18.4.2009

Official Journal of the European Union

C 90/11

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(Case C-39/09 P)

2009/C 90/16

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Société des plantations de Mbanga SA (SPM) (represented by: A. Farache, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, Commission of the European Communities

Form of order sought

The appellant claims the Court should:

—primarily:

—partially set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance;

—order the Commission to pay damages and the costs of the case at first instance and on appeal, including those of the appellant;

—in the alternative:

—refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for it to rule again and make a decision as to the amount of damages to be paid.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant essentially puts forward two pleas in law in support of its appeal.

First, it submits that the Court of First Instance erred in law in holding that the Community system for the import of bananas does not manifestly and seriously infringe the principle of maintaining effective competition, a principle which, according to the appellant, is a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals.

In this connection the appellant alleges, first, the failure by the Court of First Instance to take into account the objectives of competition in so far as it based its judgment solely on the general objectives pursued specifically in the context of the organisation of the common market in the banana sector. Secondly, the appellant claims that the Court of First Instance incorrectly interpreted the connection between the Community legislation and the anti-competitive practices existing on the banana market in so far as it refused to concede that the Community provisions enable, by means of import licences, the grant of economic advantages to certain privileged operators, whose position on the market is strengthened by the existing rules.

By its second plea, the appellant pleads the infringement, by the Court of First Instance, of general principles of law and, inter alia, of the principle of sound administration in so far as it held that that principle, in itself, is not a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. That principle has been affirmed many times in case-law and has the effect, in the present case, of putting the Commission under an obligation to take into consideration the particular circumstances of the market and of the producers who are not able to obtain the status of operators at the time of the adoption of the Community legislation.

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