Official Journal of the European Union

C series

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C/2025/1085

(Case C-867/24)

(C/2025/1085)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: ACE-Avocats, ensemble (represented by: J.-P. Hordies, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: Lupicinio Rodríguez Jiménez, Council of the European Union, Republic of Estonia, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-828/22, ACE-Avocats v Council of the European Union of 2 October 2024;

—declare the application for partial annulment of Article 1(12) of the contested regulation, amending Article 5n(1), (2) and (5) of Regulation No 833/2014, (1) to be admissible and well-founded;

—consequently, uphold the appellant’s original application and annul Article 5n(1), (2) and (5) of the contested regulation in so far as it concerns the appellant;

—order the Council to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the appellant.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on three grounds of appeal.

First ground: the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law by holding that the reasoning for the contested prohibition was sufficient even though it was based on the stated objective of ending Russia’s war of aggression, an objective which has clearly not been achieved, thereby calling into question the validity of that reasoning.

Second ground – divided into two separate parts:

First part: the General Court erred in law by rejecting the intervener’s argument that Articles 15 and 17 of the Charter, relating to the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to property, had been infringed and that those fundamental rights and the economic freedoms enshrined in the treaties should have been taken into account of the Court’s own motion as matters of public policy.

Second part: the General Court erred in law by holding that the contested prohibition applies to all legal practitioners, irrespective of their place of practice and their title, and then going on to state that the personal scope of that prohibition is limited, which constitutes a contradiction in the reasoning justifying the restriction on the freedom to provide services.

Third ground – divided into four separate parts:

First part: the General Court erred in law by rejecting the appellant’s line of argument that Article 56 TFEU had been infringed and by interpreting too restrictively the Reyners and Piringer judgments, which lay down general principles applicable to the legal profession.

Second part: the General Court infringed the principle of equality of arms by relying on a recital of the contested regulation in order to clarify the interpretation of that regulation while refusing to allow the appellant to rely on recitals in EU legislation in its arguments.

Third part: the General Court erred in law by restricting the scope of professional secrecy guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter to specific procedural and legal areas, contrary to the case-law of the Court of Justice.

Fourth part: the General Court held that the scope of Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter are identical and thus wrongly restricted the right of access to a lawyer only to cases before the courts.

(1) Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (JO 2014 L 229, p. 1).

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1085/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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