Official Journal of the European Union

C 278/3

(Case C-120/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Inland transport of dangerous goods - Directive 2008/68/EC - Article 5(1) - Concept of ‘construction requirement’ - Prohibition on laying down more stringent construction requirements - Authority of a Member State requiring a service station to be supplied with liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) only from road tankers fitted with a particular heat-resistant lining not provided for by the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) - Unlawfulness - Decision legally unchallengeable by a category of persons - Strictly limited possibility of obtaining the annulment of such a decision where there is clear conflict with EU law - Principle of legal certainty - Principle of effectiveness)

(2021/C 278/03)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: X

Defendant: College van burgemeester en wethouders van de gemeente Purmerend

Other party: Tamoil Nederland BV

Operative part of the judgment

1.Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on the internal transport of dangerous goods, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/103/EU of 21 November 2014, must be interpreted as precluding the laying down of construction requirements that are more stringent than those set out in Annexes A and B to the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, concluded at Geneva on 30 September 1957, in the version in force on 1 January 2015, such as a requirement, imposed by the authorities of a Member State on a service station pursuant to an administrative decision in the form of an environmental licence, to be supplied with liquefied petroleum gas only from road tankers fitted with a particular heat-resistant lining such as that at issue in the main proceedings;

2.EU law, in particular the principle of effectiveness, does not preclude a procedural rule of national administrative law which provides that, in order for a requirement contrary to EU law, imposed by an administrative decision which in principle is legally unchallengeable by a category of persons, to be annulled on the ground that it would be unenforceable if it were implemented by a subsequent decision, the person must establish that the requirement at issue clearly could not, on the basis of a summary examination leaving no room for doubt, have been adopted in the light of EU law, subject, however, to the proviso, which it is for the referring court to verify, that that rule is not applied so strictly that in practice the possibility for an individual of obtaining the effective annulment of the requirement at issue would be illusory.

(1) OJ C 155, 6.5.2019.