Official Journal of the European Union

C series

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C/2025/3259

24.6.2025

(C/2025/3259)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Energia Group Holdings (ROI) DAC, Energia Customer Solutions Limited, Wind Generation Ireland Limited, Holyford Windfarm Limited, Cornavarrow Windfarm Limited, Eshmore Limited, GR Wind Farms 1 Limited, CNOC Windfarms Limited, TRA Investments Limited, Ballybane Windfarms Limited, Beam Wind Limited, Meenaward Wind Farm Limited, Cordal Windfarms Limited, Sigatoka Limited, Glanaruddery Windfarms Limited, Glencarbry Windfarm Limited, Gortahile Windfarm Limited, Killala Community Windfarm Designated Activity Company, Kill Hills Windfarm Limited, Knocknacummer Wind Farm Limited, Knocknalour Wind Farm Limited, Seahound Wind Developments Limited, Lisdowney Wind Farm Limited, Monaincha Wind Farm Limited, Ronaver Energy Limited, Tullynamoyle Wind Farm II Limited

Defendant: The Commission for Regulation of Utilities

Notice parties: Eirgrid PLC, The Attorney General

Questions referred

Does Article 13(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 (1) require that generators with firm access who are dispatched downwards by the system operator be fully compensated for the revenue lost as a result of being redispatched (including any foregone financial support) such that the generator is put in the same financial position as it would have been in had it not been redispatched and is accordingly indifferent to the prospect of being redispatched?

In this context, what is meant by the words ‘unjustifiably low or unjustifiably high compensation’ and by reference to what criteria or benchmark is the assessment of whether compensation is ‘unjustifiably low or unjustifiably high’ to be made?

In particular, does Article 13(7) permit the adoption of a measure of application that distinguishes between electricity generators in relation to their entitlement to compensation depending on whether the generators enjoy the benefit of priority dispatch or not?

Is Article 13(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional, whether in its terms or with the assistance of a reference under Article 267, such that it is directly effective in national law?

To what extent does Article 13(7) require or permit the adoption of national measures of implementation or application?

If Article 13(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not directly effective, may it nonetheless be invoked before a national court for the purposes of challenging the legality of a provision of national law (including any purported national implementing measure) allegedly inconsistent with it and as a basis for annulling or setting aside such a provision or measure if found to be inconsistent with it or is the exercise of such a jurisdiction by a national court excluded by Poplawski II?

If Article 13(7) is not directly effective, and if it cannot be invoked before a national court for the purpose set out in (a) above, what remedies are available to an undertaking who claims that a purported national implementing measure wrongly restricts its entitlement to compensation under Article 13(7), whether pursuant to Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter or otherwise?

As regards the correct meaning and effect of Article 13(7):

Having regard to the provisions of Article 71 of Regulation (EU) 2019/343, was it open to the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) to adopt a measure of application deferring payment of compensation under Article 13(7) to 2024?

Was it open to the NRA to adopt a measure of application that deferred the decision as to whether (and if so to what extent) compensation should be payable under Article 13(7) in respect of foregone financial support?

Does Article 13(7) permit the adoption of a measure of application that (i) restricts compensation to generators participating in the ex ante (day ahead) market, thus excluding de minimis generators from being compensated in the event of being redispatched and/or (ii) provides for payment of compensation to suppliers of electricity, who may be intermediaries rather than the generators who have been redispatched?

In the event that a renewable generator that is a party to a Corporate Power Purchase Agreement (CPPA) is redispatched downwards, must the compensation payable under Article 13(7) include compensation for the loss of any payments that would have been payable under the CPPA (in the event that the generator had not been redispatched) due to the contract strike price exceeding the relevant market price or do such payments constitute a form of financial support falling outside the scope of Article 13(7)(b)?

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(1) Regulation (EU) 2019/934 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (OJ 2019, L158, p. 54).

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ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3259/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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