Official Journal of the European Union

EN

C series

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C/2024/6908

25.11.2024

(Case C-517/24, Broski)

(C/2024/6908)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: VG

Defendant: Zastępcy Rzecznika Dyscyplinarnego przy Sądzie Okręgowym w Gdańsku

Questions referred

1.Must Articles 2 and 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (‘the TEU’) and Article 6(1) to (3) TEU read in conjunction with the first and second sentences of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’) be interpreted as meaning that a court that includes members of the Izba Odpowiedzialności Zawodowej Sądu Najwyższego (Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court), which was established in place of the Izba Dyscyplinarna Sądu Najwyższego (Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) pursuant to the amendment to the 2017 ustawa o Sądzie Najwyższym (Law on the Supreme Court) (ustawa z 9 czerwca 2022 r. o zmianie ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym oraz niektórych innych ustaw) (Law of 9 June 2022 Amending the Law on the Supreme Court and Certain Other Laws; Dz. U. of 2022, item 1259) and whose competences includes the competence to review decisions issued in disciplinary proceedings conducted against, among others, judges (Articles 3(4a), 27a and 73(1) of the ustawa z dnia 8 grudnia 2017 r. o Sądzie Najwyższym (Law of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court) – consolidated text of 23 April 2024 (Dz. U. of 2024, item 622)), is not a tribunal established by law within the meaning of EU law?

2.Must the provisions indicated in the first question, as well as the principle of primacy and the principle of effectiveness, in conjunction with Article 4(1) and (2), Article 10(1) and the first sentence of recital 16 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, be interpreted as meaning that – with respect to decisions given at first instance, appeals against which were heard by the Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court – those provisions oblige (or authorise) the national court hearing a case on the handing down of a cumulative judgment (a cumulative decision) against a judge to find that guilt has not been finally and lawfully proven and determined in that regard, and thus the aforementioned provisions oblige (or authorise) the national court to disregard such decisions in the process of deciding on a cumulative penalty (handing down a cumulative decision), thus applying a remedy which has the effect of placing the judge who has filed a motion for such a decision in the same position that he or she would have been in had the violations in question not occurred?

The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.

OJ 2016, L 65, p. 1.

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ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6908/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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