Official Journal of the European Union

EN

C series

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C/2025/2223

22.4.2025

(Case T-85/25)

(C/2025/2223)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Alta Pay Group d.o.o. Beograd (Belgrade, Serbia) (represented by: M. Fellner, lawyer)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—annul ECB’s Decision ECB-SSM-2024-AT-5 of 26 November 2024 without replacement pursuant to Articles 263 and 264 TFEU; and

—order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings of annulment.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on the following pleas in law.

1.First plea in law, alleging a violation of the right to be heard pursuant to Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) in conjunction with Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’). The applicant’s right to be heard was violated by (i) not being granted access to all documents of the file, (ii) not being granted a reasonable period of time to submit comments, (iii) by not giving sufficient reasons and by (iv) witnesses not having been questioned by the ECB.

2.Second plea in law, alleging a violation of the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial under Article 47 of the Charter in conjunction with Article 6(1) ECHR. The applicant was not in a position to effectively conduct its defence for the reasons set forth in the first plea of law.

3.Third plea in law, alleging a violation of Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter and Article 22(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (1) (access to the file). The ECB refused the applicant access to all documents on file, thereby preventing it to contest any information therein or to use exculpatory evidence in its favour.

4.Fourth plea in law, alleging a violation of Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter and Article 22(1) of Regulation No 1024/2013 (right to be heard). The applicant was granted an unreasonably short time to submit its comments, which prevented it from fully pleading its case.

5.Fifth plea in law, alleging a violation of Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter and Article 22(2) of Regulation No 1024/2013 (duty to give reasons). The ECB did not provide sufficient reasons for its decision. It did not properly discuss the legal requirements for acting in concert and based its decision on mere doubts.

6.Sixth plea in law, alleging a violation of Article 48(1) of the Charter (Presumption of innocence) in conjunction with Article 6(2) ECHR. The ECB has reversed the burden of proof in relation to whether there was an acting in concert, even though the existence of an acting in concert results in penalties which may imposed on the applicant.

7.Seventh plea in law, alleging a violation of Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter and Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank (2) (failure to establish the facts of the case). The witnesses offered by the applicant were not heard and the facts of the case were not properly established, so that the ECB rendered its decision on an incomplete set of facts.

8.Eighth plea in law, alleging that the requirements for acting in concert are not met. The ECB incorrectly applied section 20(1) of the Austrian Banking Act (3), by failing to consider that an acting in concert requires an agreement on the joint exercise of voting rights.

9.Ninth plea in law, alleging a violation of Article 17 of the Charter. The wrongful application of section 20(1) of the Austrian Banking Act led to a suspension of applicant’s voting rights in Addiko Bank AG, which constitutes a violation of the applicant’s property rights.

10.Tenth plea in law, alleging a misuse of discretion pursuant to Article 263, second paragraph, TFEU and a violation of the principle of proportionality. The ECB’s decision constitutes a misuse of discretion since the provisions pursuant to section 20(1) of the Austrian Banking Act do not aim at preventing mere joint acquisitions. Since the decision is based on mere doubts, the principle of proportionality would have required to seek less intrusive measures.

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(1) Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63).

(2) Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) (OJ 2014 L 141, p. 1).

(3) Bundesgesetz über das Bankwesen (Bankwesengesetz – BWG), (BGBl 532/1993, last amended by BGBl 98/2021).

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2223/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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