(Appeal – Statement of formation of a group within the meaning of Rule 29(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament – Lack of political affinities – Retroactive dissolution of the TDI Group – Cross-appeal – Interpretation of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC – Meaning of decision of ‘direct and individual’ concern to a natural or legal person – Inadmissibility of action brought by a national political party)

Summary of the Judgment

Actions for annulment – Natural or legal persons – Measures of direct and individual concern to them – Whether directly affected – Criteria – Parliament decision dissolving a political group formed by Members belonging to a national political party – Whether that party directly affected – Not so affected

(Art. 230, fourth para., EC; Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Rules 29(1) and (2), and 30)

The condition that the decision forming the subject-matter of an action for annulment must be of ‘direct concern’ to a natural or legal person, as it is stated in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, requires the Community measure complained of to affect directly the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules.

A decision of the European Parliament concerning the interpretation of Article 29(1) of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure and dissolving with retroactive effect the ‘Groupe technique des députés indépendants (TDI) – Groupe mixte’ – to the extent to which it deprived the Members having declared the formation of the TDI Group, and in particular the Members from the Front National’s list, of the opportunity of forming by means of the TDI Group a political group within the meaning of Rule 29 – affected those Members directly. Those Members were in fact prevented, solely because of the contested act, from forming themselves into a political group and were henceforth deemed to be non-attached Members for the purposes of Rule 30; as a result, they were afforded more limited parliamentary rights and lesser material and financial advantages than those they would have enjoyed had they been members of a political group within the meaning of Rule 29.

Such a conclusion cannot be drawn, however, in relation to a national political party such as the Front National. Although it is natural for a national political party which puts up candidates in the European elections to want its candidates, once elected, to exercise their mandate under the same conditions as the other Members of the Parliament, that aspiration does not confer on it any right for its elected representatives to form their own group or to become members of one of the groups being formed within the Parliament.

Under Rule 29(2) the formation of a political group within the Parliament requires a minimum number of Members from various Member States and, in any event, Rule 29(1) mentions only the possibility of Members forming themselves into groups according to their political affinities. The rule assigns no specific function in the process of forming political groups to the national political parties to which those Members belong.

(see paras 34-37)

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber) 29 June 2004 (1)

(Appeal – Statement of formation of a group within the meaning of Rule 29(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament – Lack of political affinities – Retroactive dissolution of the TDI Group – Cross-appeal – Interpretation of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC – Meaning of decision of ‘direct and individual' concern to a natural or legal person – Inadmissibility of action brought by a national political party)

In Case C-486/01 P,

Front National, established at Saint-Cloud (France), represented by F. Wagner and V. de Poulpiquet de Brescanvel, avocats,

appellant,

APPEAL against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) of 2 October 2001 in Joined Cases T-222/99, T-327/99 and T-329/99 Martinez and Others v Parliament [2001] ECR II-2823, seeking to have that judgment set aside,

the other party to the proceedings being:

European Parliament, represented by G. Garzón Clariana, J. Schoo and H. Krück, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg,

defendant at first instance,

LA COUR, THE COURT (Grand Chamber),

composed of: V. Skouris, President, P. Jann, C.W.A. Timmermans (Rapporteur), A. Rosas, J.‑P. Puissochet and J.N. Cunha Rodrigues (Presidents of Chambers), R. Schintgen, F. Macken, N. Colneric, S. von Bahr and R. Silva de Lapuerta, Judges,

Advocate General: D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Registrar: M. Múgica Arzamendi, Principal Administrator,

after hearing oral argument from the parties at the hearing on 9 December 2003,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the hearing on 20 January 2004,

gives the following

1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 2012 L 26, p. 1), as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 (OJ 2014 L 124, p. 1) (‘Directive 2011/92’).

2 The request has been made in proceedings between, on the one hand, Waltham Abbey Residents Association and, on the other hand, An Bord Pleanála (Planning Board, Ireland; ‘the Board’), Ireland and the Attorney General (Ireland), concerning authorisation granted by the Board for a strategic residential housing development.

Legal context

European Union law

Directive 2011/92

3 Recitals 7 to 9 of Directive 2011/92 state:

‘(7) Development consent for public and private projects which are likely to have significant effects on the environment should be granted only after an assessment of the likely significant environmental effects of those projects has been carried out. …

(8) Projects belonging to certain types have significant effects on the environment and those projects should, as a rule, be subject to a systematic assessment.

(9) Projects of other types may not have significant effects on the environment in every case and those projects should be assessed where the Member States consider that they are likely to have significant effects on the environment.’

4 Article 2(1) of that directive provides:

‘Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before development consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to a requirement for development consent and an assessment with regard to their effects on the environment. Those projects are defined in Article 4.’

5 Under Article 3(1) of that directive:

‘The environmental impact assessment shall identify, describe and assess in an appropriate manner, in the light of each individual case, the direct and indirect significant effects of a project on the following factors:

…

(b) biodiversity, with particular attention to species and habitats protected under [Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7), as amended by Council Directive 2013/17/EU of 13 May 2013 (OJ 2013 L 158, p. 193) (“Directive 92/43”)] and Directive 2009/147/EC [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ 2010 L 20, p. 7)];

…’

Article 4 of Directive 2011/92 provides:

‘1. Subject to Article 2(4), projects listed in Annex I shall be made subject to an assessment in accordance with Articles 5 to 10.

(a) a case-by-case examination;

(b) thresholds or criteria set by the Member State.

Member States may decide to apply both procedures referred to in points (a) and (b).

Where a case-by-case examination is carried out or thresholds or criteria are set for the purpose of paragraph 2, the relevant selection criteria set out in Annex III shall be taken into account. Member States may set thresholds or criteria to determine when projects need not undergo either the determination under paragraphs 4 and 5 or an environmental impact assessment, and/or thresholds or criteria to determine when projects shall in any case be made subject to an environmental impact assessment without undergoing a determination set out under paragraphs 4 and 5.

Where Member States decide to require a determination for projects listed in Annex II, the developer shall provide information on the characteristics of the project and its likely significant effects on the environment. The detailed list of information to be provided is specified in Annex IIA. The developer shall take into account, where relevant, the available results of other relevant assessments of the effects on the environment carried out pursuant to Union legislation other than this Directive. The developer may also provide a description of any features of the project and/or measures envisaged to avoid or prevent what might otherwise have been significant adverse effects on the environment.

The competent authority shall make its determination, on the basis of the information provided by the developer in accordance with paragraph 4 taking into account, where relevant, the results of preliminary verifications or assessments of the effects on the environment carried out pursuant to Union legislation other than this Directive. The determination shall made available to the public and:

(a) where it is decided that an environmental impact assessment is required, state the main reasons for requiring such assessment with reference to the relevant criteria listed in Annex III; or

(b) where it is decided that an environmental impact assessment is not required, state the main reasons for not requiring such assessment with reference to the relevant criteria listed in Annex III, and, where proposed by the developer, state any features of the project and/or measures envisaged to avoid or prevent what might otherwise have been significant adverse effects on the environment.

Member States shall ensure that the competent authority makes its determination as soon as possible and within a period of time not exceeding 90 days from the date on which the developer has submitted all the information required pursuant to paragraph 4. In exceptional cases, for instance relating to the nature, complexity, location or size of the project, the competent authority may extend that deadline to make its determination; in that event, the competent authority shall inform the developer in writing of the reasons justifying the extension and of the date when its determination is expected.’

Annex II.A of that directive contains the list of ‘information to be provided by the developer on the projects listed in Annex II’. That list reads as follows:

‘1. A description of the project, including in particular:

(a) a description of the physical characteristics of the whole project and, where relevant, of demolition works;

(b) a description of the location of the project, with particular regard to the environmental sensitivity of geographical areas likely to be affected.

(a) the expected residues and emissions and the production of waste, where relevant;

(b) the use of natural resources, in particular soil, land, water and biodiversity.

Annex III to that directive sets out the ‘criteria to determine whether the projects listed in Annex II should be subject to an environmental impact assessment’.

Directive 2014/52

Recitals 11 and 29 of Directive 2014/52 state:

‘(11) The measures taken to avoid, prevent, reduce and, if possible, offset significant adverse effects on the environment, in particular on species and habitats protected under [Directive 92/43] and Directive 2009/147 …, should contribute to avoiding any deterioration in the quality of the environment and any net loss of biodiversity, in accordance with the [European] Union’s commitments in the context of the [United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, signed in Rio de Janeiro on 5 June 1992,] and the objectives and actions of the Union Biodiversity Strategy up to 2020 laid down in the [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions] of 3 May 2011 entitled ‘Our life insurance, our natural capital: an EU biodiversity strategy to 2020’ [(COM(2011) 244 final)]

…

(29) When determining whether significant effects on the environment are likely to be caused by a project, the competent authorities should identify the most relevant criteria to be considered and should take into account information that could be available following other assessments required by Union legislation in order to apply the screening procedure effectively and transparently. In this regard, it is appropriate to specify the content of the screening determination, in particular where no environmental impact assessment is required. Moreover, taking into account unsolicited comments that might have been received from other sources, such as members of the public or public authorities, even though no formal consultation is required at the screening stage, constitutes good administrative practice.’

Directive 92/43

Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43 provides:

‘Any plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site but likely to have a significant effect thereon, either individually or in combination with other plans or projects, shall be subject to appropriate assessment of its implications for the site in view of the site’s conservation objectives. In the light of the conclusions of the assessment of the implications for the site and subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the competent national authorities shall agree to the plan or project only after having ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned and, if appropriate, after having obtained the opinion of the general public.’

Article 12(1) of that directive provides:

‘Member States shall take the requisite measures to establish a system of strict protection for the animal species listed in Annex IV(a) in their natural range, prohibiting:

(a) all forms of deliberate capture or killing of specimens of these species in the wild;

(b) deliberate disturbance of these species, particularly during the period of breeding, rearing, hibernation and migration;

(c) deliberate destruction or taking of eggs from the wild;

(d) deterioration or destruction of breeding sites or resting places.’

Point (a) of Annex IV to that directive mentions ‘all species’ of bats belonging to the suborder of ‘microchiroptera’.

Irish law

Taking the view that in those circumstances the vote adversely affected it, the Front National brought an action for annulment of the contested act by application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 19 November 1999 (Case T-327/99). By applications lodged at the Court Registry on 5 October and 22 November 1999, Messrs Martinez and de Gaulle (Case T-222/99) and Mrs Bonino, Messrs Pannella, Cappato, Dell’Alba, Della Vedova, Dupuis, Turco and La Lista Emma Bonino (Case T-329/99) also brought actions having the same purpose.

The judgment under appeal

In the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance declared the Front National’s action admissible but dismissed it as unfounded.

As to whether the action was admissible, the Court of First Instance rejected the pleas of inadmissibility put forward by the Parliament, which alleged (i) non-existence of the contested act, (ii) that the act was not amenable to judicial review by the Community judicature and (iii) that the act was not of direct and individual concern to the Front National within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC.

First, addressing the plea of inadmissibility alleging non-existence of the contested act in so far as it dissolved the TDI Group, the Court of First Instance held, in paragraph 26 of the judgment under appeal, that in order to determine whether an act may be the subject of a challenge in an action under Article 230 EC it is necessary to look at the substance of the act rather than its form. Following examination of the contents of the act and of the circumstances leading to its adoption, the Court of First Instance found, in paragraph 46 of the judgment, that by such an act the Parliament had not only decided to adopt the general interpretation of Rule 29(1) proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the view expressed by that committee on the conformity with Rule 29 of the statement of formation of the TDI Group, but had also established the non-existence ex tunc of that group for non-observance of the condition referred to in that rule.

As regards the second plea of inadmissibility put forward by the Parliament concerning the non-actionable nature of the contested act, the Court of First Instance held, in paragraphs 59 to 62 of the judgment under appeal, that an act of that kind, in depriving the Members who declared the formation of the TDI Group of the opportunity of organising themselves by means of that group in a political group within the meaning of Rule 29, with the result that those Members were deemed to be non-attached under Rule 30, affected the conditions under which the parliamentary functions of the Members concerned were exercised, and thus produced legal effects in their regard. Such an act cannot, therefore, be deemed merely to be an act confined to the internal organisation of the work of the Parliament but must be open to review by the Community judicature under the first paragraph of Article 230 EC.

Third, in response to the plea of inadmissibility by which the Parliament had questioned whether the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC were met, the Court of First Instance held, in paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal, that the contested act had to be regarded as directly affecting Messrs Martinez and de Gaulle and the Members who had brought the action in Case T-329/99, since the act, without the need for any supplementary measure, prevented those Members from forming themselves by means of the TDI Group into a political group within the meaning of Rule 29, something which directly impinged on the performance by them of their functions. Consequently, the Court held that the contested act had also to be regarded as being of direct and individual concern to the Front National.

So far as the first of those conditions is concerned, the Court of Instance held more specifically as follows:

66‘As regards Case T-327/99, it should be noted that the French political party known as the Front National is a legal person whose stipulated object is to promote via its members political ideas and projects in the context of national and European institutions. It presented a list of candidates at the election in June 1999 of representatives to the Parliament. The persons on that list who were elected to the Parliament all form part of the body of Members declaring the formation of the TDI Group. Owing to the act of 14 September 1999, they are all in the situation described at paragraph 59 above, which directly impinges on the promotion of the ideas and projects of the party which they represent in the European Parliament and, hence, also on the attainment of that political party’s stipulated object at European level.’

67The act of 14 September 1999 must therefore be regarded as directly affecting the Front National.

As to the second of the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, the Court of First Instance, having described the case-law on the interpretation of that condition and the circumstances which had led to the dissolution of the TDI Group, held, in paragraph 72 of the judgment under appeal, that the contested act concerned the Front National individually by virtue of circumstances differentiating it from all other persons.

Consequently, the Court of First Instance rejected the third plea of inadmissibility put forward by the Parliament and held, in paragraph 75 of the judgment under appeal, that the Front National’s action for annulment therefore had to be declared admissible.

Substance

So far as the substance of the action was concerned, however, the Court of First Instance dismissed all the pleas put forward by the Front National, which alleged (i) a misreading of Rule 29(1) (first plea), (ii) infringement of the principle of equal treatment and of the Rules of Procedure, as well as the lack of a legal basis (second plea), (iii) infringement of the principle of equal treatment with regard to members of the TDI Group (third plea), (iv) disregard of the parliamentary traditions common to the Member States (fourth plea), (v) infringement of essential procedural requirements (fifth plea) and (vi) a presumption of misuse of procedure (sixth plea).

Consequently, the Court of First Instance dismissed the actions for annulment before it and ordered the Front National to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Parliament in Case T-327/99.

The appeal

By its appeal, the Front National claims that the Court should:

–declare the appeal admissible;

–find that there has been an infringement of Community law by the Court of First Instance;

–quash the limbs and grounds of the judgment under appeal in whole or in part;

–rule on the case as appropriate or, failing that, refer the case back to the Court of First Instance; and

–order the Parliament to pay all the costs.

The Parliament contends that the Court should:

–dismiss the appeal;

–set aside the judgment under appeal to the extent to which it admits the Front National’s action for annulment;

–dismiss the action as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded; and

–order the Front National to pay the costs.

The cross-appeal

Arguments of the parties

By its cross-appeal, which it is appropriate to examine first, the Parliament disputes, in essence, the Front National’s standing to bring proceedings for annulment of the contested act. It argues in that regard that, although the Court of First Instance, in paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal, correctly assessed the impact of that act on the legal position of the Members who had declared the formation of the TDI Group (some of whom were also members of the Front National), it nevertheless made an error of law in holding, in paragraph 67 of the judgment, that the contested act had to be regarded as ‘directly’ affecting the Front National. The party did not meet that condition, laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, precisely because it was concerned only indirectly by the contested act. The Parliament puts forward the following arguments on this point.

First, the conclusion reached by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 67 of the judgment under appeal is not consistent with the finding in other passages of the judgment, in particular in paragraphs 59 and 65 thereof, in which the Court found that the contested act had to be regarded as of direct concern to the Members who had declared the formation of the TDI Group, since they were deprived of ‘the opportunity of organising themselves by means of that group in a political group within the meaning of Rule 29’. In the Parliament’s submission, it is inconceivable that national political parties, which are not afforded a special status under the Rules of Procedure, should be affected by acts of the Parliament in the same way as Members, who do enjoy a special status by virtue of those rules.

Second, the finding that the Front National is directly affected by the contested act is also at variance with the case-law of the Court and, in particular, with the judgment in Case 69/69 Alcan and Others v Commission [1970] ECR 385, by virtue of which an applicant can be directly concerned by an act only if the latter has per se the immediate effect of depriving the applicant of a right or imposing on it a duty, so that such an applicant is placed in the same position as the one it would be in if the act concerned were addressed to it. In the Parliament’s submission, that is not the case here, since the Front National, unlike its candidates who are elected Members of the Parliament, is affected only indirectly by the act concerned.

The Parliament argues, third, that, although it admittedly follows from the Court’s case-law that the acts which it adopts may form the subject-matter of an action for annulment where they produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties or where such effects go beyond the internal organisation of the work of the Parliament, an act such as the contested act, which regulates the situation of certain Members, produces no legal effects with regard to third parties such as a national political party. The Front National cannot pray in aid the fact that it took part in the elections in June 1999 or the fact that some of its members were actually elected Members of the Parliament, since, after the election, there ceased to be any legal relationship between the political parties which had taken part in the electoral campaign and the assembly elected. It follows both from Article 4(1) of the Act of 20 September 1976 concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage and from Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure that elected representatives of the Parliament must exercise their mandate independently and cannot be bound by any instruction or receive a binding mandate. If, in such circumstances, the proposition that the contested act also produces legal effects with regard to a national political party such as the Front National were accepted, the Members of the Parliament would amount to no more than ‘intermediaries’ between the Parliament and their party, with no independence or responsibility of their own, something which would run counter to both the letter and the spirit of the abovementioned provisions.

Fourth and finally, the Parliament mentions the negative consequences which might ensue if the Front National’s action were held admissible. If the Court of First Instance’s interpretation were accepted by the Court of Justice, both Courts would be exposed to the risk of being deluged with actions brought not only by other persons or groups of persons who are concerned only indirectly by the Parliament’s internal measures of organisation – such as the foundations of political parties, which could be affected, for example, if the payment of grants from appropriations paid to the political groups were no longer possible – but also by other political parties which, under their own statutes, might consider themselves the particular target of specific provisions of the Rules of Procedure, such as Rule 152 concerning the composition of parliamentary committees, or Rule 168(2), as a result of which, when interparliamentary delegations are set up, account must be taken of ‘as far as possible fair representation of Member States and of political views’.

In the observations which it has submitted on the cross-appeal under Article 117(2) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, the Front National challenges the Parliament’s argument that it has no locus standi under the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC. In its submission, the admissibility of its action is established not only as regards the legal nature of the contested act but also as regards the Front National itself.

As concerns, first, the legal nature of the contested act, the Front National submits that the decision by which the Parliament, on 14 September 1999, endorsed the interpretation of Rule 29(1) put forward by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs is an actionable act, since, by virtue of the case-law of the Court of Justice, such an act is definitive in nature and produces legal effects which go beyond the internal organisation of the work of the Parliament as it deprives the political parties and Members seeking to adhere to the TDI Group of the opportunity of organising themselves into a political group. In those circumstances, the members of the Front National which the party put up as candidates in the elections and whose election it worked to secure are placed in a less favourable position than that of Members of the Parliament who belong to a political group: that affects directly promotion of the party’s ideas and projects and distorts the election results after the ballot.

As regards, second, the person who actually brought the action, the appellant submits that the admissibility of the action is also established in that the contested act is of both direct and individual concern to the Front National.

As regards, in the first place, the condition that the decision forming the subject-matter of the action must be of ‘direct’ concern to the natural or legal person, the Front National concurs with the Court of First Instance’s finding that the contested act was of direct concern to it, since, although the act had significant repercussions on the scope of the political rights and material advantages afforded to the members of the TDI Group, it also had a direct impact on the parties to which those Members belonged, particularly on the Front National, since the latter had actively campaigned for its members to be elected to the Parliament and had thereby incurred considerable expense. The party thus had an obvious interest in the Members for whose election it had worked having the same advantages as the other Members of the Parliament. Relying in particular in this regard on Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, the Front National rebuts the Parliament’s argument that the legal relationship between the parties involved in the campaign and the resulting assembly ceased after the ballot. The principle of equal treatment for parties in an electoral campaign, endorsed by the Court in that judgment, remains effective once the ballot is over, with the result that the Court must censure any breach of that principle if persons who have voted for the Front National are not represented in the Parliament under equivalent, if not identical, conditions to those applicable to Members of the Parliament from the other groups.

As to the condition that the decision at issue in the proceedings must be of ‘individual’ concern to the natural or legal person, the Front National maintains that it fulfils the conditions established by the case-law and, in particular, by the judgment in Case C-309/89 Codorniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853, since it is affected by the contested act by reason of attributes which are peculiar to it and circumstances which differentiate it from all other persons. The Front National concurs in this regard with the Court of First Instance’s assessment in paragraphs 69 to 71 of the judgment under appeal.

Findings of the Court

As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that under the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC any natural or legal person may institute proceedings against a decision addressed to it or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of ‘direct and individual’ concern to it.

Although the Parliament, by its cross-appeal, does not challenge the Court of First Instance’s finding that the contested act is in the nature of a decision and concerns the Front National individually, it does, however, dispute the conclusion, in paragraph 67 of the judgment under appeal, that the act is of direct concern to the party.

In that regard, it is appropriate to bear in mind that, by virtue of settled case-law, the condition that the decision forming the subject-matter of the proceedings must be of ‘direct concern’ to a natural or legal person, as it is stated in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, requires the Community measure complained of to affect directly the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see, inter alia, Case C‑404/96 P Glencore Grain v Commission [1998] ECR I‑2435, paragraph 41, and the case-law cited).

In this instance there is no question that the contested act – to the extent to which it deprived the Members having declared the formation of the TDI Group, and in particular the Members from the Front National’s list, of the opportunity of forming by means of the TDI Group a political group within the meaning of Rule 29 – affected those Members directly. As the Court of First Instance rightly pointed out in paragraphs 59 and 65 of the judgment under appeal, those Members were in fact prevented, solely because of the contested act, from forming themselves into a political group and were henceforth deemed to be non-attached Members for the purposes of Rule 30; as a result, they were afforded more limited parliamentary rights and lesser material and financial advantages than those they would have enjoyed had they been members of a political group within the meaning of Rule 29.

Such a conclusion cannot be drawn, however, in relation to a national political party such as the Front National. As the Advocate General has noted in point 40 of his Opinion, although it is natural for a national political party which puts up candidates in the European elections to want its candidates, once elected, to exercise their mandate under the same conditions as the other Members of the Parliament, that aspiration does not confer on it any right for its elected representatives to form their own group or to become members of one of the groups being formed within the Parliament.

It must be observed that under Rule 29(2) the formation of a political group within the Parliament requires a minimum number of Members from various Member States and that, in any event, Rule 29(1) mentions only the possibility of Members forming themselves into groups according to their political affinities. The rule assigns no specific function in the process of forming political groups to the national political parties to which those Members belong.

In those circumstances, it cannot be maintained that a national political party is directly affected by the contested act, which applies, and which in fact, by virtue of the actual wording of Rule 29, could apply, only to the Members of the Parliament who had declared the formation of the TDI Group.

In paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance admittedly found that, since the contested act deprived the Members concerned, particularly those elected from the Front National’s list, of the opportunity to organise themselves into a political group, it directly impinged on the promotion of the ideas and projects of the party which they represented in the European Parliament and, hence, on the attainment of that political party’s stipulated object at European level, the reason why the Front National was directly affected by the act.

Such effects, however, cannot be regarded as directly caused by the contested act. Even on the assumption that such consequences ensue, they result from the fact that Members who do not belong to a political group are deemed to be non-attached Members under Rule 30 and from the fact that non-attached Members are afforded a less favourable status by Rule 30. The Front National is liable to be affected only indirectly by the contested act, by virtue of the consequences which the act entails for the status of the Members who adhere to that party.

The Court must also reject the argument which the Front National derives from the Court’s recognition, in its judgment in Les Verts v Parliament, of the principle of equal treatment for parties in an electoral campaign, which remains effective once the ballot is over. That judgment concerned a quite different situation from the one at issue in this instance.

Thus, the decisions of the Parliament at issue in Les Verts v Parliament were of direct concern to the applicant in that case, since they provided, in the period preceding the European elections in 1984, for the allocation of appropriations between the political groupings – which included that party – without any further measure being necessary, given that the calculation of the proportion of the appropriations to be awarded to each of the political groupings concerned was automatic and left no room for any discretion, as the Court stated in paragraph 31 of its judgment.

In the present case, however, the Front National is not directly concerned by the contested act. Although it cannot be denied that no implementing measure is necessary for the act to produce effects, there is also no question that, pursuant to the actual wording of Rule 29, the act can produce effects only on the legal situation of Members of the Parliament and not on that of national political parties from whose lists those Members were elected and which, in some cases, have played a part in securing the election of those Members. Contrary to the requirements laid down by the case-law referred to in paragraph 34 of this judgment, such an act therefore does not directly produce effects on the legal situation of the Front National.

In view of all the foregoing considerations, it must therefore be concluded that the Court of First Instance erred in law in holding, in paragraph 67 of the judgment under appeal, that the contested act directly affected the Front National, and the judgment must be set aside in so far as it declared the Front National’s action admissible.

Admissibility of the Front National’s action

Under the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, the Court, where it quashes a decision of the Court of First Instance, may either itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for final judgment.

In this case, the Court considers that it has all the elements necessary for it to adjudicate itself on the admissibility of the action brought by the Front National before the Court of First Instance. The arguments put forward by the party in support of its case are identical to those which it developed in its observations on the Parliament’s cross-appeal and are based, in essence, on the proposition, already referred to, that the contested act was of direct concern to it inasmuch as it appreciably affected the promotion of the ideas and projects of the party within the European Parliament.

For the reasons set out in paragraphs 36 to 43 of this judgment, the Front National cannot be regarded as directly affected by the contested act.

In those circumstances, the action which the Front National brought before the Court of First Instance must be dismissed as inadmissible. Consequently, there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the main appeal.

Costs

Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to the procedure on appeal by virtue of Article 118 of those Rules, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Parliament has applied for the Front National to be ordered to pay the costs and since the latter has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and those of the proceedings for interim measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this judgment.

On those grounds,

THE COURT (Grand Chamber) hereby:

Sets aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities of 2 October 2001 in Joined Cases T‑222/99, T‑327/99 and T‑329/99 Martinez and Others v Parliament in so far as it declared admissible the action brought by the Front National (Case T‑327/99);

Dismisses as inadmissible the action brought by the Front National for annulment of the European Parliament’s Decision of 14 September 1999 concerning the interpretation of Rule 29(1) of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure and dissolving with retroactive effect the ‘Groupe technique des députés indépendants (TDI) – Groupe mixte’;

Finds that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the appeal brought by the Front National against the judgment referred to in paragraph 1 of the operative part of this judgment;

Costs

Orders the Front National to pay the costs incurred by the European Parliament both in these proceedings and in the proceedings for interim measures.

Skouris

Jann

Timmermans

Rosas

Puissochet

Cunha Rodrigues

Schintgen

Macken

Colneric

von Bahr

Silva de Lapuerta

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 29 June 2004.

Registrar

President

1 –

Language of the case: French.

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