19 October 2017 (*1)

(Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — EU trade mark — Application for registration of the word mark Paloma — Earlier figurative mark Paloma — Opposition proceedings — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 8(1)(b) — Likelihood of confusion — Principle of interdependence — Similarity of the marks — Absence)

In Case C‑224/17 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 27 April 2017,

Hernández Zamora SA, established in Murcia (Spain), represented by J.L. Rivas Zurdo, abogado,

appellant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),

defendant at first instance,

Rosen Tantau KG,

intervener at first instance,

THE COURT (Seventh Chamber),

composed of A. Rosas (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, A. Prechal and E. Jarašiūnas, Judges,

Advocate General: P. Mengozzi,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to give a decision by reasoned order, pursuant to Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice,

makes the following

1By its appeal, Hernández Zamora SA seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 17 February 2017, Hernández Zamora v EUIPO — Rosen Tantau (Paloma) (T‑369/15, not published, EU:T:2017:106) (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court dismissed its action seeking the annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 21 April 2015 (Case R 1697/2014-2), concerning opposition proceedings between Hernández Zamora and Rosen Tantau KG.

2In support of its appeal, Hernández Zamora puts forward two grounds, alleging incorrect interpretation of Article 8(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).

The appeal

3Pursuant to Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part.

4That provision must be applied in the present case.

5On 19 July 2017, the Advocate General took the following position:

‘1. For the reasons developed below, I propose that the Court, in accordance with Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure, dismiss the appeal, consisting of two grounds, brought against the judgment under appeal, as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded. In those circumstances, the appellant should bear its own costs, in accordance with Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules.

3. As regards the criticism alleging that the goods at issue belong to the same class of the Nice Agreement, it must be noted that the appellant merely reiterates an argument, put forward at first instance, which was rejected in paragraph 33 of the judgment under appeal, without invoking any error in law allegedly vitiating the General Court’s examination of that argument. I note that it is settled case-law that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, inter alia, judgment of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 34, and the orders of 15 July 2014, Zoo Sport v OHIM, C‑676/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2080, paragraph 17, and of 13 January 2015, Asos v OHIM, C‑320/14 P, not published, EU:C:2015:6, paragraph 25). An application which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments presented before the General Court seeks, in fact, a mere re-examination of those pleas in law and arguments, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, order of 13 January 2015, Asos v OHIM, C‑320/14 P, not published, EU:C:2015:6, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). Such an application must therefore be declared to be manifestly inadmissible.

5. Therefore, I consider that the first ground of appeal invoked by the appellant must be regarded as manifestly inadmissible.

6. By its second ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the similarity between the goods at issue obliged the General Court to assess the existence of a likelihood of confusion, on the basis of the principle of interdependence. Therefore, a lesser degree of similarity between the goods at issue could be offset by the word identity between the conflicting signs. By refusing to apply that principle in the present case, the General Court erred in law.

10. It follows, in my opinion, that the second ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.

11. In the light of those considerations, I consider that the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.’

6For the same reasons as those given by the Advocate General, the appeal must be dismissed as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded.

Costs

7Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. Since the present order has been adopted before the appeal has been served on the defendant and, therefore, before the latter could have incurred costs, Hernández Zamora must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Seventh Chamber) hereby:

Done at Luxembourg, 19 October 2017.

Registrar

President of the Seventh Chamber

ECLI:EU:C:2017:740

* Language of the case: English.