Official Journal of the European Union

C 64/9

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(Case C-537/21 P)

(2022/C 64/15)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: PL (represented by: N. de Montigny, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—allow the appeal and set aside the judgment under appeal

—refer the case back to the General Court

—order the defendant to the appeal to pay the costs incurred by the appellant in these proceedings and at first instance

Pleas in law and main arguments

By his appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, the following grounds of appeal and arguments:

1.The rejection of the first part of the first plea in law in the action for annulment:

The word ‘whistleblower’, used by the General Court, does not appear in the Staff Regulations and implies a negative and biased assessment.

In regarding it as essential that a connection is established between the contested appraisal procedure and the allegations made by the appellant before OLAF, the General Court erred in law and contradicted the guidance provided in Case T-689/16.

The General Court failed to have regard to the content of the documents before the Court and the scope of the protection attached to the status of informant and unlawfully reversed the burden of obligations and of proof.

The General Court also erred in law and ruled ultra petita by finding that the appellant had not requested the Secretary-General to take on the role of appeal assessor or requested the Reports Committee to meet.

2.The rejection of the second part of the first plea in law in the action for annulment:

The General Court unlawfully held admissible and reliable Annex D.7 submitted by the Commission.

The General Court erred in law and ruled ultra petita by criticising the appellant for not having challenged the appointment of F as assessor during the appraisal procedure. It also misconstrued the wording of Article 3(3) of the GIP.

The General Court held, contrary to the evidence contained in the court file, that the conflict was only an alleged conflict even though it was not disputed that there was a conflict.

The General Court also wrongly held that the appellant had not demonstrated that, without the alleged defect, the assessment would have been different.

3.The rejection of the second part of the second plea in the action for annulment:

The General Court failed to address the question of the admissibility and reliability of Annex D.7 whereas it relied on that document.

The General Court failed to have regard to the protection attached to the status of informant and failed to ascertain whether there was subjective partiality vitiating the appraisal procedure.

The General Court prejudged the potential outcome of a judgment ordering annulment and ruled ultra petita. It also infringed the principle of audi alteram partem.

The General Court also wrongly applied the GIP concerning appraisal.

4.The rejection of the first part of the third plea in law in the action for annulment:

By holding that the report was based on specific, reliable and verified information, the General Court failed to have regard to the factual evidence and documents submitted by the parties. It also imposed an unlawful condition of admissibility of the plea and failed to have regard to the rules applicable in the event of long-term absences. Lastly, it unlawfully failed to analyse the appellant’s position on the substance of the case.

5.The rejection of the second part of the third plea in law in the action for annulment:

The General Court failed to have regard to the rules on the taking of evidence and infringed the principle of audi alteram partem and the rights of the defence.

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