to the enforcement order began to run from the service of that order. (18) In view of the fact that that line of argument is clearly contrary to the conduct adopted by the applicant in the main proceedings, I consider that it should be rejected under the legal principle that a party may not set itself in contradiction to its previous conduct to the detriment of another (venire contra factum proprium non valet). (19)

56.In the light of the foregoing considerations, I consider that the answer to the second question referred for a preliminary ruling should be that Article 8(1) and (3) of Regulation No 1393/2007, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation of the sentencing State according to which the period for lodging an appeal against a decision evidenced by a judicial document served in accordance with Regulation No 1393/2007 begins to run from the service of the document in question and not only when the one-week period, laid down in paragraph 1 of that article for refusing to accept that document, has expired.

57.As a preliminary point, it should be noted, in the first place, that the referring court, hearing an action for damages against the defendants, is asking the Court about the interpretation of Articles 36 and 39 of Regulation No 1215/2012 in order to ascertain whether the eight-day period laid down in the Slovenian legislation for lodging an objection to an enforcement order allows the right to defend oneself to be exercised effectively or if that period should, owing to its duration and the specific features of the Slovenian objection procedure, entail a refusal to recognise and to enforce such an order.

58.In that regard, it should be noted that, as is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court enjoy a presumption of relevance so that it is possible to refuse to give a ruling on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling, under Article 267 TFEU, only where, for instance, it is quite obvious that the interpretation of a provision of EU law, or the assessment of its validity, which is sought by the national court, bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose or where the problem is hypothetical. (20)

59.Although the question of the recognition and enforcement of the enforcement order in Austria is not raised, given that the applicant has already settled the claim established by that order, the first question seems to enjoy a presumption of relevance in so far as the referring court should be able to examine the merits of the arguments raised by the defendants in their defence.

60.In the second place, it should be observed, as the Commission has noted, that, even if, formally, the referring court refers, in its first question, to Articles 36 and 39 of Regulation No 1215/2012, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that its uncertainties essentially relate to the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of a judicial decision where the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document was not served on the defendant in sufficient time as to enable him or her to exercise the right to defend himself or herself under Article 45(1)(b) and Article 46 of that regulation.

61.Since the Court has jurisdiction to extract from all the information provided by that court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute, (21) the first question must be understood as referring to Articles 45(1)(b) and Article 46 of that regulation.

62.Consequently, by its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 45(1)(b) and Article 46 of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that there are grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement of a judicial decision rendered at the end of non-adversarial proceedings where an appeal against that decision must be brought within a period of eight days, in a language other than the official language or one of the official languages of the place in which the defendant resides or in a language understood by the defendant.

63.As is apparent from the combined provisions of Article 45(1)(b) and Article 46 of Regulation No 1215/2012, where a judgment is given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him or her to arrange for his or her defence, it is not necessary to recognise and enforce such a decision, unless no appeal has been brought against it, when it was possible for the defendant to do so.

(a) The existence of a ‘document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document’

64.In order to answer the first question from the referring court, it is necessary to examine, first, the question whether the enforcement order issued by the Slovenian courts in non-adversarial proceedings may be classified as a ‘document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document’ within the meaning of the aforementioned provisions.

65.In that regard, it should be noted, as the Court has held in its case-law relating to point 2 of Article 27 of the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed in Brussels on 27 September 1968, (22) which may be transposed to the essentially equivalent provisions of Regulation No 1215/2012, that the term ‘document which instituted the proceedings’ or ‘equivalent document’ means the document or documents which must be duly and timeously served on the defendant in order to enable him or her to assert his or her rights before an enforceable judgment is given in the State of origin. (23)

66.That is precisely the case in the main proceedings. According to the information provided by the referring court, the enforcement order adopted by the Slovenian courts against the applicant was issued not on the basis of a final and enforceable instrument, but only on the basis of invoices and without first seeking comments from the applicant in the main proceedings. Actual service of that enforcement order signals the start of a period during which the applicant may lodge an objection and present its defence.

67.Consequently, like the documents at issue in the case that gave rise to the judgment of 13 July 1995, Hengst Import (C‑474/93, EU:C:1995:243), the enforcement order in the case in the main proceedings must be classified as a ‘document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document’ within the meaning of Article 45(1)(b) and Article 46 of Regulation No 1215/2012.

68.In that context, it should also be noted that the Court has held that point 2 of Article 27 of the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 remains applicable where the defendant has lodged an objection against a decision given in default and a court of the State in which the judgment was given has held the objection to be inadmissible on the ground that the time for lodging an objection has expired. Since the dismissal of the objection to the enforcement order as inadmissible means that the decision given in default remains intact, the Court considered that the objective of that article requires that the court in the State in which enforcement is sought should carry out the examination prescribed by that provision. (24)

(b) Exercise of the rights of defence rendered excessively difficult

69.In that analysis, the question also arises as to whether the eight-day period laid down by the Slovenian legislation for lodging an objection to an enforcement order gives the addressee sufficient time to arrange his or her defence, in accordance with Article 45(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012.

70.That requirement must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter and also of the principle of effectiveness.

71.On the one hand, national legislation providing that the period for lodging an objection to an enforcement order is fixed at eight days may, in principle, be justified by the objective of ensuring rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of decisions issued in a Member State and legal certainty as established by Regulation No 1215/2012. On the other hand, as the Court has pointed out on several occasions, although the main aim of the instruments of the law of civil procedure is to improve the efficiency and speed of judicial procedures and to ensure the proper administration of justice, those objectives cannot be attained by undermining in any way the rights of defence of the addressees of the documents in question. (25)

(1) General criteria developed by the case-law

72.In order to determine whether a judicial procedure infringes the right to an effective remedy, it is necessary to determine whether the detailed rules of the objection procedure which national law lays down give rise to a significant risk that the parties concerned cannot lodge the objection required. (26) In particular, the time limit for preparing and submitting an effective remedy must be sufficient in practical terms. (27) Since the procedures may vary considerably from one national legal order to another, it should be noted that the criteria which, according to the Court, are to be taken into account when assessing whether a time limit is sufficient in order to ensure the protection of the rights of the defence include inter alia the significance for the parties concerned of the decisions to be taken and the complexities of the procedures. (28)

73.So far as the present case is concerned, I consider that facing an order for payment involves significant risks because such a judicial decision directly affects the financial interests of the addressee. That is all the more the case if the order for payment concerns, as in the present case, a significant amount. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that, as well as that financial risk, there are other overriding and legitimate reasons, which may justify the need to defend oneself in a legal action, namely that of avoiding harm to one’s reputation linked to such a procedure. Indeed, as the applicant states in its written observations, it was forced to pay the debt claimed from it only because it had claims against other debtors in Slovenia, which could have been recovered and its reputation would have suffered considerable harm if those claims had been the subject of enforcement proceedings. Having regard to those circumstances, it seems to me undeniable that the applicant has an obvious interest in defending itself against the decision of the Local Court, Ljubljana. The importance of the proceedings at issue for the applicant cannot therefore be called into question.

74.As for the complexities of the procedures at issue, I consider that lodging an objection to an enforcement order requires taking steps in so far as that implies the need to clarify the circumstances in which a claim arises and to rely on legal arguments appropriate for calling into question the validity of that claim or its enforceability, while taking into account the rules of civil procedure relating to the burden of proof. Depending on the circumstances, that task may be particularly complex and, therefore, require the assistance of a legal adviser, lawyer or other legal professional.

75.That said, it is important to note that the latter aspect may have a decisive impact on the assessment of the issue of whether a procedural time limit may be considered sufficient for ensuring an effective defence. (29) Since a layperson will generally have major difficulties – which is not the case of a person with legal qualifications or the necessary experience – he or she will need a more generous time limit. However, all the procedural rules do not, in general, grant any discretion to the national court in fixing the time limits, even for extending them, so that such ability may be taken into account. Consequently, the addressee of a judicial document will be required to comply with the time limit laid down without receiving more favourable treatment.

76.In any event, I am convinced that the complexities of a procedure cannot be assessed only in the abstract. Rather, it seems necessary to take into account the detailed rules of procedure at issue as a whole, as illustrated, by way of example, by the Court’s case-law which I shall set out below.

(2) The parallels with the Profi Credit Polska case

77.In that regard, I should like to point out that in the judgment in Profi Credit Polska, which concerned a situation comparable to the case in the main proceedings, the Court held, with regard to Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, (30) that national legislation which provides that an objection to an order for payment must be lodged within a time limit of two weeks and that the defendant must, in the objection, set out the complaints and adduce facts and evidence which will enable the court to assess whether a contractual term is unfair, gives rise to the risk that the consumer will not lodge an objection or that it will be inadmissible. (31)

78.It is important to note that the Court followed, in essence, the decision proposed by Advocate General Kokott in that case, referring more than once to the legal analysis in the Advocate General’s Opinion. That Opinion seems to me to be particularly relevant in the present case, since it makes it easier to understand the reasons which led the Court to conclude that the procedural rules at issue were likely to make it excessively difficult to exercise the right to object to an order for payment. More specifically, the Advocate General considered that a period of two weeks ‘is not, however, too short for the consumer to have to take some action’, and that it is only compatible with the principle of effectiveness if the consumer ‘does not have to adduce the facts and evidence which formed the basis for the assessment of the unfairness of the terms of the loan agreement within this period’. (32)

79.It seems to me that that reasoning is logical and may be transposed to the present case, in view of the similarities between the procedural rules examined by the Court in the judgment in Profi Credit Polska and those at issue in the present case. For a better understanding of the analysis, I shall set out the criteria used by the Court in the aforementioned case and which, in my view, are present in this case. After explaining the parallels between the two cases, I shall explain what, in my view, should be the conclusions to be drawn as regards the disposal of the present case.

(i) Objection to a court order for payment

80.First of all, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that both cases have as their subject matter the right to lodge an objection to a court order for payment. The procedural situation of the addressee of the judicial document in both cases is, essentially, the same in so far as the addressee is forced to defend itself against a judicial decision issued without prior adversarial proceedings and without an instrument permitting enforcement, solely on the basis of the allegations of the party seeking enforcement, while the duty of the court hearing the payment order proceedings is limited to verifying the formal validity of the documents establishing the existence of a debt. (33)

(ii) The obligation of the addressee of the judicial document to give reasons for its objection

81.Like the national legislation at issue in the judgment in Profi Credit Polska, the Slovenian legislation which is being examined in the present case requires the objection to an enforcement order to be reasoned and, in particular, that certain facts are set out and supporting evidence adduced. (34) Therefore, the procedural requirements imposed by the national legislation in both cases are relatively strict in so far as it is not enough for the addressee of the judicial document to ‘react’ to the enforcement order, for example, by expressing, first of all, his or her wish to defend himself or herself, by being authorised to lodge written observations at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for which a longer time limit is applicable.

82.In the present case, the addressee of the judicial document is required to lodge a ‘complete’ defence, containing all the relevant facts and evidence, within a period that starts to run from service of the order, which involves a considerable effort, as I have already explained. (35) In view of the fact that such a task cannot be accomplished in all cases without the legal advice of a lawyer or other legal professional, it is reasonable to conclude that such a requirement brings the risk that the addressee of the judicial document will be unable to lodge an objection or that the objection will be inadmissible.

(iii) The period for lodging an objection is less than two weeks

83.It is widely acknowledged in legal practice that having the necessary time is an essential condition for adequate preparation of a legal defence. Moreover, it must be noted that, as one of the elements which characterise a fair hearing, guaranteeing the right to have the necessary time for preparing the defence is an expression of the rule of law. (36) For those reasons, it is logical to assume that the longer the period for taking a procedural step is, the more thorough the preparation may be.

84.On the basis of those considerations, I should point out that, in the present case, the period for lodging an objection to an enforcement order is only eight days, which cannot be extended, whereas in the judgment in Profi Credit Polska that period was two weeks. (37) It should also be noted that, according to the information provided by the Slovenian Government in its written observations, that legislation does not take into account national holidays or non-working days, unless it is a question of the last day of the period. In such a case, the period expires at the end of the first working day thereafter. The Slovenian legislation at issue is therefore much more restrictive and, accordingly, poses more difficulties for the defence. Consequently, the Court’s criticism concerning the brevity of the period laid down in the circumstances that gave rise to the judgment in Profi Credit Polska should be all the more applicable in the present case.

(iv) The obligation to pay court fees

85.Furthermore, it is apparent from the file that the Slovenian legislation has another similarity with the Polish legislation at issue in the judgment in Profi Credit Polska in that it requires payment of the court fees. According to the information provided by the referring court, the defendants received from the Local Court, Ljubljana, a request to pay court fees within eight days, an obligation which was fulfilled in due time. (38)

86.Although the amount paid in the present case does not seem to be particularly high, it must not however be overlooked that the obligation to pay court fees is, in any event, an administrative requirement which had to be fulfilled. Moreover, it cannot be precluded that there are other situations in which the addressee of an enforcement order will be forced to pay more significant sums. For those reasons, it seems to me reasonable to assume, for the purposes of the present analysis, that legislation such as that at issue, imposing the obligation to pay court fees within a particularly short period, may deter the addressee of the judicial document from lodging an objection to an order for payment, as the Court rightly considered in the aforementioned case. (39)

(v) The level of diligence expected from an individual in his or her legal relations

87.A factual difference between the two cases with regard to the status of the addressee of the respective judicial document calls for a few observations on my part. I am aware of the fact that entrepreneurs are subject to stricter requirements of diligence than consumers as regards their legal relations. An undertaking generally has a certain knowledge and experience in the management of contractual relations with its trading partners and clients, enabling it to act more skilfully in the business world. Since that is clearly not the case of a consumer, the latter tends to be regarded as particularly worthy of protection. That notion finds its expression in the Court’s extensive case-law relating to Directive 93/13, (40) which includes the judgment in Profi Credit Polska. In fact, a study of that judgment reveals legal reasoning guided by the objective of protecting consumers, given that, as the Court states, they are in a position of weakness vis-à-vis sellers or suppliers. (41)

88.That said, I do not think that that fact alone can have a significant impact on the analysis. Irrespective of the fact that the order for payment is addressed, in the present case, to a company operating in the area of international transportation of goods, that is to say a seller or supplier, it seems to me that a period of eight days is too short to enable it to exercise fully its right to an effective defence. Consequently, it must be stated at this stage of the analysis that, even applying a strict level of diligence, the legislation at issue does not comply with the requirements of EU law.

(3) Summary of the analysis

89.That explanation of the parallels which may be established between the two cases shows the obstacles facing the addressee of a judicial document in a situation such as that in the main proceedings. In the present case, it is clear that the requirements imposed by the national procedural rules disregard the fact that the addressee of a judicial document with the characteristics of an enforcement order, who does not exercise his or her right to refuse service of that document, in accordance with Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007, needs some time to become familiar with the content of the documents transmitted, to ask for legal advice from a lawyer or other legal professional, to pay the court fees required by law, to arrange for his or her legal defence, (42) to arrange for any translation of the documents and to submit a defence containing all the relevant facts and evidence to the court located in another Member State that is hearing the action brought by the creditor.

90.The considerations set out in the present Opinion show that it is essential to take all those aspects into account when assessing whether the period for lodging an objection to an enforcement order allows the right to defend oneself to be exercised effectively. In the end, the deterrent nature of such a period is often the result of numerous factors linked to the requirements of the national procedural legislation. From that point of view, I consider that, if it were to be established that the period at issue adversely affects the right to defend oneself owing to its length and the specific features of the objection procedure, that finding should lead to a refusal to recognise and enforce that order.

because that is the only way of ensuring effective protection of the person concerned.

91.Given that, in the present case, the conditions laid down by the Slovenian legislation for lodging an objection to an order for payment are <i>as restrictive as, or even more restrictive than</i>, those laid down by the Polish legislation in the judgment in <i>Profi Credit Polska,</i> I consider that, as a whole, they are <i>likely to render excessively difficult the exercise of the right of objection</i> under Article 45(1)(b) and Article 46 of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter. (43)

92.In the light of the foregoing considerations, I observe that – subject to the assessment which it is for the referring court to make in the light of the criteria set out in point 89 of the present Opinion – effective protection of the rights of the defence is not guaranteed in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings. Consequently, I consider that recognition and enforcement of an order for payment issued in those circumstances should be refused, in accordance with Article 45(1)(b) and Article 46 of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter.

<i><b>The answer</b> <b> </b> <b>to the first question</b></i>

93.For the reasons set out above, I propose that the answer to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling should be that Article 45(1)(b) and Article 46 of Regulation No 1250/2012, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the recognition and enforcement of a decision that has not been issued in adversarial proceedings is to be refused where an appeal against the decision must be lodged in a language other than the official language of the Member State in which the defendant resides or, if there are several official languages in that Member State, other than the official language or one of the official languages of the place in which he or she resides, and where, under the law of the Member State in which the decision has been issued, the non-renewable period for lodging the appeal is only eight calendar days.

<b>The third question</b>

94.By its third question, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State according to which the objection to an enforcement order must be reasoned and lodged within eight days, irrespective of the fact that the addressee of that order is established in another Member State and that that order is not written in an official language of the requested Member State or in a language which the addressee understands.

95.As regards the interpretation of Article 18 TFEU, it must be recalled, as is apparent from settled case-law, that that provision applies independently only to situations governed by EU law for which the TFEU lays down no specific rules of non-discrimination. (44)

96.Under Article 18 TFEU, any discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited, which includes several forms of indirect discrimination, for example through specific linguistic regimes. (45)

97.In that regard, so far as Regulation No 1393/2007 is concerned, it should be noted that Article 8 thereof gives concrete expression to a prohibition of discrimination based on the language of the parties to the proceedings, so there is no need to give the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU an autonomous interpretation.

98.As regards Regulation No 1215/2012, it must be stated that, in a case relating to whether any discrimination could be identified in the specific features of Croatian law regarding enforcement orders issued by notaries in Croatia on the basis of an authentic document, orders which could not be recognised or enforced in another Member State under that regulation, the Court gave an autonomous interpretation of Article 18 TFEU, in the absence of other specific provisions on non-discrimination in the context of that regulation. (46)

99.Article 18 TFEU establishes the principle of equal treatment and aims to eliminate any measures that make a national of another Member State subject to different treatment placing him or her in a factual or legal situation that is unfavourable in relation to nationals. It therefore seeks to avoid, in the sphere of EU law, situations that are comparable being treated differently and vice versa.

100.In the present case, the applicant, represented by the defendants, decided not to exercise its right to refuse service, provided for in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007. (47) It was therefore placed in the same situation as Slovenian nationals, with regard to the period for lodging an objection to an enforcement order. Moreover, the Slovenian Government also drew attention to that point in its written observations. Accordingly, it does not appear that the Slovenian legislation provides for different treatment on the basis of the criterion of nationality.

101.In so far as, first, specific rules of non-discrimination apply to the present case and, second, the addressee of the judicial document voluntarily waived being treated differently from Slovenian nationals in the same situation, I cannot see how Article 18 TFEU applies. The interpretation of that provision is therefore not necessary for the purpose of resolving the dispute in the main proceedings. However, in the interests of clarity and a better understanding of the answers that the Court will give to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the referring court, I think it is expedient to state that expressly to the referring court.

102.In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the third question should be that Article 18 TFEU must be interpreted as not applying to a situation in which the addressee of a judicial document has waived his or her right to refuse service of that document in accordance with Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007.

(1) Article 8(1) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation of the sentencing State according to which the period for lodging an appeal against a decision evidenced by a judicial document served in accordance with Regulation No 1393/2007 begins to run from the service of the document in question and not only when the one-week period, laid down in paragraph 1 of that article for refusing to accept that document, has expired.

(2) Article 45(1)(b) and Article 46 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as meaning that the recognition and enforcement of a decision that has not been issued in adversarial proceedings is to be refused where an appeal against the decision must be lodged in a language other than the official language of the Member State in which the defendant resides or, if there are several official languages in that Member State, other than the official language or one of the official languages of the place in which he or she resides, and where, under the law of the Member State in which the decision has been issued, the non-renewable period for lodging the appeal is only eight calendar days.

(3) Article 18 TFEU must be interpreted as not applying to a situation in which the addressee of a judicial document has waived his or her right to refuse service of that document in accordance with Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007.

—

Original language: French.

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (OJ 2007 L 324, p. 79).

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).

Reig Fabado, I., ‘Los documentos privados y el reglamento 1393/2007 de notificaciones y traslado,’ <i>Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional</i>, Vol. 9, No 2, October 2017, p. 678, explains that, although Regulation No 1393/2007 is an instrument of judicial cooperation in civil matters which ensures the proper functioning of the internal market and which contributes to the establishment of a space of freedom, security and justice within the European Union, it accords particular importance to the effective judicial protection of the addressee of a judicial document.

Judgments of 16 September 2015, <i>Alpha Bank Cyprus</i> (C‑519/13, EU:C:2015:603, paragraph 71), and of 7 May 2020, <i>Parking and Interplastics</i> (C‑267/19 and C‑323/19, EU:C:2020:351, paragraph 48).

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) (OJ 2020 L 405, p. 40).

See Menétrey, S. and Richard, V., ‘Le silence du défendeur dans le procès international : paroles de droit judiciaire européen’, <i>Les Cahiers de Droit</i>, Vol. 56 No 3 and 4, September-December 2015, p. 497.

See Gascón Inchausti, F., ‘Service of proceedings on the defendant as a safeguard of fairness in civil proceedings: in search of minimum standards from EU legislation and European case-law’, <i>Journal of Private International Law</i>, Vol. 13, 2017, No 3, p. 511.

The Court has stated that ‘it is important not only to ensure that the addressee of a document actually <i>receives</i> the document in question, but also that he is able to <i>know</i> and <i>understand</i> effectively and completely the meaning and scope of the action brought against him abroad, so as to be able effectively to assert his rights in the Member State of transmission’ (see judgments of 16 September 2015, <i>Alpha Bank Cyprus</i> (C‑519/13, EU:C:2015:603, paragraph 32) and of 6 September 2018, <i>Catlin Europe</i> (C‑21/17, EU:C:2018:675, paragraph 34)) Emphasis added.

See point 3 of the present Opinion.

Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

Judgment in <i>Profi Credit Polska</i> (paragraphs 62 to 67).

Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in <i>Profi Credit Polska</i> (C‑176/17, EU:C:2018:293, point 79).

Judgment in <i>Profi Credit Polska</i> (paragraphs 28 and 29).

Judgment in <i>Profi Credit Polska</i> (paragraph 65).

See point 74 of the present Opinion.

See judgment of 9 March 2017, <i>Zulfikarpašić</i> (C‑484/15, EU:C:2017:199, paragraph 48) concerning the interpretation of Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (OJ 2004 L 143, p. 15), read in the light of recital 12 thereof, from which it is apparent that the debtor must be duly informed about the claim in order to enable him or her <i>to arrange for his or her defence</i>.

Sladič, J., ‘Evropska izterjava in zavarovanje terjatev s prikazom postopka v Sloveniji in Avstriji’, <i>Pravosodni bilten</i>, 40 (2019), Vol. 3, pp. 27 and 28, also expresses doubts as to the compatibility with EU law of the eight-day period laid down in the Slovenian legislation, referring specifically to the similarities with the Polish legislation that formed the subject matter of the judgment in <i>Profi Credit Polska</i>.

Judgments of 26 January 1993, <i>Werner</i> (C‑112/91, EU:C:1993:27, paragraph 19); of 10 February 2011, <i>Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach</i> (C‑25/10, EU:C:2011:65, paragraph 18); of 18 July 2017, <i>Erzberger</i> (C‑566/15, EU:C:2017:562, paragraph 25); and of 29 October 2015, <i>Nagy</i> (C‑583/14, EU:C:2015:737, paragraph 24).

Judgments of 24 November 1998, <i>Bickel and Franz</i> (C‑274/96, EU:C:1998:563, paragraph 31), and of 27 March 2014, <i>Grauel Rüffer</i> (C‑322/13, EU:C:2014:189, paragraph 27).

Judgment of 7 May 2020, <i>Parking and Interplastics</i> (C‑267/19 and C‑323/19, EU:C:2020:351, paragraph 45).

See point 56 of the present Opinion.