7 September 2023 (*)

(Appeal – Prudential supervision of credit institutions – Specific supervisory tasks assigned to the European Central Bank (ECB) – Decision to withdraw the authorisation of the credit institution Versobank AS – Division of powers between the ECB and the national competent authorities – Procedural rights – Procedural defects)

In Case C‑803/21 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, lodged on 17 December 2021,

Versobank AS, established in Tallinn (Estonia), represented by O. Behrends, Rechtsanwalt,

appellant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

Ukrselhosprom PCF LLC, established in Solone (Ukraine),

applicant at first instance,

European Central Bank (ECB), represented by E. Koupepidou, S. Letocart and G. Marafioti, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

European Commission, represented by A. Nijenhuis, A. Steiblytė and D. Triantafyllou, acting as Agents,

intervener at first instance,

THE COURT (First Chamber),

composed of A. Arabadjiev, President of the Chamber, L. Bay Larsen (Rapporteur), Vice-President of the Court, acting as Judge of the First Chamber, P.G. Xuereb, T. von Danwitz and A. Kumin, Judges,

Advocate General: J. Kokott,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

1By its appeal, Versobank AS asks the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 6 October 2021, Ukrselhosprom PCF and Versobank v ECB (T‑351/18 and T‑584/18, EU:T:2021:669; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court, (i) found that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the action in Case T‑351/18 for annulment of Decision ECB‑SSM‑2018‑EE‑1 WHD‑2017‑0012 of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 26 March 2018 (‘the decision of 26 March 2018’ or ‘the first decision’), and, (ii) in Case T‑584/18, dismissed the action for annulment both of Decision ECB‑SSM‑2018‑EE‑2‑WHD‑2017‑0012 of the ECB of 17 July 2018 (‘the decision of 17 July 2018’ or ‘the second decision’), replacing the first decision, by which the ECB withdrew Versobank’s authorisation to operate as a credit institution, and of Decision ECB‑SSM‑2018‑EE‑3 of the ECB of 14 August 2018 on the costs relating to the review procedure.

Legal context

Directive 2013/36/EU

2Article 3 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338), entitled ‘Definitions’, provides in paragraph 1 thereof:

‘For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply:

…

(36) “competent authority” means competent authority as defined in point (40) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1)];

…’

3Article 18 of that directive provides:

‘The competent authorities may only withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution:

(a) does not make use of the authorisation within 12 months, expressly renounces the authorisation or has ceased to engage in business for more than six months, unless the Member State concerned has made provision for the authorisation to lapse in such cases;

…

(e) falls within one of the other cases where national law provides for withdrawal of authorisation; or

(f) commits one of the breaches referred to in Article 67(1).’

4Article 35 of that directive, entitled ‘Notification requirement and interaction between competent authorities’, provides in paragraphs 1 to 3:

‘1. A credit institution wishing to establish a branch within the territory of another Member State shall notify the competent authorities of its home Member State.

(a) the Member State within the territory of which it plans to establish a branch;

(b) a programme of operations setting out, inter alia, the types of business envisaged and the structural organisation of the branch;

(c) the address in the host Member State from which documents may be obtained;

(d) the names of those to be responsible for the management of the branch.

…’

5Article 36 of the directive, entitled ‘Commencement of activities’, states in paragraphs 1 and 2:

‘1. Before the branch of a credit institution commences its activities the competent authorities of the host Member State shall, within two months of receiving the information referred to in Article 35, prepare for the supervision of the credit institution in accordance with Chapter 4 and if necessary indicate the conditions under which, in the interests of the general good, those activities shall be carried out in the host Member State.

6Article 67 of Directive 2013/36, entitled ‘Other provisions’, provides in paragraph 1:

‘This Article shall apply at least in any of the following circumstances:

…

(d) an institution fails to have in place governance arrangements required by the competent authorities in accordance with the national provisions transposing Article 74;

(e) an institution fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information on compliance with the obligation to meet own funds requirements set out in Article 92 of Regulation [No 575/2013] to the competent authorities in breach of Article 99(1) of that Regulation;

…

(o) an institution is found liable for a serious breach of the national provisions adopted pursuant to Directive 2005/60/EC [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (OJ 2005 L 309, p. 15)];

…’

7Article 74 of Directive 2013/36, entitled ‘Internal governance and recovery and resolution plans’, provides in paragraph 1 that ‘institutions shall have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks they are or might be exposed to, adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administration and accounting procedures, and remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management’.

Regulation No 575/2013

8Article 4 of Regulation No 575/2013, entitled ‘Definitions’, provides in paragraph 1:

‘For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

…

(40) “competent authority” means a public authority or body officially recognised by national law, which is empowered by national law to supervise institutions as part of the supervisory system in operation in the Member State concerned;

…’

Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

9Recital 28 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63; ‘the Basic SSM Regulation’) is worded as follows:

‘Supervisory tasks not conferred on the ECB should remain with the national authorities. Those tasks should include the power to receive notifications from credit institutions in relation to the right of establishment and the free provision of services, to supervise bodies which are not covered by the definition of credit institutions under Union law but which are supervised as credit institutions under national law, to supervise credit institutions from third countries establishing a branch or providing cross-border services in the Union, to supervise payments services, to carry out day-to-day verifications of credit institutions, to carry out the function of competent authorities over credit institutions in relation to markets in financial instruments, the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing and consumer protection.’

10Article 2 of that regulation, entitled ‘Definitions’, provides:

‘For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

…

…

9. “Single supervisory mechanism” (SSM) means the system of financial supervision composed by the ECB and national competent authorities of participating Member States as described in Article 6 of this Regulation.’

11Article 4 of that regulation, entitled ‘Tasks conferred on the ECB’, provides:

‘1. Within the framework of Article 6, the ECB shall, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:

(a) to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw authorisations of credit institutions subject to Article 14;

…

…’

12Article 6 of the Basic SSM Regulation, entitled ‘Cooperation within the SSM’ states:

‘1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB and national competent authorities. The ECB shall be responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM.

…

4. In relation to the tasks defined in Article 4 except for points (a) and (c) of paragraph 1 thereof, the ECB shall have the responsibilities set out in paragraph 5 of this Article and the national competent authorities shall have the responsibilities set out in paragraph 6 of this Article, within the framework and subject to the procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article, for the supervision of the following credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies, or branches, which are established in participating Member States, of credit institutions established in non-participating Member States:

– those that are less significant …

…

5. With regard to the credit institutions referred to in paragraph 4, and within the framework defined in paragraph 7:

…

(b) when necessary to ensure consistent application of high supervisory standards, the ECB may at any time, on its own initiative after consulting with national competent authorities or upon request by a national competent authority, decide to exercise directly itself all the relevant powers for one or more credit institutions referred to in paragraph 4, including in the case where financial assistance has been requested or received indirectly from the EFSF [European Financial Stability Facility] or the ESM [European Stability Mechanism];

…

6. Without prejudice to paragraph 5 of this Article, national competent authorities shall carry out and be responsible for the tasks referred to in points (b), (d) to (g) and (i) of Article 4(1) and adopting all relevant supervisory decisions with regard to the credit institutions referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 4 of this Article, within the framework and subject to the procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article.

…

…’

15Article 80 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (OJ 2014 L 141, p. 1), entitled ‘NCAs’ [national competent authorities] proposal to withdraw an authorisation’, provides:

‘1. If the relevant NCA considers that a credit institution’s authorisation should be withdrawn in whole or in part in accordance with relevant Union or national law, including a withdrawal at the credit institution’s request, it shall submit to the ECB a draft decision proposing the withdrawal of the authorisation (hereinafter a “draft withdrawal decision”), together with any relevant supporting documents.

16Article 83 of that regulation, entitled ‘ECB decision on the withdrawal of an authorisation’, states:

‘1. The ECB shall take a decision on the withdrawal of an authorisation without undue delay. In doing so it may accept or reject the relevant draft withdrawal decision.

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

17Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 255, p. 1; ‘the SRM Regulation’), entitled ‘Division of tasks within the SRM’, states in paragraph 3:

‘In relation to entities and groups other than those referred to in paragraph 2, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the [Single Resolution Board (SRB)] [“the Board”] for the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, the national resolution authorities shall perform, and be responsible for, the following tasks:

(a) adopting resolution plans and carrying out an assessment of resolvability in accordance with Articles 8 and 10 and with the procedure laid down in Article 9;

(b) adopting measures during early intervention in accordance with Article 13(3);

(c) applying simplified obligations or waiving the obligation to draft a resolution plan, in accordance with Article 11;

(d) setting the level of minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities, in accordance with Article 12;

(e) adopting resolution decisions and applying resolution tools referred to in this Regulation, in accordance with the relevant procedures and safeguards, provided that the resolution action does not require any use of the Fund and is financed exclusively by the tools referred to in Articles 21 and 24 to 27 and/or by the deposit guarantee scheme, in accordance with Article 79, and with the procedure laid down in Article 31;

(f) writing down or converting relevant capital instruments pursuant to Article 21, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31.

If the resolution action requires the use of the Fund, the Board shall adopt the resolution scheme.

When adopting a resolution decision, the national resolution authorities shall take into account and follow the resolution plan as referred to in Article 9, unless they assess, taking into account the circumstances of the case, that the resolution objectives will be achieved more effectively by taking actions which are not provided for in the resolution plan.

When performing the tasks referred to in this paragraph, the national resolution authorities shall apply the relevant provisions of this Regulation. Any references to the Board in Article 5(2), Article 6(5), Article 8(6), (8), (12) and (13), Article 10(1) to (10), Articles 11 to 14, Article 15(1), (2) and (3), Article 16, the first subparagraph of Article 18(1), Article 18(2) and (6), Article 20, Article 21(1) to (7), the second subparagraph of Article 21(8), Article 21(9) and (10), Article 22(1), (3) and (6), Articles 23 and 24, Article 25(3), Article 27(1) to (15), the second sentence of the second subparagraph, the third subparagraph, and the first, third and fourth sentences of the fourth subparagraph of Article 27(16), and Article 32 shall be read as references to the national resolution authorities with regard to groups and entities referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph. For that purpose the national resolution authorities shall exercise the powers conferred on them under national law transposing Directive 2014/59/EU [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and [2013/36], and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190)] in accordance with the conditions laid down in national law.

The national resolution authorities shall inform the Board of the measures referred to in this paragraph that are to be taken and shall closely coordinate with the Board when taking those measures.

The national resolution authorities shall submit to the Board the resolution plans referred to in Article 9, as well as any updates, accompanied by a reasoned assessment of the resolvability of the entity or group concerned in accordance with Article 10.’

18Article 18 of the SRM Regulation, entitled ‘Resolution procedure’, provides in paragraph 1:

‘The Board shall adopt a resolution scheme pursuant to paragraph 6 in relation to entities and groups referred to in Article 7(2), and to the entities and groups referred to in Article 7(4)(b) and (5) where the conditions for the application of those paragraphs are met, only when it assesses, in its executive session, on receiving a communication pursuant to the fourth subparagraph, or on its own initiative, that the following conditions are met:

(a) the entity is failing or is likely to fail;

(b) having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures, including measures by an IPS [institutional protection scheme], or supervisory action, including early intervention measures or the write-down or conversion of relevant capital instruments in accordance with Article 21, taken in respect of the entity, would prevent its failure within a reasonable time frame;

(c) a resolution action is necessary in the public interest pursuant to paragraph 5.

An assessment of the condition referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph shall be made by the ECB, after consulting the Board. The Board, in its executive session, may make such an assessment only after informing the ECB of its intention and only if the ECB, within three calendar days of receipt of that information, does not make such an assessment. The ECB shall, without delay, provide the Board with any relevant information that the Board requests in order to inform its assessment.

Where the ECB assesses that the condition referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph is met in relation to an entity or group referred to in the first subparagraph, it shall communicate that assessment without delay to the Commission and to the Board.

An assessment of the condition referred to in point (b) of the first subparagraph shall be made by the Board, in its executive session, or, where applicable, by the national resolution authorities, in close cooperation with the ECB. The ECB may also inform the Board or the national resolution authorities concerned that it considers the condition laid down in that point to be met.’

Background to the dispute

19The appellant is a credit institution established in Estonia. Its main shareholder is Ukrselhosprom PCF LLC, which has an equity holding of 85.2622% in it.

20The appellant was classified as a less significant institution for the purposes of Article 6 of the Basic SSM Regulation.

21As a less significant credit institution, the appellant was placed under the prudential supervision of the Finantsinspektsioon (Financial Supervisory Authority, Estonia) (‘the FSA’), acting as the national competent authority, within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Basic SSM Regulation. Moreover, that authority also had competence in relation to the monitoring of compliance with rules intended to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism (‘AML/CFT’).

22The FSA, after several on-site inspections, identified recurring breaches committed from 2015 by the appellant in connection with, first, the ineffectiveness of its AML/CFT regime as regards the management of the risks stemming from its business model and, secondly, the inadequacy of the AML/CFT governance arrangements which it had in place. After sending the appellant a number of notices to comply with the legal requirements, the FSA, on 8 August 2016, adopted a precept requiring it to take certain steps to remedy immediately the shortcomings previously identified, in particular by the proper application of existing AML/CFT policies and procedures.

23By letter of 28 February 2017, the FSA informed the appellant that it had still not complied with all of the obligations imposed by the precept at issue. On 10 April 2017, the FSA adopted, in relation to the appellant, a failing or likely to fail declaration and, on 7 February 2018, the FSA, acting as the national resolution authority, held that a resolution was not in the public interest (together, ‘the FOLTF decisions’).

24In the course of an inspection carried out in September 2017, the FSA identified material and severe breaches of the AML/CFT legislation similar to those which had been identified in previous inspections, and found that the appellant’s internal control system was weak and inadequate.

25On 8 February 2018, the ECB received a proposal from the FSA to withdraw the appellant’s authorisation, in accordance with Article 80 of the SSM Framework Regulation. The day before, the FSA, in its capacity as the national resolution authority responsible for credit institutions, had approved the assessment of its resolution department.

26On 6 March 2018, the ECB’s Supervisory Board approved the draft decision withdrawing the appellant’s authorisation and set a period for it to submit its observations in that regard. After examining the observations submitted by the appellant on 14 March 2018, the ECB – on the basis of Article 4(1)(a) and Article 14(5) of the Basic SSM Regulation, Article 83 of the SSM Framework Regulation, and Article 17 of the Krediidiasutuste seadus (Law on Credit Institutions) of 9 February 1999 (RT I 1999, 23, 349; ‘the Estonian Law on Credit Institutions’), which transposed Directive 2013/36 – adopted and notified to the appellant its decision of 26 March 2018 by which it withdrew the latter’s authorisation.

27On 27 March 2018, the competent Estonian court adopted a decision opening the proceedings for the liquidation of the appellant.

28On 26 April 2018, the Administrative Board of Review of the ECB (‘the ABoR’) received an application from Ukrselhosprom PCF for review of the decision of 26 March 2018. The ABoR held that request for review to be admissible, taking the view that that company was directly and individually concerned by that decision.

29After the ABoR adopted and communicated to the ECB’s Supervisory Board an opinion by which it proposed that the Supervisory Board take the view that the substantive and procedural infringements relied on by Ukrselhosprom PCF were unfounded and that it adopt a decision identical in content to the decision of 26 March 2018, the ECB’s Governing Council followed that opinion and adopted the decision of 17 July 2018, which was notified to the appellant’s liquidators. The latter decision repealed and replaced the decision of 26 March 2018.

30In paragraph 3.2 of the decision of 17 July 2018, the ECB expressed the view that, on the basis of the evidence gathered and the findings of the on-site inspections carried out by the FSA, the grounds for withdrawal of authorisation set out in Article 18(f) of Directive 2013/36, as transposed into Estonian law, had to be regarded as being satisfied in relation to the appellant. The grounds for that withdrawal of authorisation were as follows:

– the appellant’s failure to have in place the governance arrangements required by the FSA, in accordance with the national provisions transposing Article 74 of Directive 2013/36;

– the appellant’s lack of an effective AML/CFT regime to manage the risks stemming from its business model, in spite of three on-site AML/CFT inspections, several meetings and notices, the precept of 8 August 2016 and a letter concerning non-compliance with the precept;

– the appellant’s failure to implement the precept within the period and to the extent prescribed;

– the appellant’s submission of misleading and incorrect documents and information to the FSA and its breach of conditions laid down by the legislation of a Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA), namely, the Republic of Latvia.

31As regards, more specifically, the fourth ground justifying the withdrawal of authorisation, the ECB noted, in paragraph 3.3(d) of the decision of 17 July 2018, that the appellant had submitted misleading and inaccurate information and documents to the FSA concerning its activities in Latvia, stating, first, that it did not own a subsidiary there and, secondly, in its communication of 9 February 2016 to that national competent authority, that it had closed its establishment in Latvia, even though the latter was still operational. The ECB observed that, according to the information communicated by the Latvian national supervisory authority to the FSA, the appellant had created its ‘subsidiary’ in Latvia in breach of the Latvian legislative provisions on the ‘passporting’ procedure laid down in Articles 35 to 38 of Directive 2013/36, while that ‘subsidiary’ had provided financial services in Latvia without interruption since October 2013. In the ECB’s view, such conduct, which constituted an infringement of the Estonian Law on Credit Institutions, was an additional ground for withdrawal of authorisation under Article 18(e) of Directive 2013/36.

32As regards the proportionality and necessity of the withdrawal of authorisation, the ECB also considered that, in the circumstances of the case, the withdrawal of authorisation had to be regarded as an appropriate and proportionate measure, and that there were no less onerous measures capable of restoring legality. In particular, it set out and analysed the various available measures, explaining why it considered that they were not effective in terms of restoring legality.

33Specifically, with regard to self-liquidation, the ECB acknowledged that such a solution had been proposed by the appellant in its observations on the draft decision of 26 March 2018, that such a possibility existed under Estonian law and that it would in any event have resulted in the withdrawal of authorisation. Nevertheless, the ECB decided not to opt for that possibility, since (i) self-liquidation would have obfuscated the substantive reasons for which the FSA had proposed the withdrawal of authorisation; (ii) such a withdrawal of authorisation would have been based on Article 16(3) of the Estonian Law on Credit Institutions and not on Article 17 of that law; (iii) self-liquidation would thus have given an inaccurate view of the severity of the appellant’s breaches of the applicable law, which, in the ECB’s view, justified a non-voluntary withdrawal of the authorisation; and (iv) under Article 20(5) of Directive 2013/36, the communication regarding the withdrawal of authorisation must concern not only the withdrawal itself but also the grounds on which it is based. As regards acquisition by another Estonian company, the ECB did not accept that solution either because (i) no documentary evidence had been provided in relation to there being a specific commitment on the part of any of the investors and (ii) the appellant’s business plan did not provide sufficient information to determine whether the transaction would have led to a change in commercial strategy. Furthermore, despite the additional period allowed to the appellant to submit the documentation, it had failed to provide the necessary information.

34Lastly, the ECB considered that, in view of the severity and duration of the breaches, the fact that the appellant had repeated its unlawful conduct despite the various warnings received, and the damage to public confidence in the Estonian and European financial system, caused by its conduct, the public interest in restoring legality outweighed the appellant’s private interest in maintaining its authorisation.

The actions before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

35By applications lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 5 June 2018 and 27 September 2018, the appellant and Ukrselhosprom PCF brought actions for annulment, respectively, of the decision of 26 March 2018 (Case T‑351/18) and the decision of 17 July 2018 (Case T‑584/18).

36After joining, in the judgment under appeal, Cases T‑351/18 and T‑584/18 for the purposes of the judgment, the General Court found, with regard to Case T‑351/18, that the action had become devoid of purpose after it had been brought and that there was therefore no longer any need to rule on it.

37With respect to Case T‑584/18, the General Court declared the action for annulment of the decision of 17 July 2018 admissible as regards Versobank, but dismissed that action on the merits. In particular, it rejected the pleas alleging that the ECB had no power to adopt a decision concerning the withdrawal of authorisation and liquidation, to assess AML/CFT issues, to refuse to permit self-liquidation and to refuse to permit the appellant to be sold to other potential investors; the pleas alleging breach of the principles of proportionality, equal treatment and non-discrimination, the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty; and the pleas alleging breach of essential procedural requirements, the right to be heard, the rights of the defence and the duty to give reasons.

Forms of order sought by the parties before the Court of Justice

38By its appeal, the appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

– set aside the judgment under appeal;

– annul the decisions of 26 March 2018 and 17 July 2018; and

– order the ECB to pay the costs.

39The ECB, supported by the Commission, contends that the Court should dismiss the appeal and order the appellant to pay the costs.

The appeal

40By its appeal, the appellant puts forward six grounds for setting aside the judgment of the General Court. It complains that the General Court erred in law, first, by finding that there was no need to adjudicate on the action for annulment of the decision of 26 March 2018; second, by rejecting the pleas related to infringements of essential procedural requirements; third, in finding that the ECB had competence to withdraw the appellant’s authorisation on account of alleged breaches of AML/CFT provisions; fourth, by failing to recognise that the infringement of Latvian law resulting from the operation of a branch in Latvia could not serve as a basis for the withdrawal of authorisation since it had been the subject of a settlement with the competent authority, the Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Financial and Capital Markets Commission, Latvia) (‘the FKTK’), before the competent court and with the latter’s approval; fifth, by considering, inter alia, that the resolution matters in the present case were governed by the SRM Regulation; and, sixth, by disregarding certain procedural rules.

69By the sixth part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court set out a number of erroneous considerations which show that it had no confidence in its fundamental position that all the procedural issues are irrelevant.

70The ECB and the Commission contend that this part of the ground of appeal should be rejected as inadmissible.

Findings of the Court

71The appellant’s line of argument, characterised by being very general and vague, does not enable the Court to identify the contested elements of the judgment under appeal.

72The sixth part of the second ground of appeal must therefore also be rejected as inadmissible.

Seventh part of the second ground of appeal

73By the seventh part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in rejecting as late and therefore inadmissible its plea as to the illegality of the rule in the SSM Framework Regulation laying down a time limit for the exercise of the right to be heard of only three working days in circumstances in which even the formal rights of representation of the appellant had been recognised only extremely belatedly, namely on 5 November 2019, following the judgment of 5 November 2019, ECB and Others v Trasta Komercbanka and Others (C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P and C‑669/17 P, EU:C:2019:923).

74The ECB, supported by the Commission, contends that this part of the ground of appeal must be found to be inadmissible.

Findings of the Court

75Although the appellant has made no explicit reference in the seventh part of the second ground of appeal to a particular paragraph of the judgment under appeal, it is nevertheless possible to identify the paragraph of the judgment to which it refers, namely paragraph 375; in that paragraph the General Court rejected as out of time a plea of illegality raised against the provisions of the SSM Framework Regulation alleging that the period prescribed for submitting observations on a proposed withdrawal of authorisation was too short.

76However, since the appeal, contrary to the requirements set out in paragraph 54 above, provides no indication at all of the error of law purportedly committed by the General Court in that regard, the seventh part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.

Eighth part of the second ground of appeal

77By the eighth part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for erroneously rejecting, in paragraph 381 et seq. of the judgment under appeal, the plea based on the fact that the appellant had not been informed of the resolution decisions relied upon in adopting the first and second decisions, and that those decisions had never been disclosed to it.

78The ECB, supported by the Commission, contends that this part of the ground of appeal is inadmissible.

Findings of the Court

79While the appellant refers explicitly to paragraph 381 et seq. of the judgment under appeal, it has failed to specify the error of law that the General Court allegedly committed in that regard.

80Consequently, as in paragraph 76 above, the eighth part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.

Ninth part of the second ground of appeal

81By the ninth part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in rejecting the plea relating to the duty to state reasons. It states in that regard that the General Court provided entirely new explanations and, in particular, referred to the existence of a Latvian branch and to the fact that customers in Latvia accounted for 66% of the appellant’s income for the period from November 2013 to August 2016.

82The ECB contends in reply that this part of the ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible, while the Commission argues that it is entirely unfounded.

Findings of the Court

83It should be observed that in the present case the appeal fails to identify precisely the paragraphs in the grounds of the judgment under appeal which are contested. While it is nevertheless possible to identify one of those paragraphs, namely paragraph 258, which concerns the contribution of the Latvian branch to the appellant’s income, the fact remains that the appeal does not set out any legal arguments substantiating the claim of a failure to state reasons.

84Consequently, the ninth part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.

85Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.

The third ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

86The appellant argues that the General Court erred in considering that the ECB was competent to revoke its authorisation owing to alleged breaches of AML/CFT provisions. The ECB lacks any competence in relation to payment services which, according to the first and second decisions, constituted the appellant’s business.

87The ECB should merely ensure that the national authorities exercise their powers under national law and in accordance with the AML/CFT provisions of that law, subject to review by the national courts. Article 4(1) of the Basic SSM Regulation does not disapply the principle that national law, including law implementing EU directives, falls within the sole competence of the national authority, subject to review by the national courts. Article 4(3) of that regulation would have a paradoxical effect if it were interpreted as expanding the ECB’s powers as opposed to the ECB being required to comply with national law implementing directives when discharging its responsibilities.

88According to the appellant, the General Court, in paragraph 144 of the judgment under appeal, seeks to reinterpret the restriction on the potential powers of the national authorities under Article 18 of Directive 2013/36 as a power to propose. However, that directive has no connection with the subsequent rules in the Basic SSM Regulation concerning cooperation between the national competent authority and the ECB in the narrow field of less significant credit institutions, that is to say entities transforming deposits into loans. The national competent authority cannot submit any proposals on matters outside the SSM, such as AML/CFT issues in connection with the provision of payment services or resolution issues and thereby create additional powers for the ECB.

89In any event, the General Court’s reasoning is erroneous since it involves an implicit misinterpretation of the Estonian law implementing Directive 2013/36. The General Court erred in law by applying Articles 18 and 67 of that directive directly. In that regard, the appellant submits that Article 67(1)(o) of that directive is referring to a valid and final court ruling against which no appeal lies. However, the General Court does not identify any binding decision by the Estonian authorities or courts on the highly contentious issue of potential AML/CFT infringements. The on-site inspection reports, drawn up solely by one person, are not binding acts that may be subject to judicial review.

90The ECB, supported by the Commission, counters that this ground of appeal is in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.

Findings of the Court

91As was stated correctly in paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal, and contrary to what is claimed by the appellant, the power under Article 4(1)(a) of the Basic SSM Regulation to withdraw authorisation from credit institutions is reserved exclusively to the ECB.

92The General Court was also correct in pointing out, in paragraph 117 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 4(3) of the Basic SSM Regulation provides that for the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by that regulation, and with the objective of ensuring high standards of supervision, the ECB is to apply all relevant EU law, and where the EU law is composed of directives, the national legislation transposing those directives.

93In addition, as stated in paragraph 122 of the judgment under appeal, Article 14(5) of the Basic SSM Regulation provides that the ECB may withdraw the authorisation in the cases set out in relevant EU law on its own initiative, following consultations with the national competent authority of the participating Member State where the credit institution is established, or on a proposal from such a national competent authority.

94It should also be observed that the General Court was correct to consider, in paragraphs 132 and 133 of the judgment under appeal, that the overall scheme of Article 6(4) to (6) of the Basic SSM Regulation establishes a differentiation between prudential supervision of ‘significant’ entities and that of entities classified as ‘less significant’ in relation to seven of the nine tasks listed in Article 4(1) of that regulation, and that it follows therefrom, inter alia, that not only does the exclusive competence for the prudential supervision of ‘significant’ entities fall to the ECB, but that the same holds true for the prudential supervision of ‘less significant’ entities in relation to the task listed in Article 4(1)(a) of the Basic SSM Regulation concerning the authorisation and withdrawal of authorisation to credit institutions.

95As regards, more specifically, the withdrawal of authorisation from a credit institution provided for in Article 4(1)(a) of the Basic SSM Regulation, it was rightly observed in paragraph 140 of the judgment under appeal that the cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authorities is expressed, in accordance with Article 14(5) of that regulation, first, by the obligation to consult those authorities, in the event that the ECB withdraws the authorisation on its own initiative and, secondly, in the possibility that those authorities have to propose such a withdrawal to the ECB.

96In addition, as regards the link between AML/CFT and prudential supervision, the General Court rightly pointed out, in paragraph 143 of the judgment under appeal, that, among the circumstances justifying withdrawal of a banking authorisation, first, Article 18(f) of Directive 2013/36 mentions the breaches referred to in Article 67(1) of that directive, which include serious breaches of the national provisions adopted pursuant to Directive 2005/60 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. Secondly, Article 18(e) of that directive mentions the other cases in which national law provides for withdrawal of authorisation.

97In that regard, it was held correctly in paragraph 187 of the judgment under appeal that although the Member States remain competent to implement the AML/CFT provisions, as expressly provided for in recital 28 of the Basic SSM Regulation, the ECB has exclusive competence to withdraw authorisation, for all credit institutions, irrespective of their size, even where such competence is based, as in the present case, on the grounds set out in Article 67(1)(d), (e) and (o) of Directive 2013/36, to which Article 18 of that directive refers, since Article 14(5) of that regulation lays down, as a condition for the withdrawal of authorisation, the existence of one or more grounds justifying withdrawal under Article 18 of that directive. Accordingly, the ECB’s competence to adopt the decision of 17 July 2018 cannot, on that ground, be called into question.

98Consequently, in the light of the foregoing, the General Court, first, did not err in law in noting, in paragraph 144 of the judgment under appeal, that, although Article 18 of Directive 2013/36 refers to the power of national competent authorities to withdraw authorisations, in view of the distribution of tasks between those authorities and the ECB, provided for in Article 4 of the Basic SSM Regulation, and particularly in view of the fact that the power to withdraw authorisation has become an exclusive competence of the ECB, which the ECB may exercise, pursuant to Article 14(5) of that regulation, on a proposal from a national competent authority, Article 18 of that directive must be understood as referring to the power to propose the withdrawal of authorisation, which remains with the national competent authorities.

99Second, the General Court likewise did not err in law in holding, in paragraph 197 of the judgment under appeal, that it was without disregarding the division of powers between the national competent authorities of the participating Member States and the ECB under the SSM that, in the present case, the legal assessment intended to determine whether the facts constituting breaches of the AML/CFT legislation established by the FSA justified withdrawal of authorisation was reserved for the ECB.

100As regards the appellant’s argument alleging, in essence, that the ECB was not entitled to apply national law because the EU Courts do not have jurisdiction to review the legality of decisions by the ECB applying national law, it must be stated, as the ECB submits, that that argument was not raised before the General Court.

101According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, since, in an appeal, the oversight of the Court of Justice is confined to a review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the General Court, a party cannot put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice an argument which it has not raised before the General Court. To allow appellants to raise for the first time before the Court of Justice arguments which they have not made before the General Court would be to allow them to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeal proceedings is limited, a wider case than that heard by the General Court (order of 15 September 2022, CNMSE and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑749/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:699, paragraphs 19 and 20 and the case-law cited).

102Furthermore, as stated in paragraph 92 above, the ECB, for the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the Basic SSM Regulation, is to apply, inter alia, the national legislation transposing the relevant directives.

103Accordingly, the argument in question must, in any event, be rejected as unfounded.

104As regards the appellant’s contention that the ECB had no competence to withdraw its authorisation since its business consisted of payment services, that argument, as the ECB submits, is a new argument since it was not raised before the General Court. Accordingly, it must be rejected as inadmissible.

105Lastly, for the same reason, it is necessary to reject as inadmissible the argument that, in essence, the withdrawal of a banking authorisation pursuant to Article 67(1)(o) of Directive 2013/36 cannot be based on findings contained in an on-site inspection report, but requires a valid and final court ruling against which no appeal lies declaring that the entity concerned is responsible for serious breaches of AML/CFT rules.

106In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the third ground of appeal must be rejected as in part unfounded and in part inadmissible.

The fourth ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

107The appellant submits that in paragraphs 237 to 268 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court breached the principle of legal certainty and the allocation of competences between the Courts of the European Union and the national courts by failing to recognise that the allegation of an infringement of Latvian law by means of the illegal operation of a branch in Latvia is a precluded issue in so far as it was the subject of an administrative judicial settlement with the competent authority, namely the FKTK, before the competent national court and with the approval of that court; that settlement has the same effect as if that court had determined in a final judgment that there was no such branch in Latvia.

108The General Court erred in failing to take account of the fact that only the FKTK and the Latvian court in question have competence to make a finding that an illegal branch allegedly existed in Latvia. Neither the FSA, the ECB nor the General Court could not make any determination on that issue, even in the absence of the settlement, simply because, as an issue of Latvian law, it is outside their competence.

109In addition, the General Court did not specify the source on which it bases its finding, disputed by the appellant and set out in paragraphs 258 to 260 of the judgment under appeal, that 66% of the appellant’s income for the period from November 2013 to August 2016 was attributable to customers in Latvia. The General Court also erred in law by assuming, in arriving at that figure of 66%, that the place of residence of the customer is per se relevant for finding the existence of a branch. The General Court’s findings in that regard are unlawful in terms of procedure since they are based on documents that were submitted very late and on which the appellant was not given any opportunity to comment by the General Court.

110The ECB, supported by the Commission, contends that this ground of appeal is in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.

Findings of the Court

111It should be observed that, as stated in paragraph 237 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant, as regards the illegal operation of a branch in Latvia, argued before the General Court that the question relating to the ‘passporting’ procedure for undertaking cross-border activities in other countries, a procedure which it failed to follow, was now irrelevant, since that issue had been the subject of a settlement agreement before a Latvian administrative court and neither the FSA nor the Latvian national competent authority had imposed sanctions on it in that regard.

112In that respect, it should be pointed out that, after observing, in paragraph 257 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant had established a branch in Latvia and carried out financial activities unlawfully because it had infringed the notification procedure, known as ‘passporting’, the General Court found, in paragraph 266 of that judgment, that the administrative judicial settlement at issue was not capable of legalising the appellant’s unlawful conduct in the past, but only of preventing any further measures, including penalties, in the future.

113Accordingly, the General Court considered that, despite the administrative judicial settlement, the fact that the ‘passporting’ procedure had been infringed was of relevance for its rejection, in paragraph 268 of the judgment under appeal, the plea raised by the appellant.

114However, in claiming in its appeal that the General Court breached the principle of legal certainty and the allocation of competences between the Courts of the European Union and the national courts by failing to recognise that the allegation of an infringement of Latvian law by means of the illegal operation of a branch in Latvia was a precluded issue in so far as it had been the subject of a settlement with the competent authority, the appellant has raised an argument that was not previously relied on before the General Court. In the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 101 above, such an argument must be rejected as inadmissible.

115As regards the appellant’s argument, summarised in paragraph 109 above, it must be found, as the ECB has stated before the Court of Justice, that the figures given in paragraphs 258 and 260 of the judgment under appeal were included in the ECB’s statements in defence relating to Cases T‑351/18 and T‑584/18, such that the appellant – who thus had the possibility of challenging them in the proceedings at first instance, without, however, making use of that possibility – is not entitled to do so in the appeal. In any event, it does not adduce any evidence capable of calling those figures into question.

116Lastly, as regards the argument based on an alleged error of law by the General Court in finding that the place of residence of the customer is per se relevant for finding that a branch exists, it must be held that that argument is based on a misreading of paragraphs 258 to 260 of the judgment under appeal. While it is true that the General Court noted in paragraph 260 of the judgment that 3% of the accounts opened with that branch were held by Latvian residents, it nevertheless remains the case, as is apparent from paragraphs 258 and 259 of that judgment, that the General Court relied on the fact that Latvian customers and customers from third countries, recruited in Latvia, had generated, between November 2013 and August 2016, 66% of the total income from services provided by the appellant and that, therefore, the branch in Latvia could not constitute a mere representative or support office.

117Consequently, this argument must be rejected as unfounded.

118Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as partly inadmissible and partly unfounded.

The fifth ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

119The appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in assuming that the resolution matters at issue in the present case are governed by the SRM Regulation or are based on an analogous application of that regulation, when in fact such matters are governed by the provisions of Estonian national law implementing Directive 2014/59 and by other provisions of Estonian law.

120Nor did the General Court appropriately address the appellant’s plea with respect to the ECB’s decision not to permit self-liquidation, even though a decision otherwise would have eliminated any need for a withdrawal of authorisation.

121Lastly, the General Court erred in holding that it was necessary to apply for permission for self-liquidation, even though neither the SRM Regulation nor Directive 2014/59 require such permission.

122The ECB, supported by the Commission, contends that this ground of appeal is in part inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.

Findings of the Court

123It should be observed that the appellant’s first argument, as both the ECB and the Commission contend, is imprecise in that it neither identifies nor makes it possible to identify the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal which are challenged.

124Consequently, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 54 above, that argument must be rejected as inadmissible.

125As regards the second argument raised by the appellant, while that argument does make it possible – despite the fact that it fails to refer to the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal that are contested – to identify those paragraphs as paragraphs 200 to 204 thereof, the fact remains that it is too general and vague to allow for an understanding of the error of law that the General Court, in the appellant’s view, might have committed in that regard. Indeed, all the appellant claims in this instance is that the General Court did not appropriately address its plea concerning the ECB’s decision not to permit self-liquidation.

126It follows that that argument must also be rejected as inadmissible.

127As regards the third argument, it should be observed that paragraph 201 of the judgment under appeal is worded as follows:

‘As a preliminary point, as regards the self-liquidation of the … applicant, it should be noted that, under Article 117 of the Estonian Law on Credit Institutions, in order to self-liquidate, a credit institution must submit an application for voluntary liquidation to the FSA, which is therefore the authority competent to either accept or reject such an application.’

128The appellant’s argument, set out in paragraph 121 above, is not capable of calling into question the finding made by the General Court in paragraph 201 of the judgment under appeal. Indeed, such a finding does not conflict with the fact that neither the SRM Regulation nor Directive 2014/59 requires an application to be made for the authorisation of self-liquidation. Moreover, it is apparent from paragraph 108 of the judgment under appeal that the appellant itself accepted that the possibility of self-liquidation is recognised under all national law.

129Consequently, since that argument is unfounded, it must be rejected.

130Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected as partly inadmissible and partly unfounded.

The sixth ground of appeal

Arguments of the parties

131The appellant claims that the General Court committed four procedural errors.

132The ECB, supported by the Commission, contends that this ground of appeal is in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.

The first procedural error consists in the General Court failing to respect the limits of its own competence under Article 263 TFEU, which is to review acts of the ECB within the strict framework established by that article, that is to say, in the light of EU law and of any substantive and procedural errors committed by the ECB. The General Court made determinations on issues which, being governed by national law, fall within the exclusive competence of the national competent authorities and courts, in particular in relation to payment services, other financial services, AML/CFT issues, resolution matters and the enforcement of the prohibition of illegal activities such as illegal branches. In particular, the General Court was not empowered to decide the disputes relating to the alleged breaches of AML/CFT rules and to the existence in the past of an allegedly illegal branch.

133Moreover, action by the ECB going beyond its competences does not expand the powers of the General Court. Article 263 TFEU prescribes that in such cases the act at issue adopted by the EU institution must be annulled for lack of competence. That question should be raised by the EU Courts of their own motion.

134The second procedural error arises from the fact, first, that the judgment under appeal is based decisively on documents that were submitted very late, despite the appellant’s objections submitted in that regard at the hearing and without the appellant having had any opportunity to comment, and, second, from the fact that there were no relevant English translations, even at the time of the first and second decisions; as a result the appellant’s rights under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) were clearly infringed.

135The third procedural error stems from the General Court’s failure to take into consideration either the infringement of the appellant’s rights under Article 47 of the Charter before the beginning of the proceedings, or the continued lack of access for its representatives to the appellant’s premises and, therefore, the lack of effective representation of the appellant during the proceedings. The appellant’s former chief executive officer discharged the role of representative of the appellant solely in his private time, at his own expense and with no access to the bank. The lack of recognition of the appellant’s representation rights in the past had, moreover, meant that the action before the General Court had to be prepared in a very short period of time and on the basis of limited telephone conversations.

136The appellant submits that the fourth procedural error consists of the General Court failing to order the production of the ‘FOLTF decisions’, especially in the light of the extensive discussion of those decisions in the judgment under appeal and the manifest error as to their legal basis. Lastly, the rejection of requests for the production of other documents as being late was not appropriate in the light of the extreme difficulties which affected the defence of the appellant’s rights.

137The ECB contends, primarily, that the first, third and fourth parts of the sixth ground of appeal are inadmissible. In any event, this ground of appeal is unfounded. The Commission, for its part, argues that the second to fourth parts of the ground of appeal are inadmissible. In any event, it is unfounded.

Findings of the Court

138As regards the first part of this ground of appeal, reference should be made to paragraphs 95 to 97 above.

139According to those paragraphs, as regards the withdrawal of authorisation from a credit institution provided for in Article 4(1)(a) of the Basic SSM Regulation, it was rightly observed in paragraph 140 of the judgment under appeal, that the cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authorities is expressed, in accordance with Article 14(5) of that regulation, first, by the obligation to consult those authorities, in the event that the ECB withdraws the authorisation on its own initiative and, secondly, in the possibility that those authorities have to propose such a withdrawal to the ECB.

140In addition, as regards the link between AML/CFT and prudential supervision, the General Court rightly pointed out, in paragraph 143 of the judgment under appeal, that, among the circumstances justifying withdrawal of a banking authorisation, first, Article 18(f) of Directive 2013/36 mentions the breaches referred to in Article 67(1) of that directive, which include serious breaches of the national AML/CFT provisions adopted pursuant to Directive 2005/60. Secondly, Article 18(e) of Directive 2013/36 mentions the other cases in which national law provides for withdrawal of authorisation.

141Lastly, it was held correctly in paragraph 187 of the judgment under appeal that although the Member States remain competent to implement the AML/CFT provisions, as expressly provided for in recital 28 of the Basic SSM Regulation, the ECB has exclusive competence to withdraw authorisation, for all credit institutions, irrespective of their size, even where such competence is based, as in the present case, on the grounds set out in Article 67(1)(d), (e) and (o) of Directive 2013/36, to which Article 18 of that directive refers, since Article 14(5) of that regulation lays down, as a condition for the withdrawal of authorisation, the existence of one or more grounds justifying withdrawal under Article 18 of that directive. Accordingly, the appellant cannot properly question, on that ground, the ECB’s competence to adopt the decision of 17 July 2018.

142Consequently, just as the appellant cannot properly question the ECB’s competence to adopt the decision of 17 July 2018, based in particular on serious breaches of national AML/CFT provisions adopted pursuant to Directive 2005/60, it also cannot properly question the competence of the General Court in that regard.

143As regards the alleged lack of competence of the General Court to adopt a position in other areas governed by national law, in particular as regards payment services, other financial services, resolution matters and the enforcement of the prohibition of illegal activities such as illegal branches, it is important to point out, first, that the appellant did not argue before the General Court that the ECB had no competence in those areas and, second, that the appellant’s line of argument on that issue is imprecise and does not make it possible to identify the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal to which the appellant refers.

144In those circumstances, the first part of this ground of appeal must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.

145As regards the second part of this ground of appeal, it must be found that the appellant has failed to identify any paragraph of the judgment under appeal which is based decisively on documents placed on the file in an allegedly irregular manner and the nature and content of which are not specified.

146Such failings render that part of the ground of appeal inadmissible.

147As regards the third part of this ground of appeal, it must be pointed out that, inasmuch as it alleges that the General Court did not in any way take into consideration an infringement of the appellant’s rights under Article 47 of the Charter before the beginning of the proceedings, it also fails to satisfy the requirements of precision referred to in paragraph 54 above.

148Consequently, that part of the ground of appeal is inadmissible in that respect.

149Inasmuch as it alleges that the General Court did not take into consideration the continuing lack of access to the appellant’s premises and, therefore, the lack of effective representation of the appellant during the proceedings, the third part of the sixth ground of appeal constitutes a new argument, since it was not raised before the General Court.

150Consequently, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 101 above, that part of the ground of appeal must also be rejected as inadmissible in that respect.

151Accordingly, the third part of the sixth ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety as inadmissible.

152As far as the fourth part of the sixth ground of appeal is concerned, it should be observed that while it does not explicitly state which paragraphs of the judgment under appeal are meant, it does allow paragraphs 416 and 419 of the judgment under appeal to be identified in this instance as those to which it refers.

153Paragraphs 415, 416 and 419 of the judgment under appeal are worded as follows:

‘415 It is apparent from Article 88(2) [of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court] that the application referred to in paragraph 1 thereof must state precisely the purpose of the measures sought and the reasons for them. In addition, that provision states that, where the application is made after the first exchange of pleadings, the party submitting that application must state the reasons for which he or she was unable to submit it earlier.

416 In the present case, most of the requests for measures of inquiry, with the exception of the request for production of the “FOLTF decisions”, were made for the first time at the reply stage. The applicants do not in any way explain in their application the reasons for this delay. Consequently, those applications must be rejected as inadmissible.

…

419 … so far as the requests for the production of documents are concerned … as regards the “FOLTF decisions” (the only application for measures of inquiry lodged at the application stage and therefore not out of time), it must be rejected on the basis of the considerations set out in paragraph 181 above. …’

154However, the appellant has failed to set out the legal arguments that support the fourth part of the sixth ground of appeal.

155It follows that that part of the ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.

156Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the sixth ground of appeal must be rejected as partly inadmissible and partly unfounded.

The first ground of appeal and the second part of the second ground

Arguments of the parties

157As regards the first ground of appeal and the second part of the second ground of appeal – alleging that the General Court erred in law in holding that there was no need to adjudicate on the action for annulment of the decision of 26 March 2018 – the appellant argues, in the first place, that the ECB was not entitled to find that the second decision replaced the first decision with effect from the date of notification of the first decision, since that would be contrary to Article 24 of the Basic SSM Regulation, the operating rules of the ABoR, Article 263 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter. In the second place, the appellant claims that it retains an interest in obtaining the annulment of the first decision, even though it was replaced legally with retroactive effect by the second decision.

158The ECB, supported by the Commission, contend that the first ground of appeal and the second part of the second ground should be rejected.

Findings of the Court

159In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, an applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings must, in the light of the purpose of the action, exist at the stage of lodging the action, failing which the action will be inadmissible. That purpose must, like the interest in bringing proceedings, continue until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate, which presupposes that the action or, as the case may be, the appeal, must be liable, if successful, to procure an advantage for the party bringing it (judgments of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 61, and of 4 September 2018, ClientEarth v Commission, C‑57/16 P, EU:C:2018:660, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

160The question whether an applicant retains his or her interest in bringing proceedings must be assessed in the light of the specific circumstances, taking account, in particular, of the consequences of the alleged unlawfulness and of the nature of the damage claimed to have been sustained (judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 65).

161In the present case, it is common ground that the appellant had an interest in bringing proceedings when it lodged its action for annulment of the first decision before the General Court.

162As observed in paragraph 29 above, the first and second decisions are identical in content.

163In addition, the action for annulment brought by the appellant against the second decision (Case T‑584/18) reproduced all the pleas and arguments included in the action for annulment brought against the first decision (Case T‑351/18).

164Consequently, it must be found that the General Court, in the judgment under appeal, ruled on all the arguments put forward by the appellant with regard, also, to the first decision.

165The appellant had the possibility, which it has used, to lodge an appeal against that judgment.

166Nevertheless, all the grounds of the appeal, as results from the foregoing considerations, have been rejected.

167Consequently, if the first ground of appeal and the second part of the second ground of appeal were upheld, the General Court would be required to rule, for a second time, on the same pleas and arguments that the appellant had raised.

168However, the Court of Justice has rejected all the grounds of the appeal and the appellant does not specify the advantage it could gain from the General Court delivering such a second judgment concerning a decision that is identical and pleas and arguments that are identical.

169In those particular circumstances, it does not appear that the upholding of the first ground of appeal and the second part of the second ground of appeal is liable, by being successful, to procure an advantage for the appellant.

170It follows that, in the present case, there is no need to rule on the first ground of appeal and the second part of the second ground of appeal.

171Since none of the grounds raised in support of the appeal has been upheld, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

172In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs. Under Article 138(1) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

173Since the appellant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered, in accordance with the form of order sought by the ECB, to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the ECB.

174In accordance with Article 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, under which Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs, the Commission is to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby:

Dismisses the appeal;

Orders Versobank AS to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB);

Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.

Arabadjiev

Bay Larsen

Xuereb

von Danwitz

Kumin

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 7 September 2023.

Registrar

President of the Chamber

Language of the case: English.