Official Journal of the European Union

C series

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C/2025/1750

31.3.2025

(Case C-118/25 P)

(C/2025/1750)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Nord Stream 2 AG (represented by: T. Winter, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Parliament, Council of the European Union, Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, Republic of Lithuania, Republic of Poland, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—set aside the judgment under appeal, in particular points 1 and 3 of the operative part;

—to the extent that the Court considers the state of the proceedings so permit to rule on the substance and

—annul the Directive (EU) 2019/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (<span class="oj-super oj-note-tag">1</span>) (‘the contested directive’) in its entirety or; in the alternative

—annul Article 49a of the contested directive or; in the alternative

—annul ‘completed before 23 May 2019 ’ in Article 49a(1) of the contested directive;

—or; in the alternative to the extent that the Court does not consider the state of the proceedings so permit to refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the substance; and

—order to the Council and the Parliament to pay the appellant’s costs, including the costs before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant relies on seven grounds of appeal.

First, the General Court made errors in law as it did not follow the ruling of the Court of Justice as required under Article 61 of the Statute of the Court. The General Court repeatedly disregards the binding findings of the judgment of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council (C-348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548), by failing to recognize that the contested directive deprives the appellant of any possibility to apply for an exemption or a derogation from the outset, and by questioning the unequal treatment of the appellant as established by the Court. Furthermore, the General Court draws wrong conclusions from the finding of the Court concerning the severability of Articles 36 and 49a of the contested directive for the ability of the General Court to annul the contested directive in its entirety.

Second, the General Court made errors in law as it distorted the facts and evidence regarding the documents related to the foreseeability of the change in law, regarding the appellant’s final investment decision, its investments and the irreversibility of its investments and regarding the real aim and impact of the contested directive.

Third, the General Court made errors in law by failing to order measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry in relation to the appellant’s irreversible investments, the real objectives of the contested directive, and its ability to reach the publicly stated objectives.

Fourth, the General Court made errors in law in finding that there was no infringement of the principle of legal certainty. The General Court’s finding that the appellant could have adapted its project upon the proposal for the contested directive lacks any basis in the facts relied on. The General Court distorted facts and evidence regarding the public discussion preceding the pre-announcement of the proposal for the contested directive. Furthermore, the General Court distorted facts and evidence and omitted to take appropriate measures of inquiry regarding the final investment decision of the appellant, its investments made and the irreversibility of its investments.

Fifth, the General Court made errors in law in finding that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment. The Court has established that the difference in treatment consists of excluding the appellant from being eligible for an exemption or a derogation. The General Court erred in law when it did not examine the possible objective justifications for excluding the appellant from being eligible for an exemption and a derogation and restricted its assessment to Article 49a of the contested directive.

Sixth, the General Court made errors in law in finding that there was no infringement of the principle of proportionality. The General Court distorted the facts and evidence regarding the public benefit of the contested directive and restricted its assessment to official documents of the EU institutions. It erroneously considered the impact of the appellant’s pipeline and not the impact of the regulation of that pipeline. The General Court erred in law in rejecting the appellant’s objection that the lack of public benefits of the contested directive does not outweigh its strong impact on the appellant. Firstly, the General Court committed a serious procedural error in not accepting the proof of the economic consequences of the contested directive on the appellant. Secondly, the General Court’s assessment is marred with errors. In particular, it is not possible for the appellant to simply cancel its investments and concluded contracts.

Seventh, the General Court made errors in law in finding that there was no misuse of powers. The appellant has proven that the EU institutions drafted and adopted the contested directive with the intention of regulating only the appellant’s pipeline.

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(1) OJ 2019 L 117, p. 1.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1750/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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