22 June 2023 (*1)

(Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Civil service – Officials – Appraisal report – Obligation to state reasons – Manifest error of assessment – Action for annulment and for damages – Appeal manifestly inadmissible in part and manifestly unfounded in part)

In Case C‑720/22 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 23 November 2022,

QN, represented by N. Flandin and L. Levi, avocates,

appellant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

European Commission,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Eighth Chamber),

composed of M. Safjan, President of the Chamber, N. Jääskinen and M. Gavalec (Rapporteur), Judges,

Advocate General: L. Medina,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court,

makes the following

1By his appeal, QN seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 14 September 2022, QN v Commission (T‑179/21, not published, EU:T:2022:557; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court dismissed his action seeking, first, annulment of his 2019 career development report (‘the appraisal report at issue’) and, in so far as necessary, annulment of the decision of 22 December 2020 of the European Commission rejecting his complaint against that report and, second, compensation for the non-material damage he allegedly suffered on account of that report.

2Pursuant to Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part.

3It is appropriate to apply that provision in the present case.

4On 5 April 2023, the Advocate General took the following position:

‘1. For the reasons set out below, I propose that the Court dismiss the appeal in the present case, in accordance with Article 181 of its Rules of Procedure, as manifestly inadmissible in part and manifestly unfounded in part.

The first ground of appeal

43 By this ground of appeal, divided into three parts, the appellant complains that the General Court rejected his fifth plea raised at first instance, alleging lack of competence of the signatory of the appraisal report at issue. In the context of the first part of the ground of appeal, which is directed primarily against paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having found that the signature of the appraisal report at issue by the appeal assessor was sufficient to regard that report as valid. Next, in the context of the second part, which is directed primarily against paragraphs 27 and 29 of the judgment, the appellant criticises the General Court for having found that the appraisal report at issue had been signed by the person having competence to do so on the basis of a lawful delegation of signature. Last, in the context of the third part, which is directed primarily against paragraphs 30 and 31 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant criticises, in essence, the General Court for having reversed the burden of proof, even though, under a measure of organisation of procedure, the General Court requested the Commission to provide evidence relating to the competence of the signatory of the appraisal report at issue. However, according to the appellant, the General Court failed to comply with the measure of organisation of procedure that it had itself ordered and, therefore, did not clarify the question relating to the competence of the signatory of the appraisal report at issue.

4 As a preliminary point, the Court notes that the appellant challenges, in essence, the General Court’s decision that the appraisal report at issue was signed by the person having competence to do so. It must be stated that the appraisal report at issue was signed electronically on 14 April 2020 by a member of staff of the Account Management Centre (AMC) because the appellant’s reporting officer had retired.

5 In those circumstances, the delegation of the member of staff of the AMC was characterised by the General Court as a “delegation of signature” which, unlike a delegation of power, does not involve a transfer to the delegatee of competence belonging to the delegator, but merely empowers the delegatee to draw up and sign, on behalf of and under the responsibility of the delegator, the formal document of a decision the substance of which has been defined by the latter (judgment of 13 July 2006, Vounakis v Commission, T‑165/04, EU:T:2006:213, paragraph 45).

6 Moreover it must be borne in mind that the Court has held, in cases where decisions have been signed by an official in the name of the Commission and subject to its control, that delegation of signature within an institution is a method relating to the internal organisation of the services of the EU administration which complies with the internal rules of the Commission and is the normal means whereby the Commission exercises its powers (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 October 1972, Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission, 8/72, EU:C:1972:84, paragraphs 10 to 14; of 17 January 1984, VBVB and VBBB v Commission, 43/82 and 63/82, EU:C:1984:9, paragraph 14; and of 11 October 1990, FUNOC v Commission, C‑200/89, EU:C:1990:356, paragraphs 13 and 14).

7 In that connection, it is clear from the wording and overall scheme of Article 3 of Commission Decision C(2013) 8985 final of 16 December 2013 laying down general provisions for implementing Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and implementing the first paragraph of Article 44 of the Staff Regulations (“the GIPs”) that it covers only delegation of power. By contrast, the GIPs are silent as to the possibility of having recourse to delegation of signature. That fact alone cannot be interpreted as precluding that possibility. On the contrary, it is in the interest of the organisation and smooth functioning of the services of the Commission that the reporting officer, who occupies, as a general rule, the post of head of unit, is not required to sign personally all the appraisal reports which he or she drafts.

8 Next, regarding the argument that the General Court failed to take into consideration the evidence produced following the adoption of the measures of organisation of procedure requested by the appellant and that there was no clarification of the issue of competence of the signatory of the appraisal report at issue, that argument must be rejected. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the General Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it. Whether or not the evidence before it is sufficient is a matter to be appraised by it alone and is not subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, except where that evidence has been distorted or the substantive inaccuracy of the findings of the General Court is apparent from the documents in the file (judgment of 11 June 2015, EMA v Commission, C‑100/14 P, not published, EU:C:2015:382, paragraph 80).

9 Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the delegation of signature at issue in the present case, in so far as it concerned clearly defined management and administrative measures, and failing any indication that the administration departed in the present case from the relevant rules applicable in this sector, must be considered to be lawful (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 October 1990, FUNOC v Commission, C‑200/89, EU:C:1990:356, paragraph 13).

10 In addition, even assuming that the member of staff of the AMC who signed the appraisal report at issue did not have the necessary competence to do so, this would substantiate the annulment of the appraisal report at issue only if it were established that, without that competence, the content of the report would have differed (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 1975, Suiker Unie and Others v Commission, 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73, EU:C:1975:174, paragraph 91). However, the appellant does not show or even claim that that was the case here.

11 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the first ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.

The second ground of appeal

12 By that ground of appeal, which is divided into three parts and is directed primarily against paragraphs 39, 40, 42 and 96 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court rejected his fourth plea raised at first instance and alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons. More specifically, in holding that the appraisal report at issue gave sufficient reasons, the General Court distorted the evidence in the file and therefore erred in law and vitiated the judgment under appeal by failing to give reasons.

13 Regarding the first part of that ground of appeal, the appellant challenges the reason given in paragraph 39 of the judgment under appeal that the 2019 assessment had not been found to be less favourable than that of the preceding years. More specifically, by that reason, the appellant submits that the General Court distorted “the elements of the file”, page 415 of Annex 37 to his application at first instance in particular.

14 In that connection, by that part of that ground of appeal, the appellant appears to criticise the General Court for having distorted the evidence in the file in that, on the one hand, the General Court considers, in paragraph 39 of the judgment under appeal, that it “does not find that the 2019 assessment is less favourable than that of the preceding years” while, on the other hand, the appellant submits that it is apparent from an exchange of messages on the professional social media platform LinkedIn between the appellant and the appeal assessor that the latter had written to him that 2019 had not been “[his] best year” and that his appraisal report was therefore “so-so”. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, such distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court of Justice’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence, and it is for the appellant to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in its view, led to that distortion (judgment of 28 May 2020, Asociación de fabricantes de morcilla de Burgos v Commission, C‑309/19 P, EU:C:2020:401, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited).

15 That is not the case here, all the more so since the General Court does not make any reference to that exchange of messages. A fortiori, it cannot be criticised for having carried out a manifestly inaccurate reading thereof. The appellant merely, in actual fact, requests a new assessment of the facts and the evidence, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on appeal.

16 By the second part of the second ground of appeal, directed against paragraph 40 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant argues that, having regard to the content of the message sent by the appeal assessor referred to in paragraph 14 of the present position, the General Court failed to give reasons to the requisite legal standard for its decision, in that paragraph of the judgment under appeal, that the comments in points 3.2 and 3.3 of the appraisal report at issue are “clear, individualised and consistent” whereas it is apparent from that message that the appraisal report at issue was not “particularly good” as opposed to the preceding and subsequent appraisal reports, which required the General Court to give detailed reasons.

17 However, I note that the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case, and that the General Court’s reasoning may even be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgment of 16 June 2022, Sony Corporation and Sony Electronics v Commission, C‑697/19 P, EU:C:2022:478, paragraph 153 and the case-law cited).

18 I would also point out that the obligation of the EU Courts to state reasons is formal in nature. It follows that reasoning with which the appellant disagrees on the substance does not constitute a complaint alleging failure to give reasons in the judgment under appeal. In the present case, it is apparent from paragraph 40 of the judgment under appeal, against which the second part of the ground of appeal is directed, that the General Court gave reasons to the requisite legal standard for the consideration contained therein; the General Court, in, inter alia, paragraph 41 of that judgment – which the appellant does not criticise in his appeal – stated that it was clear from Article 43 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and from the case-law cited in paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal that there is no requirement to give individual reasons for each of the observations or assessments set out successively by, inter alia, the initial reporting officer and the appeal assessor.

19 In the context of the third part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that, in paragraph 42 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that the appeal assessor was not required to provide additional explanations as to the reasons which led him to validate, without reservations, the initial appraisal report at issue, even though that assessor had, inter alia, made a comment relating to elements which were allegedly mentioned orally and for the first time during the appeal procedure. Those elements are not, consequently, set out in the appraisal report at issue. Accordingly, and contrary to what was stated in paragraph 96 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant claims that he did not have the opportunity to comment on those elements.

20.In that connection, it must be stated that, in the context of that part of the ground of appeal, the wording of which is, moreover, not entirely clear, the appellant does not specify the errors of law allegedly vitiating paragraphs 42 and 96 of the judgment under appeal. It follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or ground concerned is inadmissible.

21.Consequently, an appeal that does not have such characteristics cannot be the subject of a legal assessment which would allow the Court to exercise its function in the area under examination and to carry out its review of legality (judgments of 7 November 2013, Wam Industriale v Commission, C‑560/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:726, paragraph 44, and of 17 December 2020, Inpost Paczkomaty and Inpost v Commission, C‑431/19 P and C‑432/19 P, EU:C:2020:1051, paragraph 31).

22.Further, according to the Court’s settled case-law, a mere abstract statement of the grounds in the application does not alone satisfy the requirements of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, concerning the subject matter of the application, and Article 169 of the Rules of Procedure (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 December 1961, Fives Lille Cail and Others v High Authority, 19/60, 21/60, 2/61 and 3/61, EU:C:1961:30, p. 294; of 5 March 1991, Grifoni v EAEC, C‑330/88, EU:C:1991:95, paragraph 18; and order of 31 January 2019, Iordăchescu v Parliament and Others, C‑426/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:89, paragraph 29).

23.It follows that the second ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible in part and manifestly unfounded in part.

The third ground of appeal

24.By that ground of appeal, divided into two parts, the appellant complains that the General Court rejected his third plea raised at first instance, alleging infringement of Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and breach of the rules of objectivity and impartiality.

25.In the first part of that ground of appeal, the appellant criticises, in essence, the General Court for, first, having carried out an incorrect legal characterisation of the facts and erred in law by holding that the events referred to in paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal did not show that the initial reporting officer had lacked objectivity and impartiality when drafting the appraisal report at issue.

26.More specifically, the appellant criticises the General Court for having failed to analyse the evidence provided showing that he was subject to psychological harassment.

27.Second, the appellant criticises the General Court for having considered, in paragraph 53 of the judgment under appeal, that the fact that the reporting officer had informed the director of the human resources department, who had, in turn, informed the medical service, that the appellant was difficult to work with was “a mere allegation” made by the appellant. Accordingly, in paragraph 54 of his appeal, he complains that the General Court “distorts the elements of the file” by not taking into account certain items of evidence which, according to the appellant, were such as to establish the existence of such information.

28.In that connection, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, while the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess those facts, save where the evidence produced before that court has been distorted, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction, under Article 256 TFEU, to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions which it has drawn from them (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA, C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 47, and of 2 September 2021, Commission v Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology, C‑57/19 P, EU:C:2021:663, paragraph 57).

29.As far as distortion of the evidence is concerned, the Court has previously clarified that there is such distortion where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence is clearly incorrect. However, such distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgments of 3 September 2020, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑742/18 P, EU:C:2020:628, paragraph 107, and of 15 October 2020, Deza v Commission, C‑813/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:832, paragraph 38).

30.In the present case, in paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court considered, first of all, that, although the factual circumstances put forward by the appellant might suggest that there were differences between the appellant and the appraiser and a certain amount of frustration on the part of the latter, the assessments in the appraisal report do not reflect this in any way, as the report states that the appellant’s work was satisfactory. The General Court went on to specify that those circumstances do not, as such, mean that the appraiser was no longer able to assess the merits of the appellant objectively. Last, it held that the evaluations contained in the appraisal report at issue could not, as such, constitute evidence that that report was drawn up with a lack of impartiality and objectivity, since they stated that the appellant’s work was satisfactory.

31.By those grounds, the General Court carried out a sovereign assessment of those factual elements, following which it was validly able to decide, without committing a manifest error, that those factual elements did not show that the appraiser had lacked objectivity and impartiality when drafting the appraisal report at issue.

32.Regarding alleged distortion of certain items of evidence which the appellant claims vitiates paragraph 53 of the judgment under appeal, it must be stated that the appellant criticises the General Court, in fact, for having failed to have regard to those items of evidence, even though the appellant had submitted them to the General Court. In that regard, it should be noted that it is not the task of the Court of Justice on appeal to substitute its own assessment of the evidence for that made by the General Court. In that regard, it is not for the Court of Justice to criticise the choices made by the General Court in the context of that examination, in particular where it decides to rely on certain items of evidence before it and to reject others, except where it finds that the General Court distorted the evidence by misinterpreting its clear content (judgment of 16 February 2012, Council v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraph 161).

33.Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the first part of the third ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.

The fourth ground of appeal

39.By that ground of appeal, which is directed primarily against paragraphs 64, 66 and 67 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court rejected the first plea raised at first instance and alleging lack of objectives in the appraisal procedure, manifest error of assessment and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and of the principle of good administration. Accordingly, the appellant submits that the General Court was incorrect to consider that three documents referred to by the appellant, that is, the job description guidelines, the document entitled “staff matters” and the document entitled “Constructive dialogue and fair report: guidance for Reporting Officers”, did not constitute indicative rules of conduct which the administration imposes on itself and from which it may not, in principle, depart.

40.In addition, given the similarities between, on the one hand, the Guide to the appraisal of the European Central Bank (ECB) and, on the other, the document entitled “Constructive dialogue and fair report: guidance for Reporting Officers”, the appellant also criticises the General Court for having failed to take them into consideration, in the light of its case-law.

41.It must be borne in mind that the Court has previously held, in a judgment concerning internal measures adopted by the administration of an EU institution, that although those measures may not be regarded as “rules of law” which the administration is always bound to observe, they nevertheless form rules of conduct indicating the practice to be followed, from which the administration may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons that are compatible with the principle of equal treatment. In adopting such rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them that they will henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the institution in question imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those rules under pain of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations. It cannot therefore be precluded that, on certain conditions and depending on their content, such rules of conduct, which are of general application, may produce legal effects (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 December 1983, Blomefield v Commission, 190/82, EU:C:1983:358, paragraph 20, and of 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraphs 209 and 211).

42.It follows from that case-law that, in order to determine whether internal measures adopted and published by the administration constitute rules of conduct indicating the practice to be followed which are, on publication, declared applicable to the cases relating to them, account must be taken not only of their content but also of the context in which those measures occur, of their objective and of their wording (see, by analogy, judgments of 11 July 2013, Gosselin Group v Commission, C‑429/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:463, paragraph 65, and of 11 July 2013, Ziegler v Commission, C‑439/11 P, EU:C:2013:513, paragraph 61).

43.The General Court did not commit an error of law or distortion in finding that the three documents relied on by the appellant set out mere recommendations and guidance for reporting officers without imposing a rule on the administration to set objectives in the appraisal procedure. In finding that those documents had no binding legal force, the General Court considered, implicitly but necessarily, that the Commission had not laid down rules of conduct and had not had the intention to enforce strictly and uniformly the recommendations and guidance to all of the appraisals of officials and of members of the temporary staff.

44.Further, it is appropriate, for the same reasons, to reject the appellant’s argument alleging similarities between the document entitled “Constructive dialogue and fair report: guidance for Reporting Officers” and the Guide to the ECB appraisal – the latter of which was held to be binding in the judgment of 8 November 2018, QB v ECB (T‑827/16, EU:T:2018:756) – as, in the present case, the Commission did not commit to enforcing the guidance set out in that document strictly and uniformly in the case of all appraisals of officials and of members of the temporary staff.

45.Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.

The fifth ground of appeal

46.By that ground of appeal, divided into four parts, the appellant complains that the General Court rejected his second plea at first instance, alleging infringement of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, failure to have regard to Article 7(3) of the GIPs and to the guidance for reporting officers, manifest errors of assessment and misuse of powers, and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and breach of the principle of good administration.

47.In the context of the first part of that ground of appeal, which is directed primarily against paragraph 92 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant criticises, in essence, the General Court for having found that the statements by some of his colleagues showing that he cooperated well were not likely to render implausible the assessment of the appellant’s reporting officer. Accordingly, by failing to take account of the evidence produced, the appellant submits that the General Court infringed its obligation to state reasons and, moreover, distorted the evidence by drawing such a conclusion.

48.In the context of the second part of that ground of appeal, directed primarily against paragraphs 96 and 97 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant criticises, in essence, the General Court for having found that he could have commented on the “elements mentioned orally by the jobholder during the appeal discussion”, referred to in paragraph 96 of that judgment, and that he had produced no evidence in that respect. On that point, the appellant refers to a number of items of evidence which he claims were distorted by the General Court.

49.In the context of the third part of that ground of appeal, directed primarily against paragraphs 101, 102 and 107 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having found that he had not established a link between the psychological harassment to which he claims he was subject and the negative comments of the appeal assessor allegedly contained in the appraisal report at issue. In support of that part, the appellant also puts forward a number of items of evidence which, according to him, were distorted or not taken account of by the General Court.

50.In the context of the fourth part of that ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having failed to examine his complaint related to breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and of the principle of good administration, in so far as, despite the working relationship with the initial reporting officer being so tense as to constitute psychological harassment, that reporting officer was not replaced with another person.

51.It must be recalled, as a preliminary point, that, according to settled case-law, while the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess those facts, save where the evidence produced before that court has been distorted, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction, under Article 256 TFEU, to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions which it has drawn from them (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA, C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 47; of 2 September 2021, Commission v Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology, C‑57/19 P, EU:C:2021:663, paragraph 57; and order of 15 July 2022, MO v Council, C‑165/22 P, not published, EU:C:2022:595, paragraph 4 (position of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona, point 7)).

52.Having regard to the Court’s case-law, there is distortion where, inter alia, the General Court has manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of the evidence (see, inter alia, judgment of 10 February 2011, Activision Blizzard Germany v Commission, C‑260/09 P, EU:C:2011:62, paragraph 57).

53.Moreover, regarding failure to give reasons, it is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case, and that the General Court’s reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgment of 25 June 2020, Commission v CX, C‑131/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:502, paragraph 35, and of 13 January 2022, YG v Commission, C‑361/20 P, not published, EU:C:2022:17, paragraph 33).

54.In the present case, it must be stated, in the first place, that, by the fifth ground of appeal, the appellant intends to call into question the factual assessments made by the General Court, in paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal in particular. However, the appellant does not put forward any elements to establish, to the requisite legal standard, the distortions allegedly vitiating the judgment under appeal. The Court cannot therefore find, on the basis of those elements alone, that the General Court manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of the facts resulting from the evidence in the file.

55.Regarding, more specifically, the fourth part of the fifth ground of appeal, the appellant cannot validly criticise the General Court for not having examined such a complaint, since, after it validly held, in paragraph 102 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant had not adduced evidence capable of establishing harassment by his head of unit or head of sector, the General Court rejected that complaint, implicitly but definitely.

56.In those circumstances, the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.

57.Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety as manifestly inadmissible in part and manifestly unfounded in part.’

5On the same grounds as those upheld by the Advocate General, the appeal must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible in part and manifestly unfounded in part.

Costs

6Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. In the present case, since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other party to the proceedings and, therefore, before the latter could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear his own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Eighth Chamber) hereby orders:

Luxembourg, 22 June 2023.

Registrar

President of the Chamber

*

Language of the case: English.