9 June 2020 (*1)

(Application for interpretation — Manifest inadmissibility)

In Case C‑183/17 P-INT,

APPLICATION for interpretation of the judgment of 31 January 2019, International Management Group v Commission (C‑183/17 P and C‑184/17 P, EU:C:2019:78), made on 10 January 2020, under Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 158 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice,

International Management Group, established in Brussels (Belgium), represented by L. Levi and J.-Y. de Cara, avocats,

the other party to the proceedings being:

European Commission, represented by J. Baquero Cruz and J. Norris, acting as Agents,

THE COURT (Third Chamber),

composed of M. Vilaras, President of the Fourth Chamber, acting as President of the Third Chamber, M. Safjan, J. Malenovský (Rapporteur), L. Bay Larsen and D. Šváby, Judges,

Advocate General: H. Saugmandsgaard Øe,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to rule by reasoned order, in accordance with Article 159a of the Rules of Procedure of the Court,

makes the following

1.By application lodged at the Court Registry on 10 January 2020, International Management Group (‘IMG’) has asked the Court to interpret paragraphs 1 to 3 of the operative part of the judgment of 31 January 2019, International Management Group v Commission (C‑183/17 P and C‑184/17 P, ‘the judgment which the Court is asked to interpret’, EU:C:2019:78), in conjunction with paragraphs 91 to 105 of the grounds of that judgment.

2.IMG is asking the Court to interpret those paragraphs 91 to 105 as meaning that the European Commission is not justified in doubting its status as an international organisation within the meaning of the EU financial legislation.

Legal context and background to the application for interpretation

3.The provisions of the EU financial legislation, in the versions applicable to the dispute which gave rise to the judgment which the Court is asked to interpret, are set out in paragraphs 2 to 13 of that judgment.

4.The factual background to that dispute, the decisions of the Commission, and the judgments of the General Court of the European Union to which that dispute gave rise are set out in paragraphs 16 to 37 of that judgment.

The judgment which the Court is asked to interpret

5.In paragraphs 84 to 96 of the judgment which the Court is asked to interpret, the Court examined the grounds on which IMG, in its appeals, criticised the General Court for having held that the Commission had not erred in law or made any manifest errors of assessment by justifying its decisions on the basis of doubts in relation to IMG’s status as an international organisation within the meaning of the EU financial legislation.

6.In paragraph 97 of that judgment, the Court concluded that those grounds of appeal were well founded.

7.In paragraphs 98 to 102 of that judgment, the Court found, in essence, that the acceptance of those grounds of appeal resulted in the setting aside of the judgments of the General Court in their entirety.

8.In paragraphs 103 to 105 of that judgment, the Court discussed the actions for annulment brought by IMG and gave final judgment on those actions, annulling the decisions of the Commission. By contrast, it referred the claim for damages made along with those actions back to the General Court, on the ground that the Court could not give final judgment on it.

The operative part of the judgment which the Court is asked to interpret includes the following paragraphs in particular:

‘1. [the Court] sets aside the judgments of the General Court of the European Union of 2 February 2017, International Management Group v Commission (T‑29/15, not published, EU:T:2017:56), and of 2 February 2017, International Management Group v Commission (T‑381/15, not published, EU:T:2017:57);

Forms of order sought and arguments of the parties

10.IMG claims that the Court should declare its application for interpretation admissible and well founded and order the Commission to pay the costs.

11.In support of its application, it argues, firstly, that it meets the conditions of admissibility arising under Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 158 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. In particular, it submits, that application highlights that there is doubt as to the meaning and scope of the judgment which the Court is asked to interpret, which IMG and the Commission understand in two different ways. According to IMG, it follows from that judgment that the Commission no longer has any reason to continue to cast doubt on its status as an international organisation within the meaning of the EU financial legislation, whereas the Commission is of the opinion that implementation of that judgment involves re-examining IMG’s status in the light of all the relevant legal and factual circumstances.

12.Secondly, IMG maintains that the Court must declare that the judgment which the Court is asked to interpret has to be interpreted as meaning that it has the status of an international organisation for the purposes of the EU financial legislation.

13.The Commission contends that the application for interpretation should be dismissed and that IMG should be ordered to pay the costs.

14.By way of its principal argument, it takes the view that that application should be dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible. The doubt alleged by IMG relates, in its view, to a question which was not dealt with by the Court in the judgment which the Court is asked to interpret and which cannot, therefore, be resolved by an interpretation of that judgment.

15.In the alternative, the Commission considers that that application should be dismissed as being unfounded. The judgment which the Court is asked to interpret should be interpreted not in the manner claimed by IMG, but as meaning that the specific factors on which the General Court and the Commission itself relied in finding that there were doubts regarding IMG’s status as an international organisation were not capable of justifying those doubts in law.

The application

16.Article 159a of the Rules of Procedure provides, inter alia, that, where an application for interpretation is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court may at any time decide, having heard the Judge-Rapporteur and the Advocate General, to dismiss it, in whole or in part, by reasoned order.

17.That article must be applied in the present case.

18.Article 158(1) of the Rules of Procedure provides that, in accordance with Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if the meaning or scope of a judgment is in doubt, the Court of Justice is to construe it on application by any party or any institution of the European Union establishing an interest therein.

19.As is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court, it follows from the requirement that ‘the meaning or scope of a judgment … [be] in doubt’ set out in those provisions that, in order to be admissible, an application for interpretation of a judgment must, inter alia, seek to resolve an obscurity or ambiguity that may affect the meaning or scope of that judgment (orders of 11 July 2013, Commission v Italy, C‑496/09 INT, EU:C:2013:461, paragraph 8, and of 13 December 2018, Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO, C‑118/18 P-INT, not published, EU:C:2018:1007, paragraph 8).

20.It follows that an application for interpretation is not admissible where it relates to points which have not been decided by that judgment (order of 11 July 2013, Commission v Italy, C‑496/09 INT, EU:C:2013:461, paragraph 8).

21.In the present case, it must be held, straightaway, that the judgment which the Court is asked to interpret does not in any way decide the point which, according to IMG, is a source of obscurity or ambiguity.

22.The Court held, in paragraphs 93 to 97 and 104 of that judgment, that none of the factors on the basis of which the Commission and the General Court had successively concluded that there were doubts in relation to IMG’s status as an international organisation, in the light of the EU financial legislation, could justify those doubts in law, with the result that both the General Court, in the judgments under appeal, and the Commission, in its decisions, had erred in law by relying on those factors to justify such doubts.

23.In doing so, the Court merely held that the doubts expressed by the Commission, on the basis of a series of factors, regarding IMG’s status as an international organisation, were incorrect in law. By contrast, it in no way decided the issue of whether, on the basis of an analysis not vitiated by any errors of law and of all the relevant factors, it should be found that IMG had such a status or, on the contrary, the possibility that it had such a status should be excluded.

24.Consequently, it is manifestly clear that the application for interpretation does not seek to resolve an obscurity or ambiguity that may affect the meaning or scope of the judgment which the Court is asked to interpret.

25.That application for interpretation must therefore be dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible.

Costs

26.Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

27.In the present case, since IMG has been unsuccessful in its application, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds, the Court (Third Chamber) hereby orders:

Luxembourg, 9 June 2020.

Registrar

Acting as President of the Third Chamber

ECLI:EU:C:2020:140

* Languages of the case: English and French.