17.6.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 206/19

(Case C-156/19)

(2019/C 206/23)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC), Consorzio Ge.Se.Av. S. c. arl

Respondent: De Vellis Servizi Globali Srl

Questions referred

1.First question

—On the basis of the characteristics of national sports law, can the Federazione calcistica italiana (Italian Football Federation, ‘FIGC’) be classified as a body governed by public law in so far as it was established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character?

—In particular, is the requirement relating to the purpose of the body satisfied in respect of the Federation, even in the absence of a formal act establishing a public authority and despite its membership base, on account of its incorporation into a sector (sports) organised in accordance with models of a public-law nature and the fact that it is required to comply with the principles and rules drawn up by the Comitato olimpico nazionale italiano (Italian National Olympic Committee, ‘the CONI’) and international sporting bodies, as a result of the recognition, for sporting purposes, of the national public entity?

—Furthermore, can this requirement arise in relation to a sports federation such as the Federazione italiana giuoco calcio, which has the ability to fund itself, in respect of an activity of no significance in the context of public law, such as that at issue in this case, or must the requirement that the application of the rules on public and open tendering be ensured in any event, where such an entity awards any type of contract to third parties, be regarded as taking precedence?

2.Second question

—On the basis of the legal relationship between the CONI and the FIGC (Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio), does the former have a dominant influence over the latter in the light of the legal powers relating to recognition of the undertaking for sporting purposes, approval of annual budgets, supervision of the management and proper functioning of the bodies, and placing the entity into receivership?

—On the other hand, are those powers insufficient to meet the requirement relating to the dominant public influence of a body governed by public law on account of the significant participation of the presidents and representatives of the sports federations in the key bodies of the Olympic Committee?