Official Journal of the European Union

C 374/14

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(Case C-454/17 PP)

(2017/C 374/19)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Vincent Piessevaux (represented by: L. Ponteville, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—set aside the judgment of the General Court of 17 May 2017 in Case T-519/16;

—grant the appellant the form of order sought by it in the proceedings before the General Court;

—order the defendant to pay the costs of both instances.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The first ground of appeal alleges infringement of the principle of equal treatment, Article 77 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to those Staff Regulations. The General Court erred in law by rejecting the plea of illegality of Staff Note 113/11 from the Appointing Authority of the Council, which introduces a derogation from the last sentence of the third paragraph of Article 9 of the Council Decision of 11 October 2011 adopting the general implementing provisions relating to Articles 11 and 12 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations of Officials relating to the transfer of pension rights (‘the 2011 GIP’) — a derogation according to which the general implementing provisions adopted on 29 April 2004 (‘the 2004 GIP’) will continue to apply only in cases where the Appointing Authority has notified a proposal concerning a subsidy to the person concerned and where the latter has given his consent before the entry into force of the 2011 GIP. The reasoning of that rejection, set out in paragraphs 68 to 71 of the judgment under appeal, is contrary to the principle of equal treatment, Article 77 of the Staff Regulations of Officials and Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to those Staff Regulations.

The second ground of appeal alleges distortion of the first part of the third ground of annulment relied on by the appellant, breach of the principle of the authenticity of documents, failure to state reasons and infringement of the principle of equal treatment. The General Court erred in law:

—in paragraphs 73, 74, 80 and 81 of the judgment under appeal, by distorting the first part of the third ground of annulment and by breaching the authenticity of the appellant’s pleadings, by wrongly stating that the appellant had invoked a breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations;

—in paragraphs 73 to 100 of the judgment under appeal, by failing to respond, in breach of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, to the first part of the third ground of annulment, which is based on infringement of the principle equality of treatment and not on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations;

—in paragraphs 82 to 100 of the judgment under appeal — in the event that it should nevertheless be held that paragraphs 82 to 100, or a part thereof or certain elements thereof, constitute a response to the first part of the third ground of annulment — by rejecting the plea of illegality of the last sentence of the third paragraph of Article 9 of the 2011 GIP, relied on by the appellant and based on infringement of the principle of equal treatment.

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