30.4.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 152/56

(Case T-158/18)

(2018/C 152/66)

Language of the case: Italian.

Parties

Applicants: Mario Scaloni (Ancona, Italia) and Ennio Figini (Chiaravalle, Italia) (represented by: P. Putti, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should order the European Union and/or the European Commission, depending on the interpretation to be given of the directive and the regulation at issue, to pay compensation for the full face value of the shares as described in the application and as is apparent from the documentation attached, and to pay the costs of the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The applicants claim that after the entry into force of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (Text with EEA relevance), (1) followed by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, (2) the Italian State was not allowed to take action in support of some of its banks, including Banca Marche.

In support of the action, the applicants rely upon three pleas in law.

1.First plea in law, claiming damages because the Commission’s interpretation of Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 was not in conformity with EU law, and because of the unlawfulness of the exclusion of Banca Marche from the framework for State aid and the consequent breach of the principle of equality and/or of non-discrimination.

—In that regard, the applicants claim that the Commission considered that aid to banks from various Member States met the conditions set out in Article 107(3)(b), and were therefore considered to be lawful. Italy’s planned interventions ought to have been assessed on the basis of that same provision, the only one that governs State aid, and not according to the directive and the regulation at issue. Those two pieces of legislation do not affect State aid, and could not have done so, being secondary legislation. The aid to the Italian banks ought also to have been allowed because it was based on the same considerations that, according to the Commission, had justified aid already paid.

—Furthermore, if the secondary legislation should be held to be applicable, the first plea in law is that the Commission, by not allowing that aid, breached the principle of equality.

2.Second plea in law, alleging breach of the hierarchical principle of EU norms by the EU legislature.

—In that regard, the applicants claim that, if the Court were to find that the Commission’s interpretation was correct, the breach would date from the legislative measures and the responsibility would be that of the European Union as a whole.

3.Third plea in law, alleging breach of the fundamental principles of the Italian legal order and the inapplicability of EU law.

—In that regard, the applicants claim that, if the Court were to find that the directive and the regulation at issue did not infringe the EU principle of equality either, the Italian Constitutional Court will have to be asked to ascertain whether the Italian constitutional legal rules are compatible with the principle of equality. If the Court were to find otherwise, the legislation that was in breach of that principle could not be incorporated into the Italian legal order.

(1) OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190.

(2) OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1.