Provisional text

26 November 2024 (*1)

( Action for annulment – Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 – Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 – Directive (EU) 2024/1265 – Legislative act – Act entailing implementing measures – Lack of direct concern – Manifest inadmissibility – Request for ‘constitutional dialogue’ with the Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court, Belgium) – Clear lack of jurisdiction )

In Case T‑392/24,

Raf Verbeke, residing in Ghent (Belgium),

Elias Vlerick, residing in Ghent,

represented by M. Kaçar, lawyer,

applicants,

Council of the European Union,

defendants,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),

composed of M.J. Costeira (Rapporteur), President, U. Öberg and P. Zilgalvis, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

makes the following

1By their action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicants, Mr Raf Verbeke and Mr Elias Vlerick, request, in the first place, annulment of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (OJ L 2024/1263), of Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 of 29 April 2024 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 2024/1264), and Council Directive (EU) 2024/1265 of 29 April 2024 amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States (OJ L 2024/1265) (together, ‘the contested acts’) and, in the second place and in the alternative, that a ‘constitutional dialogue’ be conducted with the Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court, Belgium) on the implementation by the Belgian authorities of the contested acts.

2Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine an action or where the action is manifestly inadmissible, the Court may decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.

3In this instance, the Court considers that it has been sufficiently informed by the documents in the file and decides, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.

Applicants’ first head of claim

4By their first head of claim, the applicants request annulment of Regulations 2024/1263 and 2024/1264 and of Directive 2024/1265.

5It should be noted at the outset that, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, ‘any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.’

6The fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU thus distinguishes three situations in which an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person may be declared admissible. It is therefore necessary to examine whether one of those situations has arisen in the case at hand.

7First of all, it must be pointed out that, since the applicants are not the addressees of the contested acts, they do not have a right of action under the first situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

8Next, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the expression ‘regulatory act’, within the meaning of the third situation in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, does not include legislative acts.

9The distinction between a legislative act and a regulatory act is based on the criterion of the procedure which led to its adoption (order of 6 September 2011, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, T‑18/10, EU:T:2011:419, paragraph 65).

10Article 289(1) to (3) TFEU provides that legal acts adopted in accordance with the procedures referred to as the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ and the ‘special legislative procedure’ are to constitute legislative acts.

11In the present case, it is apparent from the preamble to Regulation 2024/1263 that its legal basis is Article 121(6) TFEU and that it was adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. Moreover, it is apparent from the preamble to Regulation 2024/1264 that its legal basis is Article 126(14) TFEU and that it was adopted in accordance with the special legislative procedure.

12It follows that Regulations 2024/1263 and 2024/1264, in so far as they were adopted in accordance with the ordinary and special legislative procedures, respectively, are legislative acts and not regulatory acts, within the meaning of the third situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

13Furthermore, as regards Directive 2024/1265, it should be recalled that the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU provides that ‘a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.’ To that effect, Article 2(1) of that directive provides that ‘Member States [are to] bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 31 December 2025.’

14Thus, in so far as the action seeks the annulment of a directive with which the Member States must comply by 31 December 2025 at the latest by bringing into force the laws, regulations or administrative provisions necessary, the materialisation of the legal effects of that directive in relation to the applicants requires implementing measures within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, namely national implementing measures amenable to judicial review before the national courts.

15Accordingly, it follows from paragraphs 12 and 14 above that the applicants do not have a right of action against the contested acts under the third situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

16Last, and consequently, the first head of claim can be declared admissible only in so far as the applicants are directly and individually concerned by the contested acts, by virtue of the second situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

17As regards the concept of direct concern, it must be noted that a natural or legal person is directly concerned by the decision against which the action is brought where two cumulative criteria are met, namely, first, the contested measure must directly affect the legal situation of the natural or legal person and, second, it must leave no discretion to its addressees who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from the EU rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori and Commission v Ferracci, C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

18As regards the first of those conditions, it is settled case-law that the action for annulment provided for in Article 263 TFEU is available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their form, which are intended to have binding legal effects (see judgment of 3 June 2021, Hungary v Parliament, C‑650/18, EU:C:2021:426, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

19In order to determine whether an act produces such effects and may, accordingly form the subject matter of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, it is necessary to examine the substance of that act and to assess its effects in the light of objective criteria, such as the content of the said act, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution which adopted the act (see judgment of 3 June 2021, Hungary v Parliament, C‑650/18, EU:C:2021:426, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

20Accordingly, whether an act is capable of directly affecting the legal situation of a natural or legal person cannot be assessed with regard solely to the fact that that act takes the form of a directive (judgment of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, C‑348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 64).

21In the case at hand, it must be pointed out that the contested acts, jointly referred to as ‘the economic governance framework reform’ (see recital 8 of Directive 2024/1265), seek to reform the European Union’s economic governance framework, in the light of the objectives of budgetary discipline and sustainability of the debt of the Member States.

22Thus, first, the purpose of Regulation 2024/1263 is to lay down rules to ensure the effective coordination of sound economic policies of the Member States and, in particular, detailed rules on the content of national medium-term fiscal-structural plans (Article 1(1) and (2) of that regulation).

23Second, Regulation 2024/1264 amends Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ 1997 L 209, p. 6, and corrigendum OJ 1998 L 46, p. 20), the purpose of which is to lay down provisions to speed up and clarify the excessive deficit procedure of Member States which have adopted the single currency (Article 1 of the latter regulation).

24Third, Directive 2024/1265 amends Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States (OJ 2011 L 306, p. 41), which lays down detailed rules concerning the characteristics of the budgetary frameworks of the Member States in order to avoid excessive government deficits (Article 1 of the latter directive).

25It follows that the contested acts apply to the Member States, in so far as they provide for an economic governance framework for them, in particular rules relating to national fiscal-structural plans, to the excessive deficit procedure of Member States which have adopted the single currency and to the budgetary frameworks of the Member States in order to avoid excessive government deficits.

26Consequently, the contested acts are not capable of directly affecting the applicants’ own legal situation. That conclusion is moreover confirmed by the applicants’ claims in the application.

27First, the applicants do not identify any specific provision of the contested acts capable of affecting their legal situation, but merely request that those acts be annulled in their entirety.

28Second, the applicants do not rely on any concrete effect of the contested acts on their legal situation. On the contrary, they claim that those acts have effects on the management of and property rights in public municipal land in Ghent (Belgium), which are not in line with their interests in that management. In particular, they maintain that those acts (i) prevent ‘a land value [relating to the disposal of certain public lands] as an asset enabling a debt to be taken on to compensate the former acquirer of the land’, (ii) may infringe the Belgian ‘constitutional identity’, and (iii) ‘impose rules on expenditure and indebtedness which prevent local authorities from complying with their constitutional obligations’.

29Any effects of the contested acts on the management and rights of a public entity, such as the City of Ghent, however, cannot constitute effects which directly affect the applicants’ legal situation, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 17 above.

30Since one of the two cumulative conditions set out in paragraph 17 above is not satisfied, namely the condition of direct concern, it must be concluded that the applicants do not have standing to bring an action for annulment of the contested acts under the second situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

31Accordingly, the applicants’ first head of claim must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible, in that the applicants cannot base their standing to bring an action for annulment of the contested acts on any of the situations referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

Applicants’ second head of claim

32By their second head of claim, formulated in the alternative, the applicants request the General Court to conduct a ‘constitutional dialogue’ with the Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) on the implementation by the Belgian authorities of the contested acts.

33However, in the context of the review of legality under Article 263 TFEU, the General Court has no jurisdiction to conduct a ‘constitutional dialogue’ with a national court.

34It follows that the applicants’ second head of claim must be rejected on the ground that the Court clearly lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine it.

35It follows from all of the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety, in part as manifestly inadmissible and in part on account of the Court’s clear lack of jurisdiction to hear and determine it.

Costs

36Since the present order was adopted before the application was served on the defendants and before the latter could have incurred costs, it is sufficient to decide that the applicants must bear their own costs, in accordance with Article 133 of the Rules of Procedure.

On those grounds,

hereby orders:

Luxembourg, 26 November 2024.

Registrar

President

*

Language of the case: Dutch.