27 March 2025 (*)

( Appeal – Civil service – Official – Refusal to amend the official’s personal file – Decision not to include the official’s name on the list of persons promoted in 2020 – Action for annulment and for damages – Time limits for bringing proceedings – Starting point – Application for legal aid – Suspension of time limits – Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court – Order of the General Court refusing the applicant that aid – Service by registered post, with a form for acknowledgement of receipt, to the address mentioned in the application for legal aid – Unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure – Excusable error )

In Case C‑91/23 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 16 February 2023,

XH,

appellant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

European Commission,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Sixth Chamber),

composed of T. von Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, acting as President of the Sixth Chamber, A. Kumin and I. Ziemele (Rapporteur), Judges,

Advocate General: A. Rantos,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

By her appeal, XH seeks to have set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 19 December 2022, XH v Commission (T‑522/21, EU:T:2022:867; ‘the order under appeal’), by which the General Court dismissed her action seeking, first, annulment of the European Commission’s decision of 24 November 2020 refusing to amend her Sysper 2 file, confirmed by the decision of 16 June 2021 rejecting her complaint, and of the Commission’s decision of 12 November 2020 not to include her name on the list of official’s promoted in 2020, confirmed by the decision of 8 June 2021 rejecting her complaint (together, ‘the contested decisions’), and, secondly, compensation in respect of the harm suffered.

Legal context

The Staff Regulations

According to Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’):

‘Appeals [to the Court of Justice of the European Union] shall be filed within three months. The period shall begin:

–on the date of notification of the decision taken in response to the complaint;

…’

Under Article 57(1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, in the version thereof resulting from the amendments adopted on 11 July 2018 (OJ 2018 L 240, p. 68) (‘the Rules of Procedure of the General Court’):

‘1. Without prejudice to Article 80(1), Article 148(9) and Article 178(2) and (3), where the Statute or these Rules require a document to be served on a person the Registrar shall ensure that service is effected via e-Curia.

Article 80(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court provides that the application is to be served on the defendant by e-Curia if he or she has an e-Curia account and that, otherwise, the application is to be served on the defendant in the form of a certified copy sent by registered post with a form for acknowledgement of receipt or by delivery of the copy against receipt.

Article 89 of the Rules of Procedure provides:

‘1. The purpose of measures of organisation of procedure shall be to ensure that cases are prepared for hearing, procedures carried out and disputes resolved under the best possible conditions.

(a)to ensure the efficient conduct of the written or oral part of the procedure and to facilitate the taking of evidence;

(b)to determine the points on which the parties must present further argument or which call for measures of inquiry;

(c)to clarify the forms of order sought by the parties, their pleas in law and arguments and the points at issue between them;

(d)to facilitate the amicable settlement of proceedings.

(a)putting questions to the parties;

(b)inviting the parties to make written or oral submissions on certain aspects of the proceedings;

(c)asking the parties or third parties for the information referred to in the second paragraph of Article 24 of the Statute;

(d)asking the parties to produce any material relating to the case;

(e)summoning the parties to meetings.

Article 90 of the Rules of Procedure reads as follows:

‘1. Measures of organisation of procedure shall be prescribed by the General Court.

Article 148(9) of those rules is worded as follows:

‘Where the applicant for legal aid is not represented by a lawyer, a copy of the document to be served shall be served on him by registered post with a form for acknowledgement of receipt or by delivery of the copy against receipt. Service on other parties shall be effected as provided for in Article 80(1).’

The Practice Rules

Point 205 of the Practice Rules for the Implementation of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, in the version thereof resulting from the amendments adopted on 17 October 2018 (OJ 2018 L 294, p. 23) (‘the Practice Rules’) provides as follows:

‘Without prejudice to the [General Court’s] power to request information or the production of further documents under Articles 89 and 90 of the Rules of Procedure [of the General Court], the application for legal aid may not be supplemented by the subsequent filing of additional material. Such material shall be rejected, unless it has been lodged at the request of the [General Court]. In exceptional cases, supporting documents intended to establish the applicant’s lack of means may nevertheless be accepted subsequently, subject to the delay in their production being adequately explained.’

Background to the dispute

The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 8 of the order under appeal as follows:

2.‘2. The [appellant] is a [confidential] official.

3.On 12 November 2020, the Commission published a Communication to the Administrative Notices No 32-2020. That communication contained the list of officials promoted under the 2020 promotion exercise. The [appellant’s] name did not appear on that list (“the decision of non-promotion”).

4.On 24 November 2020, a head of unit in the Commission Directorate-General (DG) for Human Resources adopted Decision D/386/20 by which he refused to amend the [appellant’s] Sysper 2 file (“the decision refusing to amend her Sysper 2 file”).

5.On 5 February 2021, the [appellant] lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the [Staff Regulations] against the decision of non-promotion.

6.On 22 February 2021, the [appellant] lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against the decision refusing to amend her Sysper 2 file.

7.By Decision R/80/21 of 8 June 2021, the competent appointing authority … rejected the complaint lodged by the [appellant] against the decision of non-promotion.

8.By Decision R/125/21 of 16 June 2021, the [appointing authority] rejected the complaint lodged by the [appellant] against the decision refusing to amend her Sysper 2 file.’

The proceedings before the General Court and the order under appeal

By document lodged at the General Court Registry on 26 August 2021, XH submitted an application for legal aid.

By order of 19 November 2021 in Case T‑522/21 AJ, the President of the General Court dismissed that application (‘the order of 19 November 2021’).

By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 18 January 2022, the appellant brought an action on the basis of Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the contested decisions and, secondly, compensation in respect of the harm she claimed to have suffered.

By separate document, lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 17 June 2022, the Commission raised a plea of inadmissibility pursuant to Article 130 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, on the ground that the applications for annulment brought by the appellant were out of time and on account of the close link between the appellant’s application for compensation and those applications for annulment.

By the order under appeal, the General Court, upon application by the Commission and under Article 130(1) and (7) and Article 126 of its Rules of Procedure, ruled on the inadmissibility of the action for annulment without going to the substance of the case and dismissed that action as inadmissible.

First of all, as regards the starting point of the time limits for instituting proceedings, the General Court found that the Commission had proved that the appellant was in a position to become acquainted with the decision rejecting her complaint against the decision of non-promotion by 9 June 2021 at the latest and with the decision rejecting her complaint against the decision refusing to amend her Sysper 2 file by 21 June 2021 at the latest. Consequently, it held that the time limits for lodging appeals against those two decisions had started to run on 9 June 2021 at the latest and 21 June 2021 at the latest, respectively.

Secondly, concerning the date on which the suspension of the time limits for lodging an appeal provided for in Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations, linked to the filing of the application for legal aid on 26 August 2021, came to an end, the General Court held that the order of 19 November 2021 was duly and regularly served on the appellant on 26 November 2021. Therefore, the General Court concluded that the suspension of those time limits for lodging appeals ended on the latter date.

Lastly, the General Court held that those time limits, plus the extension on account of distance referred to in Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, had expired on 21 and 31 December 2021 respectively. Consequently, it held, in paragraphs 96 and 97 of the order under appeal that the applications for annulment, made in the application at first instance brought on 18 January 2022, had to be dismissed as inadmissible on account of their lateness, which was not the result of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure or of an excusable error.

The claims for compensation brought by the appellant were also held to be in part inadmissible and in part manifestly inadmissible. The General Court furthermore ordered the appellant to pay the costs.

Procedure before the Court of Justice and forms of order sought

On 16 February 2023, the appellant brought an appeal against the order under appeal.

By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 31 March 2023, the appellant applied for legal aid then, by document lodged on 11 May 2023, she informed the Court that she was withdrawing that application. As a result, by order of 7 July 2023, delivered in Case C‑91/23 P-AJ I, the President of the Sixth Chamber of the Court ordered that that application be removed from the Court’s register.

By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 25 April 2023, the appellant brought a second application for legal aid, which was dismissed by order of the Court of 10 July 2023, delivered in Case C‑91/23 P-AJ II.

By her appeal, XH claims that the Court of Justice should:

–set aside the order under appeal;

–as a consequence, grant the form of order sought by XH at first instance and, accordingly, annul the contested decisions and compensate XH for the harm she claims to have suffered;

–order the Commission to pay all of the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal and

–in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court in order that it may rule on the action.

The Commission contends that the Court of Justice should:

–dismiss the appeal and

–order the appellant to pay the costs.

The appeal

Preliminary observations

It follows from settled case-law that, in accordance with the requirements stemming from Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or the ground of appeal concerned may be inadmissible (judgment of 4 July 2024, Portugal v Commission (Madeira Free Zone), C‑736/22 P, EU:C:2024:579, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

Specifically, a ground of appeal supported by an argument that is not sufficiently clear and precise to enable the Court to exercise its powers of judicial review, in particular because essential elements on which the ground of appeal relies are not indicated sufficiently coherently and intelligibly in the text of the appeal, which is worded in an unclear manner in that regard, does not satisfy those requirements and must be declared inadmissible (judgment of 4 July 2024, Portugal v Commission (Madeira Free Zone), C‑736/22 P, EU:C:2024:579, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

The Court has also held that an appeal lacking any coherent structure which simply makes general statements and contains no specific indications as to the points of the decision under appeal which may be vitiated by an error of law must be dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible. Those requirements are also not satisfied by an appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the decision under appeal, merely reproduces the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court. Such an appeal amounts in reality to no more than a request for re-examination of the application submitted to the General Court, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake (judgment of 4 July 2024, Portugal v Commission (Madeira Free Zone), C‑736/22 P, EU:C:2024:579, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

27In addition, the Court has held on several occasions that a mere abstract statement of the grounds in the application does not satisfy the requirements of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, concerning the subject matter of the application, and of Article 169 of the Rules of Procedure (order of 16 November 2023, AV and AW v Parliament, C‑773/21 P, EU:C:2023:895, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

28Lastly, in accordance with settled case-law, it is clear from Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that appeals are limited to points of law. The General Court, therefore, has exclusive jurisdiction to make findings in respect of the relevant facts and to assess those facts and the evidence. Accordingly, the assessment of those facts and that evidence does not therefore, save where it distorts those facts and evidence, constitute a point of law which is, as such, subject on appeal to review by the Court of Justice. Such distortion must be clearly apparent from the documents in the case file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence. It presupposes that the General Court has manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of the evidence. In that regard, it is not sufficient to show that a document could be interpreted differently from the interpretation adopted by the General Court. The appellant must indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in its view, led to that distortion (judgment of 4 July 2024, Portugal v Commission (Madeira Free Zone), C‑736/22 P, EU:C:2024:579, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

29It is in the light of those considerations that the five grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant should be examined. It is appropriate to examine, first of all, the fifth ground of appeal, which concerns the General Court’s analysis in relation to the starting point of the time limits for bringing proceedings for annulment before addressing, next, the fourth plea in law which concerns the General Court’s assessment of the date on which the suspension of the time limits for bringing proceedings ended. Lastly, it is appropriate to examine, first, the second part of the third ground of appeal which concerns the General Court’s assessment as to the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure and, secondly, the first and second grounds of appeal and the first part of the third ground of appeal, in relation to the General Court’s assessment as to the existence of an excusable error.

The fifth ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

30By her fifth ground of appeal, concerning the General Court’s determination of the starting point of the time limit for bringing the actions for annulment against the contested decisions, the appellant submits, first, that the General Court distorted the evidence and committed a manifest error of assessment when, to justify the consideration that the appellant had not produced any evidence to demonstrate the technical problems she allegedly encountered, it held, in the second sentence of paragraph 36 of the order under appeal, that no technical problem prevented the appellant from accessing her professional email on 9, 10, 13 and 21 June 2021 and when it did not take account of her absence on sick leave, confirmed by the calendar of absences and presences which she produced in response to a measure of organisation of procedure adopted by the General Court.

31The appellant also states that the contested decisions were not communicated to her by email, but through the documentary system known as the ‘Advanced Records System’ (‘the ARES System’), which she did not access during her sick leave, nothing to the contrary being stated in the file. According to the appellant, although the General Court refers to a complaint submitted on 19 June 2021, directed against the decision concerning promotions of that year, such a complaint could not have been submitted through the ARES System at that date since that decision was not adopted until November 2021.

32Secondly, the appellant claims that, in paragraph 59 of the order under appeal, the General Court distorted the evidence and committed a manifest error of assessment in failing to examine the admissibility or the probative value of the note in the file signed by the Head of Unit of the Directorate-General (DG) for Informatics, produced by the Commission in order to demonstrate that the appellant consulted the decisions rejecting her complaints at the date of their adoption. In addition, the General Court imposed on her a burden of proof which was impossible to satisfy, since it related to negative facts.

33Thirdly, in her reply, the appellant alleges infringement of Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and Article 91 of the Staff Regulations, read in conjunction with Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter, and an infringement of those articles interpreted by themselves. In that regard, she submits, inter alia, that a restrictive interpretation of the concept of ‘admissibility’ is such as to hinder the proper administration of justice and that, as well as imposing a burden of proof which was impossible to satisfy, the order under appeal is based on unwarranted presumptions, which impedes her right to a fair trial.

34The Commission contends that the fifth plea must be rejected.

Findings of the Court

35It must be held, first, that in criticising the General Court for failing to have taken into account her absence due to sickness, the appellant does not specifically indicate the evidence allegedly distorted by the General Court, apart from referring to the calendar of absences and presences which she claims confirms her period of sick leave, nor does she explain how the evidence that she was put on sick leave at a given time enables the existence of a technical problem at that time to be established. The appellant’s line of argument is, in fact, confined to requesting a fresh assessment of the facts and evidence, which, by virtue of the case-law cited in paragraph 28 of the present judgment, falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice at the appeal stage. That line of argument must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.

36Secondly, it is important to observe that the General Court’s considerations relating to the complaint brought on 19 June 2021 were made for the sake of completeness, after that court had held, inter alia, that the appellant had not substantiated her claims linked to the technical problems which she had allegedly encountered. Consequently, the appellant’s arguments relating to that complaint of 19 June 2021 are ineffective.

37Thirdly, so far as concerns the appellant’s complaints relating to paragraph 59 of the order under appeal, suffice it to observe that, since the General Court did not assess the probative value of the note to the file signed by the head of unit of the DG for Informatics, that court cannot be criticised on the grounds that it distorted that evidence.

38Fourthly, so far as concerns the complaints relating to infringement of Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter, it must be recalled that, in accordance with Article 127(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to the procedure on appeal by virtue of Article 190(1) of those rules, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. In the present case, those complaints were raised by the appellant for the first time in her reply, without her having established that they were based on a matter of law or of fact which came to light in the course of the procedure. Consequently, those complaints must be held to be inadmissible.

39The fifth ground of appeal must therefore be rejected in its entirety.

The fourth ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

40By her fourth ground of appeal, which concerns paragraphs 43 to 46 of the order under appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in law in the interpretation of the obligation to serve the decision on legal aid to the appellant and that it distorted the evidence in relation to the limits of the mandate of the service provider.

41The appellant argues, first, that by holding, in paragraph 43 of the order under appeal, that the delivery of the order of 19 November 2021 to a service provider complied with Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the General Court infringed that provision which requires, where the legal aid applicant is not represented by a lawyer, that service be made to the applicant for legal aid him or herself, and which limits the involvement of the service provider to delivering to that applicant the invitation to go to the nearest post office to collect in person the letter containing the order on legal aid and to sign him or herself the acknowledgement of receipt.

42Secondly, the appellant submits that by holding, in paragraph 44 of the order under appeal, that, in the present case, the service provider had been duly mandated by the appellant to receive her correspondence and by thus equating the service of an order of the General Court with other exchanges of general correspondence, the General Court distorted the evidence. In that regard, the appellant refers, first, to the Postal Law [confidential: of country A], from which it is apparent that service contracts do not cover the representation of a client in the procedure for the service of a judicial decision. Such a conclusion follows, secondly, from the contract concluded with that service provider, as is apparent from the appellant’s correspondence with that service provider and, inter alia, Annexes 3 and 4 to the letter of 12 April 2022 that the appellant sent to the General Court. Lastly, the acknowledgement of receipt of 26 November 2021 was not signed in the appellant’s name, and the service provider exceeded its mandate in accepting the service of the order of 19 November 2021 and in signing an acknowledgement of receipt without a specific power of attorney.

43In her reply, the appellant adds that the General Court’s acts should be assessed in the light of the principles of legal certainty and proper administration of justice. In that context, the appellant alleges infringement of Article 57 and of Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and of points 79 to 81 of the Practice Rules, read in conjunction with Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter.

44The Commission contends that the fourth ground of appeal should be rejected.

Findings of the Court

45In accordance with Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where the applicant for legal aid is not represented by a lawyer, a certified copy of the document to be served shall be served on him or her by registered post with a form for acknowledgement of receipt or by delivery of the copy against receipt.

46In that regard, the General Court found, in paragraphs 41 and 42 of the order under appeal, that the appellant had completed the application for legal aid herself and sent the original of that application to or lodged it at the General Court Registry in paper form and that, since the appellant had not provided the names of her lawyers before the order of 19 November 2021 was made, that order could not be sent to the address of her lawyers. It was on that basis that the General Court, first, held, in paragraph 43 of the order under appeal, that ‘the applicant does not dispute that she gave an address in [confidential: country A] in the application for legal aid and that the [order of 19 November 2021] was sent to her by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt to that address’. That finding is not called into question by the appellant in the present appeal proceedings.

47Secondly, the General Court found, in paragraph 44 of the order under appeal, that, ‘in [her] response to the measure of organisation of procedure adopted by the [General] Court on 7 April 2022, the [appellant] explains that she had concluded a contract with a service provider located in [confidential: country A] whose role was precisely to receive correspondence sent to her at the address mentioned in her application for legal aid’.

48The General Court inferred from that finding, also in paragraph 44, that ‘that service provider was duly mandated to receive correspondence addressed to the applicant’.

49As regard, in the first place, the alleged distortion of the evidence which is to have been committed by the General Court in making that finding, it must be borne in mind that, as is apparent from paragraph 28 above, a distortion must be clearly apparent from the documents in the case file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence and the appellant must indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in his or her view, led to that distortion.

50First of all, the appellant neither explains with the clarity and precision required how the General Court is to have distorted the contents of Annexes 3 and 4 to her letter of 12 April 2022 addressed to the General Court, namely, respectively, a reproduction of an envelope addressed to the appellant and the correspondence with the service provider, nor explains how that evidence is capable of supporting her statement relating to the scope of the mandate which she conferred on her service provider. That line of argument must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.

51Next, so far as concerns the claim that the acknowledgement of receipt of 26 November 2021 was not signed in the appellant’s name and that her service provider exceeded its mandate, it must be observed that, in paragraph 45 of the order under appeal, the General Court stated that, ‘in her response to the measure of organisation of procedure adopted by the [General] Court on 7 April 2022, the [appellant] also acknowledges that it was that service provider who signed, on 26 November 2021, the acknowledgement of receipt of the [order of 19 November 2021]. She even adds that the service provider was obliged to forward that order to her by means of an email’. The appellant does not put forward any argument such as to indicate any material inaccuracy in the General Court’s reading of her response to that measure of organisation of procedure, but seeks in fact to call in question the assessment of the facts made at first instance. That line of argument must therefore also be rejected as inadmissible.

52Lastly, as regards the line of argument derived from the provisions of the Postal Law [confidential: of country A], suffice it to state that the appellant does not state precisely which evidence the General Court is to have distorted. That line of argument must therefore also be rejected as inadmissible.

53In the second place, as regards an alleged infringement of Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, it is important to observe that that provision sets out the arrangements for service where the applicant for legal aid is not represented by a lawyer. In such a situation, as was recalled in paragraph 45 of the present judgment, a certified copy of the document to be served shall be served on him or her by registered post with a form for acknowledgement of receipt or by delivery of the copy against receipt.

54The General Court verified, in paragraphs 43 and 44 of the order under appeal, that the conditions provided for in Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court had been met, by finding, first, that the order of 19 November 2021 had been sent to the appellant by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt to the address she had given and, secondly, that it was apparent from the information provided by the appellant that the service provider that she had entrusted to receive in her name and on her behalf the correspondence sent to that address was duly mandated to that effect.

55On the basis of such findings, the General Court could hold, without infringing Article 148(9) of its Rules of Procedure, that service of the order of 19 November 2021 had been validly conducted. It was sufficient to ascertain that, in fact, the person who had received the document in question had done so in the name of and on behalf of the appellant and had at least an apparent mandate to that effect. It was not for the General Court to verify, in addition, that, in the present case, that person had acted within the limits of its mandate, such a fact falling exclusively within the scope of the contractual relationship between that person and the appellant.

56Article 148(9) of those rules does not lay down the conditions which must be met for service to be regarded as having been validly conducted in a situation where the applicant for legal aid has entrusted a third party with a mandate to receive his or her correspondence. The decision to enter into an agreement with a service provider in relation to the receipt and sending of correspondence falls within the appellant’s private sphere.

57Consequently, the scope of the obligations of the service provider under such an agreement cannot be assessed in the light of Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and the argument that such obligations are limited, where a decision relating to legal aid is sent, to the delivery, to the aid applicant, of an invitation to go to the nearest post office to collect in person the letter containing the order containing the order in relation to legal aid and to sign him or herself the acknowledgement of receipt, is irrelevant and must be rejected as unfounded.

58In the third place, so far as concerns the complaints alleging an infringement of Article 57 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and points 79 to 81 of the Practice Rules, read in conjunction with Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter, those complaints were raised by the appellant for the first time in the reply. Inasmuch as the appellant has not yet proved that those complaints are based on a matter of law or of fact which came to light in the course of the procedure, they must be regarded as having been made out of time and must, thus, be declared inadmissible, in accordance with Article 127(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to the procedure on appeal under Article 190(1) of those rules.

59Accordingly, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as in part unfounded and in part inadmissible.

The second part of the third ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

60By the second part of the third ground of appeal, the appellant first submits that the General Court erred in law and committed a manifest error of assessment in excluding, in paragraph 69 of the order under appeal, the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure, since, in paragraphs 63 and 64 of the order under appeal, it applied those concepts to the appellant’s situation in an incorrect way, by basing its reasoning on the Court of Justice’s case-law in relation to the obligations of senders. The appellant, as the recipient of the General Court’s decision on legal aid, was in a different situation.

61Next, she alleges the General Court erred in law in referring, in paragraphs 66 to 68 of the order under appeal, to the management of the appellant’s personal mailbox, without taking account of Article 57 of its Rules of Procedure.

62Lastly, the appellant argues that the General Court committed a manifest error of assessment by attributing to the appellant consequences for delays resulting from the acts and failures of the General Court Registry, without taking account of the time which was necessary for the service provider to resend the documents received while the appellant’s mailbox was full. In the reply, the appellant adds that the General Court’s failure to take into account the inactivity of that Registry or the steps which should have been taken by that registry also indicate interference with the proper administration of justice, infringement of points 22, 33, 38, 102, 104 and 205 of the Practice Rules and Annex 2 thereto and of Articles 36 to 38, 56 and 76, Article 147(7) and Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, read in conjunction with Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter.

63Furthermore, the appellant claims that her right of access to a court was affected, inasmuch as requirements beyond any reasonable expectation were imposed on her, infringing both Article 91 of the Staff Regulations and Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

64The Commission contends that the present part of the third ground of appeal should be rejected.

Findings of the Court

65In the first place, it is settled case-law that the strict application of procedural rules serves the requirements of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice (order of 31 May 2024, Good Services v EUIPO, C‑152/24 P, EU:C:2024:457, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited).

66In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, procedural time limits may be derogated from only in quite exceptional circumstances, unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure (order of 31 May 2024, Good Services v EUIPO, C‑152/24 P, EU:C:2024:457, paragraph 13).

67The appellant having claimed before the General Court that, on account of a technical error beyond her control, she was unable to access the email by which her service provider forwarded to her, on 26 November 2021, the order of 19 November 2021, the General Court held, in paragraph 62 of the order under appeal, that, by her argument, the appellant was relying on the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure preventing any loss of rights resulting from the expiry of the time limit for bringing proceedings, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

68The appellant does not dispute before the Court of Justice that characterisation of her arguments by the General Court.

69Consequently, the General Court was fully entitled, in order to assess the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure which could justify the application at first instance being lodged out of time, to point out in paragraph 63 of the order under appeal, referring to paragraph 37 of the judgment of 19 June 2019, RF v Commission (C‑660/17 P, EU:C:2019:509), that the concepts of ‘unforeseeable circumstances’ and ‘force majeure’, first, comprise the same elements and have the same legal consequences and, secondly, that those concepts include an objective element, relating to abnormal circumstances which are alien to the party relying upon them, and a subjective element relating to that party’s obligation to guard against the consequences of the abnormal event by taking appropriate measures without making excessive sacrifices.

70The General Court was also right to note, in paragraph 64 of the order under appeal, referring to paragraph 38 of the judgment of 19 June 2019, RF v Commission (C‑660/17 P, EU:C:2019:509), not only that the applicant must carefully monitor the progress of the proceedings and, in particular, exercise diligence in order to meet the time limits, but also that the concepts of ‘unforeseeable circumstances’ and ‘force majeure’ do not apply to a situation in which a diligent and informed person would objectively have been able to avoid the expiry of a time limit for bringing proceedings.

71Since the General Court’s analysis specifically concerned the arguments put forward by the appellant in order to justify lodging her application at first instance out of time, whereas she was the sender of that application and she was under, in that respect, an obligation to exercise diligence in order to avoid the expiry of the time limit for bringing proceedings, the fact that the circumstances at issue in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 19 June 2019, RF v Commission (C‑660/17 P, EU:C:2019:509) can be distinguished from those at the origin of the present case is irrelevant.

72Consequently, the line of argument alleging that the General Court, in the present case, incorrectly referred to the case-law of the Court of Justice on the concepts of ‘unforeseeable circumstances’ and ‘force majeure’ developed in the judgment of 19 June 2019, RF v Commission (C‑660/17 P, EU:C:2019:509), must be rejected as unfounded.

73In the second place, inasmuch as the appellant criticises the General Court for, in paragraphs 66 to 68 of the order under appeal, putting forward grounds based on the management of her mailbox, without taking into account the obligations in relation to the service of a document, stemming from Article 57 of its Rules of Procedure, it is sufficient to observe that those paragraphs of the order under appeal are intended to reply to the arguments raised by the appellant herself, by which she claimed the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure originating in the saturation of her mailbox. Therefore, the General Court cannot be criticised for having relied, inter alia, on the appellant’s poor management of her mailbox to justify its decision.

74As to the remainder, the line of argument in point 63 of the appeal by which the appellant claims that, in paragraphs 66 to 68 of the order under appeal, the General Court erred in law by ‘failing to apply [the] requirement of … postal delivery with … confirmation of receipt at the permanent address of the [appellant] as required by … Article 57 of the Rules [of Procedure]’, is not formulated in a manner sufficiently clear and precise to enable the Court of Justice to exercise its powers of judicial review and must, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 24 and 25 of the present judgment, be rejected as inadmissible.

75In the third place, inasmuch as the appellant alleges that the General Court committed a manifest error of assessment in attributing to the appellant the consequences of delays resulting allegedly from acts and failures of the General Court Registry, without taking account of the time required by the service provider to resend the documents to the appellant while her mailbox was full, it must be stated that the appellant does not thereby identify the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court when it examined the facts she relied upon and does not explain why the analysis of the time taken by the service provider was necessary in connection with the reasoning seeking to establish the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure following from the saturation of her mailbox. That argument, which is not supported by sufficient details, must be rejected as inadmissible.

76In the fourth place, the complaints raised by the appellant in her reply, set out in paragraphs 62 and 63 of the present judgment, must be rejected as inadmissible, since they are not stated with the required clarity and precision and are, in any event, new within the meaning of Article 127(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to the appeal proceedings under Article 190(1) of those rules.

77Accordingly, the second part of the third ground of appeal must be rejected as, in part, inadmissible and, in part, unfounded.

The first and second grounds of appeal and the first part of the third ground of appeal

First part of the third ground of appeal

–Arguments of the parties

According to settled case-law, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice when examining an appeal is limited to the legal review of findings made in relation to the pleas and arguments debated before the General Court. A party cannot, therefore, put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the General Court since that would allow that party to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeal proceedings is limited, a wider case than that heard by the General Court (judgment of 30 November 2023, Sistem ecologica v Commission, C‑787/22 P, EU:C:2023:940, paragraph 136 and the case-law cited).

96Accordingly, inasmuch as the third ground of appeal is based on an alleged error of law and an alleged breach of the principle of good administration, resulting from the fact that the General Court did not request that the application for legal aid be put in order, it must be rejected as inadmissible.

97Lastly, in so far as the appellant, in the reply, relies on an infringement of points 22, 33, 38, 102, 104 and 205 of the Practice Rules and Annex 2 thereto, Articles 36 to 38 and 56, 76, 147 and 148 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, read in conjunction with Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter, and Article 91 of the Staff Regulations, those complaints must be rejected as inadmissible, since they are not stated with the required clarity and precision and are, in any event, new, within the meaning of Article 127(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to appeal proceedings under Article 190(1) of those rules.

98The first part of the third ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as partly inadmissible and partly unfounded.

The second ground of appeal and the first to third and seventh parts of the first ground of appeal

–Arguments of the parties

99In support of her second ground of appeal, the appellant claims, first, that, in failing to provide reasons for its conclusion in paragraph 82 of the order under appeal, according to which the error of the General Court Registry referred to in paragraph 81 of that order could not be regarded as having been, to a decisive extent, of such a nature as to give rise to a pardonable confusion in the mind of the appellant, the General Court breached its duty to state reasons.

100Secondly, the appellant alleges the General Court committed an error of law and a manifest error of assessment in holding that the fact that it communicated with the appellant using her address in [confidential: country B] throughout the proceedings was not, to a decisive extent, of such a nature as to cause pardonable confusion.

101Thirdly, the appellant claims that the General Court breached the principles of good administration and legitimate expectations by refusing, in paragraph 82 of the order under appeal, to take responsibility for the result of its error, an error which it had acknowledged in paragraph 81 of the order. That error gave rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the appellant as to the address at which the order of 19 November 2021 would be sent to her, being the address which the General Court had used to communicate with her throughout the proceedings.

102Fourthly, the appellant argues that the General Court’s finding in paragraph 83 of the order under appeal that the appellant had no assurance that the order of 19 November 2021 would be sent to her in [confidential: country B] constitutes an error of law, a manifest error of assessment, a breach of the right to good administration, a breach of the duty to state reasons and a breach of the principle of legitimate expectations. Moreover, that consideration by the General Court is based on the finding, made in the same paragraph of the order under appeal, that the appellant had provided solely one postal address, namely in [confidential: country A], which results from a distortion of the evidence. That is attested to, in particular, by the fact that her address in [confidential: country B] had been used by the General Court Registry.

103In the first part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that, in paragraphs 90 and 92 of the order under appeal, the General Court distorted the evidence, in classifying the two documents referred to in paragraphs 84 to 86 of that order exclusively as ‘additional material’ within the meaning of point 205 of the Practice Rules, whereas those two documents related to the proof of sending of two handwritten letters by which the appellant had sent a request for a change of her address to the General Court Registry. That error of law constitutes both a restriction on the freedom of movement for persons and a breach of the rights to good administration and to a fair trial.

104Furthermore, the General Court distorted the evidence in holding, in paragraph 84 of the order under appeal, that the second postal document established the dispatch of a registered letter from the same address in [confidential: country A] as that which appeared on the legal aid application form, whereas the only address which that second document could have referred to as ‘available’ to the appellant was her address in [confidential: country B].

105In support of the second part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant argues that, in paragraph 88 of the order under appeal, the General Court incorrectly concluded that it was not possible to determine which postal document in relation to proof of dispatch by registered mail corresponded to each of the two handwritten letters in question, respectively, and, accordingly, to assess at what dates those letters were received, respectively, by the General Court Registry. According to the appellant, the first handwritten letter is logically that by which she requested that her postal address be updated and the second is that by which she requested the General Court Registry to send all communication to her at that address. Indeed, that conclusion by the General Court is contradicted by the fact that, in paragraph 89 of the order under appeal, it itself accepted that the second handwritten letter had been received on 7 January 2022. In that regard, the appellant also observed that that alleged uncertainty would not have existed had the General Court included the letters concerned in the file.

106In the third part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that, by the finding made in paragraph 83 of the order under appeal, that, in the legal aid application, the appellant had consented to the order ruling on that application being sent to her at her address in [confidential: country A], the only address given in the application concerned, the General Court distorted the evidence and committed a manifest error of assessment and an error of law. In that regard, the appellant refers to paragraph 81 of the order under appeal, from which it is purportedly apparent that, contrary to that finding, the two postal addresses were included in the legal aid application, and not only the address in [confidential: country A]. Under Articles 76 and 147 and Article 148(9) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and points 102 and 104 of the Practice Rules and Annex 2 thereto, in that situation, the Registry should have requested that the appellant’s postal address be put in order.

107Furthermore, the appellant adds that paragraph 83 of the order under appeal implies that she had consented to the use of her address in [confidential: country A] in November 2021, whereas that is no way apparent from the events described or from the evidence she subsequently submitted.

108By the seventh part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that, in the last sentences of paragraphs 84 and 87 of the order under appeal, the General Court distorted the evidence, namely Annex 2, pages 8 and 9, to the letter sent by registered mail of 27 December 2021 which contained, contrary to what the General Court held, the reference to the address of the appellant in [confidential: country B], for the purposes of receiving her correspondence at that address.

109The Commission contends that the second ground of appeal and the first to third and seventh parts of the first ground of appeal should be rejected.

–Findings of the Court

110By her arguments, the appellant challenges the grounds set out in paragraphs 82 to 84, 87, 88, 90 and 92 of the order under appeal by which the General Court assessed whether the information on the status of the legal aid proceedings available on the Court of Justice’s website and the dispatch, by the General Court, of the acknowledgment of receipt of her application for legal aid to her habitual residence, namely in [confidential: country B], and the exchanges of correspondence with the General Court Registry were of such a nature, to a decisive extent, as to cause confusion in the appellant’s mind regarding the expiry date of the time limits for bringing proceedings against the contested decisions.

111First, as stated in paragraphs 83 and 85 of the present judgment, the General Court legitimately held, in paragraphs 75 and 76 of the order under appeal that, if the appellant had taken appropriate measures to avoid the consequences of the saturation of her personal mailbox, the failures she attributed to the General Court Registry would not have prevented her from complying with the time limits for bringing proceedings and that, as a result, the appellant had not exercised all the diligence required of a normally well-informed person.

112Secondly, the assessment made by the General Court according to which the appellant had not exercised all the diligence required was sufficient in order not to accept the existence of an excusable error, as held in paragraph 88 of the present judgment.

113Therefore, the complaints concerning the General Court’s assessment of the arguments in relation to the status of the legal aid proceedings available on the Court of Justice’s website and the dispatch, by the General Court, of the acknowledgement of receipt of the appellant’s application for legal aid to her habitual residence, namely in [confidential: country B], and to the correspondence with the Registry of the General Court are ineffective, inasmuch as they concern grounds of the order under appeal stated, as opposed to paragraphs 75 and 76 of that order, for the sake of completeness. The superfluous nature of those grounds is confirmed by the use of the words ‘in any event’ at the beginning of paragraph 77 of the order under appeal.

114The second ground of appeal and the first to third and seventh parts of the first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as ineffective.

The fourth to sixth parts of the first ground of appeal

–Arguments of the parties

115The fourth part of the first ground of appeal is based on a manifest error of assessment and an error of law stemming from a failure to recognise the actual permanent address of the appellant and its change in the course of the proceedings. The order under appeal implies, first, that the appellant gave her irrevocable consent to the use of her address in [confidential: country A] throughout the proceedings, whereas that is not explicitly supported by any evidence and, secondly, that the General Court Registry thus has a discretionary choice to use one or the other of those two addresses, which is inconsistent with Article 76(a), Article 177(1)(a) or Article 194(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Moreover, the appellant’s two postal addresses were used in parallel, whereas Articles 76 and 147 of those Rules of Procedure require the use of a single address.

116Besides committing a manifest error of assessment, the General Court erred in law by denying the appellant the possibility to change, during the course of the proceedings, her postal address in [confidential: country A] in the legal aid application form, to replace it with that of her permanent residence in [confidential: country B], even though, at that latter address, the appellant acknowledged, by her handwritten signature, the receipt of the correspondence of 3 September 2021. According to the appellant, the General Court in so doing infringed Articles 76 and 147 of its Rules of Procedure and points 102 and 104 of the Practice Rules and Annex 2 thereto.

117The fifth part of the first ground of appeal is based on a manifest error of assessment and an error of law stemming from a failure to put the appellant’s postal address in order. The appellant thus alleges the General Court infringed point 102 of the Practice Rules and Annex 2(a) thereto, read in conjunction with Articles 76 and 147 and Article 148(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, inasmuch as it did not check the address of the appellant’s permanent residence before serving the order of 19 November 2021 and did not prescribe a reasonable time limit within which to put the application for legal aid in order, at the start of the procedure when inconsistencies were discovered. According to the appellant, in using an address at which the appellant did not reside, the General Court breached her right to receive timely and accurate correspondence about the proceedings and her rights to a fair trial and of access to a court.

118The sixth part of the first ground of appeal alleges infringement of points 22, 33 and 38 of the Practice Rules and Articles 36 to 38 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, a manifest error of assessment, a breach of the principle of good administration and of the right to a fair trial and distortion of evidence as regards the service of the appellant’s correspondence on the General Court and the rejection of proof of postal dispatches provided by the appellant.

119The appellant thereby alleges that, in reaction to the acknowledgement of receipt of her application for legal aid, she explicitly chose her address for correspondence in [confidential: country B]. In that regard, the appellant also submits that her correspondence, which referred exclusively to her address in [confidential: country B], and the acknowledgment of receipt of the application for legal aid clearly indicated that that address would henceforth be the one used during the proceedings. Thus, failure to take account of the proofs of dispatch of the registered letters sent to the General Court Registry constitutes an infringement of points 22, 33 and 38 of the Practice Rules and Articles 36 to 38 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

120The Commission submits that the fourth to sixth parts of the first ground of appeal are inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.

–Findings of the Court

121It is sufficient to observe that, since the appellant does not state at which paragraphs of the order under appeal the fourth to sixth parts of the first ground of appeal are directed, the latter do not satisfy the requirements set out by the case-law cited in paragraphs 24 to 26 of the present judgment and must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.

122Since none of the grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant in support of her appeal is capable of succeeding, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

123Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs. Article 138(1) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings pursuant to Article 184(1) thereof, provides that the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

124Since the Commission has applied for costs and XH has been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to pay the costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Sixth Chamber) hereby:

1.Dismisses the appeal;

2.Orders XH to pay the costs.

von Danwitz

Kumin

Ziemele

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 27 March 2025.

Registrar

President

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Language of the case: English.