Provisional text

11 September 2024 (*)

( Law governing the institutions – Member of the Court of Auditors – Activity incompatible with the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors – Expenses considered undue – Recovery decision – Decision of the Court of Justice ruling on the breach of the obligations arising from the office of Member of the Court of Auditors – Lawfulness of OLAF’s investigation and final report – Duty to state reasons – Limitation period – Article 98(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 – Legitimate expectations – Error of assessment – Non-contractual liability – Non-material damage )

In Case T‑386/19,

CQ, represented by L. Levi, lawyer,

applicant,

European Court of Auditors, represented by K. Kantza and B. Schäfer, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition),

composed of R. da Silva Passos, President, S. Gervasoni, N. Półtorak, I. Reine (Rapporteur) and T. Pynnä, Judges,

Registrar: H. Eriksson, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 4 May 2023,

gives the following

1.1 By his action, the applicant, CQ, seeks, first, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, the annulment of the decision of the European Court of Auditors of 11 April 2019 establishing an amount receivable from him and to be recovered from him, in which the Court of Auditors claimed that he had unduly received the sum of EUR 153 407.58 by way of mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances, representation expenses and expenses for the use of the services of drivers, and ordered the recovery of that sum (‘the contested decision’) and, secondly, on the basis of Article 268 TFEU, compensation for the non-material damage he has suffered.

2.2 Article 285 TFEU provides as follows:

‘The Court of Auditors shall carry out the Union’s audit.

It shall consist of one national of each Member State. Its Members shall be completely independent in the performance of their duties, in the Union’s general interest.’

3.3 Article 286(3) and (6) TFEU is worded as follows:

‘3. In the performance of these duties, the Members of the Court of Auditors shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body. The Members of the Court of Auditors shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties.

…

4.4 Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ 2013 L 248, p. 1), is drafted as follows:

‘In order to step up the fight against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the European Union and of the European Atomic Energy Community …, the European Anti-Fraud Office … shall exercise the powers of investigation conferred on the Commission …’

5.5 Article 4(1) and (2) of Regulation No 883/2013 provides as follows:

‘1. In the areas referred to in Article 1, the [European Anti-Fraud] Office shall carry out administrative investigations within the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies …

Those internal investigations shall be conducted in accordance with the conditions set out in this regulation and in the decisions adopted by the respective institution, body, office or agency.

(a) the [European Anti-Fraud] Office shall have the right of immediate and unannounced access to any relevant information, including information in databases, held by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and to their premises … The [European Anti-Fraud] Office may take a copy of, and obtain extracts from, any document or the contents of any data medium held by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies …’

6.6 Article 5(1), (2) and (3) of Regulation No 883/2013 provides as follows:

‘1. The Director-General may open an investigation when there is a sufficient suspicion, which may also be based on information provided by any third party or anonymous information, that there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union. …

The decision to open an internal investigation shall be taken by the Director-General, acting on his own initiative or following a request from the institution, body, office or agency within which the investigation is to be conducted or from a Member State.

7.7 Article 7(2) of Regulation No 883/2013 provides as follows:

‘The staff of the [European Anti-Fraud] Office shall carry out their tasks on production of a written authorisation showing their identity and their capacity. The Director-General shall issue such authorisation indicating the subject matter and the purpose of the investigation, the legal bases for conducting the investigation and the investigative powers stemming from those bases.’

8.8 Article 9(4) of Regulation No 883/2013 states:

‘Without prejudice to Articles 4(6) and 7(6), once the investigation has been completed and before conclusions referring by name to a person concerned are drawn up, that person shall be given the opportunity to comment on facts concerning him.’

9.9 Article 11(4) of Regulation No 883/2013 is worded as follows:

‘Reports and recommendations drawn up following an internal investigation and any relevant related documents shall be sent to the institution, body, office or agency concerned. That institution, body, office or agency shall take such action, in particular of a disciplinary or legal nature, as the results of the internal investigation warrant, and shall report thereon to the [European Anti-Fraud] Office, within a time limit laid down in the recommendations accompanying the report, and, in addition, at the request of the [European Anti-Fraud] Office.’

10.10 Article 1 of Decision No 1-2003 of the Court of Auditors of 16 January 2003 relating to the mission expenses of the Members of the Court, which was applicable at the material time in the present action (‘Decision No 1-2003’), stated as follows:

‘The binding commitments (that is, the travel orders) relating to mission expenses must be obtained as soon as possible. For the mission expenses of Members, the authorising officer shall be the President of the Court [of Auditors]. …’

11.11 Article 3 of Decision No 1-2003 was worded as follows:

‘In the course of their missions Members may travel by official car, plane, train or boat.’

12.12 Article 5 of Decision No 1-2003 provided as follows:

‘Applications for the reimbursement of mission expenses shall be made as soon as possible after the Member’s return. Hotel expenses (excluding meals) shall be reimbursable.’

13.13 Article 6 of Decision No 1-2003 was worded as follows:

‘Where a mission lasts for less than twelve hours in one day, half the corresponding daily subsistence allowance shall be paid. In all other cases the daily subsistence allowance shall be paid in its entirety.’

14.14 Article 2 of Decision No 7-2004 of the Court of Auditors of 22 April 2004 concerning the representation and reception expenses of its Members, applicable at the material time in the present action (‘Decision No 7-2004’) was worded as follows:

‘At the beginning of each financial year, once the Members have been consulted, the appropriation shall be divided into two parts:

…

the second, Part B, shall be reserved for general representation and reception expenses incurred by the Members in their capacity as Members of an institution; these expenses shall be reimbursed at the end of each quarter on the basis of the relevant declarations accompanied by receipts or other written proof deemed to be equivalent and showing the date of the invitation, the number of guests and the capacity of the main guest. …’

15.15 Article 6 of Decision No 7-2004 provided as follows:

‘For receptions held at home, the Court [of Auditors] shall reimburse the expenses incurred, up to the amount evidenced by the supporting documents submitted.’

16.16 Decision No 7-2004 was accompanied by a note of 22 April 2004 for the attention of the Members of the Court of Auditors containing ‘suggestions with regard to representation and reception expenses’ (‘the note of 22 April 2004’). That note stated, inter alia, as follows:

‘Representation expenses are intended primarily to promote the external relations of the Court [of Auditors].

Members represent the Court [of Auditors] inter alia when they maintain, in the interest of the Court [of Auditors], professional contacts with individuals holding positions within the European Union …, Member States or other countries.

…

Expenditure for each event must be commensurate with its size and the status of the attendees.

When Members represent the Court [of Auditors], their spouse/partner may also be called upon to attend the event. Guests may also be accompanied.

Friends or personal contacts must be given private invitations.

…

Relevant guidance is provided in Annex 1.

Expenses must be declared clearly and succinctly using Annex 2.’

17.17 Annex 1 to the note of 22 April 2004 stated that ‘representation/receptions outside the Court [of Auditors] [should], as a general rule, be for individuals holding prominent positions within the European Union …, Member States or other countries’ and that costs relating to representation/reception expenditure at the Member’s private residence ‘[should] not be higher than [was] necessary for that purpose, including floral arrangements’.

18.18 That annex also stipulated that, ‘where the guest list, in addition to persons outside the institution, includes staff of the Court [of Auditors], a balance must be maintained between the two categories’ and that ‘personal friends and family members (except for spouses/partners) must be given private invitations at the expense of the Member’

19.19 Article 1 of Decision No 33-2004 of the Court of Auditors of 15 June 2004 on the management and use of the car fleet at the European Court of Auditors, which was applicable at the material time in the present action until the entry into force of Decision No 19-2009 of the Court of Auditors of 20 April 2009 on the management and use of the car fleet at the European Court of Auditors (‘Decision No 33-2004’), provided as follows:

‘Official vehicles shall be permanently available to the Members and the Secretary-General [of the Court of Auditors] for journeys undertaken by them in the performance of their duties.’

20.20 Article 4 of Decision No 33-2004 was worded as follows:

In addition to the rental cost, costs incurred by the Members and the Secretary-General through use of the vehicle in the course of their duties shall be defrayed by the Court [of Auditors].

The following shall be regarded as journeys undertaken in the performance of official duties:

–journeys covered by a travel order,

–other journeys undertaken in the performance of official duties, evaluated at a standard rate of 15 000 kilometres per year.’

21 Article 5 of Decision No 33-2004 was drafted as follows:

‘Where the Members or the Secretary-General use their official cars for journeys other than those referred to in Article 4, they shall be responsible for any related expenditure (tolls, fuel costs and any additional rental charge resulting from mileage in excess of the overall figure of 45 000 kilometres per year).’

22 Article 6 of Decision No 33-2004 provided as follows:

‘Drivers shall be entitled to reimbursement of travel expenses … when they drive the Members or the Secretary-General on journeys undertaken in the course of their duties.’

23 Decision No 33-2004 was accompanied by a document entitled ‘Commentary on Decision No 33-2004 on the management and use of the car fleet at the Court of Auditors’ (‘the Commentary on Decision No 33-2004’).

24 In the Commentary on Decision No 33-2004, on the subject of Article 4 of that decision, the following was stated:

‘The following shall be considered “other journeys undertaken in the performance of official duties”:

–journeys between home (in the place of employment) and the place of work,

–journeys between the place of employment/residence and the airport,

–official obligations in close proximity but not covered by a travel order,

–cases of force majeure (sickness, medical tests, incapacity to drive, etc.).’

25 The wording of Articles 1 and 4 to 6 of Decision No 19-2009 of the Court of Auditors of 20 April 2009 on the management and use of the car fleet at the European Court of Auditors reproduced the wording of the corresponding articles of Decision No 33-2004.

26 Article 7 of Decision No 19-2009 provided as follows:

‘This decision cancels and replaces Decision No 33-2004. It shall enter into force on the same date as the new interinstitutional framework contract concerning leased vehicles.’

27 Decision No 19-2009 was accompanied by a document entitled ‘Commentary on Decision No 19-2009 on the management and use of the car fleet at the European Court of Auditors’ (‘the Commentary on Decision No 19-2009’).

28 The Commentary on Decision No 19-2009 for Article 4 of that decision reproduced the wording relating to Article 4 of Decision No 33-2004 in the Commentary on Decision No 33-2004.

5. The Code of Conduct for the Members of the Court of Auditors of 2012

29 Article 2(1), (2) and (4) of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Court of Auditors, adopted by that institution on 8 February 2012 (‘the 2012 Code of Conduct’), was worded as follows:

‘1. Members shall avoid any situation liable to give rise to a conflict of interest. They shall not deal with matters in which they have any personal interest, in particular a family or financial interest, that could impair their impartiality. …

…

30 Article 4 of the 2012 Code of Conduct provided as follows:

‘1. Members of the Court [of Auditors] shall devote themselves to the fulfilment of their mandate. They may not exercise any political office.

…

II. Background to the dispute

31 The applicant was a Member of the European Court of Auditors from 1 March 2006 to 30 April 2018, completing two terms of office. Before being appointed to the Court of Auditors, he had, since the 1980s, held various political offices in the Kingdom of Belgium. Until 2002, he was a member of one political party and thereafter he was a member of another political party (‘the political party in question’).

32 During his terms of office, he was assigned to the chamber of the Court of Auditors responsible for auditing EU expenditure in connection with external relations, enlargement and humanitarian aid. For approximately seven years, the applicant held the office of Dean of that chamber.

33 After receiving a favourable opinion from the committee responsible for assessing the external activities of the Members of the Court of Auditors, the applicant was authorised, by decision of 30 April 2015, to take up the office of President of an environmental organisation in the region from which he originates.

34 As a Member of the Court of Auditors, the applicant was reimbursed his representation and reception expenses and various expenses incurred in the course of missions authorised, at his request, by the President of the Court of Auditors and was paid daily subsistence allowances in connection with those missions.

35 The applicant was provided with an official car. Between 2006 and March 2014, the Court of Auditors provided the applicant with a driver. From April 2014 onwards, the applicant was able to request that a driver assigned to the ‘pool of drivers’ under the responsibility of the Director of Finance of the Court of Auditors be made available.

36 In the course of 2016, the Court of Auditors received information concerning a number of serious irregularities attributed to the applicant. On 18 July 2016, its Secretary-General orally informed the applicant of the allegations made against him.

37 In the summer of 2016, services within the Court of Auditors carried out an analysis of the applicant’s missions and the missions of the Court of Auditors’ drivers for whom he had issued travel orders, with a view to identifying possible irregularities. Correspondence was subsequently exchanged between those services and the applicant regarding the alleged irregularity of some of his missions and of some of his drivers’ missions and regarding the Court of Auditors’ request for the reimbursement of claimed expenses. The applicant considered the allegations of irregularity to be unfounded and refused to reimburse the sums claimed by the Court of Auditors.

38 In addition, on 26 July 2016, the Court of Auditors was informed of allegations that the applicant had committed insurance fraud in 2011, following an accident involving his official car and his own car. On 1 September 2016, the Secretary-General of the Court of Auditors reported those allegations orally to the applicant. In a note dated the same day, the applicant maintained that the accident in question had been a collision between his official car, driven by the driver assigned to his Cabinet, and his private car, driven by his son.

39 On 14 October 2016, the Secretary-General of the Court of Auditors, acting on instructions from the President of the Court of Auditors, forwarded a file to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) relating to the applicant’s activities that had resulted in possible undue expenditure from the budget of the European Union. On 15 November 2016, OLAF decided to open an investigation into the matter.

40 On 31 March 2017, the Director-General of OLAF formally notified the President of the Court of Auditors of the opening of an investigation into possible irregularities involving the applicant and affecting the financial interests of the European Union in relation to the use of the Court of Auditors’ assets and missions carried out or authorised in breach of the applicable rules.

41 On 22 September 2017, the applicant was informed by OLAF of the opening of that investigation and of his status as a ‘person concerned’ in that investigation.

42 On 20 November 2017, OLAF carried out an inspection of the premises of the applicant’s Cabinet, during which it collected various documents. After a preliminary analysis of those documents, OLAF informed the applicant, on 15 December 2017, that the scope of the investigation had been extended to possible conflicts of interest and other infringements of Articles 285 and 286 TFEU and of the provisions of the 2012 Code of Conduct.

43 The applicant was heard orally by OLAF investigators on 22 December 2017. After OLAF had communicated to him a summary of the facts established following the investigation, the applicant sent written observations to OLAF on 15 May 2018.

44 On 2 July 2018, the Court of Auditors received OLAF’s final report concluding its investigation (‘the OLAF report’). The report found, in respect of the applicant, misuse of the resources of the Court of Auditors in connection with activities unrelated to his duties, improper use of fuel cards, misuse of the motor insurance contract for his official car, unjustified absences, failure to declare outside activities, transmission of confidential information and the existence of conflicts of interest.

45 In the light of the findings made in that report, OLAF recommended that the Court of Auditors initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, take appropriate steps to ensure the recovery of EUR 472 869.09, corresponding to the expenses unduly borne by the Court of Auditors, and consider the recovery of EUR 97 954.52, corresponding to the salary paid for the periods of the applicant’s unjustified absences.

46 Moreover, taking the view that some of the acts discovered in the investigation could constitute criminal offences, OLAF forwarded information and its recommendations to the judicial authorities of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

47 In the light of the information forwarded by OLAF, the State Prosecutor at the Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg (Luxembourg District Court, Luxembourg) requested, by letter of 1 October 2018, that the Court of Auditors waive the applicant’s immunity from legal proceedings. On 15 November 2018, the Court of Auditors granted that request.

48 On 3 July 2018, the President of the Court of Auditors sent its Members a copy of the OLAF report and of the recommendations made by OLAF.

49 On 5 October 2018, the President of the Court of Auditors sent a preliminary report to its Members. That report recommended that a request be put to the Court of Justice ‘to examine the facts as established and to determine whether [the applicant had] failed to fulfil the obligations arising from his office’. That report and the OLAF report were communicated to the applicant on the same date. The annexes to the OLAF report were also sent to him on 17 October 2018.

50 On 19 November 2018, the applicant sent written observations to the Court of Auditors. On 26 November 2018, he was heard by the Members of the Court of Auditors in a closed meeting.

51 On 29 November 2018, in a closed meeting, the Court of Auditors decided to refer the applicant’s case to the Court of Justice of the European Union pursuant to Article 286(6) TFEU.

52 By the action which it brought on 15 February 2019, the Court of Auditors claimed that the Court of Justice of the European Union should declare that the applicant no longer met the obligations arising from his office and, accordingly, impose the penalty provided for in Article 286(6) TFEU.

53 By its judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held that the applicant had breached the obligations arising from his office within the Court of Auditors and declared him to be deprived of two-thirds of his pension entitlement from the date of delivery of that judgment.

54

By letter of 14 December 2018 and an amending letter dated 23 January 2019, the Secretary-General of the Court of Auditors informed the applicant of his intention to recover EUR 160 839.89 for the EU budget. Annexed to those letters was a table setting out the expenses considered undue (‘the table of recoveries’). The applicant replied to those letters on 4 February 2019, submitting his observations.

55On 11 April 2019, the Secretary-General of the Court of Auditors adopted the contested decision, deciding as follows:

–EUR 33 172.91 had been paid to the applicant unduly in respect of mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances,

–EUR 49 138.25 had been paid to the applicant unduly in respect of representation expenses,

–a total of EUR 71 096.42 (EUR 30 501.27 in emoluments plus EUR 40 595.15 in mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances) had been unduly charged to the EU budget by the applicant as a result of the improper use of the services of drivers at the Court of Auditors,

–in cooperation with the Court of Auditors’ accounting officer, the total sum of EUR 153 407.58 was to be recovered by 31 May 2019.

56By letter of 4 June 2019, taking note of the fact that the sum of EUR 153 407.58 had not been paid by 31 May 2019, the Court of Auditors’ accounting officer requested payment of that sum, together with default interest at the rate of 3.5% [per annum], giving a total of EUR 153 584.10.

57By letter of 7 June 2019, the Court of Auditors’ accounting officer took note of the payment by bank transfer of the sum of EUR 153 584.10. Having regard to the date of that payment, she reduced the interest charge and proposed to reimburse EUR 88.26, in view of the fact that, on that date, the applicant’s debt stood at EUR 153 495.84.

III. Forms of order sought

58The applicant claims that the General Court should:

–annul the contested decision;

–in so far as is necessary, annul the two decisions of the Court of Auditors’ accounting officer of 4 and 7 June 2019;

–order the Court of Auditors to repay the sum of EUR 153 495.84 (EUR 153 407.58 plus EUR 88.26 in default interest charged to him) increased by default interest at the rate of 3.5% [per annum] up to the date of repayment in full;

–order the Court of Auditors to compensate the non-material damage he has suffered;

–order the Court of Auditors to pay the costs.

59The Court of Auditors contends that the General Court should:

–dismiss the action as partly inadmissible and partly unfounded;

–reject the application for compensation as inadmissible;

–order the applicant to pay the full costs of the proceedings.

In support of his claim for annulment, the applicant puts forward six pleas in law, alleging (i) the unlawfulness of the OLAF investigation and of OLAF’s report; (ii) failure on the part of the Court of Auditors to exercise its discretion, in particular as authorising officer, breach of its duty to prove the accusation and breach of its duty to state reasons; (iii) breach of its duty to act within a reasonable time; (iv) breach of the principles of legal certainty and of the protection of legitimate expectations, and the existence of ‘manifest errors’; (v) failure to comply with the dictum that administrative proceedings must await the outcome of criminal proceedings; and (vi) breach of the duty to state reasons regarding the use of the services of drivers and infringement of Article 75 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ 2012 L 298, p. 1).

The applicant maintains that OLAF’s investigation and its report are unlawful for three reasons, which are that OLAF unlawfully extended the scope of its investigation, that OLAF infringed his right to privacy and that OLAF failed to observe his rights of defence.

The Court of Auditors disputes the applicant’s arguments.

It must be observed that the applicant’s line of argument in the present case concerning the unlawfulness of the OLAF investigation and of OLAF’s report is largely the same as that which he put forward in the proceedings under Article 286(6) TFEU (paragraphs 126 to 134 of the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782)) and which the Court of Justice rejected in paragraphs 140 to 175 of the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782).

First of all, the Court of Justice acknowledged that OLAF had decided to extend the scope of the investigation, which had originally been opened in relation to possible irregularities involving the applicant and affecting the financial interests of the European Union and concerning the use of the Court of Auditors’ assets and missions carried out or authorised in breach of the applicable rules, to include possible conflicts of interest and other infringements of Articles 285 and 286 TFEU and of certain provisions of the 2012 Code of Conduct. In paragraph 157 of the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice nevertheless concluded that the fact that that extension had been prompted by evidence discovered during the inspection carried out on 20 November 2017 could not mean that OLAF’s decision to extend the scope of its investigation was unlawful.

Next, in paragraph 166 of the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held that the arguments put forward by the applicant were incapable of establishing, for the purposes of the proceedings under Article 286(6) TFEU, that OLAF had unlawfully infringed his right to respect for private life.

Lastly, in paragraph 174 of the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice concluded that the arguments put forward by the applicant were incapable of demonstrating, for the purposes of the proceedings under Article 286(6) TFEU, that his rights of defence had been infringed.

It is apparent that, following the delivery of the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the applicant solely disputes the relevance to the present case of the conclusion which the Court of Justice stated in paragraph 174 of that judgment.

As the applicant points out, the Court of Justice held that, while both OLAF and the Court of Auditors were required to comply with their respective obligations, observance of the right to be heard enjoyed by the Member or former Member of the Court of Auditors in question had to be viewed broadly for the purposes of proceedings under Article 286(6) TFEU (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 170).

In support of that view, the Court of Justice also referred to the principle that it could not be ruled out that that Member or former Member might have been given a sufficient opportunity by the Court of Auditors to be heard on evidence on which he had not been able to comment effectively before the adoption of the OLAF report (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 170). In that connection, first of all, the Court of Justice noted that it was common ground that the applicant had been heard orally by OLAF on 22 December 2017, that several written exchanges had taken place between OLAF and the applicant’s lawyer and that, following the communication of a summary of facts drawn up following the investigation, the applicant had been able to send OLAF a written document in which he sought to refute the allegations made in that summary (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 171).

Secondly, the Court of Justice pointed out that, on 5 October 2018, the applicant had been sent the OLAF report and the preliminary report sent to the Members of the Court of Auditors by the President of the Court of Auditors and that he had been able to comment on those reports both by sending written observations and at a hearing before the Court of Auditors (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 172).

Thirdly, the Court of Justice noted that the applicant had not put forward any argument to show that he had been unable to express his views adequately before the Court of Auditors on certain evidence adduced against him before the adoption of the OLAF report (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 172).

The conclusion reached in paragraph 174 of the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), is applicable in the present case, since, as in the proceedings under Article 286(6) TFEU, it cannot be ruled out that, in the present case, the applicant might have been given a sufficient opportunity by the Court of Auditors to be heard on evidence on which he had not been able to comment before the adoption of the OLAF report.

In the present proceedings, the applicant has not put forward any new, specific evidence to show that he was not sufficiently heard by the Court of Auditors on evidence on which he had not been able to comment before the adoption of the OLAF report. It was, however, open to the applicant to put forward such evidence in the written stage of the present proceedings, in particular in his observations on the inferences to be drawn for the purposes of the present case from the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782).

72Therefore, the first plea must be dismissed as unfounded.

By this plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the Court of Auditors merely referred to the OLAF report without analysing it and, in particular, without indicating in exactly what way each of the impugned expenses was irregular. He refers to Articles 98, 100 and 101 of Regulation 2018/1046, from which it is clear that the authorising officer is required to assess whether an amount receivable exists and then to decide upon its recovery. Thus, it is incumbent on the Court of Auditors to indicate precisely why each of the impugned expenses was irregular, something which it must also do in order to fulfil its duty to state reasons.

The Court of Auditors disputes the applicant’s arguments.

It must be observed as a preliminary point that, in the present proceedings, following the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the applicant no longer maintains his complaint that the Court of Auditors failed to exercise its discretion. There is therefore no need to rule on that complaint.

As regards the allegations that the Court of Auditors breached its duty to prove the accusation and breached its duty to state reasons, which the applicant does maintain in the present proceedings, these should be examined together, since they overlap. Moreover, it is clear from the case file that, in fact, the applicant solely alleges a failure to state reasons regarding the undue nature of the various sums identified by the Court of Auditors, having regard, in particular, to the table of recoveries.

The right to sound administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), imposes an obligation on the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union to give reasons for their decisions. That obligation has the same scope as that arising from the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, which provides that legal acts are to state the reasons on which they are based. The duty to state reasons has the purpose, on the one hand, of enabling the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure taken in order to defend their rights and, on the other hand, of enabling the Courts of the European Union to exercise their power to review the legality of the decision (see judgment of 14 July 2021, BG

v <i>Parliament</i>, T‑253/19, not published, EU:T:2021:459, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). The obligation to provide a statement of reasons is an essential procedural requirement, as distinct from the question whether the reasons given are correct, which goes to the substantive legality of the contested measure (see judgment of 22 May 2012, <i>Internationaler Hilfsfonds</i> v <i>Commission</i>, T‑300/10, EU:T:2012:247, paragraph 180 and the case-law cited). The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. The grounds may be adequate even though they set out reasons which are incorrect (see order of 12 July 2012, <i>Dover</i> v <i>Parliament</i>, C‑278/11 P, not published, EU:C:2012:457, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

78Furthermore, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question of whether the statement of reasons for a measure is to be deemed adequate must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgment of 14 July 2021, <i>BG</i> v <i>Parliament</i>, T‑253/19, not published, EU:T:2021:459, paragraph 45).

79In the present case, the contested decision comprises three parts: the covering letter giving notice of the contested decision, the annex thereto (Annex 1), setting out the contested decision, and the summary debit note (Annex 2).

80After setting out in the contested decision the provisions concerning mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances, representation expenses, the use of the Court of Auditors’ car fleet and the mission expenses of drivers used by Members that the applicant had allegedly infringed, the Court of Auditors went on to identify the sums unduly paid which the applicant was required to pay back.

81In that regard, the Court of Auditors stated that, upon analysing the OLAF report and its annexes, and documents in the possession of the administrative services of the Court of Auditors, it had found that the applicant had unduly obtained reimbursement of expenses for private activities or activities unrelated to, or incompatible with, his duties, when he knew or ought to have known that such expenses could not be incurred using resources of the Court of Auditors. More specifically, the decision establishing an amount receivable and to be recovered contains a table of recoveries which sets out, for each activity giving rise to an undue charge to the budget of the European Union, inter alia, the reason given by the applicant in his travel order or in his driver’s travel order or in his request for the reimbursement of representation expenses, the true nature of the activity in question, a reference to the evidence establishing the true nature of the activity, the date and place of the activity giving rise to the expenses and the cost borne by the Court of Auditors.

82It follows that the contested decision contains a statement of reasons that satisfies the requirements of Article 41 of the Charter, since the reasoning given enables the applicant to ascertain the grounds on which the contested decision is based and enables the General Court to exercise its power of review in that regard, without prejudice to the examination of the merits of the contested decision, which will be carried out when the fourth plea in law is addressed.

83The applicant’s allegation that, in its defence, in relation to the fourth plea in law, the Court of Auditors has put forward new reasoning or new grounds, will be examined in detail when that plea is addressed.

84Therefore, the second plea in law must be dismissed as unfounded.

85The applicant maintains that the Court of Auditors infringed the duty to act within a reasonable time, enshrined in Article 41(1) of the Charter, by calling into question the regularity of claims for reimbursement which he had made since 2006, even though, from the time when those claims were submitted, the Court of Auditors had all the relevant information for ascertaining whether the claims were legitimate or for deciding to seek clarification. In his view, the Court of Auditors’ verification work should be restricted to a retroactive period of no more than three years or, at least, of no more than five years from 5 October 2018 onwards, that being the date of its preliminary report. The applicant thus submits that the entries in the table of recoveries that pre-date 4 October 2013, meaning lines 1 to 261 inclusive, are time-barred, giving a sum total of EUR 85 924.75, so that the total amount that could be characterised as an amount receivable that the Court of Auditors may claim from him is EUR 67 482.83.

86The applicant relies, in that regard, on Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 248, p. 1), as amended by Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1995/2006 of 13 December 2006 (OJ 2006 L 390, p. 1), Article 73a of which introduces the principle that entitlements of the European Union in respect of third parties are subject to a limitation period of five years. As regards the period within which a debit note must be sent to the debtor, the applicant observes that neither ‘the Financial Regulation’ nor the implementing rules for that regulation specify any such period. However, he points out that it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the period within which a debit note is communicated must be reasonable and that the Court of Justice considers that such communication is unreasonable where it takes place outside a period of five years from the point at which the institution in question was, under normal circumstances, in a position to claim its debt. In his reply, the applicant also refers to Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046.

87In his observations on the inferences to be drawn for the purposes of the present case from the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the applicant expresses the view that the Court of Justice did not adopt a position on the present plea, inasmuch as it rejected a different complaint alleging a breach of the reasonable time principle which concerned the disciplinary action of the Court of Auditors.

The Court of Auditors disputes the applicant’s arguments and submits, in essence, that it was only from the date of the OLAF report that its claim could be regarded as certain, of a fixed amount and due, as is required by Article 78(2) of Regulation No 966/2012 and Article 81(b) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the rules of application of Regulation No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ 2012 L 362, p. 1). Consequently, on the date of the contested decision, the period of five years had not yet expired. The Court of Auditors points, in this connection, to the wording of the second paragraph of Article 85 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Rules’), pursuant to which the request for recovery of sums unduly paid must be made no later than five years from the date on which the sum was paid. It also points out that, where it can be established that the recipient deliberately misled the administration with a view to obtaining the sum concerned, the request for recovery is not invalidated even if this period has elapsed, which is a general principle of EU law.

(a) <i><b>The limitation period</b></i>

89By his plea alleging a breach of the reasonable time principle, the applicant invokes the principle that entitlements of the European Union in respect of third parties are subject to a limitation period of five years. In that regard, he cites, in particular, Article 73a of Regulation No 1605/2002, as amended, which was in force until 31 December 2013, and Articles 78 and 85b of Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 357, p. 1), as amended by Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 478/2007 of 23 April 2007 (OJ 2007 L 111, p. 13), which was in force until 31 December 2012. In addition, in his reply, the applicant also refers to Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046. At the hearing, on being asked by the General Court to specify the legal basis of the application to the present case of the principle that entitlements of the European Union in respect of third parties are subject to a limitation period of five years, the applicant asserted that, as he had stated in his reply, the proper basis was Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046, a point with which the Court of Auditors did not take issue. The Court must therefore refer to that provision, which was applicable on the date of adoption of the contested decision.

90The applicant states, in essence, that the Court of Auditors was not entitled to send him a debit note claiming amounts receivable in respect of payment requests deemed irregular dating back more than five years. By that allegation, the applicant argues, in essence, that the limitation period provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046 applies without exception.

91Article 98(1) and (2) of Regulation 2018/1046 is worded as follows:

‘1. In order to establish an amount receivable, the authorising officer responsible shall:

(a) verify that the debt exists;

(b) determine or verify the reality and the amount of the debt; and

(c) verify the conditions according to which the debt is due.

The establishment of an amount receivable shall constitute recognition of the right of the Union in respect of a debtor and establishment of entitlement to demand that the debtor pay the debt.

The authorising officer shall send the debit note immediately after establishing the amount receivable and at the latest within a period of five years from the time when the Union institution was, in normal circumstances, in a position to claim its debt. Such period shall not apply where the authorising officer responsible establishes that, despite the efforts which the Union institution has made, the delay in acting was caused by the debtor’s conduct.’

92In that regard, it should be noted, as a preliminary point, that the limitation rules must be devised in such a way as to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the objectives of legal certainty and dealing with cases within a reasonable time, as general principles of EU law, and, on the other, the effective and efficient application of the principle of sound financial management (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 January 2021, <i>Whiteland Import Export</i>, C‑308/19, EU:C:2021:47, paragraph 49). It is in that particular context, and not by simple application of Article 41 of the Charter, as the applicant maintains, that the reasonable time principle comes into play.

93More specifically, the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046 provides for the limitation rule that applies to the sending of debit notes in the interest of legal certainty, which protects both the debtor in question and the EU institution sending the debit note. As far as the debtor is concerned, the principle of legal certainty precludes the EU institution from acting without any time limit, thereby threatening, inter alia, to undermine the stability of legal positions already acquired. As for the EU institution, in its task of recovering EU entitlements in respect of third parties, in order to satisfy the principle of sound financial management, it must act within a reasonable time, that being an aspect of the principle of sound management deriving from the fundamental need for legal certainty (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 November 2014, <i>Nencini</i> v <i>Parliament</i>, C‑447/13 P, EU:C:2014:2372, paragraph 45; of 14 June 2016, <i>Marchiani</i> v <i>Parliament</i>, C‑566/14 P, EU:C:2016:437, paragraph 101; and of 5 October 2004, <i>Sanders and Others</i> v <i>Commission</i>, T‑45/01, EU:T:2004:289, paragraphs 59 and 60 and the case-law cited).

94The laying down of time limits for establishing amounts receivable must also be consistent with the principle of effectiveness and must not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to apply EU law (see, by analogy, judgments of 17 November 2016, <i>Stadt Wiener Neustadt</i>, C‑348/15, EU:C:2016:882, paragraph 41, and of 21 January 2021, <i>Whiteland Import Export</i>, C‑308/19, EU:C:2021:47, paragraphs 48 and 65).

95Admittedly, having regard to Article 98(1) and (2) of Regulation 2018/1046, an EU institution is in a position, in normal circumstances, to claim its debt from the date when supporting documents capable of identifying a given claim as being certain, of a fixed amount and due are available to it or when such supporting documents would have been available to it, had it acted with the necessary diligence (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 14 June 2016, <i>Marchiani</i> v <i>Parliament</i>, C‑566/14 P, EU:C:2016:437, paragraph 103).

96Nevertheless, establishing an amount receivable may be rendered impossible in practice in cases where, despite the efforts it has made, an EU institution has been unable to identify a debt on account of the debtor’s conduct, in particular, time-wasting manoeuvres or bad faith on the debtor’s part.

97That interpretation follows from the principle that strict rules on limitation which, for reasons inherent to them, are systematically an obstacle to the protection of the European Union’s financial interests are liable to render the application of the rules of EU law impossible in practice or excessively difficult (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 January 2021, <i>Whiteland Import Export</i>, C‑308/19, EU:C:2021:47, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

98The interpretation of Article 98 of Regulation 2018/1046 as providing for exceptions to the starting point of the period allowed for establishing amounts receivable is corroborated, by analogy, by the provision made in Article 105 of that regulation for events which interrupt the limitation period for the recovery of amounts receivable.

99Admittedly, in the case of entitlements of the European Union in respect of third parties, Regulation 2018/1046 does not provide for any suspension or interruption of the limitation period resulting from any action taken, inter alia, by OLAF in connection with an investigation, by contrast with the second paragraph of Article 139(2) of the same regulation, which applies to decisions to exclude persons or entities referred to in Article 135(2) thereof from participating in award procedures governed by that regulation or from being selected for implementing EU funds. However, that omission in the legislative text should not be interpreted too narrowly and account must be taken of the specific role of OLAF and of the vested powers granted to OLAF by provisions of EU law. Any different conclusion would render the application of the rules of EU law impossible in practice or excessively difficult and would undermine the principle of the effectiveness of EU law.

100It follows that the starting point of the period for establishing amounts receivable, under the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046, which is to say the time when the institution concerned is, in normal circumstances, in a position to claim its debt, is not necessarily the same as the time when a person such as the applicant requests an institution to pay a sum of money. Where other circumstances prevail, it could be the time when OLAF delivers a report to that institution (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 14 June 2016, Marchiani v Parliament, C‑566/14 P, EU:C:2016:437, paragraph 107).

101In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s allegation that the limitation period established by the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046 applies without exception is legally incorrect.

102Consequently, it is necessary to consider, case by case, at what point in time the Court of Auditors was, in normal circumstances, in a position to claim its debt, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046.

(b) The applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 1 to 261 of the table of recoveries

103The applicant maintains that, because of the time-bar, the Court of Auditors was not entitled to establish an amount receivable and recover it in respect of the claims for reimbursement which he made during the period between 2006 and 4 October 2013, which are addressed in lines 1 to 261 of the table of recoveries.

104In the present case, it is common ground that the Court of Auditors did not send the applicant the debit note until 11 April 2019, after receiving the OLAF report on 2 July 2018, on the basis of which the Court of Auditors drew up its preliminary report of 5 October 2018. It is apparent from its report that OLAF carried out an inspection at the premises of the applicant’s Cabinet and, on that occasion, gathered various documents so that it could analyse them digitally and that it questioned both the applicant himself and other persons concerned (see also paragraphs 39 to 46 above). On completing its investigation, OLAF established that the information which the applicant had provided to the Court of Auditors in his travel orders and declarations of representation expenses had been insufficient to enable the President of the Court of Auditors to decide whether the activity in question was in the interests of the Court of Auditors.

105First of all, it is clear from Article 11(1) and (2) of Regulation No 883/2013, read in the light of recitals 28 and 29 thereof, that the OLAF investigation was concluded by the drawing up of a final investigation report, which is admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings, setting out, inter alia, the conclusions of the investigation and the recommendations of OLAF’s Director-General regarding follow-up action. Under Article 11(4) of that regulation, OLAF is to send the report to the institution, body, office or agency concerned, on which it will be incumbent to take such action, in particular of a disciplinary or legal nature, as the results of the investigation warrant and to report thereon to OLAF, within a time limit laid down in the recommendations accompanying the report and, in addition, at the request of OLAF. In the present case, it was precisely in that context that the Court of Auditors drew up its preliminary report of 5 October 2018, on the basis of OLAF’s report.

106Secondly, it is important to bear in mind that, in accordance with Article 1(4) of Regulation No 883/2013, OLAF conducts administrative investigations, called ‘internal investigations’, within the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies established by or on the basis of the Treaties for the purpose of fighting fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the European Union. It is also clear from that regulation that, in such investigations, OLAF has the right of immediate and unannounced access to any relevant information, including information in databases held by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and to their premises. It may take a copy of and obtain extracts from any document or the contents of any data medium held by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. OLAF may request oral information, including through interviews, and written information from staff members. It may carry out on-the-spot checks and inspections at the premises of economic operators in order to obtain access to information relevant to the matter under internal investigation.

107An EU institution such as the Court of Auditors, on the other hand, does not have such investigatory powers, in particular for the purpose of identifying and establishing a claim against one of its Members.

108In the light of the preliminary observations set out in paragraphs 89 to 107 above, the Court must examine whether, in the case of the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 1 to 261 of the table of recoveries, it was from the date on which those claims were lodged, as the applicant argues, or from the date of the OLAF report, as the Court of Auditors contends, that the Court of Auditors was in a position to identify and to claim the amount receivable set out in each of those lines. It is necessary, for that examination, to divide those claims into three groups.

(1) The first group of claims for reimbursement submitted by the applicant

109It is clear that several of the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 1 to 261 of the table of recoveries included a justification that was a priori credible and did not call for any additional verification on the part of the Court of Auditors at the time the applicant submitted the claim. The Court of Auditors was in possession of no information that might have allowed it to refuse those claims until the OLAF investigation was completed.

110First, this is the case with the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 29 (in part), 31, 41, 43, 54, 57 (in part), 59, 60, 61, 63 (in part), 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 81, 84, 85, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 111, 116, 118 (in part), 120, 133, 150, 168, 169, 171, 175, 183, 184, 190, 194, 203, 204, 207, 208, 211, 215, 218, 221, 229 (in part), 236, 238, 248, 258 and 260 of the table of recoveries, which relate to meetings between the applicant and holders of political office or, in some limited instances, with members of their Cabinets, or to the applicant’s participation in the activities of the political party in question.

111It must be observed that it was only in the course of OLAF’s investigation that it was established that, during his time in office, the applicant had met Belgian politicians, for the most part members of the political party in question, at least 188 times. According to the OLAF report, that figure represents 24% of all the meetings or lunches for which the applicant claimed reimbursement. It may be noted that this is the case for the activities referred to in lines 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 29 (in part), 31, 41, 43, 54, 57 (in part), 59, 63 (in part), 65, 66, 70, 84, 88, 89, 92, 96, 97, 111, 116, 118 (in part), 133, 150, 168, 169, 171, 183, 184, 190, 194, 203, 204, 207, 208, 211, 215, 218, 236, 238 and 248 of the table of recoveries.

112Moreover, it was also OLAF that discovered a connection between the meetings with Belgian politicians and the weekly meetings of the management board of the political party in question. On this point, it is clear from the OLAF report that, in the course of its investigation, OLAF obtained the minutes of 44 meetings that recorded the presence of members of the management board of the political party in question during the period from 17 November 2008 to 29 April 2010. OLAF established that the applicant had been present at 28 of those meetings. This is the case for the activities of the applicant referred to in lines 54, 60, 61, 68, 70, 81, 84, 85, 88 and 94 of the table of recoveries.

113In so far as concerns the applicant’s presence at other meetings of the management board of the political party in question, OLAF has stated that it was clear that the applicant’s position as a voting member required him to attend the board’s weekly meetings regularly until November 2008. According to the OLAF report, a review of his travel orders had revealed that, between March 2006 and November 2008, the applicant had carried out 27 missions on Mondays to meet with members of the political party in question and that those missions had enabled him to attend the weekly board meetings of that party. The General Court notes that this is the case for lines 1, 5, 7, 12, 17, 19, 23 and 24 of the table of recoveries. More specifically, among these activities, the OLAF report mentions a meeting on 7 April 2008, recorded in line 19 of the table of recoveries.

114OLAF has stated that it was not possible during the investigation to ascertain whether the applicant attended such meetings after April 2010, but that his status as a non-voting member required him to be present at least at the monthly meetings that were held on the first Monday of every month. On this point, it is indicated in the OLAF report that an analysis of the applicant’s missions between April 2010 and December 2017 revealed 17 missions in Brussels (Belgium) on the first Monday of the month for the purpose of meeting politicians from the political party in question who appear to have been involved in the management of that party. The General Court observes that the applicant’s activities referred to in lines 171, 203 and 238 of the table of recoveries fit that description.

115In addition, it is apparent from the entries in the applicant’s diary that the purpose of the missions referred to in lines 120, 175 and 221 was to attend parliamentary days of the political party in question, that the purpose of the mission mentioned in line 207 and, in part, of the mission mentioned in line 229 was to attend New Year’s receptions for that party, that the purpose of the mission referred to in line 258 was to join a visit to a town, organised for party members, and that the missions mentioned in lines 69 and 260 were to attend, respectively, a congress and a study day of the same political party (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 451).

116Second, in so far as concerns the applicant’s contacts with representative bodies and associations, referred to in lines 32, 48, 83, 93, 118 (in part), 131, 132, 134 and 135, 137, 143, 154, 155, 170, 174 (in part), 192, 209, 217, 219, 224, 227, 228, 242, 256 and 261 of the table of recoveries, OLAF established that the majority of those contacts were with local bodies, such as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the region from which the applicant originates, an industry group in the applicant’s place of origin and a local employers’ association, all of which act only within the applicant’s home region. Similar to those activities are the activities referred to in lines 39, 138 and 196 of the table of recoveries, which relate to formal invitations from a club whose purpose is to strengthen the presence of Flemish undertakings in Brussels. The table of recoveries in fact indicates, by a reference to the OLAF report, and pages 5, 18, 29 and 37 thereof in particular, that this club, whose purpose is to strengthen the presence of Flemish undertakings in Brussels, organised meetings at which Flemish entrepreneurs could meet Belgian diplomats posted abroad and that those activities were unrelated to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors. The applicant is also recorded as present in the minutes of the meetings of the management board of the political party in question on the date of the mission referred to in line 39.

117Third, in so far as concerns the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 18, 29 (in part), 100 (in part), 114 and 239, which relate to meetings with an individual, identified in the travel orders as a ‘CEO’ (Chief Executive Officer), ‘CEO [of an economic operator]’ or ‘CEO, President’, OLAF found that, between 2008 and 2015, the applicant had met that person eight times and that, at the time, he was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of a holding company in which the applicant was a shareholder, according to his declaration of interests of 2017. In addition, on being interviewed in the course of the OLAF investigation, the applicant explained that the person in question was a long-time friend and a ‘great source of inspiration’.

118Fourth, in so far as concerns the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 75 and 86, which related to his meetings with an individual identified as ‘CEO [of an economic operator]’ on 21 December 2009 and 15 March 2010, OLAF expressly mentioned those two meetings in its report, stating that they coincided with the European Union’s inquiry into State aid provided by the Belgian Government to that economic operator. OLAF also found that the applicant had been in touch with the person in question in connection with that inquiry and had facilitated direct contacts with the Cabinet of a Member of the European Commission and with another individual who was at the time President of the political party in question. In addition, it is clear from the minutes of the meetings of the management board of the political party in question that the applicant had attended one such meeting on the date of the mission referred to in line 86.

Fifth, as regards the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 45, 130, 199, 202, 230, 232, 253 and 257 (in part), those related to activities which OLAF established to be of a private nature. OLAF in fact found that those claims related, respectively, to a lunch with the President of the Belgian health insurance organisation, a meeting with a fellow hunter, a meeting with a director of an audit firm regarding a job offer for the applicant’s son, the applicant’s attendance at the marriage of a child of one of his friends, two meetings with a partner in a law firm that employed one the applicant’s children, a meeting with a Belgian politician concerning a private matter, and the applicant’s attendance at a barbecue organised by a former member of the political party in question. It is also apparent from the minutes of the meetings of the management board of the political party in question that the applicant attended one such meeting on the date of the mission referred to in line 45.

The claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 82, 115 and 121 relate to activities similar to those mentioned in paragraph 119 above. The activity referred to in line 115 was a lunch with a partner in a law firm on 10 September 2010. OLAF found the activities referred to in lines 82 and 121, described as concerning ‘Mr …, CEO’ and a ‘formal invitation’ from a certain person, to be meetings with a real-estate promoter for private purposes.

Sixth, the OLAF report also mentions activities of the applicant’s involving meetings with a diplomat of the Russian Federation, with two Members of the Commission and the Director-General of a federation of European lobbyists and with the King of the Belgians. Those activities are described in lines 56, 57 (in part), 108, 122 et 223 of the table of recoveries.

First of all, in so far as concerns the meeting with a diplomat of the Russian Federation, referred to in line 56 of the table of recoveries, OLAF found that the applicant had met that diplomat in connection with the adoption of a Russian child by a Belgian family. According to the OLAF report, a note in the applicant’s digital diary recorded the difficulties encountered in the adoption file and that the diplomat in question was willing to assist with the formalities and to help resolve the matter. OLAF also stated that the applicant had met this diplomat on 22 June 2009 and then again on 6 July 2009 and that the travel order referred to a ‘meeting with [the diplomat]’, without mentioning the real subject of the meeting. OLAF took the view that the meeting was of a private nature. Indeed, the reference to this activity of the applicant’s appears in the part of the report entitled ‘Courtesy visits to businessmen and acquaintances for private matters’.

Next, as regards the applicant’s meetings with Members of the Commission referred to in lines 57 (in part) and 108, it is clear from the OLAF report, first, that the applicant had directly approached the Cabinet of a Member of the Commission in connection with a grant application made by an organisation in relation to funding to support European cultural festivals. Secondly, OLAF found that the applicant had organised a meeting with a Member of the Commission and another individual and had attended that meeting to discuss the position of a federation of lobbyists regarding the European Union’s research and innovation strategy. According to the OLAF report, this other individual met the applicant on 18 October 2010 for a follow-up meeting, that activity being referred to in line 122 of the table of recoveries.

Lastly, as regards the applicant’s meeting with the King of the Belgians, referred to in line 223 of the table of recoveries, OLAF established, on the basis of the applicant’s diary, that he had been invited by the Belgian royal family to attend a ‘royal hunt’ near a town in Belgium.

Seventh, as regards the mission referred to in line 63 of the table of recoveries (in part), concerning the ‘opening ceremony of an academic year of a European studies establishment’, the table of recoveries refers to the applicant’s diary and states that he did not attend that ceremony inasmuch as he was not mentioned in the list of European personalities attending.

Eighth, as regards the mission referred to in line 74 of the table of recoveries, concerning an invitation from a director of a private economic operator, it is apparent from the applicant’s diary that the purpose of that meeting was to attend a concert.

Ninth, regarding the mission referred to in line 128 of the table of recoveries, involving the applicant’s attendance at a conference organised by a federation representing the interests of European land owners and land managers at the European Parliament, it is clear from the OLAF report that his attendance at events of that organisation was in connection with his external activity as President of an environmental organisation in his home region, which the Court of Auditors had authorised by decision of 30 April 2015 (see also paragraph 33 above). OLAF also noted that the two organisations worked in close collaboration and shared administrative facilities and staff.

Tenth, as regards the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 100, concerning a meeting with a Minister of State, the table of recoveries states, with a reference to the applicant’s diary, that the person whom he met was a Flemish politician who had not been a Minister since 2003.

Eleventh, as regards the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 173, relating to a working lunch with a German Member of the European Parliament, the table of recoveries states, with a reference to the applicant’s diary and pages 5, 18, 29 and 37 of the OLAF report, that the services of a driver were used for private purposes, since the applicant had requested those services for three days in connection with a single lunch.

Twelfth, as regards the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 187 and relating to a ‘formal invitation by Princess …’, the table of recoveries states, with a reference to the applicant’s diary, that the official car was used for private purposes, which meant that the driver had had to return to Luxembourg by train.

Thirteenth, as regards the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 191, for which the reason given was ‘Committee of Foreign Affairs – SR No 1/2011 Devolution’, the table of recoveries indicates, with a reference to the applicant’s diary, that the applicant used the services of a driver for private purposes following a mission.

Fourteenth, as regards the claim for reimbursement of a driver’s expenses referred to in line 147 of the table of recoveries and relating to a meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Control of the Parliament and an association’s lunchtime conference, the table indicates, with a reference to the applicant’s diary, that that was a mission ‘without allowances’ involving a medical appointment for the applicant, which had entailed the driver having to take a train from Luxembourg to Brussels in order to drive the applicant in the official vehicle back to Luxembourg.

Fifteenth, as regards the claim for reimbursement referred to in line 157, relating to a meeting with the Prime Minister and a senior staff member of an audit firm, the table of recoveries states, with a reference to the applicant’s diary, that the meeting from 15:30 hrs to 18:00 hrs with employees of that firm at a club whose purpose is to strengthen the presence of Flemish undertakings in Brussels, which doubled the applicant’s and the driver’s mission allowances and doubled the driver’s working hours, was problematic because it was unrelated to the activities of the Court of Auditors. In addition, the table indicates that the driver was obliged to travel to Brussels by train because the applicant had kept the official vehicle.

Sixteenth, as regards the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 229 (in part), concerning mission expenses in connection with a formal invitation to a chateau in France for an ‘EU Institutions’ Day’, the table of recoveries reveals, by a reference to the applicant’s diary, that that was a recreational activity, specifically, participation in a hunt in France with a two-night stay at a hotel at the location.

Seventeenth and last, as regards the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 13, 33, 47, 73, 76, 80, 103, 104, 161, 163, 164, 177, 210, 225, 237, 251 and 259 of the table of recoveries, which concern meetings with senior staff members of private economic operators, including international audit firms, the table of recoveries states, with a reference to the OLAF report, and pages 5, 18, 29 and 37 thereof in particular, or, in some cases, to the applicant’s diary, the following: for the claim addressed in line 13, ‘lunch given to a businessman (‘mission without allowances’, later acknowledged by [the applicant] as being private)’; for the claim addressed in line 33, ‘reception for the CEO of an economic operator … who is also a member of the board of directors of [another economic operator] (of which the applicant himself was a member until 30 June 2006)’; for the claims addressed in lines 47, 103, 161 and 210, in the light of the description of the invitation, that the ‘event organised by and for [an audit firm] is incompatible with the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors’; for the claims addressed in lines 73 and 76, ‘meeting with the director of an audit firm in [the applicant’s] home region’; for the claim addressed in line 80, ‘private concert – entertainment’; for the claim addressed in line 104, ‘meeting with the CEO of an economic operator …’; for the claim addressed in line 163, ‘meeting with the General-Director of [an economic operator]’; for the claim addressed in line 164, ‘meeting with a fellow hunter … director of [a Belgian company]’; for the claim addressed in line 177, ‘meeting with a director of … a Flemish investment company’; for the claim addressed in line 225, ‘private cultural event (the opera La Traviata at la Monnaie, Brussels) to which [the applicant] was invited by a businessman’; for the claim addressed in line 237, ‘meeting at a hotel in Brussels with a partner in … an audit and consulting firm’; for the claim addressed in 251, ‘lunch given to [the director] of an audit firm in Hasselt (Flanders) [(Belgium)] whom [the applicant] met again the following day, that time under a travel order’, and for the claim addressed in line 259, ‘entertainment: attendance at the Odegand music festival in Ghent [(Belgium)] on a Saturday’.

Consequently, in so far as concerns the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 29, 31, 32, 33, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 48, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 103, 104, 108, 111, 114, 115, 116, 118 (in part), 120, 121, 122, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134 and 135, 137, 138, 143, 147, 150, 154, 155, 157, 161, 163, 164, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174 (in part), 175, 177, 183, 184, 187, 190, 191, 192, 194, 196, 199, 202, 203, 204, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 215, 217, 218, 219, 221, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232, 236, 237, 238, 239, 242, 248, 251, 253, 256, 257 (in part), 258, 259, 260 and 261 of the table of recoveries, it was not until OLAF had completed its investigation that the Court of Auditors was, in normal circumstances, in a position to claim the amount receivable in each of those lines, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046.

Given that the Court of Auditors did not receive the OLAF report until 2 July 2018, and that on 5 October 2018 it completed its preliminary report concerning the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 136 above, it must be held that, having regard to the facts described in paragraph 54 above, the Court of Auditors was not in a position to identify and establish its entitlement as certain until 2 July 2018 and that it therefore informed the applicant of its claim within five years of establishing the amount receivable, as provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046. That being so, its claim relating to the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 136 above is not time-barred.

(2) The second group of claims for reimbursement submitted by the applicant

It must be observed that, among the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 1 to 261 of the table of recoveries, there are a number for which insufficient information or suspect information was given and which warranted verification by OLAF, such that it was only on completion of OLAF’s investigation that the Court of Auditors was in a position to establish its claim.

In the first place, this is the case for the applicant’s claims for reimbursement of sums which, a priori, seem excessive.

First, the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses addressed in lines 27, 90, 98, 152 and 257 (in part) of the table of recoveries, which related to meetings between the applicant and politicians or, in some limited instances, with members of their Cabinets, were for the sums of EUR 753, for a dinner with three individuals (line 27), EUR 1 159, for a dinner with five individuals (line 90), EUR 799, for a dinner with two individuals (line 98), EUR 884, for a dinner with four individuals (line 152) and EUR 802, for a dinner with three individuals (line 257).

Second, the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses addressed in lines 22, 55, 110, 160, 216, 243 and 245 of the table of recoveries, which related to receptions organised at the applicant’s home, were for the sums of EUR 2 520.68, for 18 individuals (line 22), EUR 1 976, for 12 individuals (line 55), EUR 2 271.36, for 11 individuals (line 110), EUR 3 018.90, for 16 individuals (line 160), EUR 2 340, for 10 individuals (line 216), EUR 1 897.28, for 9 individuals (line 243) and EUR 2 069.76, for 10 individuals (line 245).

Third, the claim for reimbursement of representation expenses addressed in line 123 of the table of recoveries related to a dinner with 11 individuals, including two CEOs of economic operators and the President of the political party in question, and was for the sum of EUR 2 352.

143Fourth and last, the claim for reimbursement of travel expenses and for daily subsistence allowances addressed in line 252 of the table of recoveries related to the applicant’s attendance at a summer forum in Switzerland, and was for the sum of EUR 3 931.20.

144In the second place, the Court of Auditors authorised certain claims for reimbursement from the applicant that did not provide essential information about the activities to which they related.

145First, the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 42, 44, 49, 50, 51, 139, 178, 188, 205, 234 and 235, 254 and 255 of the table of recoveries related to meetings with an individual identified by name, but whose positions were not specified.

146Second, the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 21, 28, 40 and 162 of the table of recoveries mention meetings with individuals who are merely identified as ‘director of studies’ ‘director’ and ‘count’.

147Third, the applicant justified the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 46, 53, 67, 79, 99, 101, 113, 159 and 181 of the table of recoveries by referring to a ‘formal invitation [from a campus]’ (lines 46 and 159), a ‘university’ (line 53), a ‘formal invitation’ (lines 67 and 79), a ‘formal invitation [from a university]’ (line 99), a ‘formal invitation [to an orchestra’s] garden party’ (line 101), a ‘[real estate company]’ (line 113) and the ‘presentation of the 2010 annual report’ (line 181).

148Fourth, the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 38, 62, 64, 77, 78, 107, 109, 112, 124, 126, 127, 129, 136, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 156, 158, 165, 166, 172, 176, 179, 180, 182, 189, 193, 195, 197, 198, 200, 206, 212, 213, 220, 222, 226, 231, 233, 240, 241, 244, 246, 247, 249 and 250 of the table of recoveries mention drivers’ expenses for which justifications were given such as ‘collecting [the applicant] from Verbier’, ‘driving [the applicant]’, ‘driving CD vehicle … to Verbier [(Switzerland)]’, ‘collecting CD …’, ‘driving the official vehicle’, ‘driving CD vehicle …’, ‘collecting [the applicant]’, ‘delivering … documents’ and ‘delivering important documents’, or for which no justification was given.

149Admittedly, if the Court of Auditors had acted with due diligence, it could have asked the applicant to provide additional justification for the apparently excessive sums mentioned in paragraphs 140 to 143 above and to provide the missing details for the claims for reimbursement mentioned in paragraphs 145 to 148 above. That approach would have enabled it to react at the time when the applicant submitted the claims and, where appropriate, to identify and establish an amount receivable.

150Nevertheless, it is clear from the file that OLAF’s investigation produced additional details about the applicant’s activities in relation to which all of the claims for reimbursement listed in paragraphs 140 to 143 and 145 to 148 above were made and provided further clarification in the analysis of those activities. That additional information was unknown to the Court of Auditors at the time the applicant made the claims for reimbursement, which is why it did not question them until after the OLAF investigation was completed.

151In so far as concerns the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraphs 140 and 142 above, the Court would refer to paragraphs 110, 111, 117 and 118 above, which set out the information that OLAF obtained during its investigation regarding the activities of the applicant’s to which those claims related.

152As regards the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 141 above, namely lines 22, 55, 110, 160, 216, 243 and 245 of the table of recoveries, those related to receptions organised at the applicant’s home. In its report, OLAF clarified the purpose and nature of those receptions and the connection between the applicant and the guests invited. OLAF found that, between 2006 and 2016, the applicant had organised 13 private, informal dinners for a select group at his place of origin. According to OLAF, the guests always included one or two Belgian politicians, along with some friends holding senior positions in the private sector and, in the words used by the applicant in one letter of invitation, those events were organised with the aim of spending a ‘pleasant and relaxed, but useful evening in select Flemish company’. OLAF took the view that the guests were all close friends, bound by absolute discretion and confidentiality of the conversations. The OLAF report also states that 46 individuals had attended the private dinners and that, apart from their being friends of the applicant, their relationship with him could be broadly classified as centred on Belgian politics, hunting, CEO posts and the EU institutions.

153In so far as concerns the applicant’s claim for reimbursement mentioned in paragraph 143 above, namely that addressed in line 252, concerning the applicant’s travel to a ‘summer forum’ in Switzerland, first of all, in its investigation, OLAF found that there had been no official programme for the event and that it was apparent from the presentation of the event that the guests participated in leisure excursions. Next, OLAF cited the note which the applicant had sent to the President of the Court of Auditors to claim the reimbursement of his expenses, in which he had presented the summer forum as a gathering of key representatives of governments, the diplomatic field, international organisations, political parties and parliaments to discuss current international policy issues. Lastly, OLAF concluded that, while the applicant was aware of the true nature of the event, he misrepresented it and presented it to the President of the Court of Auditors as a high-level policy discussion forum, so as to obtain the reimbursement of his expenses.

154As regards the applicant’s claims for reimbursement mentioned in paragraphs 145 to 148 above, those were, first of all, claims in relation to which OLAF provided further details in its report, as follows:

– regarding the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 44, headed ‘Dinner – Invitation by …’, OLAF established that this was a dinner with a director of an economic operator and that the applicant had in fact been a member of the board of directors of that operator until 30 June 2006;

– regarding the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 49, headed ‘Working lunch with …’, OLAF connected that activity with a music festival;

– regarding the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 51 and 113, respectively headed ‘meeting with …’ and ‘[real estate company]’, OLAF established that those activities were in fact related to private properties of the applicant in Brussels;

– regarding the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 101, headed ‘Formal invitation [to an orchestra’s] garden party’, OLAF in fact found that that activity had been of a private nature;

– regarding the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 205, headed ‘M. …’, OLAF established that that person was in fact an architect advising the applicant on the purchase of an apartment in Brussels.

155Secondly, the claims for reimbursement mentioned in paragraphs 145 to 148 above, include those for which the table of recoveries refers to specific pages of the OLAF report or of the applicant’s diary, which forms part of the report, even though it does not specifically mention the claims. They are the following:

– for the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 21 and 40, which relate to two lunches with a ‘director of studies’, the table of recoveries specifies that those were meetings with a member of the political party in question, adducing as evidence OLAF’s findings on pages 10, 11 and 12 of its report and, for the activity referred to in line 40, the applicant’s diary;

– for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 28, headed ‘Mr …, Director-General’, the table of recoveries refers to pages 15 and 16 of the OLAF report and Annex 16 to the report, and it appears from page 16 of the OLAF report that the individual met was the director of a group representing the interests of private sector employer undertakings to the European Union;

– for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 38, headed ‘Collecting [the applicant] from Verbier [(Switzerland)]’, the table of recoveries states, with reference to discussions with drivers during the investigation, that that in fact related to a skiing holiday which had necessitated recourse to the services of a driver, who went to collect the applicant from his holiday location and drive him home;

– for the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 42, 46, 50, 52 and 53, respectively headed ‘Lunch with Mr …’, ‘Formal invitation [from a campus]’, ‘Meeting with Mr …’, ‘Invitation from [the Chairman of a college of music]’ and ‘[name of a university]’ the table of recoveries states, with reference to the applicant’s diaries, that these were missions ‘without allowances’ involving representation expenses which in fact related to a meeting with a Prosecutor of a district within the applicant’s home town (line 42), a driver’s expenses for travel to a secondary school in the applicant’s home town for an evening event (line 46), driving the applicant to a private meeting (line 50), the journey of a driver who had to drive the applicant back to his home after an evening’s entertainment, stay at a hotel there and return by train the next day to Luxembourg (line 52) and the applicant’s daughter’s degree ceremony (line 53);

– for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 62, headed ‘Driving [the applicant]’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that he was required to be on mission on Tuesday 4 November 2009 in a town in Belgium from 10:30 hrs to 13:00 hrs (opening ceremony of an academic year of a European studies establishment) and that, notwithstanding, he asked a driver to come the day before to his place of origin, rather than Luxembourg, to collect him, and to spend the night there at a hotel. The table of recoveries also indicates that the applicant requested the driver to drive him back to his place of origin on Tuesday 4 November 2009 and to spend a night there at the same hotel, before driving him to Luxembourg on Wednesday 5 November 2009;

– for the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 64 and 78, headed ‘Driving [the applicant]’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the OLAF report, that those activities in fact entailed the applicant’s attendance at a meeting of the management board of the political party in question;

– for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 67, headed ‘Formal invitation’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary and to page 8 of the OLAF report, that that activity was in connection with a hunt and that the applicant had asked a second driver to join him at a town in Belgium where he was hunting, even though he was already there with a driver and an official vehicle;

– for the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 77, 107, 112, 195, 198, 212, 213 and 233, headed ‘Driving CD …’, ‘Driving [the applicant’ or ‘Collecting [the applicant]’, the table of recoveries notes, with reference to the applicant’s diaries and to pages 5, 18, 29 and 37 of the OLAF report, that the drivers’ expenses associated with travel in the applicant’s home town or in Brussels were incurred without the applicant having any mission;

– for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 79, headed ‘Formal invitation’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary and to pages 5, 18, 29 and 37 of the OLAF report, that that activity was to attend a New Year’s reception held in a hotel by a club whose purpose is to strengthen the presence of Flemish undertakings in Brussels;

– for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 99, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that the mission was in response to a formal invitation from a university to attend the awarding of honorary degrees to artists at a university in the applicant’s home region and that that was followed by a concert;

– for the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 106, 151, 153, 167 and 214, respectively headed ‘Med. Dr … – Mission without allowances’, ‘Prof. Dr Med. …, [of a university hospital]’, ‘Prof. Dr …’, ‘Prof. Dr … [of a university hospital]’ and ‘ … Prof. Dr …’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that the driver had in fact been used for private purposes in connection with medical appointments;

– for the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 109, 126, 145, 146, 148, 156, 158, 165, 179, 180, 188, 200, 206, 220, 226, 231, 240, 241, 244 and 246, headed ‘Driving [the applicant]’ or ‘driving CD …’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that the services of the driver were used for private purposes, to drive the applicant to his place of origin or to make an official car available to him while the driver had to spend the night at a hotel at the applicant’s place of origin and take a train the next day. The request addressed in line 247, headed ‘Driving official car’, should be added to these, since it is apparent from the table of recoveries, which refers to the applicant’s diary, that the driver had had to drive an official car to make it available to the applicant at Bornem (Belgium);

– for the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 124, 176 and 181, the first two of which were headed ‘Collecting [the applicant]’ and the third ‘Presentation of 2010 annual report’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that the services of the driver were used for private purposes, the applicant being taken back to his place of origin, rather than Luxembourg, on completing the mission;

– for the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 127, 140, 149, 166, 182, 189, 193, 234 and 235, headed ‘Driving official vehicle’ or Driving [the applicant]’, the table of recoveries states, with reference to the applicant’s diaries, that the driver’s services were used for private purposes, the applicant having asked the driver to come and collect him at his place of origin or in Brussels and to take him back to Luxembourg;

– for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 129, headed ‘Driving official vehicle’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that the driver’s services were used for private purposes, in that the driver went to collect the applicant’s wife at the applicant’s place of origin to drive her to a dinner attended by Members of the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg;

– for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 136, headed ‘Driving [the applicant]’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that the driver’s services were used for private purposes, in that a driver brought the applicant back to his place of origin late one Friday afternoon, left him the official vehicle and returned to Luxembourg by train;

–for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 139, headed ‘Meeting with Mr … and Mr …’, the table of recoveries refers to the applicant’s diary and to the findings on pages 10, 11 and 12 of the OLAF report;

–for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 141, headed ‘Delivering documents’, the table of recoveries states, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that the driver’s services were used for private purposes, giving the following explanation:

‘[The applicant] was on a COCOBU [Committee on Budgetary Control of the European Parliament] mission on Wednesday 10 February from 09:00 hrs to 12:00 hrs and, according to his travel order, he returned to Luxembourg at 14:00 hrs with the official vehicle. If that were in fact true, [the applicant] would not have needed to ask a driver to bring ‘Court [of Auditors] documents’ from Luxembourg to [his place of origin] on 10 February at 15:00 hrs. In reality, [the applicant] had not returned to Luxembourg. He had damaged the official vehicle in an accident on 2 February and so asked [his driver] to bring a replacement vehicle to [his place of origin] on 10 February, to spend the night there and leave by train on the Friday, leaving him the replacement vehicle. It was therefore not a question of bringing “Court [of Auditors] documents” to the applicant’s place of origin, but of bringing him a replacement vehicle so that he could use it to go on a winter sports holiday’;

–for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 142, headed ‘Driving CD vehicle … to Verbier [(Switzerland)]’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary and to an interview with the driver in the course of OLAF’s investigation, that the driver’s services had been used for private purposes;

–for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 144, headed ‘Driving [the applicant]’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary and to pages 5, 18, 29 and 37 of the OLAF report, that that activity was a meeting with the director of a Flemish photogrammetrical surveying company;

–for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 159, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that the mission the stated purpose of which was to accept a formal invitation from a campus was connected with a secondary school in the applicant’s home town and that this was a mission ‘without allowances’;

–for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 162, headed ‘Formal invitation from [a count]’, the table of recoveries indicates that that activity entailed the applicant’s attendance at a singing competition at a music school, and mentions pages 5, 18, 29 and 37 of the OLAF report and the applicant’s diary;

–for the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 172, 222 and 249, headed ‘Delivering … important documents’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that the driver’s services were used for private purposes, to bring documents to the applicant’s place of origin, the driver being obliged to use another official vehicle or to spend the night and then return to Luxembourg;

–for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 178, headed ‘Mr …’, the table of recoveries indicates that this concerned a meeting with the Chairman of a sport clothing company and refers to the finding in Annex 10 to the OLAF report (regarding hunting parties at a chateau in France), without specifically mentioning the activity addressed in that line;

–for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 197, headed ‘Collecting CD …’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to interviews with the applicant and a driver, that the driver’s services were used for private purposes, in that the driver went to collect the applicant’s private car from a garage in Brussels in order to bring it back to Luxembourg;

–for the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 250, headed ‘Driving CD …’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to interviews with the applicant and a driver and to the applicant’s diary, that the driver’s services were used for private purposes, in order to deliver champagne for the marriage of the applicant’s daughter;

–for the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 254 and 255, headed ‘Driving CD …’, the table of recoveries indicates, with reference to the applicant’s diary, that the driver’s services were used for private purposes, to drive the applicant to a private dinner given in a starred restaurant.

156 In the light of the foregoing, in so far as concerns the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 21, 22, 27, 28, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 62, 64, 67, 77, 78, 79, 90, 98, 99, 101, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 113, 123, 124, 126, 127, 129, 136, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 156, 158, 159, 160, 162, 165, 166, 167, 172, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 188, 189, 193, 195, 197, 198, 200, 205, 206, 212, 213, 214, 216, 220, 222, 226, 231, 233, 234, 235, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 252, 254 and 255 and 257 (in part) of the table of recoveries, it was only after the OLAF investigation that the Court of Auditors found itself, in normal circumstances, in a position to claim the amount receivable in each of those lines, to establish its claim and to send a debit note to the applicant as provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046.

157 Given that the Court of Auditors did not receive the OLAF report until 2 July 2018, and that on 5 October 2018 it completed its preliminary report concerning the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 156 above, it must be held that, having regard to the facts described in paragraph 54 above, the Court of Auditors informed the applicant of its claim within five years of establishing its entitlement, as provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046. That being so, its claim relating to the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 156 above is not time-barred.

(3) The third group of claims for reimbursement submitted by the applicant

158 It must be observed that, among the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 1 to 261 of the table of recoveries, there are some which allowed the Court of Auditors to carry out an ex ante check and, if it considered it appropriate, to object to the use of the resources of the Court of Auditors that the applicant proposed, or would have allowed it to do so, if it had acted with due diligence, to the extent that the results of the OLAF investigation produced nothing new concerning them.

159 These are, in the first place, claims for reimbursement in which the applicant gave insufficient information regarding the activity concerned, but which the OLAF investigation did not examine:

–first, the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 37 of the table of recoveries, which related to a meeting with an individual identified by name alone, without any mention of his position;

–second, the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 25 and 26 of the table of recoveries, which the applicant justified merely by mentioning a ‘Formal dinner’.

160 In the second place, it must be observed that the OLAF investigation did not extend to the following claims for reimbursement, which it would have been possible for the Court of Auditors to check and, if necessary, to refuse prior to the investigation:

–first, the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 30, 35, 117 and 201 of the table of recoveries, which related to meetings between the applicant and an ambassador, a rector, three Belgian politicians representing political groups and a Minister of State;

–second, the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 36 of the table of recoveries, which related to a meeting with a private economic operator;

–third, the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 102 of the table of recoveries, which related to the applicant’s attendance at a conference organised by the Commission and a non-governmental institute.

161 Consequently, in so far as concerns the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 25, 26, 30, 35, 36, 37, 102, 117 and 201 of the table of recoveries, it was when these were submitted that the Court of Auditors found itself in a position, in normal circumstances, to claim the amount receivable in each of those lines, to establish its claim and to send a debit note to the applicant as provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046, if it had acted with due diligence. As regards the applicant’s activities to which those lines relate, the Court of Auditors does not allege or, a fortiori, establish that the delay in taking action was attributable to the applicant’s conduct.

162 Since the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 161 above were submitted between 3 December 2007 and 15 September 2013, and since the Court of Auditors drew up its preliminary report on 5 October 2018, the Court of Auditors did not observe the five-year time limit provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation 2018/1046, such that the action for recovery of the sums so claimed is time-barred. These claims for reimbursement amount to a total of EUR 3 170.19.

(c) Conclusion regarding the third plea in law

163 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that any claim in respect of the applicant’s requests for reimbursement addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 161 above is time-barred. As to the remainder, the third plea in law must be dismissed.

164 By his fourth plea in law, the applicant essentially takes issue with the determination by the Court of Auditors in the contested decision of the sums he is alleged to owe in connection with a large number of activities for which the resources of the Court of Auditors were, in its view, misused, at his request. The sums in question are mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances, representation and reception expenses and the costs occasioned by the use of official cars and recourse to the services of a driver.

165 It must be recalled that, in response to the third plea law, which essentially alleges a failure to act within the prescribed period, the action for recovery in relation to some of the applicant’s claims for reimbursement, namely those addressed in lines 25, 26, 30, 35, 36, 37, 102, 117 and 201 of the table of recoveries, must be held to be time-barred (see paragraph 161 above). Those claims for reimbursement will therefore not be examined in the context of the fourth plea in law, since it is no longer necessary to consider the merits of the arguments relating to them that are put forward in the context of this plea.

166 It must also be observed that the irregularities which, in the contested decision, the Court of Auditors ascribed to the applicant were addressed in the action under Article 286(6) TFEU that it brought before the Court of Justice, in which it claimed that the Court of Justice should declare that the applicant no longer met the obligations arising from his office as Member of the Court of Auditors in accordance with Articles 285 and 286 TFEU. Both in that action and in the present action, those irregularities are identified in one and the same table, set out in an annex and drawn up on the basis of the OLAF report (see paragraph 44 above). Among the complaints raised in support of the action which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the first alleged misuse by the applicant of the resources of the Court of Auditors to finance activities unrelated to or incompatible with his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors (‘the first complaint raised by the Court of Auditors’). The Court of Justice gave its ruling on that complaint in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 359 to 799), holding that the applicant had breached his obligations arising from his office as Member of the Court of Auditors (see paragraph 53 above).

167 It is in that context that the fourth plea in law must be examined. First of all, it is necessary to consider the admissibility of the complaint alleging the existence of ‘manifest errors’.

(a) The admissibility of the complaint alleging the existence of ‘manifest errors’

168 At the hearing, the Court of Auditors argued that the applicant had failed to identify the errors that allegedly vitiated the legality of the contested decision. It stated that, in his application, the applicant had confined himself to referring to an annex in which, before the contested decision was adopted, he had identified 69 errors that he characterised as ‘manifest’, which, according to the Court of Auditors, was inadmissible in the present proceedings, since it was not for the General Court to search for the manifest errors that allegedly vitiated the contested decision. The applicant submitted no observations in that regard.

169 It must be observed that, in the last paragraph of the fourth plea in law, the applicant concludes that the Court of Auditors made ‘an impressive number of errors and not only errors of legal characterisation, but also simply errors of fact’. It is true that, in the context of this plea, the applicant mentions the word ‘error’ in only one previous paragraph that refers to the annex in question, and it must be observed that the reference to that annex is made only in passing (‘as to the remainder’).

170 Nevertheless, it is clear from the context of the arguments which the applicant puts forward in support of the fourth plea in law, both in the application and in the reply, that he essentially regards as erroneous the reasons, set out in the table of recoveries for each entry, for which the Court of Auditors considered that the resources of the Court of Auditors had been misused to pay mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances, representation and reception expenses and expenses occasioned by use of official cars and recourse to the services of a driver. That understanding is reinforced by the fact that, in the application, he emphasises that his not having commented on every entry in the table of recoveries, over and above the comments set out in the application and its annexes, in no way implies any acknowledgement on his part that the Court of Auditor’s claims are well founded.

171Consequently, the complaint alleging ‘manifest errors’ is sufficiently substantiated to be admissible. It is therefore now necessary to examine the merits of the complaints alleging breach of the principles of legal certainty and of the protection of legitimate expectations and the existence of ‘manifest errors’.

(b) <i><b>Substance</b></i>

172In his observations on the inferences to be drawn for the purposes of the present case from the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the applicant states that, in so far as concerns the criticisms based on breach of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, account should be taken of what the Court of Justice stated in paragraphs 364 to 381 of that judgment.

173In paragraph 364 of the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice pointed out that, even though the applicant formally relied on both the principle of legal certainty and the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, his arguments in fact related solely to the latter principle.

174As for the present proceedings, it should be noted that, in the reply, which was lodged after the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) was delivered, the applicant’s arguments in support of the fourth plea in law no longer refer to the principle of legal certainty. It is therefore with reference solely to the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and to any possible ‘manifest errors’ that the fourth plea in law must be examined.

175In the first place, as regards the alleged breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the applicant argues that the Court of Auditors breached that principle in that, over a period of more than 10 years, he was given, by means of the authorisations granted and the practice of the Court of Auditors, precise, unconditional and consistent assurances, originating from reliable sources, that created a legitimate expectation on his part that the payments made were regular.

176In the second place, in so far as concerns any possible ‘manifest errors’, as observed in paragraph 170 above, the applicant essentially regards as erroneous the reasons on the basis of which the Court of Auditors established that sums were paid unduly.

(1) <i>Preliminary observations</i>

(i) <i>The scope of the Court’s examination of the complaint alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations</i>

177As regards, the complaints alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the applicant states that he no longer maintains those in relation to the resources committed by the Court of Auditors for representation and reception expenses, use of the official car and recourse to the services of a driver. He does, however, maintain them in relation to the travel orders.

178In the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 365 to 374), the Court of Justice stated the following:

‘365 It is the settled case-law of the Court that the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations presupposes that precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised, reliable sources have been given to the person concerned by the competent authorities of the European Union (judgment of 8 September 2020, <i>Commission and Council</i> v <i>Carreras Sequeros and Others</i>, C‑119/19 P and C‑126/19 P, EU:C:2020:676, paragraph 144 and the case-law cited).

366 The applicability of that principle must be dismissed at the outset with regard to the resources committed by the Court of Auditors for representation and reception expenses, use of the official car and recourse to the services of a driver.

367 First, according to the Court’s case-law, payments like those made in respect of representation and reception expenses cannot, in the absence of any other relevant factor and even where a long period had elapsed between those payments and the challenge to their regularity, engender on the part of their beneficiary a legitimate expectation that those payments could no longer be challenged (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2016, <i>Marchiani</i> v <i>Parliament</i>, C‑566/14 P, EU:C:2016:437, paragraph 79)

368 The Court of Auditors’ practice of reimbursing representation and reception expenses on the basis of information provided by [the applicant] without requesting further information and without challenging the validity of his claims for reimbursement is not sufficient to establish that it gave him precise, unconditional and consistent assurances as to the regularity of those claims.

369 Second, [the applicant’s] use of his official car or recourse to the services of a driver was not the subject of any explicit decision by the Court of Auditors and there has been no indication before the Court of Justice of any other form of specific position taken by the Court of Auditors on the practice to be followed by [the applicant] in that regard.

370 Therefore, assuming that, as [the applicant] claims, the Court of Auditors did tolerate practices of whose existence it must have been aware, that fact is, in any event, not sufficient to establish that it gave him precise, unconditional and consistent assurances in that regard.

371 On the other hand, the travel orders issued explicitly, at [the applicant’s] request, by the President of the Court of Auditors constitute sufficient assurances … for him to create, in principle, a legitimate expectation as to the regularity of the missions concerned.

372 That being said, it should be noted, first of all, that, according to the Court’s case-law, an individual cannot have a legitimate expectation that a situation characterised by fraud will be maintained (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2017, <i>Santogal M-Comércio e Reparação de Automóveis</i>, C‑26/16, EU:C:2017:453, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

373 Second, having regard to the obligation … for Members of the Court of Auditors to observe rigorously the declaration obligations laid down by the rules adopted by the Court of Auditors in order to keep it fully informed of claims committing its resources, a travel order issued on the basis of a request that omits key information allowing its President to assess the regularity of the mission in question cannot, even in the absence of fraud, create the legitimate expectation of the Member concerned as to such regularity.

374 Lastly, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations may not be relied upon by a person who has committed a manifest infringement of the rules in force (judgments of 16 May 1991, <i>Commission</i> v <i>Netherlands</i>, C‑96/89, EU:C:1991:213, paragraph 30, and of 14 July 2005, <i>ThyssenKrupp</i> v <i>Commission</i>, C‑65/02 P and C‑73/02 P, EU:C:2005:454, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).’

179Consequently, in the present proceedings, it is not necessary to examine the alleged breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in relation to the resources committed by the Court of Auditors for representation and reception expenses, use of the official car and recourse to the services of a driver.

180It is, on the other hand, necessary to assess whether the travel orders issued, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors were such as to create a legitimate expectation on the applicant’s part as to the regularity of the expenses associated with the missions concerned.

(ii) <i>The scope of the Court’s examination of the complaints concerning the applicant’s legitimate expectations as to the regularity of his missions and the existence of ‘manifest errors’</i>

181After the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) was delivered, the applicant indicated that he was maintaining his complaint alleging the existence of ‘manifest errors’ solely in so far as concerned the activities which, in that judgment, the Court of Justice characterised, on examining the first complaint raised by the Court of Auditors, as not being irregular.

182It is clear from the case file that, in response to that complaint, the Court of Justice found that several of the activities covered by the table of recoveries were irregular or manifestly irregular. It must be concluded, therefore, that it is no longer necessary to rule either on the applicant’s claims for reimbursement in relation to those activities or on the question whether the travel orders issued, in the relevant cases, in connection with those claims were such as to create a legitimate expectation on his part as to their regularity. This is the case for the activities to which relate the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 93, 94, 95, 99, 100, 101, 104, 107, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118 (in part), 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 152, 154, 155 (in part), 156, 158, 159, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 205, 206, 207, 209, 212, 213, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 246, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 278, 280, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 291, 292, 295, 296 (in part), 297, 298, 299, 300, 302, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310 (in part), 311, 312, 315, 316, 318, 321, 322, 324, 325, 326 (in part), 327, 328, 329, 333, 337, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 348, 349, 351, 353, 356, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 368, 369, 371, 372, 375, 376, 377, 378, 380, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 392, 393, 394, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 404, 405, 406, 409, 410, 413, 414 and 416 of the table of recoveries.

183The same conclusion must be drawn regarding the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 34, since, in response to a measure of organisation of the procedure, the applicant indicated that, in the light of paragraph 636 of the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), he no longer maintained the complaint raised under the fourth plea in law with regard to that claim.

184Therefore, taking into account the General Court’s finding that the action for recovery is time-barred in so far as concerns a number of claims for reimbursement (see paragraph 165 above), it is necessary for the General Court solely to examine the claims addressed in lines 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 38, 41, 43, 47, 55, 56, 57, 59, 63, 65, 66, 89, 90, 92, 96, 97, 98, 103, 106, 110, 111, 116, 118 (in part), 128, 137, 138, 142, 143, 147, 150, 151, 153, 155 (in part), 157, 160, 161, 167, 168, 169, 171, 176, 183, 184, 187, 190, 194, 196, 199, 203, 204, 208, 210, 211, 214, 215, 216, 218, 236, 237, 238, 243, 245, 247, 248, 257, 276, 277, 279, 281, 284, 290, 293 and 294, 296 (in part), 301, 303, 310 (in part), 313, 314, 317, 319 et 320, 323, 326 (in part), 330, 331, 334, 335, 336, 338, 339, 346, 347, 350, 352, 354, 355, 357, 358, 367, 370, 373 and 374, 379, 381, 382, 391, 395, 402, 403, 408, 411 and 412 of the table of recoveries.

(iii) <i>The scope of the General Court’s review</i>

185In the action brought by the Court of Auditors which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice stated the following in relation to the first complaint raised by the Court of Auditors.

First, the Court of Justice pointed out that, in the context of proceedings under Article 286(6) TFEU, it was required to give a ruling on this complaint on the basis of the evidence available to it and in the light of the criteria set out in Article 286(6) TFEU in order to determine whether the alleged irregularities were such as to be classified as a breach of the obligations arising from the office of Member of the Court of Auditors for the purposes of that provision (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 361).

Secondly, the Court of Justice clarified that, although the Court of Auditors had sent the applicant the contested decision, which concerned the irregularities that were the subject of the first complaint it raised in the action that gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), its assessment of that complaint, in that judgment, did not pertain to the determination of the sums for which the applicant might be liable and was therefore without prejudice to the assessment of that decision that would have to be made in any action for its annulment that the applicant might bring before the General Court pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 362).

The proceedings provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU are a procedural mechanism for reviewing the legality of acts of the bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, can lead to the annulment of the act in question on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers. It follows that, in the context of such proceedings, the General Court must in the present case determine, in the course of its review of legality, whether one of those grounds justifies the annulment of the contested decision.

In that review of legality, the EU Courts have, in principle a full power of review over the substantive legality of the act, that is to say, a review which covers both the reasons of law and fact underlying the act and its content. In such a review, the EU judicature will ascertain, in particular, whether the assessments of fact made by the author of the act are valid (judgment of 14 July 2021, Arnautu v Parliament, T‑740/20, not published, EU:T:2021:444, paragraph 87).

In that connection, it must establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 February 2005, Commission v Tetra Laval, C‑12/03 P, EU:C:2005:87, paragraph 39; of 7 April 2016, ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava and Others v Hubei Xinyegang Steel, C‑186/14 P and C‑193/14 P, EU:C:2016:209, paragraph 36; and of 23 October 2018, McCoy v Committee of the Regions, T‑567/16, EU:T:2018:708, paragraph 98). From that perspective, the assessment of the probative value of a document is also the subject of a comprehensive review (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 September 2004, Valmont v Commission, T‑274/01, EU:T:2004:266, paragraph 43). Thus, even complex or delicate assessments made by the administration must be supported by convincing evidence (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 February 2005, Commission v Tetra Laval, C‑12/03 P, EU:C:2005:87, paragraph 41, and of 7 April 2016, Akhras v Council, C‑193/15 P, EU:C:2016:219, paragraph 56). It is therefore for the EU judicature to carry out, even in that context, an in-depth examination of the evidence (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2008, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, C‑413/06 P, EU:C:2008:392, paragraph 146).

Article 264 TFEU provides that, if the action is well founded, the act concerned must be declared void. The EU judicature cannot under any circumstances substitute its own reasoning for that of the author of the contested act (judgments of 27 January 2000, DIR International Film and Others v Commission, C‑164/98 P, EU:C:2000:48, paragraph 38; of 22 December 2008, British Aggregates v Commission, C‑487/06 P, EU:C:2008:757, paragraph 141, and of 28 February 2013, Portugal v Commission, C‑246/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:118, paragraph 85). It is nevertheless permissible for the author of the contested act to supplement its reasoning, provided that it does not go beyond the scope of the overall reasoning underlying the act or the context of which the addressee of that act was aware when the act was adopted.

Moreover, according to the case-law, acts of the institutions are in principle presumed to be lawful and accordingly produce legal effects until such time as they are annulled or withdrawn (judgment of 27 September 2006, Roquette Frères v Commission, T‑322/01, EU:T:2006:267, paragraph 333).

Furthermore, in the present case, having regard to the presumption of lawfulness of the contested decision, mentioned in paragraph 192 above, where there is a doubt as to the regularity of expenditure for which the applicant has been reimbursed, the burden of proof lies with the applicant, who must demonstrate, for each claim for reimbursement, that he incurred the expenses in question in compliance with the applicable rules. In that regard, it is clear from the case-law that it is for the applicant to adduce evidence to call into question a decision to recover sums unduly paid (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 7 March 2018, Le Pen v Parliament, T‑140/16, not published, EU:T:2018:122, paragraphs 61 to 66, and of 19 June 2018, Le Pen v Parliament, T‑86/17, not published, EU:T:2018:357, paragraph 121 et seq.). As a general rule, he must be able to produce documents demonstrating that those sums were used in compliance with the applicable rules (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 December 2005, Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v Parliament, T‑146/04, EU:T:2005:584, paragraph 157).

(iv) The inferences to be drawn for the purposes of the present case from the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19), concerning the irregularities ascribed by the Court of Auditors to the applicant

As mentioned in paragraph 166 above, the irregularities which, in the contested decision, the Court of Auditors ascribed to the applicant were the subject of the action brought by the Court of Auditors that gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). More specifically, among the complaints which the Court of Auditors raised in support of that action before the Court of Justice, the first alleged misuse by the applicant of resources of the Court of Auditors to finance activities unrelated to or incompatible with his duties as a Member of that institution. The Court of Justice ruled on that complaint in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 359 to 799), holding that the applicant had breached his obligations arising from his office as a Member of the Court of Auditors (see paragraph 53 above).

In the present case, in so far as the fourth plea in law is concerned, the applicant submits that the content of this plea was examined by the Court of Justice in paragraphs 359 to 363 and 387 to 799 of the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). Furthermore, in paragraph 392, paragraphs 615 to 618 and paragraph 700 of that judgment respectively, the Court of Justice defined when a mission or the payment of daily subsistence allowances and representation expenses, and when travel orders for a driver signed by the applicant in his capacity as authorising officer were to be considered to be in order. He submits that, although account should be taken of the dicta of the Court of Justice which appear useful for the purposes of the present proceedings and that the usefulness of the various dicta should be assessed individually, the present proceedings cannot be the forum in which to dispute the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), in particular its findings with regard to the case brought before it and its factual and legal findings.

As for the Court of Auditors, it argues that the action that gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), and the present action are independent, each one having its own purpose, the former seeking to ensure the proper functioning of the EU institutions, as the Court of Justice stated in paragraph 86 of that judgment, and the latter being an action under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU for the annulment of the Court of Auditor’s recovery decision. According to the Court of Auditors, it is incumbent on the General Court in the present action to assess the facts which it has presented. It also emphasises that, in the judgment mentioned, the Court of Justice did not acknowledge any activity to be regular, but merely observed that certain activities were not manifestly irregular, for the purposes of the proceedings provided for in Article 286(6) TFEU.

In view of these arguments of the parties, it is necessary to consider whether and, if so, to what extent the assessments of the Court of Justice in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), may be adopted in the present proceedings.

First of all, it should be borne in mind that the subject matter of the action that was brought on the basis of Article 286(6) TFEU, in which the Court of Justice adopted its position regarding the applicant, is distinct from the present action. Indeed, it concerned the establishment of a breach of the obligations arising from the office of Member of the Court of Auditors, for the purposes of that provision, and the possible imposition of a penalty. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the procedure provided for in Article 286(6) TFEU has a specific function in so far as it seeks to ensure the proper functioning of the European Union institutions (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 86). Moreover, in such proceedings, it is for the Court of Justice, exercising its discretion to the full, to investigate whether the alleged conduct of the Member of the Court of Auditors concerned constitutes a breach of the obligations arising from his office (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 87).

By contrast, the subject matter of the present action, brought pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, is the issue of the recovery of sums unduly paid and the annulment of the contested decision. As stated in paragraph 188 above, the proceedings provided for in Article 263 TFEU are a procedural mechanism for reviewing the legality of acts of the bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union which, in accordance with the second paragraph thereof, can lead to the annulment of the act in question on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers. It follows that, in the context of such proceedings, the General Court must in the present case determine, in the course of its review of legality, described in paragraphs 189 to 193 above, whether one of those grounds justifies the annulment of the contested decision.

Next, the burden of proof in the present proceedings is different from that which applied in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). In that action by the Court of Auditors, the burden of proving the applicant’s breach of his obligations, for the purposes of Article 286(6) TFEU, lay with the Court of Auditors, since it had brought the action. Accordingly, it was necessary for the Court of Auditors to demonstrate that the irregularities found were sufficiently serious and manifest as to constitute a breach by the applicant of his obligations arising from his office as a Member of the Court of Auditors for the purposes of Article 286(6) TFEU.

By contrast, in the present action, brought by the applicant on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, the burden of proof lies with the applicant (see paragraph 193 above).

It must also be observed that, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), in reaching its finding that the first complaint raised by the Court of Auditors was, in part, well founded, the Court of Justice carried out a legal assessment of each of the activities of the applicant’s that the Court of Auditors considered to be irregular. The Court of Justice concluded that some of those activities were regular or not manifestly irregular and that others were irregular or manifestly irregular (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 359 to 798).

Moreover, it is important to note that, in the present action, the irregularities which the Court of Auditors ascribed to the applicant in the contested decision, which relate to the payment of expenses unduly charged to the EU budget, are exactly the same as those to which it referred in the action which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten

(C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). In the two actions, in fact, those irregularities are presented in the same table, set out in an annex to each of the two applications.

Nevertheless, given the different nature of the subject matter of the present action, distinct from that which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) (see paragraphs 198 and 199 above), the different burden of proof (see paragraph 199 above) and the fact that, in the present case, the defence, reply and rejoinder were not lodged until after that judgment had been delivered, the parties have been able, in the present proceedings, to provide additional clarification and to put forward new arguments and evidence, in order to further demonstrate the reality of the irregularities with regard to the Court of Auditors, or in order to refute them with regard to the applicant.

Consequently, only where the same facts and evidence are relied on in the present case as in the action which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), and where there has been no further clarification, and in the absence of doubt, will it be appropriate for the General Court to adopt, in the present case, the same findings reached by the Court of Justice in that judgment.

In the light of the foregoing, it will be necessary, in the present case, to assess each of the applicant’s activities associated with the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 184 above in the light of the arguments and explanations put to the General Court by the parties, in order to determine whether or not it is appropriate to adopt the finding reached by the Court of Justice in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782).

In the present case, given that the EU judicature cannot substitute its own reasoning for that of the author of the act, as observed in paragraph 191 above, when examining whether the applicant is able to establish that expenses were properly incurred, the Court must take account of the reasons, provided by the Court of Auditors in the contested decision, for which it took the view that expenses incurred by the applicant were unduly charged to the EU budget. It is solely with reference to those reasons that the Court must consider whether the applicant succeeds in his challenge and in establishing the propriety of the expenses.

It is in the light of the observations set out in paragraphs 177 to 207 above that the Court must examine the complaints alleging infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the existence of ‘manifest errors’ regarding the applicant’s activities to which the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 184 above relate.

In its identification of the sums which it characterises as amounts receivable, the Court of Auditors draws a distinction in the contested decision between three types of expenses: first, mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances, second, representation expenses and, third, expenses associated with use of the official car and recourse to the services of a driver. It is therefore appropriate for the Court to follow the same approach in its examination of the irregularities which the Court of Auditors has ascribed to the applicant, or at least those of them which concern the activities in relation to which the applicant made the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 184 above.

(2) Mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances

As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice stated, with regard to the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, that the Court of Auditors could not legitimately reproach the applicant for benefitting from the payment of mission expenses or daily subsistence allowances for a mission authorised by the President of the Court of Auditors on the basis of a request which was not fraudulent and did not omit key information and whose irregularity was not manifest (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 380). The Court of Justice concluded that the question whether the travel orders issued, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors were such as to create a legitimate expectation on the applicant’s part as to the regularity of the missions concerned had to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in particular, by comparing the reason stated in the authorisation request with the real purpose of the mission, as shown by the evidence that had been presented to it.

The Court of Justice also stated that a claim for reimbursement of mission expenses or for payment of daily subsistence allowances had to be considered irregular if it was established that the activity actually carried out under the travel order in question could not be linked to the performance of the applicant’s duties. It stated that such irregularity could be taken into account for the purposes of the proceedings under Article 286(6) TFEU either if the travel order had been obtained fraudulently or on the basis of a request that omitted key information or if the absence of a link between that activity and those duties was obvious (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 392).

The considerations of the Court of Justice recalled in paragraphs 210 and 211 above must be applied, mutatis mutandis, in the present proceedings. Nevertheless, in their application here, as opposed to in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), account must be taken of the new arguments and evidence put forward by the parties and, more particularly, the different burden of proof that lies with the parties and the different subject matter of the present action, which is the issue of the recovery of sums unduly paid, in accordance with Regulation 2018/1046, and the annulment of the contested decision, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

It must also be borne in mind that, in the present case, the travel orders were issued, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors in view of the information which the applicant had provided, whereas the contested decision was adopted on the basis of the OLAF report, which had established that the information which the applicant had provided to the Court of Auditors in his travel orders had been insufficient to enable the President of the Court of Auditors to decide whether or not the activity in question was in the interests of that institution (see paragraph 104 above). Therefore, given that, in contrast to OLAF, the Court of Auditors lacks investigatory powers, as the Court noted in paragraph 107 above, the Court must take account of the conclusions of the OLAF report and assess, in the present proceedings, whether a travel order issued, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors, was such as to create a legitimate expectation on the applicant’s part as to the regularity of the mission concerned.

For the purposes of that assessment it will be necessary to consider, in view of the burden of proof referred to in paragraph 193 above, whether the applicant can successfully establish, if necessary on the basis of new evidence capable of calling into question the findings made in the OLAF report, that a travel order was not obtained fraudulently or on the basis of a request that omitted key information, or that the activity actually carried out under the travel order in question could be linked to the performance of his duties.

(i) The missions involving meetings with politicians and members of their Cabinets

The claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 184 above include a substantial number of claims by the applicant that were approved by the Court of Auditors and resulted in the reimbursement of mission expenses or the payment of daily subsistence allowances in connection with meetings with politicians. They are the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 1, 7, 19, 41, 43, 59, 92, 97, 118 (in part), 169, 171, 203, 204, 208, 211, 215, 238, 248, 296 (in part), 301, 303, 313, 314, 319 and 320, 326 (in part), 330 (in part), 331 (in part), 334 (in part), 336, 339 (in part), 346, 352, 355, 373 and 374 (in part), 381, 382 (in part), 395 and 402 of the table of recoveries.

It is clear from the contested decision that the Court of Auditors disputes the mission expenses or daily subsistence allowances claimed by the applicant in connection with the activities referred to in those lines, taking the view, in essence, that they were not related to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court or Auditors or to the work of that institution.

The applicant submits that the meetings he had with politicians could be linked to the performance of his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors and that they should therefore be regarded as regular and such as to give him a legitimate expectation as to their regularity. He refers, in essence, to the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), stating, in particular, that the Court of Justice held that activities in the course of the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors could include official activities seeking, in particular, to raise awareness of its work and to promote it and to maintain contacts with prominent officials in the interest of the institution. The applicant also notes that the Court of Justice stated that such official activities could very often concern officials from the same Member State as the Member of the Court of Auditors concerned. He also submits that the present proceedings do not allow the Court of Auditors to dispute the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), in particular its findings with regard to the case brought before it and its factual and legal findings.

In the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held that the missions authorised in a transparent manner with a view to meeting politicians could not, in general, be considered manifestly irregular by reason of their purpose (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 438). More specifically, as regards the applicant’s meetings with members of the political party in question, the Court of Justice stated, in those proceedings, that the close links established between the applicant and that political party were not sufficient, in those proceedings, to form a presumption from which it could be systematically inferred that a mission whose aim was to meet a politician was manifestly irregular simply because that politician was a member of that political party (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 464). According to the Court of Justice, given, in particular, the important role played by that party in Belgian political life and the contacts that the applicant could legitimately maintain within that party on account of his activities before he took up his post, the organisation of a number of official missions involving politicians belonging to that party could not be regarded as implausible (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 465).

The Court of Auditors argues, in essence, that OLAF’s investigation had brought to light a number of omissions that had made it possible to conceal the true purpose, of a private nature, of the applicant’s activities. It complains that the applicant had maintained regular, intense contacts with a restricted circle of high-level members of the political party in question, to which the applicant had belonged prior to his appointment to the Court of Auditors, and that the applicant had known these individuals for a long time. According to the Court of Auditors, such relationships were part of an undeclared political activity or, in any event, were not related to the performance of the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors.

Given that the applicant’s arguments in the present proceedings do no more than refer, in essence, to the findings made by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), and having regard to the General Court’s observations set out in paragraphs 202 to 205 above, in order to determine whether the travel orders to which the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 215 above relate were such as to create a legitimate expectation on the applicant’s part as to the regularity of the missions concerned, it is necessary, first, to consider whether the Court of Auditors itself puts forward new arguments or explanations with respect to those which it presented before the Court of Justice in relation to those claims and, if so, then to assess whether, taking those new submissions into account, it is possible to reach a different finding regarding the regularity of the claims in question from that reached by the Court of Justice or whether, in the present proceedings, the finding of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) should be adopted by the General Court (see paragraph 205 above).

In its line of argument before the General Court, the Court of Auditors does not rely solely on the mere fact that the politicians referred to in the travel orders in question were members of the political party in question and that they were acquaintances of the applicant’s. Indeed, it gives specific additional explanations to establish that the applicant’s meetings with the politicians in question, members of that political party, were severable from his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors, given their frequency and the restricted and constant circle of individuals met, as was revealed by OLAF’s investigation.

In the first place, it must indeed be observed – and the applicant does not dispute the fact – that, in the course of his two terms of office at the Court of Auditors, the applicant maintained regular contact with politicians who were members of the political party in question.

First of all, it must be recalled that, as noted in paragraphs 111 and 112 above, the frequency of the applicant’s meetings with politicians who were members of the political party in question was revealed in the course of OLAF’s investigation. OLAF established that, during his time in office, the applicant had met Belgian politicians, for the most part members of the political party in question, at least 188 times. According to the OLAF report, that figure represented 24% of all the meetings or lunches for which the applicant had claimed reimbursement. This is the case for all of the lines mentioned in paragraph 215 above, with the exception of lines 314, 319 and 320 of the table of recoveries. Moreover, it was also OLAF that established a connection between the meetings with Belgian politicians and the weekly meetings of the management board of the political party in question. On this point, it is clear from the OLAF report that, in the course of its investigation, the minutes were obtained of 44 meetings that recorded the presence of members of the management board of that political party during the period from 17 November 2008 to 29 April 2010. OLAF established that the applicant had been present at 28 of those meetings.

Next, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice found that the 42 missions which the applicant presented as having the purpose of meeting Belgian politicians could be directly linked to the applicant’s political activity, which was incompatible with his duties, inasmuch as their real purpose was to allow him to attend a board meeting of the political party in question or to attend activities or receptions organised by that political party (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 442 to 457). To these must also be added the 10 claims for reimbursement of representation expenses which the Court of Justice considered irregular in that they were directly linked to the applicant’s political activity (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 633 to 637).

Lastly, in addition to the meetings mentioned in paragraph 224 above, and among those to which paragraph 184 above relates, the applicant attended 64 further meetings with politicians, once again members of the political party in question, in the course of a mission or for which he claimed reimbursement of representation expenses (lines 19, 23, 24, 27, 41, 43, 57, 59, 65, 66, 89, 92, 96, 97, 111, 116, 118, 168, 169, 171, 183, 184, 190, 203, 204, 208, 211, 215, 218, 236, 238, 248, 257, 276, 281, 293 et 294, 296, 303, 313, 314, 323, 326, 330, 331, 334, 336, 338, 339, 346, 350, 352, 354, 355, 357, 358, 367, 370, 381, 382, 395, 402 and 408 of the table of recoveries). To these may be added the meetings with a member of a politician’s Cabinet, namely the three meetings referred to in lines 1, 7 and 301 of the table of recoveries.

In the second place, the information in the case file shows that the applicant met a limited number of politicians, all of whom were members of the political party in question, both at national level and at EU level, and that the great majority of those meetings were organised in the region from which the applicant originates.

It must be concluded that the frequency with which the applicant met a limited number of Belgian politicians in the political party in question over the course of his two terms of office at the Court of Auditors demonstrates the specific context of those meetings, which was therefore key information that was not available to the Court of Auditors at the time it approved the claims for reimbursement of mission expenses of for payment of daily subsistence allowances that the applicant made separately in advance of those meetings. It was only after OLAF had carried out an in-depth investigation into the situation, on the basis of the additional information obtained after the President of the Court of Auditors had approved those missions, that that specific context could be understood. Therefore, given the omission of that key information, the applicant cannot rely on a legitimate expectation with regard to the travel orders for the meetings with the Belgian politicians or members of their Cabinets, all of whom were members of the political party in question, referred to in lines 1, 7, 19, 41, 43, 59, 92, 97, 118 (in part), 169, 171, 203, 204, 208, 211, 215, 238, 248, 296 (in part), 301, 303, 313, 326 (in part), 330 (in part), 331 (in part), 334 (in part), 336, 339 (in part), 346, 352, 355, 373 and 374 (in part), 381, 382 (in part), 395 et 402 of the table of recoveries.

That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments.

The applicant considers that the fact of his having known the individual met for a long time is clearly not sufficient to discredit a meeting as having no connection with the performance of his duties. According to the applicant, there is nothing to prevent a Member of the Court of Auditors from meeting people he knows. He also argues, in essence, that the seven meetings over the course of twelve years with a member of the Cabinet of the leader of a political group in the European Parliament, mentioned in the missions referred to in lines 1, 7 and 301 of the table of recoveries, are clearly incapable of demonstrating that any meeting he had with that individual served purely political ends and was therefore unrelated to the performance of his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

Admittedly, the mere fact that a meeting has taken place with an individual whom the applicant knew does not necessarily demonstrate that the meeting was unrelated to the performance of the applicant’s duties. It is also true that the number of meetings the applicant had with an individual over the course of his terms of office at the Court of Auditors is not sufficient in itself to prove that each meeting concerned the applicant’s undeclared political activity or that it had no connection with his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

Nevertheless, the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 227 above must be assessed in their specific context.

Indeed, it was noted in paragraphs 222 to 226 above that, over the course of the applicant’s terms of office at the Court of Auditors, those meetings were very frequent and involved a limited number of individuals. The frequency of these meetings with a limited number of individuals must be viewed in the light of the finding of the Court of Justice that the applicant had, for most of the duration of his two terms of office at the Court of Auditors, actively engaged in political activity, as was evidenced in particular by direct and regular participation in the governing body of a national political party, and its conclusion that such activity was clearly incompatible with the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 267 and 270).

Given those circumstances, it cannot be considered that those repeated meetings between the applicant and a very limited number of politicians at national level, all of whom were members of the same political party, one to which he belonged before taking office at the Court of Auditors, were in the interests of the Court of Auditors or that their purpose was to promote its work or to exchange views in relation to the applicant’s duties. Indeed, to perform the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors in such fashion is to flout the rules of conduct by which he is bound as an individual occupying a senior position within an EU institution. As Advocate General Hogan explained in his Opinion in Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2020:1052), Members of the Court of Auditors must respect the obligations of independence, integrity and discretion as set out in Articles 285 and 286 TFEU, but also the highest standard of impartiality and disinterestedness. For Members of the Court of Auditors, which is the ‘financial conscience’ of the European Union, this necessarily implies full responsibility in the manner in which they spend public funds and, consequently, a certain degree of transparency in how they do so (Opinion of Advocate General Hogan in Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2020:1052, point 76).

It is therefore in view of that context, and in the absence of explanations from or evidence adduced by the applicant proving the contrary, that it must be held that the missions involving meetings with politicians who were members of the political party in question, referred to in the lines mentioned in paragraph 227 above, were unconnected with the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

Certain allegations made by the Court of Auditors and clear evidence in the case file confirm the absence of any such connection.

First, it must be observed that, among the applicant’s missions referred to in paragraph 227 above, those mentioned in lines 19, 41, 118, 171, 203, 211, 215, 238, 303, 326, 331, 334, 346, 352 and 402 of the table of recoveries, which took place on a Monday, were directly related to the applicant’s undeclared political activity and incompatible with his duties. Indeed, OLAF discovered in the course of its investigation that the weekly meetings of the management board of the political party in question took place on Mondays. OLAF also noted that it was clear that the applicant’s position as a voting member of the political party in question required him to attend these weekly meetings regularly until November 2008. It is also apparent from the OLAF report that the applicant’s status as a non-voting member of the political party in question, from April 2010 onwards, required him to be present at least at the monthly meetings that were held on the first Monday of every month. The applicant has not adduced evidence proving his absence from the meetings of the political party in question in the course of the relevant missions.

Second, as regards the missions referred to in lines 19 and 296 (in part) of the table of recoveries, involving meetings between the applicant and two Members of the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors states that those individuals were a member of the Committee on Development and a member of the Committee on Transport and Tourism of the European Parliament. It considers that the duties of those Members of the European Parliament had no connection with those of the applicant, who, during his terms of office at the Court of Auditors, had responsibility for auditing EU expenditure in connection with external relations, enlargement and humanitarian aid. In addition, the Court of Auditors states that one of those Members of the European Parliament had previously belonged to the same political party as the applicant had until 2002 and that he had then been one of the founding members, along with the applicant, of another political party for a short while in 2002.

Third, it is apparent from the case file that the applicant made claims for reimbursement of mission expenses or payment of daily subsistence allowances for missions that entailed meeting the same individual on several occasions in a relatively short space of time. Indeed, in 2015, the applicant’s meetings intensified, in particular, with two politicians who were members of the political party in question, those meetings being referred to in lines 330 (in part), 331 (in part), 334 (in part), 336, 346 and 355 of the table of recoveries. On being invited at the hearing to explain why he had met those two individuals so frequently the applicant offered no reasons in that regard. Thus, in the absence of explanations on his part as to the need for several official missions involving the same individual in the course of a single year, the corresponding expenses must be regarded as manifestly irregular and unrelated to the performance of the applicant’s duties.

In conclusion, in the light of the foregoing, and given the context described in paragraph 232 above, the missions involving meetings with politicians who were members of the political party in question mentioned in paragraph 227 above must be regarded as having no connection with the performance of the applicant’s duties as a member of the Court of Auditors. It follows that the travel orders relating to those meetings, issued, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors, were not capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation on the applicant’s part as to the regularity of the missions concerned. The fourth plea in law must therefore be dismissed in so far as those missions are concerned.

On the other hand, in so far as concerns the applicant’s missions referred to in lines 314, 319 and 320 of the table of recoveries, the Court makes the following observations.

In the first place, as regards the mission referred to in line 314, it is stated in the table of recoveries, which forms part of the contested decision, that the applicant had received a formal invitation from a European political party and that there is no proof of any connection with the activities of the Court of Auditors.

The applicant submits that the present proceedings do not allow the Court of Auditors to dispute the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), in particular its findings with regard to the case brought before it and its factual and legal findings (see paragraph 217 above). In this connection, it must be held that he is referring, in essence, to the findings of the Court of Justice in that judgment regarding the representation expenses occasioned by a dinner mentioned in line 314 of the table of recoveries.

It must be observed that, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice expressed its position only on the regularity of the representation expenses associated with the mission referred to in line 314 of the table of recoveries, that being a dinner with a Member of the European Parliament who represented a European political party. The Court in fact held that, since the Court of Auditors had not submitted any additional grounds or evidence of irregularity, the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses incurred for invitations sent to Members of the European Parliament had to be considered to be regular (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 624).

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors submits that the expenses occasioned by the meeting referred to in line 314 of the table of recoveries are irregular. It states that the applicant had accepted an invitation from a political party and that the remainder of the mission in question related to a hunting party in Belgium, a leisure activity which the Court of Justice held to be irregular in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). Therefore, the Court of Auditors has put to the General Court new arguments with respect to those on the basis of which the Court of Justice reached the finding in that judgment mentioned in paragraph 243 above.

The General Court notes that the case file shows that the person met was a Member of the European Parliament and a member of the Committee on Budgetary Control. First of all, in the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors does not allege that that individual was a member of the political party in question or that the applicant accepted an invitation from that political party. Secondly, with regard to the Court of Auditors’ allegation that the Court of Justice held the leisure activity of hunting to be irregular, it must be observed that, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice found to be irregular the applicant’s missions relating to invitations to participate in hunts in Belgium referred to in lines 315 and 371 of the table of recoveries. Those missions, however, have no connection with the applicant’s dinner with a Member of the European Parliament referred to in line 314 of the table of recoveries. First, it is clear from the case file that that dinner took place in Brussels on the same day as the mission referred to in line 315, which involved a hunt in Belgium, which is to say 15 October 2014. However, according to the case file, the mission referred to in line 315 did not commence until 23:00 hrs and began in Brussels and so, in all likelihood, did not commence until after the dinner in question, referred to in line 314, had ended. The Court of Auditors has therefore not established that any leisure activity of hunting took place on the day of the meeting referred to in line 314. Secondly, the mission referred to in line 371 took place on 16 November 2015, more than a year after the dinner referred to in line 314.

246

That being so, the clarification given by the Court of Auditors, mentioned in paragraph 244 above, is not sufficient for the Court to reach a different finding in the present proceedings regarding the mission referred to in line 314 of the table of recoveries from that reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraph 243 above. The General Court therefore adopts that finding with respect to the mission expenses and daily subsistence allowance referred to in line 314 of the table of recoveries, notwithstanding the fact that the Court of Justice’s finding related only to the representation expenses associated with the mission referred to in line 314.

247

Consequently, since, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice essentially held that the claim for reimbursement of representation expenses associated with the mission referred to in line 314 of the table of recoveries had to be considered to be regular (see paragraph 243 above), it must be concluded that the travel order issued, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors in relation to that mission was such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation as to its regularity. Therefore, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the mission referred to in line 314 of the table of recoveries, and to the extent of EUR 96.60.

248

In the second place, regarding the meeting with a member of the private office of a Belgian minister referred to in lines 319 and 320 of the table of recoveries, in order to dispute the regularity of the expenses associated with that mission, the applicant essentially refers to the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) (see paragraph 217 above).

249

Arguing the irregularity of that meeting, the Court of Auditors states that it was a meeting with a member of the private office of the federal Minister for Mobility and was unrelated to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors with responsibility for auditing EU expenditure in connection with external relations, enlargement and humanitarian aid.

250

In the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice noted that the person met had not been described by the Court of Auditors as belonging to the political party in question, but that the Court of Auditors considered that that mission should be linked to political or private activity on account of its connection with transport matters. The Court of Justice held that that was not enough to establish that that mission was manifestly irregular (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 470).

251

In view of the conclusion set out in paragraph 205 above, since the same facts and evidence are put forward in the present proceedings as were put forward in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), it is appropriate for this Court to adopt the finding reached by the Court of Justice regarding the mission referred to in lines 319 and 320 of the table of recoveries. Accordingly, since it was not established before the Court of Justice that the mission was manifestly irregular (see paragraph 250 above) and since the Court of Auditors does not allege that it was fraudulent or that key information was omitted, it must be held that the travel order issued in that connection, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors was such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the applicant’s part as to the regularity of the mission in question. Consequently, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it relates to the mission referred to in lines 319 and 320 of the table of recoveries, and to the extent of EUR 96.60.

(ii) <i>The other missions</i>

252

Among the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 184 above are a number of other claims which led to the reimbursement of mission expenses or the payment of daily subsistence allowances which the Court of Auditors considers to be unrelated to the performance of the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors. These relate to the applicant’s activities referred to in lines 47, 56, 57, 63, 103, 128, 137, 138, 143, 155 (in part), 157, 161, 196, 199, 210, 237, 277, 284, 290, 293 and 294, 310 (in part), 330 (in part), 331 (in part), 334 (in part), 335, 339 (in part), 347, 373 and 374 (in part), 382, 391, 411 and 412 of the table of recoveries.

253

As is the case for the missions involving meetings with politicians and members of their Cabinets (see paragraph 216 above), it is clear from the contested decision that the Court of Auditors disputes the mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances claimed by the applicant in the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 252 above, taking the view, essentially, that they were unrelated to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court or Auditors.

254

The applicant considers that the missions referred to in the lines mentioned in paragraph 252 above did relate to his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors. He refers, in that connection, essentially to the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), and states that they should be taken into account in the present proceedings. He repeats that the Court of Auditors cannot dispute in the present case the findings of the Court of Justice in that judgment with regard to the case brought before it or its factual and legal findings.

255

In the first place, as regards, in part, the missions referred to in lines 330, 331 and 334 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Justice did not express a position in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), on the propriety of the applicant’s attendance at a New Year’s reception hosted by a Flemish political party (line 330, in part) or at the presentation of a document to the Committee on Budgetary Control of the European Parliament (COCOBU) (line 331, in part) or of his meeting with the Belgian ambassador to Cuba (line 334, in part).

256

In so far as concerns the activities referred to in lines 330 and 331, the Court of Auditors states that the applicant’s attendance at a New Year’s reception hosted by a Flemish political party and at the presentation of a document to COCOBU was followed by a meeting with a member of the political party in question. In so far as concerns the activity referred to in line 334, the Court of Auditors states that the applicant’s diary mentions no meeting with the Belgian ambassador to Cuba on the day in question and that, in any event, any such meeting could not have been related to his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors because it had no audit mission programmed in Cuba.

257

The applicant makes no observations on the allegations made by the Court of Auditors, even though it falls to him, in the present proceedings, to demonstrate (see paragraph 193 above) that the charging to the EU budget of the mission expenses at issue was justified and that the contested decision is unlawful in so far as it treats those expenses as having been paid unduly.

258

That being so, it must be held that the missions referred to, in part, in lines 330, 331 and 334 of the table of recoveries had no connection with the performance of the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors. It follows that the travel orders for those missions, issued, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors, were incapable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation on his part as to the regularity of the missions concerned. The fourth plea in law must therefore be dismissed in so far as those missions are concerned.

259

In the second place, regarding the mission referred to in lines 293 and 294 of the table of recoveries, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held that the Court of Auditors’ complaints regarding that mission had to be rejected because the irregularity which the Court of Auditors ascribed to the applicant could be regarded as an excusable error on his part. According to the Court of Justice, even though the Court of Auditors’ claim that that mission was maintained despite the cancellation of the meeting that was the reason for it seemed to be valid in the light of an entry in the applicant’s diary, the existence of fraud in that regard was not established, since a lunch declared to the Court of Auditors was held at the time originally planned for that mission (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 579).

260

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors recalls that the meeting associated with the mission referred to in lines 293 and 294 of the table of recoveries was cancelled and that the applicant had instead given lunch to three members of the political party in question.

261

Taking into account the relationships between the applicant and politicians who were members of the political party in question, which the General Court has found to be unrelated to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors (see paragraphs 232 to 234 and 239 above), the same conclusion must be reached in relation to the mission referred to in lines 293 and 294 of the table of recoveries as that set out in paragraph 227 above.

262

Accordingly, it must be held that the context of the relationships between the applicant and the members of the political party in question was key information of which the President of the Court of Auditors could not have been aware at the time he approved the claim for reimbursement of mission expenses and payment of allowances in question. Given the omission of that key information, the applicant cannot claim to have had a legitimate expectation with regard to the travel order, which had been issued for a meeting that was cancelled and replaced by a lunch with three members of the political party in question. Consequently, the fourth plea in law must be dismissed in so far as it concerns the mission referred to in lines 293 and 294 of the table of recoveries.

263

In the third place, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice essentially held that the great majority of the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 252 above, and specifically those addressed in lines 56, 57, 63, 128, 137, 138, 143, 155 (in part), 196, 199, 277, 284, 290, 310 (in part), 335, 339 (in part), 347, 373 and 374 (in part), 382, 391, 411 and 412 of the table of recoveries, could not be considered manifestly irregular having regard to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 498 to 501, 515, 534 to 536, 558, 559, 561 to 563, 567 to 576 and 579).

264

In the present case, the applicant essentially refers to the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), on the question of whether the travel orders associated with the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 263 above were capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation on his part as to the regularity of the missions concerned. It is therefore necessary again to follow the reasoning set out in paragraph 220 above. The General Court must therefore examine whether the Court of Auditors puts forward new explanations or arguments with respect to those which it presented before the Court of Justice in relation to those claims and, if so, to assess whether or not, taking those submissions into account, a different finding should be reached regarding the claims in question from that reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) (see paragraph 205 above).

– <i>The missions referred to in lines 56, 138, 196, 284 and 382 of the table of recoveries</i>

265

In so far as concerns the travel orders relating to the meetings between the applicant and diplomats and business people referred to in lines 56, 138, 196, 284 and 382 of the table of recoveries, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>

(C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held that the Court of Auditors, which bore the burden of proof, had not established to the requisite legal standard that the missions in the course of which those expenses had been incurred had been of a private nature. According to the Court of Justice, those missions, involving meetings with diplomats and business people, could, in principle, be related to the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors sitting in the chamber responsible for the European Union’s external relations (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 569 to 575).

As regards the missions referred to in lines 138, 196 and 382 of the table of recoveries, the purpose of which was to enable Flemish business people to meet Belgian diplomats posted abroad, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held that those meetings could have been an opportunity for exchanges of views on matters of interest to the Court of Auditors and to raise awareness of and to promote its work among senior national officials. According to the Court of Justice, the fact that those meetings were organised by a body that sought to promote Flemish interests in Brussels was not, in itself, sufficient to prove the irregularity of the missions in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 573).

As was noted in paragraph 116 above, the table of recoveries, which forms part of the contested decision, states, with a reference to the OLAF report, in particular pages 5, 18, 29 and 37 thereof, that the claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 138 and 196 of the table of recoveries mention formal invitations from a club whose purpose was to strengthen the presence of Flemish undertakings in Brussels and which organised meetings at which Flemish business people could meet Belgian diplomats posted abroad, and that they were unrelated to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors. The same finding was made with regard to the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 382 of the table of recoveries.

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors recalls the purpose of the activities referred to in lines 138, 196 and 382 of the table of recoveries, as they have been described in paragraph 267 above. It also submits that the conclusion of the Court of Justice, mentioned in paragraph 266 above, that such activities could have been an opportunity for exchanges of views on matters of interest to the Court of Auditors and to raise awareness of and to promote its work among senior national officials could be said of any meeting between a Member of the Court of Auditors and an individual outside that institution.

That argument cannot suffice, in itself, to refute the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), namely, first of all, that it was not disputed that a ‘diplomatic dinner’ was held every year in Brussels, bringing together a large number of Belgian diplomats and, secondly, that meetings with diplomats could, in principle, be related to the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors sitting in the chamber with responsibility for the European Union’s external relations (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 569 and 573).

Consequently, with regard to the missions referred to in lines 138, 196 and 382 of the table of recoveries, the General Court should adopt in the present proceedings the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), as recalled in paragraphs 265, 266 and 269 above, and hold them to be not, in principle, irregular.

That is not the case, on the other hand, for the missions referred to in lines 56 and 284 of the table of recoveries.

In so far as concerns the mission referred to in line 56 of the table of recoveries, which mentions a working lunch on 6 July 2009 with a diplomat from the Russian Federation which, according to the explanations given by the Court of Auditors in the table of recoveries, which forms part of the contested decision, related to a favour for a third party wishing to adopt a child from that country, the Court of Justice found that the documents produced by the Court of Auditors, which post-dated that mission by several months and made no reference either to the lunch or to any prior events, did not allow it to be established with any certainty that the purpose of the mission was separate from the applicant’s duties (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 570 and 571).

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors refers to the case file, which contains an extract of the OLAF report addressing that meeting with the diplomat from the Russian Federation. As noted in paragraph 122 above, in the course of its investigation, OLAF concluded that that meeting had been of a private nature. It found that the applicant had met the diplomat in connection with the adoption of a Russian child by a Belgian family. According to the OLAF report, a note in the applicant’s digital diary recorded the difficulties encountered with the adoption file and the consul in question was willing to help to complete the necessary formalities and to resolve the matter. OLAF also stated that the applicant had met the diplomat on 22 June and then again on 6 July 2009 and that the travel orders referred to a ‘meeting with [the diplomat]’, without mentioning the real subject thereof.

The Court of Auditors also alleges that the purpose of the meeting was to assist with a procedure for the adoption by a Belgian couple of a Russian child, and that that demonstrates its private nature. It refers to the context of that mission, stating that it had been preceded by another mission ‘without allowances’ that had taken place two weeks earlier, on 22 June 2009, and that there had been a follow-up contact on 30 November 2009. According to the Court of Auditors, the fact that the applicant did not request a travel order with allowances for either meeting is evidence that they concerned the private, family life of the couple in question.

Having regard to the clarification provided by the Court of Auditors, it must be held that there is a doubt as to the regularity of this mission. The Court of Auditors relies, in particular, on the fact that the applicant met the same Russian diplomat frequently over a very short space of time, while there had been no other meetings in previous or following years, together with the email exchanges in the same period relating to a specific procedure for the adoption of a child by a couple who were friends of his, in reaching the conclusion that there is a doubt as to the regularity of the mission in question.

Consequently, given that there is a doubt as to the regularity of expenditure for which the applicant has been reimbursed, the burden of proof lies with the applicant, who must demonstrate that he incurred the expenses in question in compliance with the applicable rules (see paragraph 193 above). However, the applicant has not, in this instance, adduced new evidence capable of dispelling that doubt.

As regards the mission referred to in line 284 of the table of recoveries, involving a lunch with the ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium in France, there is again a doubt as to the regularity of that mission, in the light of the clarifications provided by the Court of Auditors. In the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice found, with regard to that mission, that, although the Court of Auditors had argued that the lunch was private in nature, on the basis of a friendship between the ambassador and the applicant and the identity of the other guests, it had not been demonstrated, in the absence of evidence to clarify for the Court of Justice the purpose of that lunch and when, in any event, the mere existence of such a friendship was not sufficient to rule out the possibility that the lunch had a professional dimension (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 575).

In the present proceedings, the applicant has added nothing new. As for the Court of Auditors, it explains again, in different terms, that the mission referred to in line 284 of the table of recoveries was of a private nature. It states that the ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium in France had extended an invitation to five individuals, including the applicant and his wife, to spend a weekend at his residence in Paris on the occasion of a wine tasting. It states that, in the context of that mission, the applicant had paid for a lunch and arranged for a bouquet of flowers to be delivered on behalf of all the guests. It emphasises that there is evidence to show that the applicant also requested and received from the Court of Auditors a tie and a scarf, as official gifts for the ambassador and his wife.

As further evidence of the private nature of the mission referred to in line 284 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Auditors refers to another, earlier activity involving the applicant and the same individuals, which the Court of Justice held, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), to be irregular. The Court of Auditors also refers to the documents in the case file and, in particular, an extract of the OLAF report in which this activity is listed under ‘Courtesy visits to businessmen and acquaintances for private matters’.

The clarifications provided by the Court of Auditors are plausible. Indeed, this was a meeting that was organised, by means of an identical invitation, only a short time after another meeting involving the same individuals, referred to in line 268 of the table of recoveries, which the Court of Justice held, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), to be irregular, since it was a dinner held at a restaurant next to a wine estate and since several emails indicated that the purpose of the trip to the region in question by the applicant and his guest was to visit that wine estate (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 659). Those factors permit the conclusion that there is a doubt as to the propriety of the mission referred to in line 284 of the table of recoveries.

Since the applicant is not able to demonstrate, in the present proceedings, that the missions referred to in lines 56 and 284 of the table of recoveries were undertaken for professional reasons, and given that there remains a doubt as to the regularity of those missions, it must be held that the meetings referred to in those lines were unrelated to the performance of the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors and were therefore irregular. It follows that the travel orders relating to those meetings, issued, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors, were incapable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation on the applicant’s part as to the regularity of the missions in question. Accordingly, the fourth plea in law must be dismissed in so far as it concerns the mission expenses referred to in lines 56 and 284.

– The missions referred to in lines 57 and 391 of the table of recoveries

As regards the travel orders for the applicant’s meetings with a Member of the Commission referred to in lines 57 and 391 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Justice held, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), that the evidence presented by the Court of Auditors was insufficient to establish the irregularity which it alleged with regard to those two missions. The Court of Justice noted that it was not disputed that such a meeting could, in principle, be connected with the performance of the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 561).

In so far as concerns the mission referred to in line 57 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Justice held that the Court of Auditors’ claim that that mission was in fact linked to the organisation of a music festival that interested the applicant in a private capacity had not been established. The Court of Justice explained that that mission had taken place on 13 July 2009, while the emails relating to the festival which the Court of Auditors had produced concerned a grant for 2011 and dated from September and October 2011. Furthermore, according to the Court of Justice, any relationship between that mission and the grant seemed even less plausible since the Member of the Commission concerned had not had responsibility for cultural affairs until 10 February 2010 (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 562 and 563).

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors refers to the case file and, in particular, an extract from the OLAF report from which it appears that the meeting with a Member of the Commission referred to in line 57 of the table of recoveries related to a European music festival for young people. It submits that that contact enabled the applicant to intervene personally, two years later, to help obtain a grant for an association active in the municipality which, in 2019, merged with the town from which the applicant originates and of which he was once mayor, and which organised a European music festival for young people. That evidence has already been examined by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), as is evident from paragraph 283 above.

The Court of Auditors also argues that the mission referred to in line 57 of the table of recoveries was irregular because there was no relationship between the applicant’s auditing responsibilities and the responsibilities of the Member of the Commission in question, who at the relevant time held the portfolio on health.

Nevertheless, even though it might be held that the fields of external relations, enlargement and humanitarian aid, for which the applicant had direct responsibility during his terms of office (see paragraph 32 above) can have no connection with the field of health, that circumstance alone is not in itself sufficient, given the different time frames of the relevant facts and the absence of specific evidence, for the Court to reach in the present proceedings a different finding regarding the mission referred to in line 57 of the table of recoveries from that reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten.

(C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), as described in paragraphs 282 and 283 above, and it must consequently be held that the mission referred to in line 57 of the table of recoveries was not irregular.

287

As regards the mission referred to in line 391 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Justice held, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), that the Court of Auditors had not produced any specific evidence in support of the claim that that mission concerned a ‘private lunch’. According to the Court of Justice, the fact, which was moreover unproven, that the Member of the Commission concerned was a hunting partner of the applicant could not as such demonstrate that the lunch in question was private. Furthermore, the fact that a senior official from a federation representing the interests of European land owners and land managers also attended that lunch also could not, according to the Court of Justice, establish the merits of the Court of Auditors’ position, especially since it was common ground that the guest list for that lunch, which had been held at the Commission’s headquarters, had not been drawn up by the applicant (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 564 and 565).

288

In the present case, the Court of Auditors relies on a body of evidence to prove the private nature of the meeting referred to in line 391 of the table of recoveries, taking into account the presence of two spouses, such as to undermine the necessary confidentiality of discussions of a professional nature, the existence of other meetings of the same five individuals, which the Court of Justice regarded, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), as being of a private nature, and the proven interest in hunting which the applicant shared with the Member of the Commission he had met.

289

First of all, in so far as concerns the private nature of the meeting in question, as found in the OLAF report, and the fact that the Member of the Commission in question and the applicant shared an interest in hunting, those allegations have already been examined by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), as is evident from paragraph 287 above.

290

Next, as regards the presence of two spouses, the Court of Justice pointed out in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), that the note of 22 April 2004 expressly stipulated that spouses and partners of the Members of the Court of Auditors and of their guests might be called upon to attend events for which representation and reception expenses were incurred (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 611).

291

Lastly, in so far as concerns the other meetings of the same five individuals which the Court of Justice held in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), to have been of a private nature, the Court of Auditors refers to the activity referred to in line 376 of the table of recoveries. By so doing, it puts forward a new argument with respect to those which the Court of Justice examined in that judgment, which are mentioned in paragraph 287 above.

292

Nevertheless, it is sufficient to observe that the activity referred to in line 376 of the table of recoveries involved individuals not all of whom were present at the lunch that constituted the activity referred to in line 391 of the table of recoveries.

293

Therefore, the new explanations given by the Court of Auditors, mentioned in paragraph 291 above, are not sufficient for the Court to reach a different finding regarding the mission referred to in line 391 of the table of recoveries from that reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraphs 282, 287, 290 and 292 above, and so, in the present proceedings, the Court must conclude that that mission was regular.

– <i>The missions referred to in lines 137, 143, 155 (in part) and 290 of the table of recoveries</i>

294

With regard to the missions referred to in lines 137, 143, 155 (in part) and 290 of the table of recoveries, which involved meetings between the applicant and the President of the Belgian Business Federation and the applicant’s participation in forums organised by that federation, the Court of Justice held, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), that the important role played by national business federations meant that those missions should not be regarded as manifestly irregular (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 515).

295

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors refers to the case file, which contains an extract from the OLAF report indicating that the majority of the applicant’s networking contacts were with local bodies, such as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the region from which the applicant originates, an industry group in the applicant’s place of origin and a local employers’ association, all of which act only within the applicant’s home region (see also paragraph 116 above). It must be observed that that extract from the OLAF report was analysed by the Court of Justice in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), and that the missions referred to in lines 137, 143, 155 (in part) and 290 of the table of recoveries did not involve meetings with local bodies in the region from which the applicant originates, but with the Belgian Business Federation, a national body.

296

As regards the meetings between the applicant and the President of the Belgian Business Federation, referred to in lines 137 and 143 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Auditors asserts in the present case that they were clearly unrelated to the activities of the Court of Auditors, for two reasons. First, they took place within a period of just four weeks, one on 24 January 2011 and the other on 21 February 2011. Secondly, during that period, the person was leaving the presidency of that federation. It states that, at the end of January 2011, it was announced in the press that the individual in question would be replaced by another person.

297

Nevertheless, in the light of the Court of Justice’s finding mentioned in paragraph 294 above, those two reasons are not sufficient to give rise to doubt as to the private nature of the meetings in question and for the Court to reach a different finding regarding the missions referred to in lines 137 and 143 of the table of recoveries from that reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782).

298

As regards the missions referred to in lines 155 (in part) and 290 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Auditors submits that only an activity carried out in the interests of the institution can justify a travel order and the reimbursement of expenses. It argues that a distinction between a regional remit and a national remit of a body, such as was drawn by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), does not meet that requirement. More specifically, regarding the activity that was the subject of the mission referred to in line 155, the Court of Auditors states that it was a lobbying activity that could not have served the interests or furthered the activities of the Court of Auditors, which is the external auditor of the European Union. It also adds that the applicant did not attend as a speaker.

299

It must be observed that, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice not only acknowledged the important role played by national business federations, but also pointed out that bodies representing civil society were likely to express views on the functioning of the institutions which could be taken into consideration by the Court of Auditors when drafting reports on that functioning (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 504). It follows that it cannot be ruled out that attendance at forums organised by the Belgian Business Federation could serve the interests of the Court of Auditors and further its activities. That conclusion cannot be called into question by the fact that the applicant did not attend as a speaker. Indeed, the taking into consideration of views expressed by bodies representing civil society may take different forms, active and passive.

300

Accordingly, the arguments mentioned in paragraph 298 above are not sufficient for the Court to reach, in the present proceedings, a different finding with regard to the missions referred to in lines 155 (in part) and 290 of the table of recoveries from that reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraphs 294 and 299 above. That being so, the missions referred to in those lines must be regarded as not irregular.

– <i>The missions referred to in lines 47, 103, 157, 161, 199, 210, 237, 277, 339 (in part), and 373 and 374 (in part) of the table of recoveries</i>

301

In so far as concerns the missions referred to in lines 47, 103, 157, 161, 199, 210, 237, 277, 339 (in part), 373 and 374 (in part) of the table of recoveries, which were meetings with senior members of international audit firms, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice observed that missions with the intention of holding discussions with senior staff of international audit firms could not be considered manifestly irregular (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 494). In response to the Court of Auditors’ argument that such contacts must be within the framework of public procurement or be part of training activities, the Court of Justice stated that no such principles were laid down in the internal rules mentioned by the Court of Auditors or corresponded to its practice, as was evident from the applicant’s travel orders (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 497).

302

More specifically, as regards the mission referred to in line 199 of the table of recoveries, the real purpose of which the Court of Auditors asserted to be to discuss a job offer that was potentially of interest to one of the applicant’s children, the Court of Justice held that the documents produced by the Court of Auditors did not demonstrate to the requisite legal standard that that meeting had been organised for that purpose or that it related primarily to the applicant’s family interests, or therefore establish the manifest irregularity of that mission. The Court of Justice acknowledged that it was true that, according to emails communicated by the Court of Auditors, the individual who was met during that mission had received the curriculum vitae of one of the applicant’s children following his discussion with the applicant and had shared potential job opportunities for that child. However, the reason given by the applicant, according to which a working lunch could be accompanied by more informal discussions relating, among other things, to the family situation of the diners, which could explain those emails, did not seem implausible (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 500 and 501).

303

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors observes that contacts with private international audit firms, like contacts with any private operator, must be within the framework of public procurement contracts. In so far as concerns more specifically the meeting referred to in line 199 of the table of recoveries, it states that, in its report, OLAF considered that meeting to be of a private nature, since it had been followed by an exchange of emails between the applicant and the individual met, in the course of which the latter had received the curriculum vitae of one of the applicant’s children and had informed the applicant of potential job opportunities for that child. By those arguments, the Court of Auditors adds nothing new in the present proceedings with respect to the arguments it put before the Court of Justice in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraphs 301 and 302 above.

304

As noted in paragraphs 301 and 302 above, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice considered that the documents produced by the Court of Auditors did not demonstrate to the requisite legal standard that the meeting referred to in line 199 had been organised for private purposes or that it related primarily to the applicant’s family interests, whereas missions with the intention of holding discussions with senior members of international audit firms could not be considered manifestly irregular.

305

Consequently, the arguments mentioned in paragraph 303 above are not sufficient for the Court to reach a different finding in the present proceedings with regard to the missions referred to in lines 47, 103, 157, 161, 199, 210, 237, 277, 339 (in part), 373 and 374 (in part) of the table of recoveries from that reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraphs 301 and 302 above, and so those missions must be regarded as regular.

– <i>The missions referred to in lines 128, 411 and 412 of the table of recoveries</i>

306

In so far as concerns the missions referred to in lines 128, 411 and 412 of the table of recoveries, which related to events organised, respectively, by an organisation representing the interests of European land owners and land managers, by another association of landowners, and by a foundation for the conservations of habitats, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held that they could not be regarded as manifestly irregular. As regards the mission referred to in line 128 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Justice stated that the applicant could not be criticised for participating, on the basis of a transparent travel order, in a conference held at the European Parliament in conjunction with a Europe-wide representative organisation. In so far as concerns the missions referred to in lines 411 and 412 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Justice stated that the Court of Auditors based its allegations on purported links between those bodies and an environmental foundation in the region from which the applicant originates that were not supported by evidence produced to the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 534 to 536).

307

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors observes that the events in question were unrelated to the performance of the applicant’s duties or his interest, but adduces no new evidence to support that allegation. Accordingly, that allegation alone is insufficient for the Court to reach a different finding in the present proceedings regarding those missions from that reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraph 306 above. Therefore, those missions must be regarded as not being manifestly irregular.

– <i>The mission referred to in line 347 of the table of recoveries</i>

308

As regards the mission referred to in line 347 of the table of recoveries, the meeting with an official from the National Bank of Belgium and with a Belgian Member of Parliament and a lawyer who also held a position within that bank, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held that that could not be described as manifestly irregular solely on the basis of the Court of Auditors’ claim that the mission was ‘unrelated to [the applicant’s] duties’ and the fact that the Member of Parliament was a member of the political party in question (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 559).

309

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors presents no new evidence concerning that mission, and so it must be held, as the Court of Justice held in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), as mentioned in paragraph 308 above, that that mission cannot be categorised as manifestly irregular.

– <i>The mission referred to in line 310 of the table of recoveries</i>

310

In so far as concerns the mission referred to in line 310 of the table of recoveries, involving, in part, a visit to a university, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held that, in the absence of any clarification by the Court of Auditors as to the reason for the alleged irregularity, that mission could not be regarded as manifestly irregular in so far as it related, in part, to a visit to a university (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 558).

311

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors submits that the mission referred to in line 310 of the table of recoveries must be regarded as not in the interests of the institution and therefore irregular, but does not adduce any new evidence to substantiate that allegation. However, it must be held, as the Court of Justice held in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) (see paragraph 310 above), that that allegation is insufficient, as such, for that mission, in the absence of any clarification from the Court of Auditors, to be regarded as manifestly irregular.

– <i>The mission referred to in line 335 of the table of recoveries</i>

312

In so far as concerns the mission referred to in line 335 of the table of recoveries, the purpose of which was to attend the funeral of one of the applicant’s assistants, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice noted that attendance at the funeral of one of the applicant’s assistants could be linked to the performance of the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors, who could reasonably be expected to offer his personal support on such an occasion to one of his close colleagues in the institution (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 576).

313

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors reiterates its argument to the effect that the mission referred to in line 335 of the table of recoveries, relating to the funeral of a parent of the applicant’s assistant, cannot give rise to the commitment of EU funds, inasmuch as the death of a parent is a matter within the private sphere. Following the finding of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraph 312 above, it must be held that that argument is insufficient as such for this mission to be regarded as irregular.

– <i>The mission referred to in line 63 of the table of recoveries</i>

314

As regards the mission referred to in line 63 of the table of recoveries, relating to an ‘opening ceremony of [an] academic year of [a European studies establishment]’, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held, with regard to the Court of Auditors’ argument that the applicant’s name was not on the list of European personalities attending the ceremony and concerning the website extract which it produced in that connection, that it did not seem sufficient to establish that the applicant was absent from the ceremony, in view of both the nature of that extract, which could not be treated as a record containing an attendance list, and the wording used in the document, which made clear that that document mentioned only some of those present at the ceremony (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 567). In addition, the Court of Justice held that, while it was established that, on the date when the mission in question took place, the applicant had had lunch in Brussels, the evidence produced by the Court of Auditors did not allow the time of that lunch to be determined (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 568).

315

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors maintains that the mission referred to in line 63 must be regarded as irregular, since the applicant did not, in its opinion, attend. It states that, concurrently, the applicant had a ‘working lunch’ in Brussels with a member of the private office of a Belgian minister. First, the Court of Auditors clarifies that, given that the ceremony in question took place between 10:30 hrs and 13:00 hrs, the distance between the ceremony and the working lunch in Brussels was such that the applicant would not have been able to arrive in time for a lunch. It explains that the distance between the place where the ceremony was held and the restaurant in Brussels is 99.6 kilometres and that the journey time, without traffic, may be estimated at one hour and thirteen minutes. Secondly, the Court of Auditors maintains that the website of the European studies establishment in question which it has presented permits the conclusion – by deduction, with knowledge of the rules of protocol for such events – that the applicant had not been present at the ceremony. It also refers to a video, available on the same website, from which it may be seen that, in his speech, the rector of the establishment greeted, in the order determined by protocol, the personalities present at the ceremony, but did not mention the applicant as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

316

The arguments of the Court of Auditors mentioned in paragraph 315 above appear to be new with respect to those upon which the Court of Justice based its finding in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). Nevertheless, they are not sufficient for the Court to reach a different finding in the present proceedings regarding the mission referred to in line 63 of the table of recoveries from that reached by the Court of Justice in that judgment. The information about the distance between the location of the ceremony and the applicant’s working lunch in Brussels does not prove that the applicant was not present at the ceremony, in the absence of information about the time of the lunch at the restaurant, as the Court of Justice indeed noted in its judgment (see paragraph 314 above). As for the video which shows that, in his speech, the rector of the establishment in question greeted, in the order determined by protocol, the personalities present at the ceremony, without mentioning the applicant, that speech is available on the same website as the extract mentioned in paragraph 314 above. In that regard, it is sufficient to observe that, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice found that the extract in question mentioned only some of those present at the ceremony, such that it cannot be ruled out that the rector’s speech followed the same approach. Lastly, it cannot be ruled out that the applicant might have decided to leave the ceremony before the end, so as to be able to arrive in time for the lunch in Brussels.

317

Consequently, in the light of the finding of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraph 314 above, it must be held that the mission referred to in line 63 of the table of recoveries does not appear to have been manifestly irregular.

318

In the light of the foregoing, the General Court must adopt in the present proceedings the findings reached by the Court in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), in so far as concerns the activities associated with the missions referred to in lines 47, 57, 63, 103, 128, 137, 138, 143, 155 (in part), 157, 161, 196, 199, 210, 237, 277, 290, 310 (in part), 335, 339 (in part), 347, 373 and 374 (in part), 382, 391, 411 and 412 of the table of recoveries. Following the Court of Justice, which held that those activities should not be regarded as manifestly irregular, having regard to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors (see paragraph 263 above), the Court must conclude that the travel orders issued, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors in relation to those activities were such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the applicant’s part as to the propriety of the missions concerned. The contested decision must therefore be annulled in so far as concerns the mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances referred to in those lines, which amount to a total of EUR 2 018.71. In so far as concerns the mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances referred to in lines 155, 310, 339, 373 and 374 of the table of recoveries, the proper amount of expenses or allowances is one half, for the mission referred to in line 155 (EUR 48.30), one third, for the mission referred to in line 310 (EUR 48.30) and one quarter, for the missions referred to in lines 339 and 373 and 374 (respectively EUR 99.57 and EUR 12.075).

319

The fourth plea in law must be dismissed in so far as it concerns the missions referred to in lines 56, 284, 293 and 294, 330 (in part), 331 (in part) and 334 (in part) of the table of recoveries.

(iii) <i>Conclusion regarding the mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances</i>

320

In the light of the foregoing, it must be held in the present proceedings that the travel orders issued, at the applicant’s request, by the President of the Court of Auditors in relation to the activities referred to in lines 47, 57, 63, 103, 128, 137, 138, 143, 155 (in part), 157, 161, 196, 199, 210, 237, 277, 290, 310 (in part), 314, 319 and 320, 335, 339 (in part), 347, 373 and 374 (in part), 382, 391, 411 and 412 of the table of recoveries were capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation on the applicant’s part as to the regularity of the missions concerned. The contested decision must therefore be annulled in so far as it concerns the mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances reimbursed or paid in respect of those missions, which amount to a total of EUR 2 211.91, and the fourth plea in law dismissed as to the remainder with regard to such expenses and allowances.

(3) <i>Representation and reception expenses</i>

321

Among the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 184 above, the claims for the reimbursement of representation and reception expenses which the Court of Auditors regards as having been unduly paid by the applicant are addressed in lines 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 55, 56, 57, 63, 65, 89, 90, 96, 98, 110, 111, 116, 138, 150, 160, 168, 171, 183, 184, 190, 194, 196, 204, 216, 218, 236, 243, 245, 257, 276, 279, 281, 284, 290, 293 and 294, 314, 319 and 320, 323, 336, 338, 339, 350, 354, 357, 358, 367, 370, 373 and 374, 381, 382 and 408 of the table of recoveries.

322

The applicant submits, in essence, that the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 321 above relate to his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors. In that connection, he refers, in essence, to the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), and states that those findings should be adopted in the present proceedings. He submits that the present proceedings do not allow the Court of Auditors to dispute the findings of the Court of Justice in that judgment, in particular its findings with regard to the case brought before it and its factual and legal findings.

323

As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, as stated in paragraph 179 above, in the present proceedings, it is not necessary to examine the alleged breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in relation to the resources committed by the Court of Auditors for representation and reception expenses. Therefore, in so far as these expenses are concerned, it is necessary solely to examine the question of whether the Court of Auditors made ‘manifest errors’ in taking the view that they were incurred in connection with irregular missions.

(i) <i>The representation expenses for meetings with politicians and members of their Cabinets who were members of the political party in question</i>

324

Among the lines mentioned in paragraph 321 above are a number which relate to contacts between the applicant and politicians or members of their Cabinets all of whom were members of the political party in question. They are lines 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 19, 23, 24, 27, 57, 63, 65, 89, 90, 96, 111, 116, 150, 168, 171, 183, 184, 190, 194, 204, 218, 236, 257, 276, 293 and 294, 323, 336, 338, 350, 354, 357, 358, 367, 370, 373 and 374, 381, 382 (in part) and 408 of the table of recoveries.

325

In that regard, it is clear that five of those claims for reimbursement of representation expenses incurred in connection with invitations sent to those politicians or to members of their Cabinets, namely those addressed in lines 1, 7, 19, 171 and 336 of the table of recoveries, are linked to claims made by the applicant for the reimbursement of mission expenses or the payment of daily subsistence allowances. Given that the latter have been held by the General Court, in paragraph 239 above, as having no connection with the performance of the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors, that conclusion must also extend to the representation expenses incurred in the context of the missions concerned.

326

In so far as concerns the other lines mentioned in paragraph 324 above and also relating to contacts with politicians or members of their Cabinets, all of whom were members of the political party in question, the analysis set out in paragraphs 230 to 235 and 237 to 239 above is valid also for the reimbursement of the representation expenses mentioned in those lines.

327

Admittedly, as the applicant states, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held, with regard to representation and reception expenses associated with professional contacts he maintained with an individual that seemed, in view of the individual’s capacity, likely to be of interest to the Court of Auditors, that an invitation sent to such an individual had to be considered proper (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 618).

328

However, in view of the burden of proof on the applicant in the present case, and in the absence of explanations or evidence capable of proving the contrary, the context of his relations with politicians and members of the their Cabinets who were members of the political party in question, described in paragraph 232 above, calls into question the connection between those relations and his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors (see paragraph 239 above).

329

Consequently, the fourth plea in law must be dismissed in so far as concerns the representation expenses referred to in lines 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 19, 23, 24, 27, 57, 63, 65, 89, 90, 96, 111, 116, 150, 168, 171, 183, 184, 190, 194, 204, 218, 236, 257, 276, 293 and 294, 323, 336, 338, 350, 354, 357, 358, 367, 370, 373 and 374, 381, 382 (in part) and 408 of the table of recoveries, since it is established that they had no relation with the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

330

That being so, it is no longer necessary to examine the amounts of the representation expenses which the Court of Auditors regards as excessive and which are referred to in the lines mentioned in paragraph 329 above, namely those in lines 6, 24, 27, 89, 90, 116, 168, 190, 194, 218, 236, 257, 293 and 294, 338, 350, 354, 357, 358, 367, 370, 373 and 374 and 408 of the table of recoveries, which arose from lunches or dinners given by the applicant to politicians who were also members of the political party in question.

331

Nevertheless, it is apparent from the lines mentioned in paragraph 330 above that the costs of meals for two individuals were EUR 124 (line 350), EUR 293.50 (line 6), EUR 482 (line 24), EUR 292 (line 89), EUR 341 (line 116), EUR 225 (line 194), EUR 227 (line 236), EUR 296 (line 338), EUR 226 (line 354), EUR 315 (line 357), EUR 196 (line 358), EUR 338.20 (line 367), EUR 414 (lines 373 and 374) and EUR 347 (line 408), that the cost of a meal for three individuals ran to EUR 753 (line 27), that the costs of meals for four were EUR 513 (line 190), EUR 802 (line 257) and EUR 670 (lines 293 and 294), that the cost of a meal for five was EUR 564 (line 168) and that meals for six individuals cost EUR 1 159 (line 90), EUR 630 (line 218) and EUR 1 330 (line 370).

332

It must be observed that those are particularly large sums for restaurant expenses and that the Court of Auditors thus had good reason to consider them to be, a priori, manifestly excessive. Since the applicant offers no specific explanations to demonstrate that the sums were reasonable and necessary, even though it is incumbent on him to prove that charging representation expenses to the EU budget was justified (see paragraph 193 above), the contested decision cannot be annulled for having treated these expenses as having been borne by the Court of Auditors unduly.

333

Consequently, having regard to the findings made by OLAF in its investigation regarding the frequency of the meetings between the applicant and politicians who were members of the political party in question (see paragraph 223 above), assessed in the light of the context mentioned in paragraph 232 above, the Court must reject the arguments under the fourth plea in law by which the applicant disputes that the representation expenses referred to in the lines mentioned in paragraph 330 above were excessive.

(ii) <i>The representation expenses associated with meetings with individuals other than politicians who were members of the political party in question</i>

334

In so far as concerns the remaining claims for reimbursement of representation expenses, which relate to meetings between the applicant and individuals other than politicians who were members of the political party in question, it is appropriate first of all to recall that, as Advocate General Hogan stated in his Opinion in <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2020:1052), the ‘financial conscience’ of the European Union necessarily implies full responsibility in the manner in which the Members of the Court of Auditors spend public funds and, consequently, a certain degree of transparency in how they do so (Opinion of Advocate General Hogan in <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2020:1052, point 76).

335

Next, Annex 1 to the note of 22 April 2004 gives examples of acceptable representation expenses, which include, for an invitation, ‘gifts of a value of not more than EUR 50’. That rule gives an indication of the amount that may be considered reasonable for gifts which the applicant might give to individuals whom he invites to a lunch or dinner.

336

Lastly, as has already been stated in paragraphs 193 and 332 above, it is incumbent on the applicant to prove that charging the representation expenses to the EU budget was justified and that the contested decision is unlawful to the extent that it treats those expenses as having been borne by the Court of Auditors unduly.

337

It is in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 334 to 336 above and of the extent of the General Court’s review in the present proceedings, described in paragraphs 185 to 193 above, that the Court must examine whether, as the applicant maintains, the Court of Auditors made errors of assessment with regard to the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses associated with the meetings with individuals other than politicians who were members of the political party in question, which are addressed in lines 17, 28, 56, 98, 138, 196, 281, 284, 290, 314, 319 and 320, 339 and 382 of the table of recoveries.

338

Given the tenor of the applicant’s arguments, described in paragraph 322 above, and the General Court’s observations in paragraphs 202 to 205 above, the Court must, in examining the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses referred to in paragraph 337 above, follow the reasoning set out in paragraphs 220 and 264 above. It is therefore necessary, first, to examine whether the Court of Auditors puts forward new arguments or explanations with respect to those which it presented before the Court of Justice in relation to those claims and, if so, then to assess whether, taking those submissions into account, it should reach the same finding in the present proceedings as was reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) with regard to them (see paragraph 205 above).

– <i>The representation expenses referred to in lines 56, 138, 196, 284 and 382 of the table of recoveries</i>

339

The representation expenses referred to in lines 138, 196 and 382 of the table of recoveries relate to dinners the purpose of which was to enable Flemish business people to meet Belgian diplomats posted abroad, those referred to in line 56 relate to a lunch with a diplomat from the Russian Federation and those referred to in line 284 relate to an invitation from the ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium in France, which was extended to five individuals. including the applicant and his wife.

340

The applicant refers, in essence, to the findings of the Court of Justice in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). In those proceedings, the Court of Justice held that the meetings with diplomats referred to in lines 56, 138, 284 and 382 of the table of recoveries had to be considered regular since it had been held that the irregularity of the missions during which those expenses had been incurred had not been established by the Court of Auditors (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 643). The same applies to the meeting referred to in line 196, in view of the conclusion of the Court of Justice that the Court of Auditors had not established to the requisite legal standard that it had been private in nature (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 569 and 572 to 574).

341

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors submits that the dinners referred to in lines 138, 196 and 382 of the table of recoveries and the lunches referred to in lines 56 and 284 were of a private nature. It maintains that the purpose of the dinners referred to in lines 138, 196 and 382 was to enable Flemish business people to meet Belgian diplomats posted abroad, that the lunch, referred to in line 56, with a diplomat from the Russian Federation was held to discuss assistance with a procedure for the adoption of a Russian child by a Belgian couple who were friends of the applicant’s, and that the lunch referred to in line 284 related to an invitation which the ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium in France had extended to five individuals, including the applicant and his wife, to spend a weekend at his residence in Paris on the occasion of a wine tasting, in the course of which the applicant had paid for a lunch and arranged for a bouquet of flowers to be delivered on behalf of all the guests. In addition, it is clear from the case file that the Court of Auditors considers the cost of that lunch, referred to in line 284, to be excessive.

342

In so far as concerns the private nature of the meetings referred to in lines 138, 196 and 382 of the table of recoveries, it is sufficient to refer to paragraphs 266 to 270 above, in which the Court of Justice concluded that the finding reached with regard to them by the Court in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>

(C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraphs 266 and 269 above, should be adopted in the present proceedings. Since, therefore, those meetings should not be considered manifestly irregular, having regard to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors (see paragraph 263 above), it must be concluded that, by taking the view that those meetings were of a private nature and by ordering the recovery of the representation expenses associated with them, the Court of Auditors made an error of assessment.

343As regards the meetings referred to in lines 56 and 284 of the table of recoveries, on the other hand, the mission expenses associated with those meetings were held by the General Court, in paragraph 281 above, to be irregular. Consequently, the representation expenses relating to those missions are also irregular and should not, therefore, be borne by the Court of Auditors.

344In the light of the foregoing, first, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as concerns the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses addressed in lines 138, 196 and 382 of the table of recoveries, amounting to a total of EUR 382, and, secondly, the fourth plea in law must be dismissed in so far as it relates to the representation expenses referred to in lines 56 and 284 of the table of recoveries.

– The representation expenses referred to in lines 17, 28 and 290 of the table of recoveries

345The representation expenses referred to in lines 17, 28 and 290 of the table of recoveries relate to lunches with, respectively, a chief administrative officer, the director of a group representing the interests of private sector employer undertakings to the European Union, and a senior member of an international audit firm.

346The applicant refers, in essence, to the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). The Court of Justice held, in that regard, that the Court of Auditors had not been able to demonstrate that the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 345 above related to expenses that had not been incurred by the applicant in his capacity as a Member of the Court of Auditors (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 639). As regards the expenses referred to in line 17, the Court of Justice held that an invitation sent to a chief administrative officer responsible for chairing a steering committee of the Federal Public Service – Finance (Belgium), in the absence of evidence that it was private, had to be regarded as falling within that category (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 640). According to the Court of Justice, the same applied to the expenses referred to in lines 28 and 290, in so far as invitations sent to the director of a Europe-wide representative group and a senior member of an international audit firm respectively could be linked to the duties of a Member of the Court of Auditors (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 642).

347In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors submits that the representation expenses referred to in lines 17, 28 and 290 of the table of recoveries should be regarded as having been incurred in the context of meetings that were not in the interests of the institution and therefore irregular.

348First of all, as regards the representation expenses referred to in line 290 of the table of recoveries, it is sufficient to refer to paragraphs 297 and 300 above, in which the Court concluded that the associated missions were not manifestly irregular, and so the representation expenses may be examined in the same way.

349Next, in so far as concerns the representation expenses incurred in connection with the meeting referred to in line 17 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Auditors substantiates its position that that activity was unrelated to the applicant’s duties by stating that it took place in the context of a mission ‘without allowances’, which, in its view, indicates that, in the applicant’s mind, it was by definition for private purposes.

350However, with regard to missions ‘without allowances’, it should be recalled that, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice examined the Court of Auditors’ submission that, at his hearing by OLAF, the applicant had acknowledged that all the missions expressly presented in requests for travel orders as being ‘missions without allowances’ were unrelated to his duties. The Court of Justice found in that respect that it was clear from the transcript of that hearing that the applicant had only stated that he presented those requests in that manner, for the sake of transparency, when a mission ‘had an objective related to [his] position but also a private aspect’ or when he had ‘doubts as to the appropriateness’ of the mission in the light of the purpose and the importance of the activity in question. The Court of Justice concluded that missions expressly presented by the applicant as ‘missions without allowances’ had to be examined in the same way as the other missions which were the subject of the first complaint made by the Court of Auditors (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 393 to 395). In view of that assessment by the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors’ sole argument that the representation expenses were associated with a mission ‘without allowances’ is not sufficient for the General Court to reach a different finding in the present proceedings regarding the meeting to which the representation expenses in line 17 of the table of recoveries relate from that reached by the Court of Justice, recalled in paragraph 346 above, and so the Court must adopt that finding in the present proceedings and conclude that those expenses are to be borne by the Court of Auditors.

351Lastly, as regards the representation expenses associated with the applicant’s meeting with the director of a Europe-wide representative group, referred to in line 28 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Auditors refers to the case file, which contains an extract from the OLAF report indicating that the meeting was of a private nature.

352It must be observed that that extract from the OLAF report was part of the file before the Court of Justice in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), in the sense that, as observed in paragraph 166 above, both in those proceedings and in the present proceedings, the irregularities which the Court of Auditors ascribes to the applicant are identified in one and the same table, set out in Annex A.47 to each of the two applications. The Court of Auditors therefore adds nothing new to the arguments it had already put to the Court of Justice in that case. That being so, the Court of Auditors must bear the representation expenses associated with the meeting referred to in line 28 of the table of recoveries, which was not manifestly irregular.

353In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that, in taking the view that the meetings referred to in lines 17, 28 and 290 of the table of recoveries were not in the interests of the institution and in ordering the recovery of the representation expenses associated with them, the Court of Auditors made an error of assessment. The contested decision must therefore be annulled in so far as it relates to the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses addressed in lines 17, 28 and 290 of the table of recoveries, which total EUR 608.80.

– The representation expenses referred to in lines 314 and 319 and 320 of the table of recoveries

354With regard to the representation expenses referred to in lines 314 and 319 and 320 of the table of recoveries, which relate to contacts with politicians who were not members of the political party in question, the same approach must be adopted as that set out in paragraphs 241 to 251 above.

355Therefore, in the present case, following the findings reached on this subject by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) (see paragraphs 243 and 250 above), which were that the representation expenses referred to in line 314 were regular and that those referred to in lines 319 and 320 were not manifestly irregular, it must be concluded that the Court of Auditors made an error of assessment in taking the view that the meetings which occasioned those expenses were irregular and in ordering the recovery of those expenses. Consequently, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses addressed in lines 314 and 319 and 320 of the table of recoveries, which total EUR 209.40.

– The representation expenses referred to in line 339 of the table of recoveries

356The representation expenses referred to in line 339 of the table of recoveries relate to a meeting with the Chef de Cabinet of the King of the Belgians.

357The applicant refers, in essence, to the finding of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), in which it held that the position held by the individual justified the regularity of the reimbursement of expenses claimed by the applicant (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 625).

358In the present proceedings, to substantiate the absence of any connection between the meeting in question and the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors, the Court of Auditors refers to the status of the individual met. That argument is no different from the argument which it put to the Court of Justice in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), and so it is necessary to adopt in the present proceedings the Court of Justice’s finding regarding the representation expenses referred to in line 339 of the table of recoveries, mentioned in paragraph 357 above.

359Consequently, it must be concluded that the reimbursement of the representation expenses referred to in line 339 of the table of recoveries was in order and that, by ordering the recovery of those expenses, the Court of Auditors therefore made an error of assessment.

360Nevertheless, the Court of Auditors considers that the expenses for a dinner for two, costing EUR 158, were excessive. It must be observed, in that regard, that the applicant makes no comment on the reasonableness of that sum, even though it is incumbent on him to refute the complaint formulated by the Court of Auditors in that regard (see paragraph 336 above).

361That being so, and having regard to the observations set out in paragraph 335 above, it must be held that the representation expenses referred to in line 339 of the table of recoveries were excessive and they should be set at EUR 50 per person, as is warranted for the representation expenses incurred by a Member of the Court of Auditors, giving a total, in this instance, of EUR 100.

362In the light of the foregoing, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the claim for reimbursement of the representation expenses referred to in line 339 of the table of recoveries, to the extent that it relates to representation expenses in the sum of EUR 100. The fourth plea in law must be dismissed in so far as concerns the remainder of the representation expenses referred to in line 339 of the table of recoveries.

– The representation expenses referred to in lines 98 and 281 of the table of recoveries

363The representation expenses referred to in lines 98 and 281 of the table of recoveries relate, respectively, to a dinner with the Chef de Cabinet of a Member of the Commission and a dinner with a Member of the Court of Auditors, a Member of the Belgian Government and a ‘Chef de Cabinet’.

364The applicant refers, in essence, to the findings reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). First, the Court of Justice held, with regard to the expenses incurred for the dinner with the Chef de Cabinet of a Member of the Commission, referred to in line 98 of the table of recoveries, that those expenses had, in principle, to be considered to have been incurred by the applicant in his capacity as a Member of the Court of Auditors, in view of the position held by the guest (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 644). The evidence produced in that regard by the Court of Auditors was not, in the Court’s view, capable of establishing the validity of its claim that that was a private dinner (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 645). The Court noted that, although the Court of Auditors relied on an exchange of emails of 20 May 2010, it was nevertheless clear from that exchange that the specific issues mentioned therein had been resolved before that dinner and there was no indication that they were the purpose of the dinner (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 646). In addition, the Court held that the Court of Auditors’ argument that the cost of the dinner in question entailed a breach by the invited individual of his obligations under Article 11 of the Staff Regulations could not, in any event, establish that the dinner was private (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 647).

In the present proceedings, in so far as concerns the political nature of the meeting referred to in line 98 of the table of recoveries, the Court of Auditors states that it is the political affinities shared by the applicant and the Chef de Cabinet in question that signal the private nature of the mission. It refers, in that regard, to an exchange of emails of 20 May 2010, included in the case file, concerning the organisation of the dinner, in which the person met used the words ‘with my bluest greetings’, which, according to the Court of Auditors, is an allusion to the colour associated in Flanders (Belgium) with the political party in question. The Court of Auditors also states that the documents seized by OLAF in any event establish that the meeting in question did not concern issues relating to the applicant’s duties.

366

The Court of Auditors adds that the individual met was the Chef de Cabinet of a Belgian Member of the Commission who was a member of the political party in question. In view of this individual’s use, in the emails of 20 May 2010, of the words ‘with my bluest greetings’, it would appear that he was also a member of that political party.

367

In view of the context of the applicant’s contacts with politicians who were members of the political party in question, described in paragraph 232 above, which must be regarded as having no connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Court of Auditors (see paragraph 239 above), the Court of Auditors’ argument mentioned in paragraph 366 above is sufficient to create a doubt as to the official nature of the meeting in question. In the absence of any further clarification in that regard from the applicant, who nevertheless bears the burden of proof, the associated representation expenses, referred to in line 98 of the table of recoveries, must be borne by him.

368

Consequently, the fourth plea in law must be dismissed in so far as it relates to the representation expenses referred to in line 98 of the table of recoveries.

369

Secondly, with regard to the dinner with a Member of the Court of Auditors, a Member of the Belgian Government and a ‘Chef de Cabinet’, referred to in line 281 of the table of recoveries, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice held that, in so far as Article 2 of Decision No 7-2004 required only the main guest to be mentioned in respect of the reason for incurring representation expenses, the presence of a further guest, whose capacity did not justify such expenses in itself, was not sufficient to establish the overall irregularity of the claim for reimbursement of the representation expenses in question (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 627).

370

In the present proceedings, it is apparent that the Court of Auditors designated the Member of the Belgian Government as the main guest at the dinner. It is clear from the case file that that individual was a member of the political party in question, for the benefit of which the applicant conducted an undeclared political activity. Since the Court has concluded, in paragraph 239 above, that, in the context described in paragraph 232 above, missions entailing meetings with Belgian politicians who were members of that political party must be regarded as having no connection with the performance of the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors, that solution must also be adopted in relation to the claim for reimbursement of the representation expenses incurred in connection with the meeting referred to in line 281.

371

Consequently, the claims for reimbursement of the representation expenses occasioned by the dinners referred to in lines 98 and 281 of the table of recoveries must be regarded as being linked to the applicant’s undeclared political activity, which is incompatible with his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors. Accordingly, the fourth plea in law must be dismissed in this regard.

372

In those circumstances, it is no longer necessary to examine the Court of Auditors’ argument that the representation expenses referred to in lines 98 and 281 of the table of recoveries were excessive.

373

It should, in any event, be observed that the sums in question were EUR 799 for the dinner with two individuals mentioned in line 98 of the table of recoveries and EUR 685 for the dinner with three individuals mentioned in line 281 of the table of recoveries. The applicant makes no comment upon the reasonableness of those sums, even though it is for him to adduce evidence in that regard (see paragraph 336 above).

374

In those circumstances, having regard to the findings in the OLAF report regarding the frequency with which the applicant met with politicians who were members of the political party in question, mentioned in paragraph 223 above, which must be assessed in the light of the context described in paragraph 232 above, the excessive nature of the representation expenses referred to in lines 98 and 281 of the table of recoveries is established and the fourth plea in law must be dismissed in this regard as well.

– <i>Conclusion regarding the representation expenses for meetings with other individuals</i>

375

In view of the foregoing, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns a total of EUR 1 300.20, broken down as follows:

–the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses relating to the meetings referred to in lines 17, 28, 138, 196, 290, 314, 319 and 320 and 382 of the table of recoveries, amounting to EUR 1 200.20;

–the claim for reimbursement of representation expenses addressed in line 339 of the table of recoveries, amounting to EUR 100.

376

The fourth plea in law must be dismissed as to the remainder of those representation expenses.

(iii) <i>Meals at the applicant’s place of origin</i>

377

The claims for reimbursement of representation expenses relating to meals at the applicant’s place of origin are addressed in lines 22, 55, 110, 160, 216, 243, 245 and 279 of the table of recoveries. In so far as those claims are concerned, the applicant refers, in essence, to the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), and argues that the expenses occasioned by those meals were related to his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors and that the contested decision is unlawful in so far as it treats those expenses as unduly paid. In that regard, the Court of Justice held that the claims in question concerned expenses that had been incurred in connection with the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors. According to the Court of Justice, it seemed that, in the eight cases referred to in those lines, the capacities of most of the guests at a reception held at the applicant’s residence were such as to demonstrate that he could legitimately seek to maintain professional contacts with them in the interest of the Court of Auditors. The Court of Justice stated that those guests thus included individuals exercising key responsibilities within the EU institutions, namely Members of the European Parliament, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Court of Auditors, and within Member States, such as Members of the Belgian Parliament, the Belgian Government and the Cabinet of the King of the Belgians, as well as ambassadors and senior officials (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 682 and 683).

378

Following the reasoning set out in paragraphs 220, 264 and 338 above, the Court must first examine whether the Court of Auditors puts forward new explanations or arguments with respect to those which it set out before the Court of Justice in relation to the claims in question and, if so, then assess whether or not, taking those submissions into account, it should reach the same conclusion in the present proceedings as the Court of Justice reached with regard to them in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) (see paragraph 205 above).

379

In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors submits that the representation expenses associated with the meals at the applicant’s place of origin referred to in lines 22, 55, 110, 160, 216, 243, 245 and 279 of the table of recoveries are clearly unrelated to his activities. In that regard, it principally produces a letter dated 28 April 2015 from the applicant to the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Belgium, inviting him to a dinner and explaining that he regularly invited ‘a number of friends to share an informal dinner at [his] home’, the guests including ‘one or two prominent political figures and a few friends occupying senior positions in the private sector’, and the aim being to ‘spend an enjoyable, relaxed and productive evening in good company’. According to the Court of Auditors, the wording of the letter shows that, as a general rule, the meals organised at the applicant’s place of origin were in reality a means of bringing together friends of his in a confidential setting and were therefore unrelated to his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

380

The Court of Auditors also points out that the meals were organised at the applicant’s home town, not at his residence in Luxembourg, where he was supposed to be officially resident upon being appointed, nor at his headquarters, which had meeting facilities for that purpose.

381

Moreover, after recalling that, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice did not consider that letter to be sufficient to demonstrate that all the meals organised by the applicant at his home in his place of origin were private in nature (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 676 to 681), the Court of Auditors adds that the letter of 28 April 2015 illustrates both the objective and the method followed by the applicant in organising receptions that were clearly not related to his activities. In any event, according to the Court of Auditors, it is not for the EU taxpayer to fund private events that are of benefit to the invited guests and which are suggestive of collusion and conflicts of interest among friends occupying senior positions in the public or private sphere.

382

The arguments of the Court of Auditors mentioned in paragraphs 379 to 381 above add nothing to those on the basis of which the Court of Justice reached its finding in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), with regard to the applicant’s letter of 28 April 2015 and the capacities of the guests at the meals in question, recalled in paragraph 377 above. Those arguments are therefore not sufficient for the Court to reach a different finding in the present proceedings with regard to the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 377 above from that reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782).

383

It should also be borne in mind that, as noted in paragraph 152 above, with regard the applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 22, 55, 110, 160, 216, 243 and 245 of the table of recoveries, OLAF clarified in its report the connection between the applicant and the guests invited to those receptions. According to OLAF, the guests always included one or two Belgian politicians, along with some good friends holding senior positions in the private sector and these events were organised with the aim of spending a ‘pleasant and relaxed, but useful evening in select Flemish company’. OLAF took the view that the guests were all close friends and could be trusted to treat the conversions with absolute discretion and confidentiality. The OLAF report also states that 46 individuals had attended these private dinners and that, apart from their being friends of the applicant’s, their relationships with him could be broadly classified as centred on Belgian politics, hunting, the private sector and EU institutions.

384

More specifically, in so far as concerns the attendance of Belgian politicians at the meals organised at the applicant’s place of origin, referred to in lines 22, 55, 110, 160, 216, 243, 245 and 279 of the table of recoveries, the case file before the General Court confirms OLAF’s finding that the guests at those meals would include one or two Belgian politicians. Indeed, it is noted in the table of recoveries that a member of the political party in question attended the meals referred to in lines 22, 55, 216, 245 and 279 and that two members of that political party attended the meal referred to in line 160. The table of recoveries does not specify the presence of such members at the meals referred to in lines 110 and 243.

385

Admittedly, the attendance of members of the political party in question at these meals appears problematic, given the findings made by OLAF in its investigation regarding the frequency of the applicant’s meetings with those politicians, mentioned in paragraph 223 above, considered in the light of the context mentioned in paragraph 232 above. For that reason, such meals could be regarded as serving, at least in part, political aims of the applicant’s, which would not be compatible with his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

Nevertheless, it must be observed that, as is clear from paragraphs 383 and 384 above, the guest lists for the meals in question were not confined to members of the political party in question or, as the Court of Justice noted in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 678), to ‘Flemish personalities’ and often included one or more individuals exercising responsibilities within EU institutions.

387

The Court of Auditors does not specify which specific guests at the meals organised at the applicant’s place of origin, referred to in lines 22, 55, 110, 160, 216, 243, 245 and 279 of the table of recoveries, demonstrate the absence of a professional relationship with the applicant. Therefore, the General Court must make in the present proceedings the same finding as was made by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraph 377 above, which is that the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses associated with those meals concerned expenses that had been incurred by the applicant in connection with his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

388

However, the General Court observes that, in relation to all the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses relating to meals at the applicant’s place of origin, mentioned in paragraph 377 above, the Court of Auditors also points to the amounts of those expenses, essentially claiming that they are excessive.

389

It should be noted in that connection that the expenses associated with those meals amounted to EUR 2 520.68 for 18 individuals (line 22), EUR 1 976 for 12 individuals (line 55), EUR 2 271.36 for 11 individuals (line 110), EUR 3 018.90 for 16 individuals (line 160), EUR 2 340 for 10 individuals (line 216), EUR 1 897.28 for 9 individuals (line 243), EUR 2 069.76 for 10 individuals (line 245) and EUR 1 104 for 6 individuals (line 279). Those expenses range from approximately EUR 140 to EUR 234 per person and must be regarded as clearly exceeding what is necessary for receptions at the applicant’s private residence, including floral arrangements if there were any, in accordance with the note of 22 April 2004 (see paragraph 16 above). Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the expenses in question were incurred away from the applicant’s place of employment.

390The General Court notes that the applicant makes no comment as to the reasonableness of those sums, even though, as stated in paragraph 336 above, it is incumbent on him to refute the Court of Auditors’ claims and to prove that charging the representation expenses to the EU budget was justified and that the contested decision is unlawful to the extent that it treats those expenses as having been paid unduly.

391In those circumstances, and having regard to the General Court’s considerations set out in paragraph 335 above, which apply <i>mutatis mutandis </i>to the meals organised at the applicant’s place of origin, it would be a fair reflection of the circumstances involved to decide that the sum of EUR 50 per person does not exceed what is necessary for the meals organised at the applicant’s place of origin, referred to in lines 22, 55, 110, 160, 216, 243, 245 and 279 of the table of recoveries.

392In addition, it is clear from Annex 1 to the note of 22 April 2004 containing suggestions with regard to representation and reception expenses of Members of the Court of Auditors that such expenditure at the private residence of a Member may be for floral arrangements, provided that they are no more than is necessary for the purpose of organising a reception (see paragraph 17 above). However, the General Court notes that the invoices on the file relating to each of the meals organised at the applicant’s place of origin, referred to in lines 22, 55, 110, 160, 216, 243, 245 and 279 of the table of recoveries, contain no information about floral arrangements for those meals. Indeed, the invoices for the meals referred to in lines 22, 55, 110, 160, 216, 243 and 245 essentially show only the price per person of the menu served at the meal. It is only the invoice for the meal referred to in line 279 that mentions, among the other services provided by the caterer, a ‘table decoration’, albeit without indicating in any way whether that was a floral arrangement and without any reference to the cost of the arrangement if there was one. In any event, given that, in accordance with Article 6 of Decision No 7-2004, for receptions held at home, the Court of Auditors is to reimburse the expenses incurred up to the amount evidenced by the supporting documents submitted (see paragraph 15 above), the mere mention of a ‘table decoration’ is not sufficient for the reimbursement of the costs of flower arrangements.

393Consequently, the contested decision must be annulled to the extent that it orders the recovery of the sums of EUR 900 under line 22, EUR 600 under line 55, EUR 550 under line 110, EUR 800 under line 160, EUR 500 under line 216, EUR 450 under line 243, EUR 500 under line 245 and EUR 300 under line 279, giving a total of EUR 4 600, and the fourth plea in law dismissed in so far as concerns the remainder of those expenses.

(4) <i>The expenses relating to use of the official car and recourse to the services of a driver</i>

394Among the applicant’s claims addressed in the lines of the table of recoveries mentioned in paragraph 184 above, the claims for reimbursement of expenses relating to use of the official car and recourse to the services of a driver which the Court of Auditors considers to have been unduly paid by the applicant are addressed in lines 3, 31, 38, 57, 66, 103, 138, 142, 143, 161, 196, 199, 203, 211, 215, 237, 238, 277, 281, 293 and 294, 296 (in part), 310 (in part), 313, 317, 319 and 320, 330, 335, 336, 339, 347, 352, 354, 355, 373 and 374, 379, 381, 382, 391, 402 and 403 of the table of recoveries.

395The applicant submits, in essence, that the claims for reimbursement of drivers’ expenses addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 394 above are related to his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors. In that regard, he refers, essentially, to the findings of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), and states that the present proceedings do not allow the Court of Auditors to dispute them.

396As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, as stated in paragraph 179 above, in the present proceedings, it is not necessary to examine the alleged breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in relation to the resources committed by the Court of Auditors for use of the official car and recourse to the services of a driver. As far as those expenses are concerned, therefore, it is necessary, in view of the extent of the General Court’s review in the present proceedings, described in paragraphs 185 to 193 above, solely to examine whether the Court of Auditors has made errors of assessment in ordering their recovery.

(i) <i>The drivers’ expenses associated with the applicant’s missions or representation expenses relating to meetings with members of the political party in question</i>

397In so far as concerns lines 203, 211, 215, 238, 293 and 294, 296 (in part), 313, 330, 336, 339 (in part), 352, 355, 381, 382 (in part) and 402 of the table of recoveries, it was held in paragraphs 239 and 261 above that the applicant’s missions referred to in those lines had no connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Court of Auditors. It must therefore be held that the drivers’ expenses referred to in the same lines are correlatively lacking in any such connection.

398The same applies to the claims for reimbursement of the driver’s expenses addressed in lines 281, 293 and 294 and 354 of the table of recoveries, which are associated with the claims for reimbursement of representation expenses occasioned by dinners with members of the political party in question, addressed in the same lines, which have been held to be incompatible with the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors (see paragraphs 329 and 371 above).

399The same conclusion applies with regard to the claims for reimbursement of the driver’s expenses addressed in lines 3, 31 et 66 of the table of recoveries, since those claims related to meetings with members of the political party in question.

400Consequently, the fourth plea in law must be dismissed in so far as concerns the drivers’ expenses addressed in lines 3, 31, 66, 203, 211, 215, 238, 281, 293 and 294, 296 (in part), 313, 330, 336, 339 (in part), 352, 354, 355, 381, 382 (in part) and 402 of the table of recoveries.

(ii) <i>Other drivers’ expenses</i>

The drivers’ expenses referred to in lines 57, 103, 143, 157, 161, 199, 237, 277, 310, 335, 347, 354 and 391 of the table of recoveries

401Among the claims for reimbursement of drivers’ expenses mentioned in paragraph 394 above, those addressed in lines 3, 31, 57, 66, 103, 143, 157, 161, 199, 237, 277, 310 (in part), 335, 347, 354 and 391 of the table of recoveries are linked to claims for mission expenses or daily subsistence allowances or representation expenses made by the applicant. The Court of Justice examined those latter claims in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), for the purpose of determining whether they were related to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

402In that regard, it must be observed that, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), after assessing each of the claims for the reimbursement of mission expenses or the payment of daily subsistence allowances addressed in lines 31, 57, 66, 103, 143, 157, 161, 199, 237, 277, 310 (in part), 335, 347 and 391 of the table of recoveries, with reference to the irregularities which the Court of Auditors alleged in those proceedings, the Court of Justice found, in essence, that they related to expenses that had been incurred by the applicant in connection with his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors (judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i>, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 494, 497, 500, 501, 504, 505, 515, 558, 559, 561 to 565, 576 and 735).

403In the present proceedings, the applicant relies on that finding by the Court of Justice to demonstrate that bearing the costs incurred following the claims for reimbursement addressed in the lines mentioned in paragraph 401 above was related to his duties and that the contested decision is unlawful in that it treated those expenses as having been unduly paid.

404In view of the applicant’s arguments and the observations set out in paragraphs 202 to 205 above, it is necessary, in the course of examining the claims for reimbursement of drivers’ expenses referred to in paragraph 401 above, to apply the same reasoning as that set out in paragraphs 220, 264, 338 and 378 above. Therefore, it is necessary, first, to consider whether the Court of Auditors puts forward new arguments or explanations with respect to those which it presented before the Court of Justice regarding those claims and, if so, then to assess whether, taking those submissions into account, it is appropriate to draw the same conclusions as the Court of Justice (see paragraph 205 above) with regard to those claims.

405In so far as concerns the claims for the reimbursement of mission expenses or the payment of daily subsistence allowances addressed in lines 57, 103, 143, 157, 161, 199, 237, 277, 310 (in part), 335, 347 and 391 of the table of recoveries, the Court reached the conclusion in the present proceedings, following the analysis set out in paragraphs 282 to 297, 301 to 305 and 308 to 313 above, that it must adopt the Court of Justice’s finding in that regard. Given that the Court of Auditors adds nothing new concerning the claims for reimbursement of drivers’ expenses addressed in those lines with respect to the arguments which it put before the Court of Justice, it must be held, as the Court of Justice held, that the drivers’ expenses referred to in the lines mentioned must be regarded as having been incurred in connection with the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

406In those circumstances, it must be concluded that, by taking the view that the drivers’ expenses referred to in lines 57, 103, 143, 157, 161, 199, 237, 277, 310 (in part), 335, 347 and 391 of the table of recoveries were unconnected with the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors and in ordering their recovery, the Court of Auditors made an error of assessment. Accordingly, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the drivers’ expenses mentioned in those lines, which amount to a total of EUR 3 224.72. As regards the expenses mentioned in line 310, the correct amount is one third of the expenses (EUR 153.65).

The driver’s expenses referred to in lines 138, 196, 319 and 320, 339 (in part) and 382 (in part) of the table of recoveries

407In so far as concerns the claims for reimbursement of the driver’s expenses addressed in lines 138, 196, 319 and 320, 339 (in part) and 382 (in part) of the table of recoveries, it must be observed that the Court of Justice gave no ruling on them in the judgment of 30 September 2021, <i>Court of Auditors</i> v <i>Pinxten</i> (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782).

408Those claims were linked to claims made by the applicant for reimbursement of representation expenses incurred in connection with activities which the Court has found not to be unrelated to his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors (see paragraphs 342, 355 and 359 above).

409Applying the same reasoning as that set out in paragraph 404 above, it must be observed that the Court of Auditors adds nothing new in the present proceedings with regard to the claims for reimbursement of the driver’s expenses addressed in the lines in question with respect to the arguments which it put before the Court of Justice. Accordingly, it must be held that the driver’s expenses referred to in lines 138, 196, 319 and 320, 339 (in part) and 382 (in part) of the table of recoveries were incurred in connection with the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors.

410In those circumstances, it must be concluded that, in taking the view that the driver’s expenses referred to in lines 138, 196, 319 and 320, 339 (in part) and 382 (in part) of the table of recoveries were unrelated to those duties and in ordering their recovery, the Court of Auditors made an error of assessment. Accordingly, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the driver’s expenses referred to in lines 138, 196, 319 and 320, 339 (in part) and 382 (in part) of the table of recoveries, amounting to a total of EUR 1 158.83. In so far as concerns the driver’s expenses referred to in lines 339 and 382, the correct amount is one quarter of the expenses for line 339 (EUR 74.13) and one third of the expenses in question for line 382 (EUR 165.70).

The driver’s expenses referred to in lines 379 and 403 of the table of recoveries

411The two claims for reimbursement of the driver’s expenses referred to in lines 379 and 403 of the table of recoveries, mentioned in paragraph 394 above, were not expressly examined by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782).

412In that regard, in view of the burden of proof mentioned in paragraph 193 above, it is incumbent on the applicant to demonstrate that there was justification for the EU budget to bear the cost of the driver’s expenses referred to in lines 379 and 403 of the table of recoveries and that the contested decision is unlawful in that it treats those expenses as paid unduly.

413It should be observed that the driver’s expenses referred to in line 379 were not linked to any mission for the applicant. It is apparent from the driver’s travel order that the purpose thereof was to drive the applicant from Luxembourg to Brussels, then to his place of origin, with the driver spending the night at a hotel and returning to Luxembourg by train.

414The driver’s expenses referred to in line 403, on the other hand, were linked to a mission for the applicant without allowances. It is apparent from the travel order that it related to ‘Maître …’ and the journey Luxembourg-Dijon-Luxembourg. According to the Court of Auditors, the real nature of the activity referred to in that line was the purchase of a vineyard.

415The applicant confines himself to submitting that, since those expenses were not classified as irregular by the Court of Justice, they cannot be regarded as such in the present proceedings.

416However, it must be observed that, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice regarded as irregular the driver missions the purpose of which was to drive the applicant for an unknown reason or for a reason that was clearly separable from his duties (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 711 to 716).

417Given that the applicant has not adduced any evidence capable of establishing that the driver’s expenses referred to in lines 379 and 403 of the table of recoveries related to travel connected with the performance of his duties, and of refuting the Court of Auditors’ allegation that those expenses were private in nature, it must be held that the Court of Auditors was entitled to categorise them as amounts receivable and to order their recovery.

418Consequently, the fourth plea in law must be dismissed in so far as it challenges the lawfulness of the recovery of the driver’s expenses referred to in lines 379 and 403 of the table of recoveries.

– The driver’s expenses referred to in line 38 of the table of recoveries

419In the contested decision, the Court of Auditors treated as irregular the driver mission referred to in line 38 of the table of recoveries, in the course of which a driver travelled from Luxembourg to the place in Switzerland where the applicant was on holiday, in order to drive him back to his place of origin.

420The applicant relies, in essence, on the finding reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), which was that, although the reason relied on by the Court of Auditors for the driver mission mentioned in line 38, namely to pick him up at his holiday location, was such as to establish the irregularity of that mission, the applicant denied having authorised such a mission, while the Court of Auditors had not demonstrated that the mission had actually taken place, given that the documents before the Court of Justice did not include a travel order signed by him (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 717).

421The Court of Justice also noted that, under the organisational arrangements within the Court of Auditors until 5 October 2016, its Members were required to sign the travel orders of drivers whose services they used (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 698).

422In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors states that there was no travel order for the applicant, and that that is sufficient in itself to establish the irregularity of the driver’s mission. It also alleges that the applicant, as the driver’s authorising officer, requested and validated the mission in question in the MISPROD computer system, which was used at that time at the Court of Auditors to attest to the correctness of missions.

423Admittedly, the case file does not contain a driver’s travel order for the activity referred to in line 38 of the table of recoveries that is signed by the applicant, as the rules in force at the time required. However, even if that administrative task was omitted, the fact remains that it is established that, between 7 and 9 March 2009, a driver incurred expenses for that activity amounting to EUR 716.82. Moreover, the Court of Auditors has added to the file extracts from the MISPROD computer system which show that the applicant was the authorising officer for the mission for his driver to go and collect him from a town in Switzerland. Those extracts also confirm the Court of Auditors’ allegations regarding the activities of the driver that were covered by the claim for reimbursement addressed in that line, which are that the driver spent the night of 7 to 8 March 2009 in a hotel in Switzerland, drove the applicant back to his place of origin on 8 March 2009 and spent the night of 8 to 9 March 2009 at a hotel there before returning to Luxembourg on 9 March 2009.

424The applicant makes no comment on the Court of Auditors’ allegations, even though it is incumbent on him in the present proceedings to demonstrate (see paragraph 193 above) that there was justification for the budget of the European Union to bear the driver’s expenses in question and that the contested decision is unlawful for treating those expenses as having been paid unduly.

425In those circumstances, it must be held that the driver’s expenses referred to in line 38 of the table of recoveries were irregular, and to dismiss the fourth plea in law in so far as it concerns that line.

– The driver’s expenses referred to in lines 106, 147, 151, 153, 167 and 214 of the table of recoveries

426The purpose of the driver’s missions referred to in lines 106, 147, 151, 153, 167 and 214 of the table of recoveries was to drive the applicant in the context of missions relating to medical appointments.

427In that regard, the applicant refers, in essence, to the finding reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782).

428The Court of Auditors argues that the driver’s missions referred to in the lines mentioned in paragraph 426 above were irregular, since the applicant’s corresponding missions were ‘missions without allowances’ or were ‘closed with no expenses’. It submits that, since those missions were not missions in accordance with the Court of Auditors’ internal rules, they could not warrant recourse to the services of a driver.

429It should be borne in mind that, with regard to those driver missions, the Court of Justice stated, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), as follows:

‘777 Those missions of [the applicant’s] cannot be considered to be connected with the performance of his duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors as it is neither claimed nor established that those appointments concerned medical checks that were mandatory in that capacity.

778 It should be noted, however, that [the applicant] did not claim reimbursement of mission expenses or payment of daily subsistence allowances for those missions. The only costs entailed by those missions for the Court of Auditors thus related to the use of the official car and recourse to the services of a driver.

779 On the one hand, there is significant ambiguity in the Commentary on Decision No 33-2004 and the Commentary on Decision No 19-2009 as to whether a journey to a medical appointment can be considered as “other travel connected with the performance of duties” within the meaning of Article 4 of each of those decisions.

780 The list of “cases of force majeure” that can be considered as such travel included “medical checks”.

781 It is indeed apparent from the Court’s settled case-law, established in various spheres of EU law, that the concept of force majeure must be understood as referring to abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances which were outside the control of the party by whom it is pleaded and the consequences of which could not have been avoided in spite of the exercise of all due care (judgment of 25 January 2017, Vilkas, C‑640/15, EU:C:2017:39, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

782 While the use of the concept of “force majeure” normally therefore implies an unforeseeable character, the wording of both the Commentary on Decision No 33-2004 and the Commentary on Decision No 19-2009 contain a certain inconsistency in that regard, as the notion of ‘medical checks’ excludes any dimension of urgency or unforeseeability.

783 On the other hand, although recourse to a driver for “other travel connected with the performance of duties” does not, by definition, require the Member of the Court of Auditors concerned to be on a mission, it must be stated that, by transparently requesting its authorisation to travel, in the context of a mission, to a medical appointment, [the applicant] allowed the Court of Auditors to carry out an ex ante check and, if it considered it appropriate, to object to the use of the resources of the Court of Auditors proposed by him.

784 In the light of those two factors, the irregularity of the missions of [the applicant] and of the driver assigned to his Cabinet [referred to in lines 106, 151, 153, 167 and 214 of the table of recoveries] is not manifest such that [the applicant] could be criticised for them in the present proceedings.’

430Those considerations and conclusions of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), should be applied to the present case, with regard to the same drivers’ missions, referred to in lines 106, 151, 153, 167 and 214 of the table of recoveries.

431Furthermore, that reasoning of the Court of Justice is also applicable to the driver mission referred to in line 147, which entailed transport expenses for the driver in connection with two medical appointments for the applicant. In view of the fact that those appointments, for which the applicant had requested authorisation from the Court of Auditors, had taken place in the context of the applicant’s travelling, in an official vehicle, to a meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Control of the Parliament and an association’s lunchtime conference (see also paragraph 132 above), his request for the services of a driver for the return journey to Luxembourg cannot be regarded as irregular, even though it meant that the driver in question had to take a train from Luxembourg to Brussels.

432In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that, by categorising as amounts receivable the driver’s expenses referred to in lines 106, 147, 151, 153, 167 and 214 of the table of recoveries and by ordering their recovery, the Court of Auditors made an error of assessment. Accordingly, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the driver’s expenses referred to in those lines, which amount to a total of EUR 1 689.25.

– The driver’s expenses referred to in line 142 of the table of recoveries

433The driver mission referred to in line 142 of the table of recoveries relates to expenses incurred in bringing the applicant’s official car to his holiday location in Switzerland. In the contested decision, the Court of Auditors acknowledges that the applicant reimbursed certain sums arising from the driver’s journey. However, it submits that the part being the salary of the driver to whom he had recourse incorrectly has not been recovered.

434The applicant disputes the fact that the driver’s salary associated with the mission referred to in line 142 of the table of recoveries constitutes a debt which he owes to the Court of Auditors. He states that, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice concluded that there was no irregularity there.

435In the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice concluded that, although the irregularity of the driver mission mentioned in line 142 was not contested, that irregularity could not be held as a complaint against the applicant in those proceedings (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 752). The Court noted that, while the parties disagreed as to the specific purpose of that mission, the applicant’s claim that the aim of the mission, as agreed with the staff member responsible for the drivers at the Court of Auditors, was to retrieve the official car following an accident essentially tallied with the statements made by the driver concerned at his hearing by OLAF on 16 October 2017 (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten

C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 754). In addition, the Court of Justice stated that it was established that, after being informed of a possible irregularity of the mission of the driver in question, the applicant had approached the administration of the Court of Auditors during 2011 with a view to reimbursing the sums that had been unduly charged to it during that mission and that those sums had been deducted from his salary (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 755).

436In the present case, it is sufficient to observe that, as indicated in paragraph 35 above, in 2011, the Court of Auditors was providing the applicant with the services of a driver, such that the salary of that driver was to be paid by the Court of Auditors, and that it was therefore not established that any financial loss accrued to it in that connection.

437Consequently, by categorising the driver’s salary referred to in line 142 of the table of recoveries as an amount receivable and by ordering its recovery, the Court of Auditors made an error of assessment. Accordingly, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the driver’s expenses referred to in that line, which amount to EUR 185.43.

– The driver’s expenses referred to in line 187 of the table of recoveries

438The subject of the driver’s mission referred to in line 187 of the table of recoveries was a ‘formal invitation by Princess …’. The Court of Auditors considers that that mission was irregular, since the applicant’s corresponding mission was a ‘mission without allowances’. More specifically, it states that the applicant was on a mission in Brussels, with his driver and official vehicle, but that he nevertheless decided to keep the official vehicle for his private weekend activities, while the driver was obliged to return to Luxembourg by train.

439The applicant refers, in essence, to the finding reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), in which it essentially concluded that it was unnecessary for it to determine whether the Court of Auditors could legitimately attribute to the applicant the practice of keeping his official vehicle and so causing the driver to make a journey by train (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 798).

440In the present proceedings, and following reasoning similar to that relating to the claim for reimbursement addressed in line 147 (see paragraph 431 above), it is sufficient to note that the Court of Auditors does not dispute the legitimacy of the applicant’s journey in response to the invitation extended by the personality in question, and nor does it specify for what private activities the applicant kept the official vehicle over the weekend. In those circumstances, and in view of the fact that the applicant’s corresponding mission was authorised by the Court of Auditors, his request for the services of a driver cannot be regarded as irregular.

441Therefore, by categorising the driver’s expenses referred to in line 187 of the table of recoveries as an amount receivable and by ordering their recovery, the Court of Auditors made an error of assessment. Accordingly, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns those driver’s expenses, amounting to EUR 42.64.

– The driver’s expenses referred to in line 247 of the table of recoveries

442The purpose of the driver’s mission referred to in line 247 was to drive the applicant’s official car, which he had been using, to a garage in Belgium for servicing.

443The applicant submits, in essence, that account should be taken of the considerations of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). In this regard, after noting that the driver’s mission referred to in line 247 was, according to the applicant, to take his official car to a garage for servicing, the Court of Justice held that the Court of Auditor’s argument could not be upheld in the absence of any evidence to support it (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 748 and 749).

444In the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors points out that the garage responsible for servicing the applicant’s official car was situated, according to the leasing agreement in force, in Luxembourg, and so the purpose of the mission in question could not have been to service that car.

445Following the same reasoning as that set out in paragraph 404 above, it is sufficient to observe that the case file does not contain any other evidence to establish the veracity of the Court of Auditor’s allegation that the servicing of this car was carried out by a garage located in another country. Accordingly, the General Court must adopt in the present proceedings the finding reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), mentioned in paragraph 443 above.

446Consequently, by categorising the driver’s expenses referred to in line 247 of the table of recoveries as an amount receivable and by ordering their recovery, the Court of Auditors made an error of assessment. Accordingly, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it relates to those expenses, which amount to EUR 239.10.

– The drivers’ expenses referred to in lines 176, 317 and 373 and 374 of the table of recoveries

447With regard to the drivers’ expenses referred to in lines 176, 317 and 373 and 374 of the table of recoveries, the applicant submits, in essence, that account should be taken of the considerations expressed by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782). The Court of Justice did not conclude that the drivers’ missions referred to in lines 176, 317 and 373 and 374 of the table of recoveries were irregular, since the documents before it did not include the applicant’s travel orders to which the Court of Auditors referred and did not therefore demonstrate that the disputed journeys were not legitimately covered by those travel orders (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 735).

448Applying the reasoning set out in paragraph 404 above, it must be noted that, in the present proceedings, the Court of Auditors states, with reference to the relevant travel orders, which it sets out in an annex, that the missions referred to in lines 176, 317 and 373 and 374 of the table of recoveries should have commenced and ended in Luxembourg.

449In that regard, it is sufficient to observe, like the Court of Justice, that the documents before the General Court in the present case again do not include the applicant’s travel orders to which the drivers’ expenses mentioned in lines 176, 317 and 373 and 374 of the table of recoveries relate, such that the irregularity of those expenses is not sufficiently established to be held as a complaint against the applicant.

450In those circumstances, it must be concluded that, by taking the view that the drivers’ expenses referred to in lines 176, 317 and 373 and 374 of the table of recoveries were unrelated to the applicant’s duties as a Member of the Court of Auditors and by ordering their recovery, the Court of Auditors made an error of assessment. Accordingly, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it requires the reimbursement of those expenses, which amount to EUR 1 431.93.

– Conclusion regarding the other drivers’ expenses

451In the light of the foregoing, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the drivers’ expenses referred to in lines 57, 103, 106, 138, 142, 143, 147, 151, 153, 157, 161, 167, 176, 187, 196, 199, 214, 237, 247, 277, 310 (in part), 317, 319 and 320, 335, 339 (in part), 347, 354, 373 and 374, 382 (in part) and 391 of the table of recoveries, which amount to a total of EUR 7 971.90. The fourth plea in law must be dismissed as to the remainder as regards those other expenses.

(c) Conclusion regarding the fourth plea in law

452In view of the foregoing, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it orders the recovery of the expenses for which reimbursement was claimed, referred to in the lines mentioned in paragraphs 320, 375, 393 and 451 above, amounting to a total of EUR 16 084.01. The fourth plea in law must be dismissed as to the remainder.

5. The fifth plea in law, based on the dictum that administrative proceedings must await the outcome of criminal proceedings

453By this plea, the applicant maintains that, because criminal proceedings are pending in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Court of Auditors was not entitled to reach a decision before the Luxembourg criminal authorities – before which the same acts as those on which the contested decision is based have been brought – give judgment. By failing to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings, the Court of Auditors has failed to observe the dictum that administrative proceedings must await the outcome of criminal proceedings. In his observations on the inferences to be drawn from the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782) for the purposes of the present case, the applicant submits that the Court of Justice did not give a ruling on the present plea.

454The Court of Auditors disputes the applicant’s arguments.

455It must be observed that, as the Court of Auditors has pointed out, in the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the Court of Justice rejected a similar line of argument from the applicant, based on the fact that criminal proceedings were pending in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. In that regard, the Court of Justice first of all noted that EU law did not provide that proceedings initiated before it under Article 286(6) TFEU must be stayed where criminal proceedings relating, in whole or in part, to the same acts have been initiated (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 83). Next, after referring to Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, which provides that, where the official is prosecuted for those same acts, a final decision is to be taken only after a final judgment has been handed down by the court hearing the case, the Court of Justice stated that proceedings relating to the breach by a Member of the Court of Auditors of the obligations arising from his office constituted a discrete legal remedy under Article 286(6) TFEU and that those proceedings were not therefore governed by the rules concerning disciplinary proceedings set out in the Staff Regulations (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraphs 84 and 85). Lastly, the Court of Justice concluded that there was therefore no need to stay the proceedings under Article 286(6) TFEU pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings initiated in Luxembourg because, in any event, the outcome of those proceedings was not such as to limit the scope of the findings which the Court of Justice was obliged to make in order to rule on the action before it (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 88).

456That reasoning should be applied in the present proceedings, brought pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Indeed, there is no rule of EU law that stipulates that proceedings commenced before the General Court pursuant to that provision must be suspended where criminal proceedings relating, in whole or in part, to the same acts have been initiated. Moreover, the financial consequences ensuing from a breach, by a Member of the Court of Auditors, of the obligations arising from his office are not governed by the rules relating to disciplinary proceedings set out in the Staff Regulations. Those financial consequences have been applied in accordance with the provisions of Articles 98 and 100 of Regulation 2018/1046. Furthermore, it may also be concluded in the present proceedings that there is no need to stay the present proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings initiated in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg because, in any event, the outcome of those proceedings is not such as to limit the scope of the findings which the General Court is obliged to make in order to rule on the present action.

457In the light of the foregoing, the present plea must be dismissed as unfounded.

458The applicant disputes that he can incur liability in his capacity as authorising officer for the expenses of his drivers, which amount to EUR 30 501.27 in salaries and EUR 40 595.15 in mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances. He refers to Article 75 of Regulation No 966/2012 and submits that he could incur such liability only in the event of ‘intentional wrongdoing’ or ‘gross negligence’ on his part in his capacity as authorising officer for the drivers’ missions. He also states that that provision, as well as Article 94 of Regulation 2018/1046, provide for referral to a special financial irregularities panel in the event that the liability of a financial actor is put in issue. In addition, the applicant states that he is not the authorising officer for the daily subsistence allowances of the drivers who drove him or for their remuneration.

459The applicant submits that the Court of Auditors has failed to fulfil its duty to state reasons by omitting to respond in the contested decision to ‘one of the arguments raised by [him] in connection with the exercise of his right to be heard’ and has infringed Article 75 of Regulation No 966/2012 or Article 94 of Regulation 2018/1046.

460 The applicant states, for the purposes of comparison, that the capacity of the two Presidents of the Court of Auditors during his two terms of office as authorising officers for his mission expenses and representation and reception expenses did not lead to their liability being put in issue. He also maintains that the mission expenses of the drivers were consistent with the legal framework that was in force at the relevant time, in particular Decisions Nos 33-2004 and 19-2009.

461 In his observations on the inferences to be drawn, for the purposes of the present case, from the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), the applicant states that the Court of Justice did not give a ruling on the present plea, which was not raised in the proceedings which the Court of Auditors brought before it.

462 The Court of Auditors disputes the applicant’s arguments.

463 In the first place, regarding the complaint of breach of the duty to state reasons, the applicant confines himself to stating that the contested decision failed to answer one of the arguments he had raised in connection with the exercise of his right to be heard. In the absence of any clarification as to what argument that may have been, it must be held that the present complaint does not meet the requirements imposed by Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, in terms of clarity and precision, and that it must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.

464 Indeed, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to proceedings before the General Court in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 53 of the same statute, and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, an application must contain the subject matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas in law. Those elements must be set out sufficiently clearly and precisely to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the General Court to rule on the action, if necessary, without further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and sound administration of justice it is necessary, in order for an action to be admissible, that the basic legal and factual particulars relied on be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see, to that effect, order of 28 April 1993, De Hoe v Commission, T‑85/92, EU:T:1993:39, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited). The application must, accordingly, specify the nature of the grounds on which it is based, with the result that a mere abstract statement of the grounds does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure. Similar requirements are called for where a submission is made in support of a plea in law (see judgment of 25 March 2015, Belgium v Commission, T‑538/11, EU:T:2015:188, paragraph 131 and the case-law cited; order of 27 November 2020, PL v Commission, T‑728/19, not published, EU:T:2020:575, paragraph 64).

465 In the second place, as regards the complaint of infringement of Article 75 of Regulation No 966/2012 or of Article 94 of Regulation 2108/1046, the applicant stated at the hearing that he was in fact referring to Article 73 of Regulation No 966/2012 and Article 92 of Regulation 2018/1046.

466 In so far as concerns the substance of the complaint alleging infringement of those latter provisions, it is sufficient to observe that it is clear from the rules which applied when Members of the Court of Auditors had recourse to the services of a driver, as described by the Court of Justice in paragraphs 695 to 700 of the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782), that it was incumbent on the applicant, as authorising officer for the missions of the drivers, to ensure that, when formulating his travel orders for drivers, the applicable rules were complied with. That requirement must be deemed to be independent of any recourse to the procedure established by Article 73 of Regulation No 966/2012 or by Article 92 of Regulation 2018/1046, or even of any referral to OLAF. Accordingly, those provisions are of no relevance in the present proceedings.

467 Moreover, liability on the applicant’s part as authorising officer for the missions of drivers, whether arising through intentional wrongdoing or gross negligence, cannot be compared with liability on the part of the President of the Court of Auditors in his capacity as authorising officer for the mission expenses and representation and reception expenses incurred by Members of the Court of Auditors. Indeed, the drivers’ missions were linked to the applicant’s own activities, whereas there is no such link between a Member of the Court of Auditors and its President with regard to the Member’s missions.

468 In the light of the foregoing, the complaint alleging infringement of Article 73 of Regulation No 966/2012 or of Article 92 of Regulation 2018/1046 must be rejected as unfounded.

469 Furthermore, in so far as concerns the complaint by which the applicant disputes liability for the drivers’ expenses, which amount to EUR 30 501.27 in salaries and EUR 40 595.15 in mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances, that complaint essentially overlaps with the complaint alleging the existence of ‘manifest errors’, which the Court has already examined in the context of the fourth plea in law (see paragraphs 394 to 451 above).

470 In the light of the foregoing, the sixth plea in law must be dismissed in its entirety.

7. Conclusion regarding the claim for annulment of the contested decision

471 In the light of all the foregoing, without it being necessary to adopt measures of organisation of the procedure as requested by the applicant, the Court annuls the contested decision in so far as it relates, first, to the claims for reimbursement of expenses the recovery of which the General Court held, in paragraph 162 above, to be time-barred and, secondly, those mentioned in paragraph 452 above. In total, the expenses covered by all those claims for reimbursement amount to EUR 19 254.20. The claim for annulment of the contested decision must be rejected as to the remainder.

472 It should be noted that, in the application for annulment, immediately after the request for annulment of the contested decision, the applicant seeks, ‘in so far as may be necessary’, the annulment of the decisions of the Court of Auditors’ accounting officer of 4 and 7 June 2019. In that regard, it must be observed that, without raising any complaint specifically directed against those two decisions, the applicant seeks their annulment in so far as concerns the amounts set out in them, as increased by interest from 31 May 2019, which, according to the calculations of the Court of Auditors’ accounting officer, stood at EUR 153 584.10 on 4 June 2019 and EUR 153 495.84 on 7 June 2019.

473 The Court points out that it was by her letter of 7 June 2019 that the Court of Auditors’ accounting officer took note of the payment that had been made inclusive of the interest due as at that date (see paragraph 57 above). Therefore, in view of the conclusion set out in paragraph 471 above, the Court upholds the claim for annulment of the decision of the Court of Auditors’ accounting officer contained in her letter of 7 June 2019 in so far as it requires the payment of default interest at the rate of 3.5% [per annum] on the sum mentioned in paragraph 471 above.

474 In those circumstances, it is not necessary to annul the decision of 4 June 2019, which states a sum, increased by interest accruing from 31 May to 4 June 2019, that is different from the sum that was established by the Court of Auditors’ accounting officer on 7 June 2019 and that has actually been paid by the applicant.

475 The applicant asks the General Court to order the Court of Auditors to reimburse him the sum which the latter treated as having been paid unduly and to pay him interest at the rate of 3.5% [per annum] from 31 May 2019, the deadline set in the contested decision for him to pay a total of EUR 153 407.58, until full payment.

476 It should be borne in mind that the annulment of a measure by a Court of the European Union has the effect of retroactively eliminating that measure from the legal order (see judgment of 30 June 2021, Mélin v Parliament, T‑51/20, not published, EU:T:2021:398, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).

477 In accordance with Article 266 TFEU, the institution, agency or body whose act has been annulled is required to take the necessary measures to implement the judgment annulling that act. The defendant institution is therefore required, under that provision, to take the necessary measures to nullify the effects of the malfeasance (see judgment of 30 June 2021, Mélin v Parliament, T‑51/20, not published, EU:T:2021:398, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

478 In addition, where the annulled act has already been implemented, the nullification of its effects requires, in principle, the restoration of the applicant’s legal situation as it stood prior to the adoption of the act (see judgment of 30 June 2021, Mélin v Parliament, T‑51/20, not published, EU:T:2021:398, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).

479 As regards the payment of interest at the rate of 3.5% [per annum] from 31 May 2019 onwards, the Court makes the following observations.

480 It is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, where amounts are received in breach of EU law, a right of restitution arises under EU law. That is the case, in particular, where the amounts were received pursuant to an EU measure declared invalid or annulled by the EU judicature (judgment of 20 January 2021, Commission v Printeos, C301/19 P, EU:C:2021:39, paragraphs 66 and 67).

481 As particularly regards the annulment, by the EU judicature, of an EU measure involving payment of an amount to the European Union, the Court of Justice has held that the payment of default interest constitutes a measure giving effect to a judgment annulling a measure, for the purposes of the first paragraph of Article 266 TFEU, in that it is designed to compensate at a standard rate for the loss of enjoyment of the monies owed and to encourage the debtor to comply with that judgment as soon as possible (judgment of 20 January 2021, Commission v Printeos, C‑301/19 P, EU:C:2021:39, paragraph 68).

482 In the present case, as the Court of Auditors stated at the hearing, interest must be calculated from 7 June 2019 onwards, which is to say, from the date on which the applicant made his payment. Indeed, the award of default interest from the date on which the applicant paid the sum at issue pursues the objective of restitution at a standard rate for the applicant’s loss of enjoyment of those funds (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 January 2021, Commission v Printeos, C‑301/19 P, EU:C:2021:39, paragraph 85).

483 As regards the rate of interest claimed by the applicant, namely 3.5% [per annum], according to the case-law, pursuant to Article 99(2)(b) of Regulation 2018/1046, the applicable rate of interest is calculated on the basis of the rate applied by the European Central Bank (ECB) to its principal refinancing operations, in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the payment fell due, increased by three and a half percentage points (see, by analogy, order of 27 January 2016, ANKO v Commission and REA, T‑165/14 DEP, not published, EU:T:2016:108, paragraph 50).

484 Given that the applicant requests the payment of interest only at the rate of 3.5% [per annum], rather than at the rate fixed by the ECB for its principal refinancing operations, increased by three and a half percentage points, the Court merely decides that, in the present case, the sum of EUR 19 254.20 is, from 7 June 2019 onwards, productive of default interest at the rate of 3.5% [per annum] until full payment is made by the Court of Auditors.

485 The applicant asks that the Court of Auditors be ordered to pay damages to make good the non-material loss he has sustained, which he assesses, ex æquo et bono, at EUR 50 000. He submits that the Court of Auditors has harmed his career and his reputation with its successive communications about the existence of the OLAF report and the conclusions drawn in it, at a time when he himself was not in possession of that report or of the preliminary report of the President of the Court of Auditors. The applicant states that the OLAF report was made available to the Members of the Court of Auditors and to the Committee on Budgetary Control of the Parliament on 3 July 2018, and yet it was not until 5 October 2018 that the preliminary report of the President of the Court of Auditors, which included the OLAF report, was communicated to him. However, following a ‘leak’, an article had already been published in the press on 11 July 2018, reporting the existence of the OLAF report and the conclusions drawn in it. In that context, the applicant complains that the Court of Auditors failed to carry out any investigation to identify the exact source of the leak. The applicant also mentions the fact that, on the same day, 11 July 2018, the Court of Auditors issued a press release and a communiqué to all staff.

486 The applicant submits that, by referring to OLAF’s investigation in communications that raised questions about him, and by stating that measures would be taken to recover fraudulent expenditure, the Court of Auditors spread information that he was guilty of wrongdoing and seriously undermined the presumption of innocence that was his due. According to the applicant, by so doing, the Court of Auditors adopted a position without being fully aware of the facts, in breach of the requirements flowing from the principle of sound administration provided for in Article 41 of the Charter and in disregard of his own powers. The applicant also argues that there was a lack of regard for the procedural safeguards provided for by the FEU Treaty and the internal rules of the Court of Auditors.

487In his reply, the applicant alleges that the Court of Auditors disregarded the principle of the presumption of innocence, the principle of sound administration, and more specifically the rule of impartiality and the duty of diligence that lies with the EU institutions, as well as procedural safeguards and the duty of confidentiality.

488The Court of Auditors submits that the applicant’s claim for damages is inadmissible because it has been presented in the context of an action for annulment brought pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, rather than in a separate action brought under Articles 268 and 340 TFEU. At the hearing, it clarified that it did not dispute the fact that it was, in principle, possible to make a claim for compensation and a claim for annulment in one and the same action. It nevertheless maintains that the applicant’s claim for compensation is not admissible because it does not address, to the requisite legal standard, all of the conditions which must be satisfied in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability. It points out that it was only in the reply that the applicant gave a more structured presentation of his claim for compensation.

489As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, the European Union may incur non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU only if a number of cumulative conditions are fulfilled, namely the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the EU institution, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct of the institution and the damage complained of (see judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

490If any one of the three conditions required for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability is not satisfied, the damages claims must be dismissed without there being any further need to consider whether the other two conditions are met (see order of 11 November 2014, Bergallou v Parliament and Council, T‑22/14, not published, EU:T:2014:954, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

491In support of his claim for damages the applicant essentially makes two complaints concerning the conduct of the Court of Auditors: first, it failed to carry out an investigation to identify the exact source of the leak of the existence of the OLAF report concerning him and the conclusions drawn in it and, secondly, it issued a press release and a communiqué to all staff on 11 July 2018, after that information had been leaked, but before he had been sent the OLAF report or the preliminary report of the President of the Court of Auditors.

492In that regard, it must be noted that, at the hearing, the Court of Auditors stated that there had been no press release of its own initiative, a point which the applicant did not dispute. Nor is the existence of a press release apparent from the case file. Accordingly, in the Court’s examination of the present claim for compensation, the applicant’s complaint concerning the existence of a press release by the Court of Auditors must be rejected at the outset as being insufficiently substantiated.

493Moreover, it is sufficient to note that it is clear from the observations made by the Court of Auditors at the hearing, which the applicant did not dispute on this point, that the Court of Auditors issued the communiqué to all staff, on 11 July 2018, only after the press had already reported the existence of the OLAF report and the conclusions drawn in it, ‘following a leak’. At the hearing, the Court of Auditors stated that it had answered a number of questions raised in that regard by journalists and that its answers had then been relayed to all staff. That is also confirmed, first, by the wording itself of the Court of Auditors’ communiqué to its staff, which mentioned the ‘questions raised by the press’ and, secondly, by the press report which the applicant cites in paragraph 234 of the application, which refers to a ‘well-informed source who came forward anonymously’ and who had given the press information about OLAF’s investigation concerning the applicant.

494It follows that it was this prior ‘leak’ of information to the press by an anonymous third party that was the origin of the Court of Auditors’ subsequent communiqué to all its staff, and that, in fact, constitutes the basis of the applicant’s allegations of damage to his career and reputation. However, in those circumstances, the applicant has not produced prima facie evidence to show that that leak to the press of the existence of the OLAF report concerning him and the conclusions drawn in it may be ascribed to the Court of Auditors.

495Therefore, since the applicant has not established that the alleged damage to his career and reputation was the direct consequence of an act that may be ascribed to the Court of Auditors, it must be concluded that no finding that that institution was at fault can be made and that the first condition for establishing the non-contractual liability of the European Union, among the conditions mentioned in paragraph 489 above, is not fulfilled. Moreover, although the applicant complains that the Court of Auditors failed to conduct an investigation to identify the exact source of the leak of information to the press in question, he does not indicate on what legal basis the Court of Auditors might have been under such an obligation, especially where it is a leak of information that cannot be ascribed to it.

496Consequently, the applicant’s claim for compensation must be rejected, without it being necessary to rule on its admissibility.

497Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. In addition, pursuant to Article 134(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, the parties are to bear their own costs. However, if it appears justified in the circumstances of the case, the General Court may order that one party, in addition to bearing his own costs, pay a proportion of the costs of the other party.

498Although the contested decision is annulled to the extent of EUR 19 254.20, which represents approximately one eighth of the total of EUR 153 407.58 that the Court of Auditors considered to be undue, the applicant has been unsuccessful as to seven eighths of that sum and unsuccessful in his claim for compensation. The applicant must therefore be ordered to bear the costs of the Court of Auditors and four fifths of his own costs, and the Court of Auditors to bear the remaining fifth.

On those ground,

hereby:

1.Annuls the decision of the European Court of Auditors of 11 April 2019 establishing an amount receivable from CQ and to be recovered from him, in which it is claimed that payment was unduly received of the sum of EUR 153 407.58 and the recovery of that sum is ordered, to the extent that it relates to the sum of EUR 19 254.20, and annuls the decision contained in the letter of the accounting officer of the Court of Auditors of 7 June 2019 in so far as it provides for the payment of default interest at the rate of three and a half percentage points on that latter sum;

2.Declares that the sum of EUR 19 254.20 is, from 7 June 2019 onwards, productive of default interest at the rate of three and a half percentage points until full payment is made by the Court of Auditors;

3.Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

4.Orders CQ to bear the costs of the Court of Auditors and four fifths of his own costs and the Court of Auditors to bear the remaining fifth.

da Silva Passos

Gervasoni

Półtorak

Reine

Pynnä

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg, on 11 September 2024.

[Signatures]

Table des matières

5. The Code of Conduct for the Members of the Court of Auditors of 2012

II. Background to the dispute

III. Forms of order sought

(a) The limitation period

(b) The applicant’s claims for reimbursement addressed in lines 1 to 261 of the table of recoveries

(1) The first group of claims for reimbursement submitted by the applicant

(2) The second group of claims for reimbursement submitted by the applicant

(3) The third group of claims for reimbursement submitted by the applicant

(c) Conclusion regarding the third plea in law

(a) The admissibility of the complaint alleging the existence of ‘manifest errors’

(b) Substance

(1) Preliminary observations

(i) The scope of the Court’s examination of the complaint alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

(ii) The scope of the Court’s examination of the complaints concerning the applicant’s legitimate expectations as to the regularity of his missions and the existence of ‘manifest errors’

(iii) The scope of the General Court’s review

(iv) The inferences to be drawn for the purposes of the present case from the judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten (C130/19), concerning the irregularities ascribed by the Court of Auditors to the applicant

(2) Mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances

(i) The missions involving meetings with politicians and members of their Cabinets

(ii) The other missions

– The missions referred to in lines 56, 138, 196, 284 and 382 of the table of recoveries

– The missions referred to in lines 57 and 391 of the table of recoveries

– The missions referred to in lines 137, 143, 155 (in part) and 290 of the table of recoveries

– The missions referred to in lines 47, 103, 157, 161, 199, 210, 237, 277, 339 (in part), and 373 and 374 (in part) of the table of recoveries

– The missions referred to in lines 128, 411 and 412 of the table of recoveries

– The mission referred to in line 347 of the table of recoveries

– The mission referred to in line 310 of the table of recoveries

– The mission referred to in line 335 of the table of recoveries

– The mission referred to in line 63 of the table of recoveries

(iii) Conclusion regarding the mission expenses and daily subsistence allowances

(3) Representation and reception expenses

(i) The representation expenses for meetings with politicians and members of their Cabinets who were members of the political party in question

(ii) The representation expenses associated with meetings with individuals other than politicians who were members of the political party in question

– The representation expenses referred to in lines 56, 138, 196, 284 and 382 of the table of recoveries

– The representation expenses referred to in lines 17, 28 and 290 of the table of recoveries

– The representation expenses referred to in lines 314 and 319 and 320 of the table of recoveries

– The representation expenses referred to in line 339 of the table of recoveries

– The representation expenses referred to in lines 98 and 281 of the table of recoveries

– Conclusion regarding the representation expenses for meetings with other individuals

(iii) Meals at the applicant’s place of origin

(4) The expenses relating to use of the official car and recourse to the services of a driver

(i) The drivers’ expenses associated with the applicant’s missions or representation expenses relating to meetings with members of the political party in question

(ii) Other drivers’ expenses

–The drivers’ expenses referred to in lines 57, 103, 143, 157, 161, 199, 237, 277, 310, 335, 347, 354 and 391 of the table of recoveries

–The driver’s expenses referred to in lines 138, 196, 319 and 320, 339 (in part) and 382 (in part) of the table of recoveries

–The driver’s expenses referred to in lines 379 and 403 of the table of recoveries

–The driver’s expenses referred to in line 38 of the table of recoveries

–The driver’s expenses referred to in lines 106, 147, 151, 153, 167 and 214 of the table of recoveries

–The driver’s expenses referred to in line 142 of the table of recoveries

–The driver’s expenses referred to in line 187 of the table of recoveries

–The driver’s expenses referred to in line 247 of the table of recoveries

–The drivers’ expenses referred to in lines 176, 317 and 373 and 374 of the table of recoveries

–Conclusion regarding the other drivers’ expenses

(c) Conclusion regarding the fourth plea in law

5. The fifth plea in law, based on the dictum that administrative proceedings must await the outcome of criminal proceedings

7. Conclusion regarding the claim for annulment of the contested decision

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Language of the case: French.