Provisional text

delivered on 6 March 2025 (1)

Case C-125/24 [Palmstråle] (i)

AA

Allmänna ombudet hos Tullverket

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court, Sweden))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Tax law – Value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Reimportation of goods – Exemption from VAT – Article 143(1)(e) – Need to comply with customs legislation – Customs union – Customs Code – Relief from customs duty on importation of returned goods – Article 203 – Article 86(6) – Relationship between customs legislation and VAT legislation )

1.This case provides the Court with a further (2) opportunity to clarify the interaction between customs legislation and import VAT legislation, on this occasion with regard to a VAT exemption. Specifically, it concerns the exemption from import VAT on the re-importation into the European Union of goods exempt from customs duties.

2.Although the conditions for an exemption from customs duty are fulfilled in principle, the customs procedure was not carried out correctly. Therefore, the Court must clarify what effects an infringement of obligations arising from the customs procedure (in this case the presentation of the goods to customs, customs declaration and application for relief from customs duty) has on the benefit of an import VAT exemption. In that respect, is the import VAT exemption accessory to the exemption from customs duties for re-imported goods or are both exemptions to be applied independently?

II. Legal framework

1. Directive 2006/112/EC (3) (‘the VAT Directive’)

3. Article 143 of the VAT Directive concerns exemptions on importation:

‘Member States shall exempt the following transactions:

…

(e) the reimportation, by the person who exported them, of goods in the state in which they were exported, where those goods are exempt from customs duties;

(f) the importation, under diplomatic and consular arrangements, of goods which are exempt from customs duties;

…’

4. Article 203 of the Customs Code governs the exemption for returned goods:

‘1. Non-Union goods which, having originally been exported as Union goods from the customs territory of the Union, are returned to that territory within a period of three years and declared for release for free circulation shall, upon application by the person concerned, be granted relief from import duty.

…

3. Article 139 governs the obligation to present goods to customs:

‘1. Goods brought into the customs territory of the Union shall be presented to customs immediately upon their arrival at the designated customs office or any other place designated or approved by the customs authorities or in the free zone by one of the following persons,

(a) the person who brought the goods into the customs territory of the Union,

…’

4. Article 5(33) of the Customs Code defines presentation of goods to customs as follows:

‘“presentation of goods to customs” means the notification to the customs authorities of the arrival of goods at the customs office or at any other place designated or approved by the customs authorities and the availability of those goods for customs controls.’

‘1. All goods intended to be placed under a customs procedure, except for the free zone procedure, shall be covered by a customs declaration appropriate for the particular procedure.

…’

‘“customs declaration” means the act whereby a person indicates, in the prescribed form and manner, a wish to place goods under a given customs procedure, with an indication, where appropriate, of any specific arrangements to be applied.’

7. Article 79 of the Customs Code governs customs debt incurred through non-compliance with customs legislation as follows:

‘1. For goods liable to import duty, a customs debt on import shall be incurred through non-compliance with any of the following:

(a) one of the obligations laid down in the customs legislation concerning the introduction of non-Union goods into the customs territory of the Union, their removal from customs supervision, or the movement, processing, storage, temporary storage, temporary admission or disposal of such goods within that territory;

…

3. In cases referred to under points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1, the debtor shall be any of the following,

(a) any person who was required to fulfil the obligations concerned, …’

8. Article 86(6) of the Customs Code contains a derogation from Article 79 of the Customs Code, inter alia, where provision is made for exemptions:

‘6. Where the customs legislation provides for a favourable tariff treatment of goods, or for relief or total or partial exemption from import or export duty pursuant to points (d) to (g) of Article 56(2), Articles 203, 204, 205 and 208 or Articles 259 to 262 of this Regulation or pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009 of 16 November 2009 setting up a Community system of reliefs from customs duty such favourable tariff treatment, relief or exemption shall also apply in cases where a customs debt is incurred pursuant to Articles 79 or 82 of this Regulation, on condition that the failure which led to the incurrence of a customs debt did not constitute an attempt at deception.’

9. Recital 38 of the Customs Code reads:

‘(38) It is appropriate to take account of the good faith of the person concerned in cases where a customs debt is incurred through non-compliance with the customs legislation and to minimise the impact of negligence on the part of the debtor.’

B. Swedish law

12. The Mervärdesskattelag (1994:200) (Law on VAT [1994:200]) was in force at the time relevant to the case. (5)

13. According to point 3 of the first paragraph of section 1 of Chapter 1, VAT is to be paid on the importation of goods into the country, which is liable for tax. Pursuant to section 1a of Chapter 2, ‘importation’ means that goods are brought into Sweden from a place outside the European Union.

14. The first paragraph of section 30 of Chapter 3 provides that imports which are exempt from tax in accordance with the lag (1994:1551) om frihet från skatt vid import, m.m (Law on tax exemption on importation, inter alia (1994:1551)) are exempt from tax.

15. The first paragraph of section 5 of Chapter 2 of the Law on tax exemption on importation, inter alia states that exemption from tax is to be granted for Union goods which, after having been exported from the European Union to a third country, are brought into Sweden by the person who exported them, without their having been processed during the time they were exported from the European Union. According to the second paragraph thereof, exemption from tax is to be granted only if the goods are subject to relief from customs duty under, inter alia, Article 203 of the Customs Code. Goods which are exempt from customs duty under Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff are treated as if they were subject to customs duty.

III. Facts and request for a preliminary ruling

16. The applicant owns horses which are used in competitions in various countries. She exported two horses to Norway, that is to say, outside the customs territory of the Union. After the horses had participated in competitions, they were brought back into the Union through a border crossing from Norway to Sweden. The applicant did not stop at the customs post to present the goods brought in and submit a customs declaration. Instead, she was only stopped at the Tullverket (Customs Authority, Sweden; ‘the Customs Authority’) road check shortly after she had passed the customs post.

17. The Customs Authority decided to charge the applicant import VAT in the amount of 41 178 Swedish kronor (SEK) (approximately EUR 3 500). However, no customs debt was established. According to the Customs Authority, exemption from VAT on re-importation could not be granted because the applicant had not declared the horses for release for free circulation or applied for relief from customs duty.

18. The applicant appealed against the decision before the Förvaltningsrätten i Karlstad (Administrative Court, Karlstad, Sweden), which dismissed the appeal. The Förvaltningsrätten i Karlstad (Administrative Court, Karlstad) found that the horses had not been declared and presented to customs upon their arrival into Union customs territory, that a customs debt had therefore been incurred and that this meant that import VAT was payable. The court also found that the declaration of the goods for release for free circulation and an application for relief from customs duty were requirements for the grant of exemption from import VAT on re-importation. As neither had happened, exemption from import VAT could not be granted.

19. Both the applicant and the Allmänna ombudet hos Tullverket (General Representative of the Customs Authority, Sweden) appealed against the judgment of the Förvaltningsrätten i Karlstad (Administrative Court, Karlstad) before the Kammarrätten i Göteborg (Administrative Court of Appeal, Gothenburg, Sweden) and claimed that the decision should be annulled. The Kammarrätten i Göteborg (Administrative Court of Appeal, Gothenburg) dismissed the appeals on essentially the same grounds as those relied on by the lower court. The applicant appealed against that judgment before the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court, Sweden).

21. The referring court is uncertain as to how Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive and Article 86(6) of the Customs Code are to be interpreted. It considers two possibilities to be conceivable. Either the conditions laid down in Article 203 of the Customs Code must be fulfilled in all cases for exemption to be granted, or exemption can be granted even if the procedural conditions laid down in Article 203 are not fulfilled (in this case, there was neither a declaration for release for free circulation nor an application for relief).

In those circumstances, the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘Must Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive and Articles 86(6) and 203 of the Union Customs Code be interpreted as meaning that both the substantive and the procedural conditions laid down in Article 203 must be fulfilled in order for relief from import duty – and thus exemption from VAT – to be granted on re-importation where a customs debt under Article 79 of the Union Customs Code has been incurred through non-compliance with the presentation obligation laid down in Article 139(1) of the Union Customs Code?’

The European Commission alone submitted written observations in the proceedings before the Court. In accordance with Article 76(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court decided not to hold an oral hearing.

24. The question referred concerns the interaction between the Customs Code and the VAT Directive in the case of what are known as ‘returned goods’. They are Union goods which are exported from the Union but returned unchanged into the Union within a certain period (first subparagraph of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code). The subject of the proceedings is an assessment for the purposes of import VAT. The applicant relies on Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive. That provision exempts the re-importation of ‘goods exempt from customs duties’ from import VAT.

26.

By leaving the customs territory of the European Union, the horses lost their status as Union goods (Article 154(a) of the Customs Code) and became non-Union goods (Article 5(24) of the Customs Code). If non-Union goods are to be returned to the customs territory of the European Union, they must – subject to the application of special customs procedures – be re-declared for release for free circulation (Article 201(1) of the Customs Code) and a customs debt would in principle be incurred (Article 77(1) of the Customs Code). In order to avoid again taxation on former Union goods (re-imported goods), the first subparagraph of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code provides for duty exemption under certain conditions. However, those conditions are not fulfilled on account of the lack of a customs declaration (Articles 158(1) and 201(1) of the Customs Code) and the lack of an application (first subparagraph of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code). Furthermore, on account of the lack of customs declaration and presentation of goods to customs (Article 139(1) of the Customs Code), a customs debt would be incurred under Article 79(1)(a) of the Customs Code.

27.Article 86(6) of the Customs Code lays down a derogation to the latter. Under that provision, relief from customs duties on returned goods under the first subparagraph of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code is also granted if the customs debt was incurred under Article 79(1)(a) of the Customs Code, that is to say on account of a failure to meet an obligation. However, that only applies if those failures were not based on an attempt at deception.

28.In the interpretation of Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive, it will first be determined whether the granting of exemption from import VAT is accessory to customs legislation and requires that all conditions for the customs relief be fulfilled (Part A.). If that is so, the exemption from import VAT under Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive would only be granted here if the abovementioned requirements of the exception in Article 86(6) of the Customs Code are fulfilled (Part B.).

29.The wording of Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive is not clear. While Article 143(1)(f) of the VAT Directive refers to goods ‘to which an exemption from customs duty applies’ [‘für die eine Zollbefreiung gilt’], Article 143(1)(e) concerns ‘goods covered by an exemption from customs duty’ [‘unter eine Zollbefreiung [fallende Gegenstände]’].

30.That suggests that, as regards point (f), all the conditions for exemption must obtain in any event, otherwise it does not ‘apply’. In contrast (Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive), ‘goods’ are also ‘covered by an exemption from customs duty’, even if the customs procedure has not been complied with. However, that linguistic difference can only be found in the German language version.

31.Historically, the exemption from import VAT for returned goods has existed since the Sixth Directive. At that time, however, there was no standardised customs procedure throughout the European Union. Each Member State had its own law on customs procedure. It would have made little sense if harmonised tax exemption had been dependent on Member States’ different laws on customs procedure. Therefore, the reference to ‘goods covered by an exemption from customs duty’, which was adopted unamended in Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive, can hardly mean compliance with the (now harmonised) customs procedure.

Interpretation of Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive

Wording and scheme

29.The wording of Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive is not clear. While Article 143(1)(f) of the VAT Directive refers to goods ‘to which an exemption from customs duty applies’ [‘für die eine Zollbefreiung gilt’], Article 143(1)(e) concerns ‘goods covered by an exemption from customs duty’ [‘unter eine Zollbefreiung [fallende Gegenstände]’].

30.That suggests that, as regards point (f), all the conditions for exemption must obtain in any event, otherwise it does not ‘apply’. In contrast (Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive), ‘goods’ are also ‘covered by an exemption from customs duty’, even if the customs procedure has not been complied with. However, that linguistic difference can only be found in the German language version.

31.Historically, the exemption from import VAT for returned goods has existed since the Sixth Directive. At that time, however, there was no standardised customs procedure throughout the European Union. Each Member State had its own law on customs procedure. It would have made little sense if harmonised tax exemption had been dependent on Member States’ different laws on customs procedure. Therefore, the reference to ‘goods covered by an exemption from customs duty’, which was adopted unamended in Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive, can hardly mean compliance with the (now harmonised) customs procedure.

Meaning and purpose

32.Customs legislation is intended to protect domestic goods from competition from third-country imports and thus ensure fair trade relations. However, that objective does not apply to returned goods because the goods originally come from the European Union. Against that background, the first subparagraph of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code provides for relief from customs duty for returned goods.

33.In contrast, import VAT applies to goods that enter the economic network of the European Union and may be the object of consumption. Import VAT is intended to pre-burden goods imported from third countries in the same way with VAT as goods in the Member State of importation. However, if goods that originally come from the European Union are re-imported into the European Union unchanged as returned goods, there are no ‘consumable’ increases in value which have to be taxed. Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive takes that into account by exempting goods from import VAT.

Different consequences of an infringement

34.Both Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive and Article 203(1) of the Customs Code therefore take account of the special situation of returned goods. However, only infringements of customs legislation give rise to a customs debt. In addition, a VAT debt can only be incurred if that infringement also fulfils the factual preconditions for importation laid down in VAT legislation. It requires the goods may also have undergone ‘taxable consumption’ in the Member State. The mere infringement of the customs procedure may indicate that. However, a corresponding presumption may be rebutted.

35.However, if import VAT exemption is refused, for example, with reference to the lack of a customs application, precisely that difference is disregarded. The refusal of an import VAT exemption would be the result of an infringement of customs legislation, even though no ‘taxable consumption’ has occurred. In the case of returned goods within the meaning of Article 203 of the Customs Code, there is no increase in value that could be ‘consumed’ and would have to be taxed (see point 33 above).

36.The different legal consequences are in keeping with the fundamental independence of customs legislation and VAT legislation. The Court has highlighted the parallel nature of customs legislation and import VAT legislation, particularly in its earlier case-law. However, that usually only concerned specific rules, such as, for example, the second subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive. Furthermore, the statement which is often cited as justification, namely that ‘import VAT and customs duties display comparable essential features since they arise from the fact of importation of goods into the European Union and the subsequent distribution of those goods through the economic channels of the Member States’, does not allow any accessory relationship to be inferred. Rather, it merely demonstrates the frequent coincidences in practice between the incurrence of customs duties and import VAT.

37.On the other hand, the places where the customs debt and import VAT debt was incurred may well be different. The second subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive only links the time at which the import VAT debt was incurred with the customs debt, but makes no statement as to the place of taxation. The place where the VAT is incurred may not be determined in accordance with customs legislation, as otherwise a contravention of the principle of the territorial application of VAT could arise. Similarly, in the view of the Court, the continued existence of the VAT debt can be independent of the extinguishment of the customs debt. That all clearly shows that there is no accessory relationship between the two regulatory regimes. Therefore, the Court no longer speaks of a parallel nature of the respective regulatory regimes, but only of a ‘link’ [Zusammenhang] or a ‘link’ [Verknüpfung].

No accessory relationship for practical reasons

38.In practice, import VAT and customs duties are levied and cleared together. That makes it possible, for example, to carry out transactions at a single point of contact and facilitate checks. In the specific case, the exemption from import VAT can be claimed at the same time as submitting the customs declaration.

39.However, such reasons relating to practicability are not sufficient to establish an accessory relationship whereby the customs procedure would also have to be complied with for a VAT exemption. The two regimes are designed differently. According to the second subparagraph of Article 1(1) thereof, ‘the Code shall apply uniformly throughout the customs territory of the Union’. In addition, customs duties belong exclusively to the European Union. Import VAT, on the other hand, does not belong to the European Union, but to the respective Member State where the import takes place because that is where the (presumed) final consumption takes place. Therefore, the VAT rate applicable there is decisive.

40.In addition, customs legislation is more formalised than VAT legislation. For example, under Article 79(1)(a) of the Customs Code an infringement of customs obligations gives rise to a customs debt. VAT, on the other hand, is a general consumption tax that aims to tax the consumer’s expenditure on a supply or service. That objective is fundamentally independent of procedural offences. Consequently, infringements of VAT formalities do not generally result in the incurrence of a VAT debt. For example, tax exemption is to be granted for intra-Community supplies if the substantive requirements are satisfied. The mere failure to satisfy formal requirements does not in principle justify a refusal to grant it.

41.In the present case, the assumption of an accessory relationship for practical reasons would produce a very strange result. Despite an infringement of customs procedure law, no customs debt was established (apparently because the rate of duty on those horses is 0%). On the other hand, import VAT was established on account of an infringement of customs procedure law, even though there is no taxable increase in the value of the returned goods. The much more formalistic customs legislation waives a customs debt (for substantive reasons), while the much less formalistic VAT legislation – there is no counterpart to Article 79 of the Customs Code in the VAT Directive – is to result in an import VAT debt despite a tax exemption.

42.Ultimately, it is not the task of VAT legislation to ensure compliance with the customs procedure. Rather, a sanction (for example, a fine) must be provided for in national law for offences under Article 42 of the Customs Code. In addition, there is still an incentive to submit a customs declaration and present goods to customs at least to benefit from customs relief. That is because an infringement of that obligation generally gives rise to customs debt in accordance with Article 79(1)(a) of the Customs Code, unless the exception laid down in Article 86(6) of the Customs Code applies (see point 44 et seq. below).

Interim conclusion

43.Compliance with the customs procedure is therefore not required for exemption from import VAT under Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive. Instead, it is sufficient that the substantive requirements for customs relief (in this case the existence of corresponding returned goods) are satisfied. This is the case here. Therefore, an infringement of the obligation to present goods to customs, the obligation to submit a customs declaration or a lack of an application for customs relief does not mean that the substantive import VAT exemption for returned goods (in this case horses) no longer applies.

In the alternative: Interpretation of Article 86(6) of the Customs Code

44.Only if the Court takes a different view is it necessary to examine whether Article 86(6) of the Customs Code allows the tax relief under the first subparagraph of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code for returned goods to continue to apply despite the infringement of customs obligations (failure to declare and present goods). This presupposes in particular that there is no attempt at deception on the part of the applicant.

45.However, this approach – pursued here in the alternative – would have the fundamental disadvantage that all the problems arising from the application of Article 79(1)(a) and the counter-exception under Article 86(6) of the Customs Code would be carried over into VAT legislation. However, subjective provisions such as Article 86(6) and recital 38 of the Customs Code (good faith) are fundamentally alien to VAT legislation. The same applies to the incurrence of VAT through a procedural infringement. The associated difficulties are clearly illustrated by the present case.

46.A first question is whether Article 86(6) of the Customs Code is relevant here at all. The exemption under the first subparagraph of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code requires that a customs declaration be submitted. That is precisely what is lacking here, which is why there would be no exemption from a purely formal point of view. However, an exemption must only be ‘provided for’. In addition, Article 86(6) of the Customs Code was created precisely to minimise the consequences of non-compliance with customs legislation (such as, for example, the lack of a customs declaration). The more convincing reasons therefore militate in favour of applying Article 86(6) of the Customs Code.

47.Whether the lack of customs declaration and presentation of the horses to customs is to be regarded as an attempt at deception in the specific case is, however, a question of fact. In principle, it is for the national court to make the necessary factual judgement. Nevertheless, it would seem sensible to provide it with guidance as to when an attempt at deception within the meaning of that provision exists. To the best of my knowledge, the Court of Justice has yet to deal with this issue.

48.In the literal sense, a person who is aware of, and seeks to avoid, the incurrence of a customs debt wishes to deceive. In addition, recital 38 of the Customs Code makes it clear that its Article 86(6) serves to take account of good faith in the event of non-compliance with customs legislation. However, a person is only deemed to have acted in good faith if he or she intends to act correctly and is able to rely on his or her judgment.

In that respect, according to recital 38 of the Customs Code, the impact of negligence is to be minimised. Consequently, gross negligence can, nonetheless, constitute an attempt at deception. That is the case if the importer must have been aware of his or her customs obligations because he or she was grossly negligent in ignoring them. That is also confirmed by a comparison with the previous provision in Article 212a of the Community Customs Code.

49. The inclusion of gross negligence in attempts at deception is also justified by the fact that customs legislation is highly formalised on account of the limited checking options available in mass customs procedures. Only customs declaration and presentation to customs enable the customs authorities to check the goods to be imported. For that reason, Article 79(1)(a) of the Customs Code allows a customs debt to be incurred in principle in the event of an infringement of the customs procedure. Only Article 86(6) of the Customs Code constitutes an exception, which, however, does not apply if there is an attempt at deception. Too narrow an understanding of an attempt at deception would contradict this rule-exception relationship. The derogation contained in Article 86(6) of the Customs Code must therefore be interpreted restrictively. Consequently, an attempt at deception within the meaning of Article 86(6) of the Customs Code exists if the importer was aware, or unaware due to gross negligence, of the customs obligations which he or she has infringed.

50. There must be objective connecting factors for the subjective evidence of the (lack of) knowledge or imposition. The surrounding circumstances are of great importance in that regard. This applies in particular to a basically neutral act without objective meaning (such as, for example, passing a customs post without stopping).

51. In the case of professional economic operators, there is much to suggest that knowledge of customs obligations can be assumed. Someone who exports his or her horses correctly obviously knows the customs legislation. It stands to reason that that person also knows that he or she has to re-import his or her horses correctly.

52. However, if the importer was aware of his or her obligation under customs legislation (for example, to declare and present goods) or was grossly negligent in not being aware of it, an infringement of that obligation is generally also an attempt at deception. Something else may apply in cases of force majeure or acute emergency situations where there is no reasonable, legally recognisable alternative course of action for the person concerned other than an infringement of customs obligations.

53. In the light of the foregoing, an attempt at deception within the meaning of Article 86(6) of the Customs Code therefore exists if objective (surrounding) circumstances show that the importer was aware of his or her customs obligations or was grossly negligent in not being aware of them and infringed them. In that case, a customs debt is incurred under Article 79(1)(a) of the Customs Code due to the (deliberate or grossly negligent) infringement of the obligation. Therefore, if Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive actually also requires compliance with the customs procedure, an import VAT exemption would probably have to be refused in this case (subject to the corresponding assessment of the facts by the referring court).

54. I propose the Court answer the question referred by the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court, Sweden) as follows:

Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive only requires that the substantive conditions laid down in Article 203 of the Customs Code are fulfilled. In so far as a customs debt under Article 79 of the Customs Code has only been incurred through non-compliance with the customs declaration obligation under Article 158(1) of the Customs Code and the presentation obligation under Article 139(1) of the Customs Code or the lack of an application for relief from customs duty under Article 203 of the Customs Code, the re-importation of returned goods within the meaning of Article 203 of the Customs Code is exempt from VAT. For that reason, it is irrelevant for the import VAT exemption under Article 143(1)(e) of the VAT Directive whether the requirements for a relief under Article 86(6) of the Customs Code (on account of the lack of an attempt at deception) are fulfilled.

* * *

(1) Original language: German.

(i) The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.

(2) Judgments of 18 January 2024, Hauptzollamt Braunschweig (Place where VAT is incurred – III) (C‑791/22, EU:C:2024:59); of 8 September 2022, Hauptzollamt Hamburg (Place where VAT is incurred II) (C‑368/21, EU:C:2022:647); of 7 April 2022, Kauno teritorinė muitinė (C‑489/20, EU:C:2022:277); of 3 March 2021, Hauptzollamt Münster (Place where VAT is incurred) (C‑7/20, EU:C:2021:161); of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung (C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579); and of 27 September 2007, Teleos and Others (C‑409/04, EU:C:2007:548).

(3) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, in the version of 1 July 2022 (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1); as last amended in OJ 2022 L 155, p. 1).

(4) Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (recast), in the version of 14 December 2016 (OJ 2016 L 354, p. 32).

(5) According to the information provided by the referring court, the new Mervärdesskattelag (Law on VAT) [2023:200] essentially contains corresponding provisions.

(6) See, for example, the Danish, French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and Dutch language versions. There is also a slight difference in the English version (‘where those goods are exempt from customs duties’, point (e), and ‘goods which are exempt from customs duties’, point (f)), which can be seen in a similar form in the Swedish version. However, that difference is not as marked as it is in the German language version.

(7) Article 14(1)(e) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).

(8) Judgments of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung (C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraph 34), and of 18 May 2017, Latvijas Dzelzceļš (C‑154/16, EU:C:2017:392, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

(9) See judgments of 18 January 2024, Hauptzollamt Braunschweig (Place where VAT is incurred – III) (C‑791/22, EU:C:2024:59, paragraph 31); of 8 September 2022, Hauptzollamt Hamburg (Place where VAT is incurred II) (C‑368/21, EU:C:2022:647, paragraphs 27 and 31); of 7 April 2022, Kauno teritorinė muitinė (C‑489/20, EU:C:2022:277, paragraph 48); of 3 March 2021, Hauptzollamt Münster (Place where VAT is incurred) (C‑7/20, EU:C:2021:161, paragraph 30 et seq.); of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung (C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraphs 44 and 48); and of 2 June 2016, Eurogate Distribution (C‑226/14 and C‑228/14, EU:C:2016:405, paragraph 64 et seq.).

(10) See, expressly, judgment of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung (C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraph 48).

(11) See my Opinion in Teleos and Others (C‑409/04, EU:C:2007:7, point 80).

(12) Judgments of 7 April 2022, Kauno teritorinė muitinė (C‑489/20, EU:C:2022:277, paragraph 51); of 3 March 2021, Hauptzollamt Münster (Place where VAT is incurred) (C‑7/20, EU:C:2021:161, paragraph 29); and of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung (C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraph 41).

(13) See judgments of 18 January 2024, Hauptzollamt Braunschweig (Place where VAT is incurred – III) (C‑791/22, EU:C:2024:59, paragraph 30 et seq.); of 8 September 2022, Hauptzollamt Hamburg (Place where VAT is incurred II) (C‑368/21, EU:C:2022:647, paragraphs 27 and 31); of 3 March 2021, Hauptzollamt Münster (Place where VAT is incurred) (C‑7/20, EU:C:2021:161, paragraphs 34 et seq.); and of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung (C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraphs 48 and 53).

(14) See judgment of 25 October 2018, Božičevič Ježovnik (C‑528/17, EU:C:2018:868, paragraph 41).

(15) See judgments of 18 January 2024, Hauptzollamt Braunschweig (Place where VAT is incurred – III) (C‑791/22, EU:C:2024:59, paragraph 32).

(16) Judgment of 18 January 2024, Hauptzollamt Braunschweig (Place where VAT is incurred – III) (C‑791/22, EU:C:2024:59, paragraph 28).

(17) Judgment of 18 January 2024, Hauptzollamt Braunschweig (Place where VAT is incurred – III) (C‑791/22, EU:C:2024:59, paragraph 34).

(18) Judgment of 7 April 2022, Kauno teritorinė muitinė (C‑489/20, EU:C:2022:277, paragraph 51).

(19) Judgment of 3 March 2021, Hauptzollamt Münster (Place where VAT is incurred) (C‑7/20, EU:C:2021:161, paragraph 27).

(20) Judgment of 18 January 2024, Hauptzollamt Braunschweig (Place where VAT is incurred – III) (C‑791/22, EU:C:2024:59, paragraph 23).

(21) See, for example, recitals 13 and 42, p. 2 of the Customs Code.

(22) See recital 9, p. 4 of the Customs Code; under that provision, ‘customs legislation should be better aligned on the provisions relating to the collection of import charges without change to the scope of the tax provisions in force’.

(23) See Article 2(1)(a) of Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom, in the version of 15 December 2020 (OJ 2020 L 424, p. 1); see also judgment of 18 January 2024, Hauptzollamt Braunschweig (Place where VAT is incurred – III) (C‑791/22, EU:C:2024:59, paragraph 32).

(24) Judgment of 18 January 2024, Hauptzollamt Braunschweig (Place where VAT is incurred – III) (C‑791/22, EU:C:2024:59, paragraph 32).

25See, for example, judgments of 3 May 2012, <i>Lebara</i> (C‑520/10, EU:C:2012:264, paragraph 23); of 11 October 2007, <i>KÖGÁZ and Others</i> (C‑283/06 and C‑312/06, EU:C:2007:598, paragraph 37 – ‘it is proportional to the price charged by the taxable person in return for the goods and services which he has supplied’), and of 18 December 1997, <i>Landboden-Agrardienste</i> (C‑384/95, EU:C:1997:627, paragraph 20 – ‘only the nature of the undertaking given is to be taken into consideration: for such an undertaking to be covered by the common system of VAT it must imply consumption’, and paragraph 3).

26Settled case-law, for example judgments of 9 February 2017, <i>Euro Tyre</i> (C‑21/16, EU:C:2017:106, paragraph 34); of 20 October 2016, <i>Plöckl</i> (C‑24/15, EU:C:2016:791, paragraph 37); and of 27 September 2007, <i>Collée</i> (C‑146/05, EU:C:2007:549, paragraph 29 et seq.).

27See, with regard to the legitimate expectation and good faith on the part of the person liable for payment in the context of a post-clearance recovery under Article 119(1)(a) and subparagraphs 3 and 4 of Article 119(3) of the Customs Code, judgment of 16 March 2017, <i>Veloserviss</i> (C‑47/16, EU:C:2017:220, paragraph 24 et seq., on the predecessor provision).

28Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 2006 L 302, p. 1).

29See, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2018, <i>Božičevič Ježovnik</i> (C‑528/17, EU:C:2018:868, paragraph 47) with regard to Article 143(1)(d) of the VAT Directive and ensuring that there is no participation in tax evasion.