Official Journal of the European Union

C series

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C/2025/4273

11.8.2025

(Case C-400/25 P)

(C/2025/4273)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko (represented by: S. Bonifassi, T. Bontinck, E. Fedorova and J. Goffin, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

—set aside in its entirety the judgment of the General Court of the European Union delivered on 2 April 2025 by the First Chamber, Extended Composition, of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-297/23;

—consequently, grant the forms of order sought by the appellant before the General Court of the European Union, namely:

—under Article 263 TFUE, annulment of:

—Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 (1) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571, (2) and

—Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 (3) and Implementing Regulation 2023/1765, (4)

in so far as those acts concern the appellant.

—under Article 268 TFEU, compensation in respect of the non-material harm that the appellant claims to have suffered as a result of the adoption of those acts;

—order the respondent to pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant raises ten grounds in support of his appeal.

In the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in ruling that, by way of the first part of the criterion laid down in Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, (5) the Council did not create a presumption of interdependence between leading businesspersons operating in Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation.

In the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in reversing the burden of proof and finding that the Council was not required to establish the existence of a relationship of interdependence between leading businesspersons operating in Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of recital 4 of Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094, (6) and that it was for the appellant to prove that that consideration was incorrect.

In the third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in interpreting the word ‘leading’, in the first part of the criterion laid down in Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014 as referring to the ‘importance’ of businesspersons operating in Russia in the light of their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they pursue those activities.

In the fourth ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in finding that the appellant had failed to show that the introduction of the first part of criterion (g) was such as to breach the principle of proportionality, and that, in doing so, the General Court also infringed its obligation to state reasons by failing to establish that the first part of criterion (g) was proportionate, and by failing to address several arguments raised by the appellant.

In the fifth ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law and infringed its obligation to state reasons in finding that the Council made an error of assessment by applying the designation criterion laid down in Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 to the appellant without demonstrating any practical, positive action in support of ‘actions or policies that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine’ on the part of the appellant.

In the sixth ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law and infringed its obligation to state reasons in finding that the Council made an error of assessment by applying the designation criterion laid down in Article 3(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 to the appellant without demonstrating any practical, positive action ‘supporting, materially or financially, Russian decision-makers’ on the part of the appellant.

In the seventh ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by substituting itself for the Council, in that it found that the application of criterion (d) was justified, in particular, by the fact that Bank Rossiya diverted funds to the benefit of President Putin and his entourage, whereas no such allegation was put forward as a ground for designation by the Council and was not, in any event, demonstrated, and by the fact that the appellant enjoyed tax exemptions and that the companies Novatek and Sakhatrans received aid from the Government of the Russian Federation, whereas no such grounds were included in the statement of reasons or put forward by the Council in order to justify the application of that criterion to the appellant.

In the eighth ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in finding that the Council had not made an error of assessment by applying the designation criterion laid down in Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 to the appellant, when the Council had failed to show that the appellant was a ‘leading’ businessperson within the meaning of the designation criterion.

In the ninth ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in finding that the Council could, under Article 29 TEU, restrict the freedom of movement of an EU citizen.

In the tenth ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law, breached the principle of proportionality and infringed its obligation to state reasons by ruling that the restriction on the appellant’s freedom of movement was proportionate, when the Council had failed to identify any personal conduct on the part of the appellant representing a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of the Member States of the European Union, and when that restriction did not respect the essence of the appellant’s right.

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Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2023 75 I, p. 134).

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2023 75 I, p. 1).

Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104).

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3).

Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (JO 2014, L 78, p. 6).

Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 of 5 June 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (JO 2023 L 146, p. 20).

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/4273/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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