Official Journal of the European Union

C series

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C/2024/4708

5.8.2024

(Case C-243/24 P)

(C/2024/4708)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: WV (represented by: É. Boigelot, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European External Action Service

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the court should:

—set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 24 January 2024, WV v EEAS, T-371/21, not published, EU:T:2024:35, in so far as that court dismissed her initial action seeking (i) the annulment of the decision of EEAS of 26 August 2020 by which it imposed on her the penalty of removal from post without a reduction of pension rights, and (ii) compensation for all the harm which she allegedly suffered, and ordered the appellant to pay the costs;

—order the defendant at first instance to pay all the costs, including those incurred before the General Court of the European Union, in accordance with Article 184 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union;

—remit the case to the General Court of the European Union so that it can issue a ruling on the appellant’s initial action.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on two principal grounds of appeal.

In the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the formation of the General Court that delivered the judgment under appeal does not meet the requirements of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and of Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, both of which enshrine the principle of the lawful judge; nor does that formation meet the requirements of second paragraph of Article 18 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in so far as one of the judges in the chamber that delivered the judgment under appeal should have recused himself or automatically stood aside or been required to do so by the President of the General Court, since he could not provide all the guarantees of impartiality that both the principle of the lawful judge and the principle of due process require of him.

One of the judges who delivered the judgment under appeal had previously worked in the department of, and in contact with a Member of the EEAS who had the power of the Appointing Authority and had, like that judge, previously been posted to a Permanent Representation within the European Union. At the least that legitimately gives rise to fears that, given the essential recitals that the judgment under appeal contains, it was not delivered with the complete independence required, contrary to that ground.

In the second ground of appeal, which is divided into four branches which may be combined, the appellant claims that, when it issued the judgment under appeal, the General Court manifestly failed to apply and interpret correctly the following rules and principles:

—First part: misinterpretation of the facts in the judgment under appeal, manifest errors of assessment, contradictions in the statement of reasons and inaccurate legal consequences;

—Second part: infringement of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court, of Article 120(c) and (d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, and of Article 76(1)(d) and (e) and Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, misuse of powers by the General Court and infringement of Article 270 TFEU and of Article 91 of the Statute, infringement of the prohibition on issuing rulings that are *ultra petita*;

—Third part: infringement of the principle of *res judicata*;

—Fourth part: failure to take into account all of the documents in the file and pleas in law of the appellant, failure to have regard to the principle of the unfettered evaluation of evidence, and the concept of a body of consistent evidence and, therefore, failure to have regard to the rules relating to the burden of proof.

According to the appellant, the court at first instance knowingly ignored a number of arguments and documents by failing to take all of them into account in a comprehensive and coherent manner, or gave unlawful effect to them either by manifestly assessing them incorrectly or by misinterpreting the facts that were presented to it, or by failing to take them into account.

The appellant also claims that the General Court intentionally and radically amended one of the essential reasons in the removal decision initially contested by the appellant, thereby supplementing that decision and amending the substance of what had been brought before it, thereby going beyond its power which prohibited it from substituting its own reasoning for that of the Appointing Authority in the decision at issue before it. By doing so, the court at first instance also went so far as to circumvent a judgment of the Court of Justice that had become final between the same parties, which rejected that reasoning relied on by the Appointing Authority which had specifically been substantially changed by the court at first instance.

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ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4708/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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