28.11.2016

Official Journal of the European Union

C 441/11

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(Case C-505/16 P)

(2016/C 441/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Olga Stanislavivna Yanukovych, as heir of Viktor Viktorovych Yanukovych (represented by: T. Beazley QC)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—set aside the Order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) dated 12 July 2016 in Case T-347/14 to the extent particularised in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the appeal, namely:

—paragraphs 2 and 4 of the operative part of that Order;

—paragraph 3 of the operative part of the Order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) dated 12 July 2016 in Case T-347/14 to the extent that the Court considers that the same paragraph 3 requires the Council of the European Union to pay only the costs incurred by the Appellant but not the costs incurred by the Deceased;

—remit the case to the General Court for hearing and judgment or alternatively:

—grant the relief sought by the Appellant in the proceedings before the General Court to the extent particularised in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the appeal, namely to annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/143 (1) of 29 January 2015 amending Decision 2014/119, Council Regulation (EU) 2015/138 (2) of 29 January 2015 amending Regulation No 208/2014, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/364 (3) of 5 March 2015 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/357 (4) of 5 March 2015 implementing Regulation No 208/2014, in so far as those measures concern Viktor Viktorovych Yanukovych and

—to the extent that the Court considers that the General Court has not already done so, order the Council of the European Union to pay both the Appellant’s costs and the costs incurred by the Deceased in relation to the claim for annulment made in the Application;

—order the Council of the European Union to pay the Appellant’s costs, to include those incurred by the Deceased, in relation to the claim for annulment made in the Statement of Modification;

—in any event, order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First, the General Court erred in law in concluding, at paragraphs 84, 89 and 92 of the Contested Order, that the Statement of Modification was inadmissible because it was lodged in the name of the Deceased after his death. The Court wrongly concluded that in the circumstances of this case the admissibility of the Statement of Modification was to be solely assessed by reference to the situation at the time the Statement of Modification was lodged. Rather, the admissibility of the Statement of Modification ought to have been assessed holistically by reference to all of the circumstances of the case.

Secondly, even if the General Court was correct in its conclusion that the admissibility of the Statement of Modification was to be solely assessed by reference to the situation at the time at which it was lodged, the General Court erred in law in concluding that the Statement of Modification was not, in substance, presented in the name of the Appellant. The Statement of Modification, read in the context of the other material with which the General Court was presented, clearly showed that it was lodged in the Deceased’s name by/on behalf of the Appellant in her capacity as the de facto successor and heir to the Deceased. As such, it was admissible by reference to the factual situation at the time it was lodged. In reaching the contrary conclusion, the General Court erred in law by distorting the evidence that was before it.

Thirdly, the General Court erred in law since it failed to distinguish between (i) the admissibility of the Statement of Modification and (ii) the admissibility of a Second Annulment Application. The General Court: (1) wrongly failed to take into account the fact that it had granted a stay in relation to the Statement of Modification; (2) wrongly concluded that the admissibility of the Statement of Modification should be decided by reference solely to the situation prevailing at the time when the Statement of Modification was lodged; (3) wrongly ignored the fact that Ukrainian succession law determines the successor six months after death but with retrospective effect, and (4) as a result, wrongly and without any justification, deprived the Appellant of access to court to challenge the 2015 Acts as successor and heir or otherwise.

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Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/143 of 29 January 2015 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine

OJ L 24, p. 16

Council Regulation (EU) 2015/138 of 29 January 2015 amending Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine

OJ L 24, p. 1

Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/364 of 5 March 2015 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine

OJ L 62, p. 25

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/357 of 5 March 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine

OJ L 62, p. 1

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