30 January 2025 (*)

( Action for annulment – Plant protection products – Active substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam – Determination of maximum residue levels for the relevant active substances in or on certain products – Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 – Lawfulness of the authority to act given to the applicant’s lawyers – No direct concern – Inadmissibility )

In Case T‑247/23,

established in Kolkata (India), represented by D. Waelbroeck and I. Antypas, lawyers,

applicant,

European Commission,

represented by F. Castilla Contreras, J. Norris and M. ter Haar, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber),

composed of L. Truchot (Rapporteur), President, H. Kanninen and M. Sampol Pucurull, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

makes the following

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Maud Tea & Seed Co. Ltd, seeks the annulment, primarily, of Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/334 of 2 February 2023 amending Annexes II and V to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards maximum residue levels for clothianidin and thiamethoxam in or on certain products (OJ 2023 L 47, p. 29, corrigendum OJ 2023 L 96, p. 89; ‘the contested regulation’) in its entirety or, in the alternative, of the contested regulation as regards those limits applicable to teas.

Background to the dispute

The applicant is a company established in India whose activities include the production and marketing of tea.

Clothianidin and thiamethoxam (‘the substances at issue’) are active substances belonging to the neonicotinoid family which are used as insecticides in agriculture for seed coating.

Clothianidin and thiamethoxam were included in Annex I to Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (OJ 1991 L 230, p. 1), since 1 August 2006 and 1 February 2007 respectively by Commission Directive 2006/41/EC of 7 July 2006 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC to include clothianidin and pethoxamid as active substances (OJ 2006 L 187, p. 24), and Commission Directive 2007/6/EC of 14 February 2007 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC to include metrafenone, Bacillus subtilis, spinosad and thiamethoxam as active substances (OJ 2007 L 43, p. 13).

The active substances listed in Annex I to Directive 91/414 are deemed to have been approved under Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1) and are listed in Part A of the annex to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 of 25 May 2011 implementing Regulation No 1107/2009 as regards the list of approved active substances (OJ 2011 L 153, p. 1).

Expiry of the approval of the substances at issue

On account of the risks to bees arising from the use of the substances at issue, the European Commission has progressively restricted the conditions for approval of those substances.

First, on 24 May 2013, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 485/2013 amending Implementing Regulation No 540/2011, as regards the conditions of approval of the active substances clothianidin, thiamethoxam and imidacloprid, and prohibiting the use and sale of seeds treated with plant protection products containing those active substances (OJ 2013 L 139, p. 12).

Second, on 29 May 2018, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/784 amending Implementing Regulation No 540/2011 as regards the conditions of approval of the active substance clothianidin (OJ 2018 L 132, p. 35) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/785 amending Implementing Regulation No 540/2011 as regards the conditions of approval of the active substance thiamethoxam (OJ 2018 L 132, p. 40). By those two implementing regulations, the Commission, inter alia, restricted the approval of the substances at issue solely to uses in permanent greenhouses and provided that the crops obtained remain in a permanent greenhouse throughout their life cycle.

The approvals of clothianidin and thiamethoxam expired on 31 January 2019 and 30 April 2019 respectively and were not renewed, with the result that the use of the substances at issue is now prohibited within the European Union.

Amendment of the maximum residue levels of the substances at issue

Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin and amending Directive 91/414 (OJ 2005 L 70, p. 1) lays down provisions on maximum residue levels (‘MRLs’) of pesticides in or on products of plant or animal origin covered by Annex I thereto for use as fresh, processed and/or composite food or feed (‘the relevant products’).

The MRLs for the substances at issue applicable to teas are set at 0.7 mg/kg for clothianidin and 20 mg/kg for thiamethoxam.

On account of the growing international concerns linked to the decline of pollinators, on the one hand, and the expiry of the approval of the substances at issue referred to in paragraph 9 above, on the other, the Commission adopted the contested regulation on 2 February 2023. Under that regulation, the MRLs for the substances at issue present in or on the relevant products were lowered to the limit of determination, the latter being defined by Article 3(2)(f) of Regulation No 396/2005 as the validated lowest residue concentration which can be quantified and reported by routine monitoring with validated control methods.

To that end, the annex to the contested regulation provides, first, for the deletion of the columns relating to the substances at issue in Annex II to Regulation No 396/2005 and, second, for the addition of columns relating to those substances in Annex V to that regulation.

Pursuant to the contested regulation, the MRLs for the substances at issue applicable to teas were reduced to 0.05 mg/kg.

The contested regulation states that it applies from 7 March 2026, it being noted that the old MRLs for the substances at issue continue to apply to products manufactured in or imported into the European Union before that date.

Procedure and forms of order sought

The applicant claims, in the final form of its pleadings, that the Court should:

–annul the contested regulation in its entirety or, in the alternative, in so far as it lowers the MRLs for the substances at issue in or on teas;

–order the Commission to pay the costs of these proceedings.

By documents lodged at the General Court Registry on 25 and 28 September and 4 October 2023 respectively, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament and the French Republic applied for leave to intervene in the present proceedings in support of the form of order sought by the Commission.

By document lodged at the Court Registry on 4 October 2023, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Canada Grains Council, the International Fresh Produce Association, the Minor Crop Farmer Alliance, the National Cotton Council of America, the U.S. Grains Council and the USA Rice Federation applied for leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the applicant. By document lodged at the Court Registry on 5 October 2023, CropLife International applied for leave to intervene for the same purpose.

By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 23 October 2023, the Commission raised a plea of inadmissibility on the basis of Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, in which it claims that the Court should:

–dismiss the action as inadmissible;

–order the applicant to pay the costs.

In its observations on the plea of inadmissibility, the applicant claims that the Court should reject that plea or, in the alternative, reserve its judgment until the final ruling in the proceedings.

By a measure of organisation of procedure of 16 May 2024, the Court put written questions to the applicant, to which the applicant replied within the prescribed period.

Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure, on the application of the defendant by separate document, the Court may decide on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case.

In the present case, as the Commission has applied for a decision on inadmissibility, the Court, finding that it has sufficient information from the documents in the case file, has decided to rule on that application without taking further steps in the proceedings.

In support of the plea of inadmissibility, the Commission raises, in essence, four pleas of inadmissibility, alleging (i) doubts as to the lawfulness of the authority to act issued by the applicant to its lawyers, (ii) the applicant’s lack of standing to bring proceedings, (iii) the applicant’s lack of interest in bringing proceedings and (iv) that the form of order sought by the applicant, submitted in the alternative, does not comply with the formal requirements of Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure.

The first plea of inadmissibility, alleging doubts as to the lawfulness of the authority to act given by the applicant to its lawyers

The Commission submits that the applicant has not provided proof that the authority to act given to its lawyers was signed by a person authorised to do so. In particular, it points out that that authority to act was signed by the applicant’s director of operations and plantations, even though he does not appear to be one of its legal representatives.

The applicant disputes that line of argument.

Under Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that statute and Article 51(1) of the Rules of Procedure, legal persons must, in order to be able to bring proceedings before the Courts of the European Union, be represented by a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area.

In particular, Article 51(3) of the Rules of Procedure provides that where the party represented by a lawyer is a legal person governed by private law, the lawyer must lodge at the Registry an authority to act given by that person. Unlike the version of that regulation applicable before 1 July 2015, that provision does not require such a person to provide proof that the authority to act given to his or her lawyer was conferred on him or her lawfully by someone authorised for that purpose (judgment of 8 February 2024, Pilatus Bank v ECB, C‑750/21 P, EU:C:2024:124, paragraph 35).

However, the Court of Justice has already held that the fact that Article 51(3) of the Rules of Procedure does not lay down such an obligation does not mean that the General Court need not verify whether the authority concerned is lawful where such authority is challenged. The fact that, at the stage of lodging its action, an applicant does not have to provide that proof does not affect the obligation on that party lawfully to have provided its lawyer with authority to act in order to be able to bring proceedings. The fact that the evidence requirements at the time of lodging an action have been relaxed has no bearing on the substantive condition that the parties must be duly represented by their lawyers. Accordingly, in the event of a challenge to the lawfulness of the authority to act given by a party to its lawyer, that party must demonstrate that that authority to act is lawful (see judgment of 8 February 2024, Pilatus Bank v ECB, C‑750/21 P, EU:C:2024:124, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

In the present case, it should be noted that the applicant’s lawyers, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51(3) of the Rules of Procedure, lodged at the Court Registry an authority to act issued on 20 April 2023 by the applicant which authorised them to bring the present action.

Admittedly, that authority to act was signed by A, the applicant’s director of operations and plantations, without specifying whether that status authorised him to sign such a document.

However, it is sufficient to note that, in response to the doubts expressed by the Commission, the applicant provided evidence to show that that authority to act had been properly conferred in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 29 above.

In particular, it is apparent from Article 135(7) of the applicant’s articles of association that the applicant’s directors have the power to initiate any legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of the applicant.

The applicant produced a copy of the resolution of its board of directors, dated 5 April 2023, authorising A to take ‘all such steps and actions as may be deemed necessary for [handling and] filing legal case etc., in the General Court of the European Union and to sign and submit various document[s] … and to make application … on behalf of the [applicant] before the [General Court].’

It follows that the authority to act lodged at the Court Registry by the applicant’s lawyers was issued by a person authorised to do so, with the result that the first plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must be rejected.

The second plea of inadmissibility, alleging that the applicant has no standing to bring proceedings

In support of the second plea of inadmissibility, the Commission submits that the applicant is not directly concerned by the contested regulation, since that regulation has no effect on its legal situation.

In particular, according to the Commission, the contested regulation merely sets a qualitative requirement applicable to the relevant products. It therefore does not introduce any prohibition, first, on the cultivation, import or placing on the EU market of those products or, second, on the use of the substances at issue. In any event, the applicant has not shown that it uses the substances at issue and that it exports and places the relevant products on the EU market.

The applicant disputes those arguments and submits that the contested regulation directly affects its legal situation.

First, the applicant refutes the doubts expressed by the Commission as regards the nature of its activities. It thus demonstrated its status as an exporting producer of tea active in the placing of the relevant products on the EU market and the use of the substances at issue in the context of its tea production activity. To that end, it relies, inter alia, on the judgments of 18 May 2022, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission (T‑245/19, EU:T:2022:295), and of 13 July 2022, Delifruit v Commission (T‑629/20, EU:T:2022:448), in which the Court accepted that companies from third countries which exported their products to the European Union had standing to bring proceedings.

Second, contrary to what the Commission maintains, the contested regulation does not merely introduce a qualitative requirement applicable to the relevant products which does not affect any rights of operators. In particular, the applicant considers that the contested regulation introduces new MRLs for the substances at issue, which must be complied with by all operators in third countries that grow and export relevant products to the European Union. The modification of MRLs by that regulation thus imposes a new, less favourable obligation on those operators, whose relevant products are intended for the EU market. In order to comply with those new MRLs, the applicant submits that it will be required to adapt its farming and plant protection practices, failing which it will have to cease its exports to the European Union. In any event, the applicant submits that, for the reasons set out above, the contested regulation also produces direct effects on its material situation that may be taken into account for the purposes of assessing the condition of direct concern.

Preliminary observations

41Under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs of that article, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person (first situation) or which is of direct and individual concern to them (second situation), and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures (third situation).

42In the present case, it is common ground that the contested regulation is not addressed to the applicant, with the result that it is not the addressee thereof.

43The applicant cannot therefore rely on standing to bring proceedings under the first situation provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

44In those circumstances, it is necessary to examine whether the applicant’s standing to bring proceedings may be established under the second or third situations provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, which allow natural or legal persons to bring an action against an act that is not addressed to them. Under the second situation, such an action may be brought provided that the act is of direct and individual concern to the applicant. In the third situation, such persons may bring proceedings against a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures if that act is of direct concern to them (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 December 2013, Telefónica v Commission, C‑274/12 P, EU:C:2013:852, paragraph 19, and of 13 March 2018, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, C‑384/16 P, EU:C:2018:176, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

45In that regard, it must be stated that both the conditions in the second situation (direct and individual concern) and those in the third situation (direct concern by a regulatory act which does not entail implementing measures) laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU are cumulative (see order of 8 October 2015, Agrotikos Synetairismos Profitis Ilias v Council, T‑731/14, not published, EU:T:2015:821, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

46Since direct concern is a condition of admissibility common to the two situations referred to in paragraph 44 above, it is necessary to ascertain, first, whether such a condition is satisfied in the present case.

As regards the condition of direct concern

47According to the Court’s settled case-law, the condition that a natural or legal person must be directly concerned by the decision against which the action is brought, laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, requires two cumulative criteria to be met, namely, first, the contested measure must directly affect the legal situation of the individual and, second, it must leave no discretion to its addressees who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from the EU rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules (see judgments of 5 May 1998, Dreyfus v Commission, C‑386/96 P, EU:C:1998:193, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited; of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, C‑348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited; and of 17 January 2024, Troy Chemical Company and Troy v Commission, T‑297/21, not published, EU:T:2024:13, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

48Furthermore, it must be stated that the mere fact that a measure may exercise an influence on an applicant’s substantive situation cannot be sufficient ground, contrary to what the applicant claims, for that applicant to be regarded as directly concerned by the measure (see judgment of 21 October 2021, Lípidos Santiga v Commission, C‑402/20 P, not published, EU:C:2021:872, paragraphs 20 to 26 and the case-law cited, and order of 9 November 2016, Biofa v Commission, T‑746/15, EU:T:2016:658, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

49The Commission’s main argument, on which the second plea of inadmissibility is based, concerns the first criterion referred to in paragraph 47 above, which is not satisfied in the present case.

50In so far as the parties disagree as to the nature of the effects produced by the contested regulation (see paragraphs 37 and 40 above), it is necessary to specify, first, the nature of such effects before examining, second, whether the applicant’s legal situation is directly affected by them.

–The nature of the effects produced by the contested regulation

51In order to determine whether a measure produces legal effects, it is necessary to look in particular to its purpose, its content, its scope, its substance and the legal and factual context in which it was adopted (judgment of 22 June 2021, Venezuela v Council (Whether a third State is affected), C‑872/19 P, EU:C:2021:507, paragraph 66).

52In the first place, as is apparent from its title and Article 1, the purpose of the contested regulation is to amend Annexes II and V to Regulation No 396/2005 as regards MRLs for the substances at issue present in or on the relevant products.

53More specifically, the contested regulation provides, first, for the deletion of the columns relating to the substances at issue in Annex II to Regulation No 396/2005 and, second, for the addition of columns relating to those substances in Annex V to that regulation (see paragraph 13 above).

54In that regard, it should be noted that Annex V to Regulation No 396/2005 contains the list of active substances subject to a limit of determination, as defined in paragraph 12 above.

55In the present case, the contested regulation lowers to the limit of determination the MRLs for the substances at issue applicable to the relevant products (recital 14 of the contested regulation). That limit corresponds, for some of those products, to the default value (0.01 mg/kg) and, for others, to specific limits of determination which have been validated, after analysis, by the EU reference laboratories (recital 15 of the contested regulation).

56Thus, as regards teas in particular, the MRLs for the substances at issue, which had previously been set at 0.7 mg/kg for clothianidin and 20 mg/kg for thiamethoxam, were lowered to 0.05 mg/kg by the contested regulation (see paragraphs 11 and 14 above).

57Furthermore, it is apparent from Articles 2 and 3 of the contested regulation that that regulation is applicable from 7 March 2026, it being specified, however, that the old MRLs will continue to apply to products manufactured in or imported into the European Union before that date.

58It follows that, under the contested regulation, the MRLs for the substances at issue applicable to teas will, from that date, be lowered to the limit of determination, corresponding to a value of 0.05 mg/kg.

59In the second place, in so far as the contested regulation merely amends Annexes II and V to Regulation No 396/2005, its effects must also be assessed in the light of that regulation.

60In the present case, Regulation No 396/2005 lays down, in accordance with the general principles set out in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ 2002 L 31, p. 1), provisions relating to MRLs for pesticides present, inter alia, in or on food (see recital 9 of the contested regulation and Article 1 of Regulation No 396/2005).

61Thus, Regulation No 396/2005, as amended by the contested regulation, forms part of EU food law, the general principles of which are established, at EU level, by Regulation No 178/2002 (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 January 2017, Queisser Pharma (C‑282/15, EU:C:2017:26, paragraph 48).

62Under Article 5(2) of Regulation No 178/2002, the general objectives pursued by food law include the free movement, within the European Union, of foods manufactured and marketed in accordance with the general principles and requirements laid down in that regulation.

63In particular, Article 11 of Regulation No 178/2002 provides that food imported into the European Union in order to be placed on the market there must comply with the relevant requirements of food law.

64It follows that food imported into the European Union must comply with the MRLs established by Regulation No 396/2005.

65In that regard, Paragraph 1 of Article 18 of Regulation No 396/2005, entitled ‘Compliance with MRLs’, provides as follows:

‘1. The [relevant] products shall not contain, from the time they are placed on the market as food or feed, or fed to animals, any pesticide residue exceeding:

(a) the MRLs for those products set out in Annexes II and III;

(b) 0.01 mg/kg for those products for which no specific MRL is set out in Annexes II or III, or for active substances not listed in Annex IV unless different default values are fixed for an active substance, while taking into account the routine analytical methods available. Such default values shall be listed in Annex V. …’

66It follows that the placing on the EU market of the relevant products as foodstuffs is subject to the condition that the MRLs laid down in Regulation No 396/2005 are complied with.

67Thus, a relevant product whose level of residues of the substances at issue exceeds the MRLs amended by the contested regulation cannot, from 7 March 2026, be placed on the EU market.

68In those circumstances, the Commission cannot maintain that the contested regulation merely sets a ‘qualitative requirement’ applicable to the relevant products which does not affect the rights of operators placing such products on the EU market.

69In the third place, it should be noted that the objective of the contested regulation, as is apparent in particular from recitals 6, 7 and 10 to 12 thereof, is to protect pollinators worldwide from the risks associated with the use of the substances at issue.

70In so far as the approval of the substances at issue has expired within the European Union (see paragraph 9 above), it follows that the contested regulation applies, primarily, to products imported into the European Union which may contain residues resulting from the use of those substances.

71Thus, recital 12 of the contested regulation states that, in so far as good agricultural practices involving outdoor uses of the substances at issue are not acceptable, in the light of current scientific and technical knowledge, due to their effects on bees, it is necessary to ensure that products imported into the European Union do not contain residues resulting from those good agricultural practices. According to that recital, it is necessary to avoid the transfer of adverse effects on bees from food production in the European Union to production of food in other parts of the world that is then imported into the European Union.

72Such measures are, according to that recital, appropriate to ensure that all products produced or consumed in the European Union are free from the substances at issue and that production is not associated with pollinator mortality.

73To that end, recital 19 of the contested regulation provides for the introduction of a reasonable period before the modified MRLs are applied in order to permit operators in third countries, especially in least developed and developing countries, and food business operators to prepare themselves to meet the new requirements which will result from them.

74It follows from those factors that the contested regulation refers more specifically to products imported into the European Union in order to protect, at international level, pollinators from the adverse effects associated with the use of the substances at issue.

75The foregoing considerations are, in the fourth place, supported by the context in which the contested regulation was adopted.

76In that regard, it should be noted that that regulation implements the Commission’s new approach, set out in its ‘farm to fork’ strategy (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 20 May 2020, entitled ‘A farm to fork strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’, COM(2020) 381 final).

77The objective pursued by that strategy is, inter alia, to ensure the transition to a sustainable food system within the European Union that can take into consideration the requirements linked, in particular, to the protection of the environment established in the ‘European Green Deal’ (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 11 December 2019, COM(2019) 640 final).

78The contested regulation pursues such an objective in so far as, as stated in paragraph 69 above, it seeks to address a worldwide environmental concern, namely the decline of pollinators.

79It is in that context that the Commission stated that the approach of taking into account environmental considerations ‘will also apply to food produced outside the [European Union], as imported products must meet the EU requirements to be placed on the market in the European Union, including compliance with the [MRLs] for pesticides’ and that, ‘[when the contested regulation has been adopted,] imported food containing measurable residues [of the substances at issue] can – after certain transitional periods – no longer be marketed in the [European Union]’ (Commission document of 22 June 2022, entitled ‘Questions and answers – Farm to fork: New rules to reduce the risk and use of pesticides in the EU’).

80Thus, the MRLs for the substances at issue, amended by the contested regulation, are intended to apply only to the relevant products which will be placed on the EU market.

81It follows from all of the foregoing that the contested regulation has the effect of prohibiting the placing on the EU market of the relevant products whose level of residues of the substances at issue exceeds, as from 7 March 2026, the MRLs amended by that regulation.

82It is in the light of those factors that it must be determined whether the applicant’s legal situation is directly affected by the contested regulation and, in particular, by the resulting prohibition on placing on the market.

–The applicant’s legal situation

83As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that it is for the applicant to prove that it has standing to bring proceedings (judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 71) and, in particular, to demonstrate that its legal situation is directly affected by the contested regulation within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 June 2015, Health Food Manufacturers’ Association and Others v Commission, T‑296/12, EU:T:2015:375, paragraph 40).

84In the present case, the Commission considers that the applicant has not demonstrated, first, that it used the substances at issue and, second, that it exported and placed the relevant products on the EU market (see paragraph 37 above).

85In the first place, it should be noted that the applicant operates tea plantations in various Indian regions of Assam and, in particular, within the Maud Tea estate, located in Chabua (India), and the Sewpur Tea estate and Bherjan Tea estate, located in Tinsukia (India).

86Furthermore, contrary to the Commission’s contention, the applicant has shown that it used the substances at issue for the purposes of its activity. It produced, first, invoices establishing the purchase of insecticides containing the substances at issue which were used in the plantations of the Maud Tea and Sewpur Tea estates and, second, its records for spraying those insecticides, which were used in 2021 and 2022 to treat those plantations.

87It follows that the applicant cultivates one of the relevant products and that it uses the substances at issue for that purpose.

88In the second place, the applicant states that, through its sister company, it exports its tea production to, inter alia, the European Union. In so doing, it demonstrated that it is active in placing that production on the EU market and that it is therefore directly affected by the contested regulation.

In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the conditions of admissibility are to be assessed on the date on which the action is brought, by reference to the situation on the date on which the application was lodged. If, on that date, the conditions for bringing the action are not met, the action is therefore inadmissible (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 November 1984, Bensider and Others v Commission, 50/84, EU:C:1984:365, paragraph 8; of 18 April 2002, Spain v Council, C‑61/96, C‑132/97, C‑45/98, C‑27/99, C‑81/00 and C‑22/01, EU:C:2002:230, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited; and order of 16 November 2023, Netherlands v Commission, T‑203/22, not published, EU:T:2023:731, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

90Accordingly, the question whether the contested regulation directly affects the applicant’s legal situation, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 47 above, must be assessed as at the date on which the action was brought (see, by analogy, order of 8 December 2015, Italy v Commission, T‑673/14, not published, EU:T:2015:969, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

91In the present case, it should be noted that the applicant has not produced any evidence to show that, on the date on which the present action was brought, it exported its tea production to the European Union.

92Thus, first, the applicant states, in the application, that the ‘tea [which it cultivates is] for domestic sale and global export’ and that ‘the EU is a key market for Indian tea exporters, including [the applicant, which] exports over 280 000 kg of bulk tea annually to the EU’. In particular, tea produced using the ‘crush tear curl’ treatment method, used for sachet teas, represents approximately 80% of the applicant’s annual exports to the European Union.

93However, as the Commission points out, the applicant does not provide any evidence in support of its claims capable of establishing that at least part of its tea production is actually exported to the European Union.

94In particular, it does not adduce any evidence to justify the figures referred to in paragraph 92 above, even though it is for the person alleging facts in support of a claim to adduce proof of those facts (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 April 2019, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, T‑492/15, EU:T:2019:252, paragraph 153 and the case-law cited).

95Furthermore, the applicant states that India is one of the top five tea exporters in the world and that the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and Poland are major importers of tea from India.

96In that regard, it produces (i) a document from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) presenting the international tea market and (ii) the data published by the Tea Board of India and the India Brand Equity Foundation concerning, respectively, the main export countries in 2022 and 2023 and the tea industry and tea exports in India.

97In so doing, the applicant merely refers to general data relating to exports of Indian tea, which do not specifically concern it and which therefore do not make it possible to establish that its production of tea is, at least in part, exported to the European Union.

98Second, in response to the doubts expressed by the Commission in the plea of inadmissibility (see paragraphs 37 and 84 above), the applicant produces a sworn statement drawn up on 30 January 2024 by its director of operations and plantations.

99It is apparent from that statement that the applicant has been ‘a grower and exporter of tea since 2000’, that ‘the [European Union] is a key export market for [the applicant] since 2000 [and that approximately] 280 000 kg of bulk tea grown by [the applicant] is exported annually to the [European Union], which represents 40% of [its] annual turnover’.

100It is sufficient to note that that statement merely reiterates the claims made, in essence, in the application (see paragraph 92 above) and, moreover, that its content is not supported by any evidence.

101Third, when questioned in that regard in the context of the measure of organisation of procedure referred to in paragraph 21 above, the applicant has also not produced any other evidence to show that it exported, at least in part, its tea production to the European Union.

102In its reply, the applicant merely states that it is one of the largest producers of conventional tea in India, a significant part of which is exported, notably to the European Union. In addition, it notes that exports of tea to the European Union represent a significant proportion of its total tea production, namely 40%, and that this has not been disputed by the Commission.

103According to the applicant, it is therefore indisputable that a significant part of its tea production is exported to the European Union, and that fact is sufficient, in its view, to conclude that its legal situation is directly affected by the contested regulation.

104It is sufficient to note that such an assertion, which, moreover, was disputed by the Commission in the plea of inadmissibility, is not supported by any evidence, even though the applicant was expressly requested to do so by the Court (see paragraphs 21 and 101 above).

105Furthermore, without it being necessary to rule on the applicant’s claims that its tea production is exported through its sister company, it should be noted that none of the documents produced is capable of establishing that that production is exported to the European Union. In particular, although it is apparent from the list drawn up by the Tea Board of India that the applicant’s sister company is one of the top 100 Indian exporters, that list does not, however, contain any details as to the countries to which that company exports. The same is true of the balance sheet and profit and loss account for the 2022-2023 period of the applicant’s sister company, from which it is apparent only, without further clarification, that that company carries on an export activity.

106It follows from the foregoing that the only evidence available to the Court to attest to the export to the European Union of the applicant’s tea production is the sworn statement drawn up by its director of operations and plantations, referred to in paragraphs 98 and 99 above.

107In that regard, given that there is no legislation at EU level governing the concept of proof, the Courts of the European Union have laid down a principle of unfettered production of evidence, which is to be interpreted as the right to rely, in order to prove a particular fact, on any form of evidence (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2019, Mahmoudian v Council, T‑406/15, EU:T:2019:468, paragraph 136 and the case-law cited).

108Furthermore, according to settled case-law, it is for the General Court alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced before it (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2020, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑742/18 P, EU:C:2020:628, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited).

109Consequently, the principle which prevails in EU law is that of the unfettered evaluation of evidence, from which it follows that the sole criterion relevant in that evaluation is the reliability of the evidence (see judgments of 9 March 2023, Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, C‑690/20 P, EU:C:2023:171, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited, and of 31 January 2024, Symphony Environmental Technologies and Symphony Environmental v Parliament and Others, T‑745/20, EU:T:2024:45, paragraph 147 and the case-law cited).

110In order to assess the credibility and, therefore, the probative value of a document, account must be taken of the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears sound and reliable (see judgments of 25 October 2011, Aragonesas Industrias y Energía v Commission, T‑348/08, EU:T:2011:621, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited, and of 31 January 2024, Symphony Environmental Technologies and Symphony Environmental v Parliament and Others, T‑745/20, EU:T:2024:45, paragraph 147 and the case-law cited).

111As regards, more specifically, the probative value of a statement, it follows from the case-law that probative value can be attributed to a sworn statement, and a fortiori to a mere statement, only if it is supported by other evidence (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 February 2018, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, T‑292/15, EU:T:2018:103, paragraph 136 and the case-law cited, and order of 22 May 2023, Bategu Gummitechnologie v Commission, T‑771/21, not published, EU:T:2023:291, paragraph 34).

112Furthermore, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the statement in question emanates from a person or entity which could have a direct interest in the case (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 February 2018, Vakakis kai Synergates v Commission, T‑292/15, EU:T:2018:103, paragraph 137 and the case-law cited).

113Thus, according to the case-law, a statement drawn up by the applicant’s managing director cannot have the same reliability and credibility as a statement from a third party or a person who is unconnected with the company (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Louis Vuitton Malletier v OHIM – Nanu-Nana (Representation of a brown and beige chequerboard pattern), T‑359/12, EU:T:2015:215, paragraphs 109 and 110, and order of 22 May 2023, Bategu Gummitechnologie v Commission, T‑771/21, not published, EU:T:2023:291, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

114In the present case, it should be noted that the statement produced by the applicant is a mere sworn statement, which emanates from its director of operations and plantations and which contains figures which are not supported by any evidence, even though it was given the opportunity to provide any evidence to that effect at various stages of the proceedings and, in particular, at the stage of lodging the application (see paragraph 92 above), of the observations on the plea of inadmissibility (see paragraph 98 above) and in response to the written questions from the Court (see paragraphs 21 and 101 above).

115That finding cannot be called into question in the light of the cases which gave rise to the judgments of 18 May 2022, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission (T‑245/19, EU:T:2022:295), and of 13 July 2022, Delifruit v Commission (T‑629/20, EU:T:2022:448), relied on by the applicant in support of its arguments (see paragraph 39 above).

116As regards, first, the case which gave rise to the judgment of 13 July 2022, Delifruit v Commission (T‑629/20, EU:T:2022:448), an action for annulment was brought before the Court against an act similar to the contested regulation, namely Commission Regulation (EU) 2020/1085 of 23 July 2020 amending Annexes II and V to Regulation No 396/2005 as regards [MRLs] for chlorpyrifos and chlorpyrifos-methyl in or on certain products (OJ 2020 L 239, p. 7, corrigendum OJ 2020 L 245, p. 31), in so far as that regulation set the MRL for chlorpyrifos in or on bananas at 0.01 mg/kg.

117It is sufficient to note that, in that case, the applicant was a company established in Ecuador, whose activity was the production and export of bananas, in particular to the European Union (judgment of 13 July 2022, Delifruit v Commission, T‑629/20, EU:T:2022:448, paragraph 2).

118Second, in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 18 May 2022, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission (T‑245/19, EU:T:2022:295), the applicant had produced documents showing that its activities included the export to the European Union of certain product categories subject to the safeguard measures imposed by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ 2019 L 31, p. 27), which was at issue in that case (judgment of 18 May 2022, Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca v Commission, T‑245/19, EU:T:2022:295, paragraphs 25 and 43).

119By contrast, in the present case, the applicant merely makes simple assertions that are not supported by any evidence.

120It follows that the applicant has not demonstrated that its tea production was, on the date on which the action was brought, exported to the European Union.

121In the third place, the applicant submits that the contested regulation affects, in any event, its legal situation in so far as it cultivates tea which is intended for the EU market.

122In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicant has not produced any evidence to establish that its tea production was, on the date on which the action was brought, placed on the EU market, even though the applicant was requested, under the measure of organisation of procedure referred to in paragraphs 21 and 101 above, to provide the Court with any evidence to that effect.

123Moreover, as regards the applicant’s argument that it will be required, pursuant to the contested regulation, to adapt its farming and plant protection practices, it should be borne in mind, first, that the mere fact that a measure may have an influence on an applicant’s material situation is not sufficient for it to be held that it is of direct concern to it (see paragraph 48 above). Second, it follows from settled case-law that the economic repercussions of a measure on the applicant’s business and, in particular, on the possibilities of marketing a product are not sufficient for that measure to be regarded as being of direct concern to the applicant (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 May 2018, Bayer CropScience and Others v Commission, T‑429/13 and T‑451/13, EU:T:2018:280, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited, and order of 20 August 2020, FL Brüterei M-V and Others v Commission, T‑755/18, not published, EU:T:2020:370, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

124It follows from all of the foregoing that the applicant has not discharged the burden of proof incumbent on it, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 83 above, in order to establish its standing to bring proceedings and, in particular, that the contested regulation directly affects its legal situation.

125Since one of the two cumulative criteria for the condition of direct concern, referred to in paragraph 47 above, is not met, the applicant cannot therefore be regarded as being directly concerned by the contested regulation.

126Since the condition of direct concern has not been satisfied, it must therefore be concluded that the applicant does not have standing to bring proceedings against the contested regulation, without it being necessary to rule on whether it is individually concerned within the meaning of the second scenario of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU or on whether that regulation constitutes a regulatory act which does not entail implementing measures within the meaning of the third scenario of that provision.

127Such a conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s argument that the dismissal of the present action as inadmissible would deprive it of its right to an effective judicial remedy. It is sufficient to recall that, whilst the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside the conditions expressly laid down in that Treaty (see judgment of 25 March 2021, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑565/19 P, not published, EU:C:2021:252, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

128Consequently, the second plea of inadmissibility, alleging that the applicant has no standing to bring proceedings, must be upheld.

129In the light of the foregoing considerations, the present action must be dismissed as inadmissible, without it being necessary to rule on the third and fourth pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Commission.

The applications to intervene

Pursuant to Article 144(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where the defendant has lodged a plea of inadmissibility as provided in Article 130(1) of those rules, a decision on the application to intervene is not to be given until after the plea has been rejected or the decision on that plea reserved. In addition, under Article 142(2) of those rules, intervention is ancillary to the main proceedings, with the result that it becomes devoid of purpose, inter alia, if the application is declared inadmissible.

In the present case, since the action has been dismissed as inadmissible, there is no need to adjudicate on the applications to intervene referred to in paragraphs 17 and 18 above.

Costs

Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those of the Commission, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission, with the exception of the Commission’s costs relating to the applications to intervene.

In addition, in accordance with Article 144(10) of the Rules of Procedure, where the proceedings in the main case are concluded before the application to intervene has been decided, the applicant for leave to intervene and the main parties shall each bear their own costs relating to the application to intervene.

Consequently, the applicant, the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and the French Republic, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Canada Grains Council, the International Fresh Produce Association, the Minor Crop Farmer Alliance, the National Cotton Council of America, the U.S. Grains Council, the USA Rice Federation and CropLife International shall each bear their own costs relating to the applications to intervene.

On those grounds,

hereby orders:

1.The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

2.There is no need to adjudicate on the applications for leave to intervene submitted by the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the French Republic, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Canada Grains Council, the International Fresh Produce Association, the Minor Crop Farmer Alliance, the National Cotton Council of America, the U.S. Grains Council, the USA Rice Federation and CropLife International.

3.Maud Tea & Seed Co. Ltd shall bear its own costs and shall pay the costs incurred by the European Commission, with the exception of the Commission’s costs relating to the applications to intervene.

4.Maud Tea & Seed, the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, the French Republic, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Canada Grains Council, the International Fresh Produce Association, the Minor Crop Farmer Alliance, the National Cotton Council of America, the U.S. Grains Council, the USA Rice Federation and CropLife International shall bear their own costs relating to the applications to intervene.

Luxembourg, 30 January 2025.

Registrar

President

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Language of the case: English.