11.9.2023

Official Journal of the European Union

C 321/3

(Joined Cases C-615/20 and C-671/20, (1) YP and Others (Lifting of a judge’s immunity and his or her suspension from duties)

(References for a preliminary ruling - Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU - Rule of law - Effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law - Independence of judges - Primacy of EU law - Article 4(3) TEU - Duty of sincere cooperation - Lifting of a judge’s immunity from prosecution and his or her suspension from duties ordered by the Izba Dyscyplinarna (Disciplinary Chamber) of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) - Lack of independence and impartiality on the part of that chamber - Alteration of the composition of the court formation called on to adjudicate on a case which up to that time had been entrusted to that judge - Prohibitions on national courts calling into question the legitimacy of a court, on undermining its functioning or on assessing the legality or effectiveness of the appointment of judges or of their judicial powers, subject to disciplinary penalties - Obligation on the courts concerned and the bodies which have power to designate and modify the composition of court formations to disapply the measures lifting immunity and suspending the judge concerned - Obligation on the same courts and bodies to disapply the national provisions providing for those prohibitions)

(2023/C 321/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Parties to the main criminal proceedings

Intervening parties: Prokuratura Okręgowa w Warszawie, Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego and Others (C-615/20)

Operative part of the judgment

1.The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU must be interpreted as precluding national provisions which confer on a body, whose independence and impartiality are not guaranteed, jurisdiction to authorise the initiation of criminal proceedings against judges of the ordinary courts and, where such authorisation is issued, to suspend the judges concerned from their duties and to reduce their remuneration during that suspension.

2.The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, the principle of the primacy of EU law and the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU must be interpreted as meaning:

—first, that a formation of a national court, seised of a case and composed of a single Judge — against whom a body, whose independence and impartiality are not guaranteed, has adopted a resolution authorising the initiation of criminal proceedings and ordering that that judge be suspended from his or her duties and that his or her remuneration be reduced — is justified in disapplying such a resolution which precludes the exercise of its jurisdiction in that case and,

—secondly, that the judicial bodies which have power to designate and modify the composition of the formations of that national court must also disapply that resolution which precludes the exercise of that jurisdiction by that court formation.

3.The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the principles of the primacy of EU law and of sincere cooperation must be interpreted as meaning:

—first, that a formation of a national court, to which a case which hitherto had been assigned to another formation of that court has been re-assigned — as a result of a resolution adopted by a body whose independence and impartiality are not guaranteed and which authorised the initiation of criminal proceedings against the single Judge comprising the latter formation and ordered his or her suspension from duties and a reduction in his or her remuneration — and which has decided to suspend the handling of that case pending a decision by the Court of Justice on a preliminary ruling, must disapply that resolution and refrain from continuing to examine that case and,

—secondly, that the judicial bodies which have power to designate and modify the composition of the formations of that national court are required, in such a situation, to assign that case back to the formation initially hearing it.

4.The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the principles of the primacy of EU law and sincere cooperation must be interpreted as precluding:

—first, national provisions which prohibit a national court, subject to disciplinary sanctions being imposed on the judges who make up that court, from examining whether an act adopted by a body whose independence and impartiality are not guaranteed and which has authorised the initiation of criminal proceedings against a judge and ordered his or her suspension from duties and a reduction in his or her remuneration is binding and, if necessary, from disapplying that act and,

—secondly, case-law of a constitutional court under which the acts appointing the judges who make up such a body cannot be the subject of judicial review, inasmuch as that case-law is liable to preclude that examination.

(1) OJ C 44, 8.2.2021.

(2) OJ C 79, 8.3.2021.

ECLI:EU:C:2023:140