24.8.2015

Official Journal of the European Union

C 279/19

(Case C-268/15)

(2015/C 279/24)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Mr Fernand Ullens de Schooten

Defendants: Ministre des Affaires Sociales et de la Santé Publique and Ministre de la Justice

Questions referred

1.Does Community law, and in particular the principle of effectiveness, in certain circumstances and, in particular, those described in paragraph 38 of the present judgment, require the national limitation period, as [that prescribed by] Article 100 of the Coordinated Laws on State Accounting applicable to a claim for compensation made by an individual against the Belgian State for infringement of Article 43 of the EC Treaty (now Article 49 TFEU) by the legislature, not to start to run until that infringement has been ascertained or, on the contrary, is the principle of effectiveness sufficiently well upheld in those circumstances by the opportunity open to that individual to interrupt the limitation period by having process served by a huissier de justice?

2.Must Articles 43 EC, 49 EC and 56 EC and the concept of a ‘purely internal situation’, which is liable to limit reliance on those provisions by a litigant in proceedings before a national court, be interpreted as precluding the application of [EU] law in proceedings between a Belgian citizen and the Belgian State in which redress is sought for damage caused by an alleged infringement of Community law resulting from the adoption and maintaining in force of Belgian legislation of the same kind as Article 3 of Royal Decree No 143 of 30 December 1982 which applies without distinction to Belgian nationals and nationals of other Member States?

3.Must the principle of the primacy of Community law and Article 4(3) TEU be interpreted as not allowing the rule of the authority of res judicata to be disapplied in connection with the re-examination or setting aside of a judicial decision which has become res judicata and which proves to be contrary to [EU] law but, on the contrary, as allowing a national rule establishing the authority of res judicata to be disapplied when the latter requires the adoption, on the basis of that judicial decision which has become res judicata but is contrary to [EU] law, of another judicial decision which would perpetuate the infringement of [EU] law by the first judicial decision?

4.Could the Court confirm that the question whether the rule of the authority of res judicata must be set aside in the event of a judicial decision which has become res judicata but is contrary to [EU] law in the context of an application for review or setting aside of that decision is not a question materially identical, within the meaning of the judgments [DaCosta and Others (28/62 to 30/62, EU:C:1963:6) and Cilfit and Others (283/81, EU:C:1982:335)], to the question whether the rule of the authority of res judicata is contrary to [EU] law in the context of an application for a (new) decision which would repeat the infringement of [EU] law, so that the court giving judgment at last instance cannot escape its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling?