12.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 270/30

(Case T-236/19)

(2019/C 270/32)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Le Comité de Douzelage de Houffalize (Houffalize, Belgium) (represented by: A. Kettels, lawyer)

Defendants: European Commission and ‘Education, Audiovisual and Culture’ Executive Agency (EACEA)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—annul or vary the contested measure;

—hold that the applicant Committee is entitled to have its ‘legal entity’ form validated and, consequently, to obtain the financing at issue.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its action against Commission Decision C(2019) 572 final of 4 February 2019 – dismissing the administrative action brought by the applicant against the decision of the EACEA of 25 June 2018, by which the EACEA did not award a grant to the applicant following the application submitted by the latter in the context of the call for applications ‘Town Twinning 2017, second deadline’ (EACEA 36/2014) – the applicant relies on a single plea in law alleging:

—infringement of Article 131.2 of Regulation No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002;

—infringement of the principle of legitimate expectations and legal certainty;

—infringement of the principle of proportionality and the prohibition of arbitrariness;

—manifest error of assessment;

—and failure to state adequate, sufficient and relevant reasons in that the contested decision states that the legitimate expectations and the legal certainty of the applicant Committee have not been breached.

According to the applicant, that decision fails to respond to the specific issue raised in that regard by the applicant. The answers given either have no connection with the line of argument put forward by the applicant Committee in its application for a re-examination or are manifestly insufficient to justify rejecting the argument arising from the infringement of the principle of legitimate expectation and legal certainty, or, in any event, are contrary to the scope of that principle.

The applicant maintains that it can rely on a legitimate expectation of being recognised as an entity without a legal personality that is eligible for grants, which it has however been denied. The applicant derives that legitimate expectation from the decisions awarding grants that were notified to it at a time when it had the same legal status, namely that of a de facto association, and from the fact that its factual and legal situation was identical and the rules governing the eligibility of entities that do not have a legal personality have not been changed since that time. The applicant submits that there was therefore no reason to renege on that legitimate expectation and adopt a different approach from that which was adopted in the past.