29.9.2014

Official Journal of the European Union

C 339/14

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(Case C-361/14 P)

2014/C 339/16

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: A. Bouquet, A. Szmytkowska, Agents, B. Doherty, Barrister)

Other parties to the proceedings: Peter McBride, Hugh McBride, Mullglen Ltd, Cathal Boyle, Thomas Flaherty, Ocean Trawlers Ltd, Patrick Fitzpatrick, Eamon McHugh, Eugene Hannigan, Larry Murphy and Brendan Gill

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 13 May 2014 in Joined cases T-458/10 to T-467/10 and T-471/10 Peter McBride and others v European Commission

—reject the annulment action, and in any case the first plea

—or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union for adjudication on the pleas raised before it on which the Court of Justice of the European Union has not ruled, and

—order the applicants at first instance to pay the costs of the appeal and the procedure before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission maintains that the judgment under appeal should be set aside on the following grounds:

First, the General Court misinterpreted and misapplied Article 266 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’ or ‘the Treaty’) in conjunction with Article 263 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness, the principle of conferral of powers, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of continuity of the legal order, the temporal application of law, the principle of legitimate expectations and the principles governing succession of legal rules, insofar as it annulled certain Commission decisions intended to carry out the Commission’s obligations under the judgments in Joined Cases T-218/03 to T-241/03, Boyle and others v Commission and Joined Cases C-373/06 P, C-379/06 P and C-382/06 P, Flaherty and others v Commission. The contested judgment finds that the Commission had a duty to take the necessary measures to comply with those judgments but that it had no competence to do so.

Second, the General Court failed to give proper reasons for its judgment and to respond to a central argument of the Commission (as well as a question about admissibility in one case). It thus breached Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

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