Official Journal of the European Union

C series

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C/2025/1084

(Case C-866/24 P)

(C/2025/1084)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: Ordre des avocats à la cour de Paris, Julie Couturier (represented by: L. Donnedieu de Vabres, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: Ordre des avocats de Genève, Council of the European Union, Republic of Estonia, European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

—set aside the judgment of the General Court of 2 October 2024 in Case T-798/22, in so far as it disregarded:

—the obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU by endorsing the statement of reasons reformulated by the Council in the course of the proceedings and not that which should have appeared in the measure itself;

—the right to an effective remedy, by holding that the right to ‘be advised’ by a lawyer prior to ‘legal proceedings’, whether ‘such proceedings have already been commenced or can be pre-empted or anticipated’, protected by the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, read in the light of Article 2 TEU, could be relegated to an exception to the general rule prohibiting legal advisory services;

—Article 52(1) of the Charter: principally, the General Court failed to respect the essential content of the right to an effective remedy and, in the alternative, the General Court infringed Article 52(1) of the Charter by failing to examine whether the other three conditions for the validity of the limitations placed on that right were satisfied;

—order the Council to pay the costs in accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

—give final judgment in the dispute by annulling, first, Article 1(12) of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1904 of 6 October 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 259 I, p. 3), in so far as it replaces and amends Article 5n(2) and (4) to (12) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1), as regards legal advisory services, second, Article 1(13) of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2474 of 16 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (OJ 2022 L 322 I, p. 1), in so far as it replaces and amends Article 5n(2) and (4) to (11) of Regulation No 833/2014 as regards legal advisory services, and, third, Article 1(13) of Council Regulation (EU) 2023/427 of 25 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (OJ 2023 L 59 I, p. 6), in so far as it inserts Article 12b(2a) into Regulation No 833/2014 as regards legal advisory services, in so far as those articles:

—breach the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU,

—infringe the right to be ‘advised’ by a lawyer, protected by the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, without complying with the conditions for the validity of limitations on the exercise of a right recognised by the Charter laid down in Article 52(1) of that Charter;

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of their appeal, the appellants put forward three grounds of appeal.

First ground of appeal: the General Court disregarded the obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU by upholding the statement of reasons reformulated by the Council in its written pleadings and not that which should have appeared in the measure itself. In that regard, the appellants submit that none of the recitals of Regulations 2022/1904, 2022/2474 and 2023/427 and Decision 2022/1909 contains any explanation of the general objectives pursued by the prohibition of the provision of legal advice, and thus the reasons why the Council specifically decided to prohibit legal advisory services, and on what basis that prohibition would make it possible to pursue the general objectives of putting an end to the Russian war of aggression.

Second ground of appeal: the General Court infringed the right to an effective remedy by holding that the right to ‘be advised’ as protected by the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, read in the light of Article 2 TEU, could be relegated to exceptions to the general rule prohibiting legal advisory services. That relegation of a fundamental right entails a regression in the protection of the essential values of the rule of law, which is opposed by Article 2 TEU. This ground of appeal is in two parts.

First part: the General Court held that the right to ‘be advised’ by a lawyer prior to ‘legal proceedings’, whether ‘such proceedings have already been commenced or can be pre-empted or anticipated’ (judgment under appeal, paragraph 55), could be relegated to exceptions to the general rule prohibiting legal advisory services. Such access must be the rule, not the exception. This is not a purely formal matter: that ‘relegation’ of a fundamental right, together with the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the exceptions, means that lawyers must refuse from the outset to give any legal advice, even very preliminary advice, to Russian entities.

Second part: the General Court disregarded the purposive perspective linked to the interpretation of the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter in its refusal to annul the regulations at issue and in its understanding of legal advice. The General Court thus appears to set a temporal requirement between legal advice and litigation, which is not contained in that provision. Litigation may take place at the same time, shortly after, a long time after the legal advice, or never at all. Legal advice given by a lawyer, by informing the client of his or her legal situation and the risks associated with it, has precisely the purpose and may possibly have the effect, as a result of the advice given, of avoiding litigation, which does not, however, exclude that advice from the scope of the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.

Third ground of appeal: the General Court infringed Article 52(1) of the Charter. This ground of appeal is in two parts.

First part: principally, the General Court failed to respect the essential content of the right to an effective remedy.

Second part: in the alternative, the General Court infringed Article 52(1) of the Charter by failing to examine whether the other three conditions for the validity of the limitations placed on that right were satisfied.

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ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1084/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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