11 November 2024 (*)

( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists – Concept of ‘association’ – Article 2(1), in fine, of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Concept of ‘benefit’ – Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 – Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Error of assessment )

In Case T‑257/24,

Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin,

residing in Moscow (Russia), represented by D. Rovetta, M. Campa, M. Moretto, V. Villante, T. Marembert and A. Bass, lawyers,

applicant,

Council of the European Union,

represented by J. Rurarz, P. Mahnič and L. Berger, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed, at the time of the deliberations, of M. Brkan, acting as President, I. Gâlea and T. Tóth (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

makes the following

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin, seeks annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2024/847) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2024/849) (together, ‘the contested acts’), in so far as those acts maintain his name on the lists annexed thereto.

Background to the dispute

The present case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

The applicant is a Russian national.

On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted, pursuant to Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).

On the same date, the Council adopted, pursuant to Article 215(2) TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).

On 25 February 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1), in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria pursuant to which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be subject to the restrictive measures at issue.

Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, reads as follows:

‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:

…

(g) leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine,

and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.

The detailed rules governing that freezing of funds are laid down in the subsequent paragraphs of that article.

Article 1(1)(e) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, prohibits the entry into or transit through the territories of the Member States of natural persons who satisfy essentially the same criteria as those set out in Article 2(1)(g) of that decision.

Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, requires the adoption of measures to freeze funds and lays down the detailed rules governing such freezing in terms essentially identical to those of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329. Article 3(1)(g) of that regulation essentially reproduces the content of Article 2(1)(g) of that decision.

By Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/397 of 9 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 31) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/396 of 9 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 1), the applicant’s name was added, respectively, to the list annexed to Decision 2014/145 and to that contained in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014 (‘the lists at issue’).

On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1), by which the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue until 15 March 2023 (together, ‘the first set of maintaining acts’).

On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 134) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 1), by which the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue until 15 September 2023 (together, ‘the second set of maintaining acts’).

On 5 June 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20) and Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 1).

Decision 2023/1094 amended, with effect from 7 June 2023, the criteria for listing the names of the persons subject to the freezing of funds, with the text of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 being replaced with the following text:

‘(g) leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefiting from them, or businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine; or’

Regulation No 269/2014 was similarly amended by Regulation 2023/1089.

On 13 September 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 226, p. 104) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3) (‘the third set of maintaining acts’), which extended the restrictive measures taken against the applicant until 15 March 2024 on the following grounds:

‘[The applicant] is the son of Dmitry [Arkadievich] Mazepin, owner and former General Director of JSC UCC Uralchem. He was a driver at Haas F1 Team until March 2022, sponsored by Dmitry [Arkadievich] Mazepin through Uralchem’s subsidiary, Uralkali. His foundation “We compete as one” is set to be financed with funds from Uralkali. He is also associated with his father through joint business interests in the company Hitech GP, which was partly owned by Dmitry [Arkadievich] Mazepin through Uralkali and whose objective is to benefit [the applicant’s] career as a motorsport driver, and which is now owned by a common business associate of the two men.

He is an immediate family member benefiting from and associated with his father, … a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’

The applicant brought an action before the Court, registered under case number T‑743/22, seeking annulment of the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts, in so far as those acts concerned him. That action was upheld by judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180).

On 12 March 2024, the Council adopted the contested acts, which extended the restrictive measures taken against the applicant until 15 September 2024, without amending the grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue as compared with the grounds contained in the third set of maintaining acts.

On 15 May 2024, the applicant brought the present action, registered under case number T‑257/24, seeking annulment of the contested acts, in so far as those acts concerned him.

By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 16 May 2024, the applicant brought an application for interim measures, in which he claimed, in essence, that the President of the General Court should suspend the operation of the contested acts, in so far as his name was maintained on the lists at issue.

By order of 21 May 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑257/24 R, not published), the Vice-President of the General Court adopted interim measures by which, in essence, he suspended the operation of the contested acts under certain conditions.

By order of 19 July 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑257/24 R, not published, EU:T:2024:507), the Vice-President of the General Court, pursuant to Article 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, partially upheld the application for interim measures and cancelled the order of 21 May 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑257/24 R, not published).

Forms of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

–annul the contested acts, in so far as they concern him;

–order the Council to pay the costs.

The Council contends that the Court should:

–dismiss the action;

–order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

Under Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure, where the Court of Justice or the General Court has already ruled on one or more questions of law identical to those raised by the pleas in law of the action, and the General Court finds that the facts have been established, it may, after the written part of the procedure has been closed, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the parties, decide by reasoned order in which reference is made to the relevant case-law to declare the action manifestly well founded.

In his reply to a measure of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court on 8 August 2024 under Article 89 of the Rules of Procedure, the applicant submits, in essence, that in the light of the judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), the conditions for applying Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure in the instant case are clearly fulfilled, particularly since that judgment has the force of res judicata, having become final in the absence of any appeal by the Council. In its reply to that measure, the Council states that it maintains its position as set out in the defence and defers to the Court’s assessment as regards the application of Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure.

In the present case, the Court considers that the conditions for applying Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure have been met and has decided to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.

In support of the action, the applicant raises two pleas in law alleging (i) infringement of the obligation to state reasons, of Article 296 TFEU, of Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, of the right to effective judicial protection and of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and (ii) error of assessment.

The Court considers it appropriate to begin by examining the second plea, in support of which the applicant claims, in essence, that the contested acts were adopted without a sufficiently solid factual basis.

That plea raises a point of law identical to that on which the Court ruled in its judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), which has become final and now has the force of res judicata with absolute effect, as the applicant rightly points out.

The applicant complains that the Council made an error of assessment in maintaining his name on the lists at issue on the basis of, first, the association criterion and, secondly, the criterion relating to ‘immediate family members … benefiting from’ ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ (criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/1094, in Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2023/1089, and, in essence, in Article 1(1)(e) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/1094; ‘criterion (g) as amended’).

In essence, the applicant states that the Council adopted the contested acts without amending the grounds for including his name on the lists at issue as compared with the grounds contained in the third set of maintaining acts. He thus asserts that the factual basis supporting the grounds relied on in those contested acts, which relates to the association criterion laid down in Article 2(1), in fine, of Decision 2014/145 (‘the association criterion’) and criterion (g) as amended, refers, as the third set of maintaining acts does, first of all, to his former position as a driver for the Haas F1 Team and the sponsorship agreement, next, to the fact that he allegedly established a foundation set to be financed by Uralkali and, lastly, to the joint business interests in Hitech GP, a company partly owned by his father through Uralkali and whose objective is to benefit the applicant’s career as a motorsport driver.

According to the applicant, since the grounds for the contested acts are based on the same evidence as that previously examined by the Court in its judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), the same assessments which led the Court to annul the third set of maintaining acts should also lead to the annulment of the contested acts.

The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. In essence, the Council claims to have established, by relying on the sufficiently solid factual basis contained in the eight WK files underpinning the adoption of Decision 2022/397 and Implementing Regulation 2022/396 and of the first, second and third sets of maintaining acts, that the applicant pursues joint interests with his father, Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, and that he has in the past obtained, and currently continues to obtain, undue benefits from him. In the light of the judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council

(T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), the Council states that it focuses mainly on the factual elements relating to the joint interests between the applicant and his father in connection with the ‘We Compete As One’ foundation (‘the foundation’) managed by the applicant.

36As a preliminary point, it should be observed, as the applicant does, that by its judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), the Court annulled the third set of maintaining acts, in so far as they concerned the applicant, on the ground that the evidence submitted by the Council in the eight WK files did not constitute a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish to the requisite legal standard, on the date of adoption of those acts, the existence of joint interests, for the purposes of the association criterion, between the applicant and his father, or of benefits for the purposes of the second limb of criterion (g) as amended.

37First, it must be recalled that it is clear from paragraph 74 of the judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), that the association criterion laid down by the relevant provisions of Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014 involves the establishment of an ‘association’ with a person or entity subject to restrictive measures. While the criterion of ‘associated’ is often used in Council acts relating to restrictive measures, it is not, as such, defined and its meaning depends on the context and circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it may be regarded as covering natural or legal persons who are, generally speaking, linked by joint interests without, however, requiring a link by means of a common economic activity. It is also apparent that, in most cases, that concept implies the existence of a link going beyond a family relationship.

38Secondly, the concept of ‘benefit’ for the purposes of the second limb of criterion (g) as amended must be interpreted in the light of the objectives pursued by that criterion, which entail increasing the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. Therefore, a benefit for the purposes of that provision covers any benefit regardless of its nature, which is not necessarily undue, but which must be quantitatively or qualitatively non-negligible. It may therefore be a financial or non-financial benefit, such as a donation, a transfer of funds or of economic resources, an intervention to further the award of public contracts, an appointment or a promotion. Furthermore, having regard to the objective of avoiding practices to circumvent restrictive measures, expressly referred to in recital 5 of Decision 2023/1094, benefits awarded by leading businesspersons operating in Russia in a situation which may lead to the circumvention of the restrictive measures to which they are subject may also be covered by the second limb of criterion (g) as amended.

39As regards, in the first place, the ground relating to the applicant’s former position as a driver for the Haas F1 Team and the sponsorship agreement, the Court found, in paragraphs 123 to 134 of its judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), that the Council had failed to produce a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish to the requisite legal standard that that part of the grounds was well founded. First, with respect to the Council’s argument that, in essence, the applicant was associated with his father because of his former position as a driver in the Haas F1 Team and the sponsorship agreement, the Court took the view, in paragraph 127 of that judgment, that the Council had not adduced any evidence relating to the applicant in the eight WK files to explain why he should be regarded as still being linked by joint interests to his father, a leading businessperson of the Russian Federation, after the termination of his contract as an F1 driver and the sponsorship agreement in March 2022. Secondly, with respect to the Council’s argument that, in essence, the applicant benefited from his father, since he could not have secured his seat as a driver in the Haas F1 Team without the sponsorship agreement, the Court considered, in paragraph 129 of that judgment, that irrespective of whether or not the applicant’s father was involved in concluding the sponsorship agreement, none of the evidence adduced by the Council shows that the applicant could not have secured that driver’s seat in the Haas F1 Team without that agreement.

40As regards, in the second place, the ground for the third set of maintaining acts according to which ‘[the] foundation … is set to be financed with funds from Uralkali’, which is concerned with the intention of the applicant’s father to, through Uralkali, finance his son’s foundation, the Court found, in paragraphs 135 to 143 of its judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), that the Council had failed to produce a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish to the requisite legal standard that that part of the grounds was well founded. First, in paragraphs 139 and 140 of that judgment, the General Court rejected the application of the association criterion to the applicant in so far as his foundation ‘is set to be financed with funds from Uralkali’, since it was common ground that, on the date of adoption of the third set of maintaining acts, the foundation had not received any funding from Uralkali and that the WK files were concerned only with financing intentions before that foundation was established, intentions that were never repeated after its establishment. Secondly, as regards the application to the applicant of criterion (g) as amended, the Court found, in paragraph 141 of its judgment, that the Council had not adduced evidence showing that the foundation received funding from Uralkali and, consequently, had not demonstrated the existence of an advantage from which the applicant allegedly benefited.

41As regards, in the third place, the ground relating to joint business interests in Hitech GP, which is concerned with the Council’s view that the applicant was associated with, and still benefited from, his father, since they have joint business interests in Hitech GP and that company’s objective was to benefit the applicant’s career, the Court found, in paragraphs 144 to 154 of its judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), that the Council had failed to produce a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish to the requisite legal standard that that part of the grounds was well founded. First, with respect to the company’s alleged objective, the Court considered, in paragraph 149 of that judgment, that none of the evidence adduced by the Council suggested that the objective of that company was, or even had been, specifically to benefit the applicant’s career or to procure any advantage for him. Secondly, with respect to the alleged joint interests in Hitech GP, the Court found, in paragraph 150 of that judgment, that none of the evidence is such as to demonstrate that, on the date of adoption of the third set of maintaining acts, the applicant’s father still held shares in, or controlled, Hitech GP. In addition, there was nothing to suggest that the applicant was still employed by that company or that his career was still linked to that company when those acts were adopted.

42In the present case, the parties agree that the grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue set out in the contested acts are identical to the grounds contained in the third set of maintaining acts and are based on the same evidence. In that regard, first, it should be noted that the evidence files produced in the context of the present proceedings and mentioned in the defence date from the period preceding the third set of maintaining acts. Secondly, it should be observed that those evidence files are all referred to in the judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), and were all examined by the Court in that judgment.

43Therefore, since the grounds for the contested acts are based on the same evidence as that previously examined by the Court in its judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), which has become final and now has the force of res judicata with absolute effect in the absence of any appeal against it, the applicant is correct in maintaining that the same assessments which led the Court to annul the third set of maintaining acts should also lead to the annulment of the contested acts.

44That is the case, in particular, as regards the assessments concerning the grounds relating to the applicant’s former position as a driver for the Haas F1 Team and the sponsorship agreement, and to the joint business interests in Hitech GP, in respect of which the Council does not put forward any new arguments over and above those set out in connection with Case T‑743/22, Mazepin v Council. At most, the Council simply claims that the applicant – through the Cypriot company Fungosa Management Ltd which he controls – and his father once held shares in Hitech GP at the same time. In that regard, even if the applicant did in fact control that company, suffice it to note that that would not call into question the Court’s findings in paragraph 150 of the judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), that, first, none of the evidence is such as to demonstrate that, on the date of adoption of the third set of maintaining acts and a fortiori the contested acts, the applicant’s father still held shares in Hitech GP or controlled it, and, secondly, there is nothing to suggest that the applicant was still employed by that company or that his career was still linked to that company when those acts were adopted.

45That is also the case as regards the assessments concerning the ground that ‘[the] foundation … is set to be financed with funds from Uralkali’, since none of the arguments relied on by the Council in the defence can succeed.

46In essence, the Council contends that (i) the foundation derives a benefit from the fact that the applicant and directors of Uralkali publicly declared that it would be financed with funds from Uralkali; (ii) the foundation organised a panel session, moderated by the applicant, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum; (iii) the foundation partnered with Moscow State University, which is sponsored by Uralchem and thanks to which athletes supported by the foundation had the opportunity to take part in an educational initiative; (iv) the foundation and the applicant benefited from management expertise through the foundation’s former CEO, currently adviser to Uralchem’s General Director; and (v) the applicant benefits from the foundation through the resources made available to him as chairman, including any financial benefits, and through the influence that position gives him.

47According to the Council, although the abovementioned evidence is not directly mentioned in the grounds for the third set of maintaining acts, which were unchanged by the contested acts, it must be seen as being covered by the ground stating that ‘[the] foundation … is set to be financed with funds from Uralkali’. The wording of that part of the grounds is sufficiently broad to cover indirect financing and other forms of direct support with financial consequences. The Council also maintains that the applicant would not have been able to secure his seat as a driver in the Haas F1 Team without the extensive benefits provided by his father.

48In that regard, it must be stated that most of the Council’s arguments merely restate those already relied on by it and rejected by the Court in Case T‑743/22 Mazepin v Council. That applies inter alia to the arguments that the foundation benefits from Uralkali’s public statements on the issue of funding, that it organised a panel session moderated by the applicant at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, and that it partnered with Moscow State University (see paragraph 46 above). The same is true of the argument that the applicant would not have been able to secure his seat as a driver in the Haas F1 Team without the extensive benefits provided by his father.

49As for the Council’s argument that the foundation and the applicant benefited from management expertise through the foundation’s former CEO, who is currently the adviser to Uralchem’s General Director, that argument must be rejected. Suffice it to note that, contrary to what the Council claims, that argument cannot be linked to the grounds for the contested acts and, in any event, the Council has failed to point to even one item of evidence in the eight WK files showing how the former CEO and current adviser to Uralchem’s General Director provided management expertise to the foundation and the applicant.

50With respect to the argument that the applicant benefits from the foundation through the resources made available to him as chairman and the influence which that position confers on him, quite apart from the fact that the Council does not point to any item of evidence to substantiate that argument, it must be recalled that, in paragraph 141 of its judgment of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22, not published, EU:T:2024:180), the Court held that the Council had not adduced evidence showing that the foundation received funding from Uralkali and, consequently, had not demonstrated the existence of an advantage from which the applicant allegedly benefited because of his father. Therefore, even assuming that the applicant benefits from the resources and influence of the foundation, the Council has failed to demonstrate that he does so as a result of funds from Uralkali, as set out in the grounds for the contested acts.

51Lastly, as regards the requirement relating to the finding by the Court that the facts have been established, laid down in Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure, it must be borne in mind that the contested acts, which extended the restrictive measures taken against the applicant until 15 September 2024, contain the same grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue as those set out in the third set of maintaining acts and are based on the same evidence files as the third set of maintaining acts. It is common ground that the applicant is referred to in the third set of maintaining acts and in the contested acts as being associated with or as benefiting from his father on account of, first of all, his former position as a driver for the Haas F1 Team and the Uralkali sponsorship agreement, next, the fact that the foundation is set to be financed by Uralkali and, finally, the alleged joint business interests in Hitech GP. It follows from the foregoing that the facts must be regarded as having been established.

52Accordingly, the second plea in law alleging error of assessment must be upheld and the present action, in so far as it seeks annulment of the contested acts, must be declared manifestly well founded, in accordance with Article 132 of the Rules of Procedure.

Costs

53Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

54In the present case, since the Council has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures.

On those grounds,

hereby orders:

1.Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine are annulled, in so far as the name of Mr Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies to which those restrictive measures apply.

2.The Council of the European Union shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by Mr Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures.

Luxembourg, 11 November 2024.

Registrar

President

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Language of the case: English