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Case C-152/19 P: Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by Deutsche Telekom AG against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission
ECLI:EU:UNKNOWN:62019CN0152
62019CN0152
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Official Journal of the European Union
C 164/23
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(Case C-152/19 P)
(2019/C 164/26)
Language of the case: German
Parties
Appellant: Deutsche Telekom AG (represented by: D. Schroeder and K. Apel, Rechtsanwälte)
Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Slovanet, a.s.
Form of order sought
The appellant claims that the Court should:
—set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14 in so far as it dismisses the action;
—annul, in whole or in part, Commission Decision C(2014) 7465 final of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom) as corrected by Commission Decisions C(2014) 10119 final and C(2015) 2484 final of 16 December 2014 and 17 April 2015 in so far as it relates to the appellant or, in the alternative, annul or further reduce the fines imposed on the appellant;
—in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration;
—order the Commission to pay all the costs arising from the present proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.
Grounds of appeal and main arguments
The appellant relies on four grounds in support of its appeal.
First, the General Court incorrectly interpreted the legal principle according to which it is necessary, for a refusal of access, that the access sought is indispensable for activity on a downstream market and, consequently, failed to apply that principle and thereby incorrectly applied it.
Secondly, the General Court misinterpreted and misapplied the legal principle that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company only where the parent company has actually exercised a decisive influence.
Thirdly, the General Court failed to apply and thereby incorrectly applied the legal principle that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company only where the subsidiary has carried out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by its parent company.
Fourthly, the General Court incorrectly applied the legal principle that the right to be heard must be respected in administrative proceedings.
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