Official Journal of the European Union

C series

—

C/2025/247

(Case C-635/24)

(C/2025/247)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Kinda Makhlouf (represented by: G. Karouni, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 17 July 2024, Makhlouf v Council (T-208/22, ECLI:EU:T:2024:497) (‘the judgment under appeal’), including in so far as it ordered the appellant to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council;

—dispose of the action on the merits and annul the contested decisions in so far as they include and maintain the appellant on the lists annexed to those acts:

a)First, Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/242 of 21 February 2022 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2022 L 40, p. 26) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/237 of 21 February 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2022 L 40, p. 6) (taken together, ‘the initial acts’), and

b)Secondly, Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1035 of 25 May 2023 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2023 L 139, p. 49) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1027 of 25 May 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2023 L 139, p. 1), in so far as those acts concern her;

—award compensation in respect of the harm caused to the appellant and order the Council to pay her EUR 50 000 in damages;

—order the Council to pay all of the costs incurred by the appellant before both the General Court and the Court of Justice.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of her appeal, the appellant puts forward four grounds of appeal.

1.The first ground of appeal alleges failure to observe the procedural safeguards which should have been applied to the appellant, since she was not heard prior to the adoption of the initial acts by the Council. According to the appellant, the General Court misjudged the need for the restrictive measures at issue to have a surprise effect, particularly because the appellant’s own estate was small compared with the estate she would inherit and the measures were adopted 11 years after the restrictive measures taken against her father.

2.In the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in upholding the Council’s assessment concerning her ties to the Syrian regime and her influence over its decisions. With reference to the family membership criterion, the General Court reversed the burden of proof and infringed Articles 26, 29 and 40 TEU, Articles 240 and 275 TFEU and Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It did so against a background in which the Council had considered the appellant to be an outsider in the area of Syrian political and economic affairs for more than 10 years and had abruptly changed its view 2 years after her father’s death, when she was living in Poland with her new husband.

3.In the third ground of appeal, the appellant claims breach of the principle of proportionality and distortion of the facts and also argues that the reasoning set out in the judgment under appeal is inadequate as regards the freezing of her own assets, in addition to the assets forming the estate of Mr Mohammed Makhlouf which were frozen. Specifically, the appellant states that the materials in the file to which the General Court referred pre-dated Mr Mohammed Makhlouf’s death and the inheritance by seven years and that the General Court should have found that the Council was not entitled to use those materials as a basis for its decision to include the appellant’s own funds within the scope of the restrictive measures.

4.In the fourth ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the General Court breached her right to a normal family life in so far as it overlooked the fact that, because of the restrictive measures taken by the Council, she was unable to reside in the European Union, to settle there and to establish her domicile and centre of interests there together with her husband, an EU national whose family, occupational and non-material interests are in Poland.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/247/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

—