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Case C-292/13 P: Appeal brought on 27 May 2013 by Fabryka Łożysk Tocznych-Kraśnik S.A. against the judgment delivered by the General Court on 22 March 2013 in Case T-571/10 Fabryka Łożysk Tocznych-Kraśnik S.A. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) — Impexmetal
ECLI:EU:UNKNOWN:62013CN0292
62013CN0292
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Official Journal of the European Union
C 215/11
(Case C-292/13 P)
2013/C 215/14
Language of the case: Polish
Parties
Appellant: Fabryka Łożysk Tocznych-Kraśnik S.A. (represented by: P. Borowski, adwokat)
Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Impexmetal S.A.
Form of order sought
—set aside the judgment in its entirety and uphold the application of 16 December 2010 in its entirety by annulling the decision of 6 October 2010 of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market;
—in the event that this head of claim is not upheld, set aside the judgment in its entirety and refer the present case back to the General Court for reconsideration;
—order the other parties to the proceedings to pay the costs, including the costs incurred by the appellant in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal and the Opposition Division of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market, and those incurred in the proceedings before the General Court.
Pleas in law and main arguments
The appellant claims that the General Court breached Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 by applying that provision to factual circumstances not covered by it.
In the view of the appellant, the erroneous application of that provision is attributable to the General Court’s incorrect assumption that the appellant’s mark is similar to the older Community figurative mark of the intervener and that there is for that reason a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. The General Court, it submits, failed to take account of the following facts:
—the similarity between the marks does not justify the assertion that this might be the source of a likelihood of confusion;
—the appellant’s mark is a part of its commercial name and this name has been used long before the application for registration;
—that mark is a historically well-founded designation of the appellant;
—the marks in issue have for a long time co-existed peacefully on one and the same market.