5 May 2025 (*)

( Action for annulment and for damages – Civil service – Compliance with the time limits laid down in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations – Request for review of a decision which has become final – No substantial new fact – Inadmissibility )

In Case T‑452/24,

DR,

applicant,

European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA),

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of O. Porchia, President, M. Jaeger (Rapporteur) and S. Verschuur, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

makes the following

By his action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, DR, seeks, first, annulment of the decision of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) of 31 October 2023 rejecting his claim for compensation for the damage which he claimed to have suffered as a result of EIOPA’s unlawful conduct (‘the contested decision’) and, in so far as necessary, of the decision of 24 May 2024 rejecting his complaint (‘the decision rejecting the 2024 complaint’), and, secondly, compensation for the material and non-material damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of that unlawful conduct.

Background to the dispute

On 1 August 2017, in view of possibly being recruited to EIOPA, the applicant completed a declaration of conflict of interest, in which he stated that:

–he was the owner and managing director of A, which held 100% of the capital of B and C;

–C was inactive and was due to merge with B;

–A and B (together, ‘the companies at issue’) provided consultancy services to, inter alia, insurance companies and pension funds which were subject to supervision by the competent national authorities supervised by EIOPA.

By email of 7 August 2017, the applicant informed EIOPA that he was considering ceasing the consultancy services which he provided, directly or through the companies at issue, to various companies.

By email of 23 August 2017, EIOPA confirmed to the applicant that it had not identified any conflict of interest and sent him a proposal for an employment contract.

On 16 September 2017, the applicant was recruited to the Oversight Department of EIOPA, as a grade AD 7 member of staff, for a period of three years.

On 26 June 2018, in a new declaration of conflict of interest sent to EIOPA, the applicant stated, in addition to the information already contained in his declaration of 1 August 2017, that C had merged with B.

By email of 20 July 2018, EIOPA asked the applicant to confirm that the companies at issue were no longer active in the financial sector.

By email of 6 August 2018, the applicant informed EIOPA that the companies at issue were no longer active in the insurance sector.

On 7 December 2018, EIOPA opened an ethics review procedure against the applicant to check the content of the two declarations of conflict of interest which he had submitted in 2017 and 2018 (‘the ethics review’). In that procedure, the Ethics Officer of EIOPA (‘the Ethics Officer’) asked the applicant:

–to provide information regarding the activities carried out in 2017 and 2018 by the companies at issue in the pensions sector and, more broadly, in the financial sector;

–to confirm that, as stated in his email of 7 August 2017, he had ceased the consultancy services which he provided directly or through the companies at issue;

–to provide him with information concerning the ownership of the companies at issue, their activities and the income they received in 2017 and 2018.

By email of 7 December 2018, the applicant informed EIOPA that, in 2018, the companies at issue did not engage in any financial activities or commercial relationships. In addition, he confirmed that the information regarding the cessation of his own consultancy services referred to in his email of 7 August 2017 was accurate and complete.

By email of 4 January 2019, the Ethics Officer asked the applicant to provide him with a statement prepared by an external accountant showing all the income he had received in 2018 and stemming from the activities of the companies at issue.

By email of 14 January 2019, the applicant sent EIOPA information concerning the companies at issue, pointing out the confidential nature of the data transmitted and specifying that they could not be disclosed to anyone else within EIOPA without his prior consent.

In his report of 28 January 2019, the external accountant stated that he had noted 10 sources of income in a bank account belonging to the applicant, which included the salary paid by EIOPA.

By email of 18 February 2019, the Ethics Officer reiterated to the applicant his request seeking to obtain a statement prepared by an external accountant showing, specifically for 2018, all his income from the companies at issue. In addition, he asked him to provide the accounting documents of the companies at issue covering the period following his entry into service at EIOPA. In response to that email, the applicant sent EIOPA the requested information, pointing out the confidential nature of the data transmitted and specifying that they could not be disclosed to anyone else within EIOPA without his prior consent.

On 4 April 2019, the Ethics Officer sent EIOPA his screening report, in which he stated that the applicant was in a situation of conflict of interest, since, first, he had received undeclared external income in 2018 which exceeded the authorised amount and, secondly, the companies at issue were still active in the insurance sector.

On 7 May 2019, the Executive Director of EIOPA transferred the applicant from the Oversight Department to another department.

On 17 May 2019, the applicant sent EIOPA his comments on the screening report drawn up by the Ethics Officer.

On 22 July 2019, the Executive Director of EIOPA opened an administrative investigation in respect of the applicant to establish the nature of his outside activities (‘the administrative investigation’).

On 30 September 2019, the external investigator delivered her report, in which she stated that, since (i) the applicant was still employed by the companies at issue, (ii) those companies carried out activities in the insurance sector and (iii) the income he had received from his outside activities in 2018 had exceeded the authorised amount, he was in a situation of conflict of interest vis-à-vis EIOPA.

By decision of 17 December 2019, the applicant was dismissed from EIOPA (‘the dismissal decision’).

On 3 February 2020, the applicant lodged a complaint with EIOPA against the dismissal decision (‘the 2020 complaint’), in which, inter alia, he:

–disputed the legality of his transfer to another department of EIOPA and of the dismissal decision;

–claimed that EIOPA had committed various irregularities when processing his personal data and those of his spouse, of the companies at issue and of their former clients;

–claimed that he had been subject to harassment by EIOPA; and

–sought payment of compensation from EIOPA, equivalent to the sum of the value of the terminated agreements and the value of the agreements which he was about to sign when he started working for EIOPA, for the damage which he claimed to have suffered as a result of the loss of his turnover after EIOPA required him to terminate the client agreements which he had concluded directly or through the companies at issue (‘the 2020 claim for compensation for loss of turnover’).

By decision of 2 June 2020, EIOPA rejected the 2020 complaint as inadmissible in part and unfounded in part (‘the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint’). More particularly, EIOPA contended that:

–the applicant’s claim challenging the legality of his transfer to another department was inadmissible, since it had not been submitted within the three-month period following the adoption of the contested decision by its Executive Director;

–the applicant’s claim challenging the unlawful processing of the personal data of his spouse and of former clients of the companies at issue was inadmissible, in so far as the dismissal decision had no direct legal effect and did not adversely affect those persons;

–the applicant’s claim challenging the legality of the dismissal decision was unfounded. In that regard, EIOPA stated that the adoption of that decision had been made necessary by the breakdown in the relationship of trust between them, for which the applicant was responsible. First, the applicant never resolved the conflict of interest between the performance of his duties within EIOPA and his activities as managing director of the companies at issue. Secondly, the applicant did not duly declare his income and that of his spouse. Thirdly, in 2018, the applicant exceeded the permitted threshold for external income. Fourthly, throughout the ethics review and the administrative investigation, the applicant breached his duty of transparency and cooperation vis-à-vis EIOPA;

–the applicant’s claim challenging the unlawful processing of his personal data and that of the companies at issue was unfounded. In that regard, first of all, EIOPA stated that, in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39), the applicant had been duly informed that it had collected his personal data. Next, EIOPA stated that the data of the applicant and of the companies at issue had been processed solely as part of the ethics review and the administrative investigation to shed light on the nature and scope of his outside activities. Lastly, EIOPA stated that the external investigator’s processing of personal data relating to the applicant and to the companies at issue had been proportionate to the objectives of the task assigned to her in the administrative investigation;

–the 2020 claim for compensation for loss of turnover was unfounded, since the applicant had freely chosen to join EIOPA and, after being informed of his rights and obligations and having completed a declaration of conflict of interest, had freely agreed to terminate the client agreements which he had concluded directly or through the companies at issue;

–the applicant’s harassment claim had not been addressed in the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint but had been the subject of a separate procedure, as requested by the applicant himself following the lodging of that complaint.

On 30 September 2020, the applicant brought an action before the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) claiming that EIOPA had unlawfully processed his personal data, those of his spouse and those of the companies at issue.

On 1 December 2021, the applicant submitted a complaint to the European Ombudsman.

By decision of 9 September 2022, the EDPS found that EIOPA had infringed Article 4(1)(a), Article 14 and Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation 2018/1725, since, during the administrative investigation, it had not correctly informed the applicant about the processing of his personal data and, in particular, about the legal basis for that processing, and, consequently, it decided to issue a reprimand to EIOPA pursuant to Article 58(2)(b) of that regulation (‘the EDPS decision’).

By decision of 25 May 2023, the Ombudsman found that, when recruiting the applicant, EIOPA had failed diligently to manage the issue of his conflict of interest, which had given rise to a serious instance of maladministration, and that the ethics review and the administrative investigation had not been carried out carefully and rigorously (‘the Ombudsman’s decision’). However, the Ombudsman clarified that, given the improvements made by EIOPA to its procedures for handling conflicts of interest, it was unlikely that the events in the present case would recur and no recommendation was deemed necessary. Accordingly, the Ombudsman closed the case, stating that her decision did not entitle the applicant to seek payment of compensation for the damage he had suffered and that no other legal consequences could be drawn from her decision.

On 2 July 2023, following the EDPS decision and the Ombudsman’s decision, the applicant sought compensation from EIOPA for the damage which he claimed to have suffered (‘the 2023 request’), in the amount of:

–34.44 million or 37.22 million Danish kroner (DKK), depending on the method of calculation chosen, for the material damage resulting from having been required to terminate the client agreements which he had concluded directly or through the companies at issue (‘the 2023 claim for compensation for loss of turnover’). In that regard, the applicant stated that the amount of DKK 34.44 million had been calculated by taking into account the value of the client agreements which he had was required to terminate, plus the rate of inflation applicable over the period 2017-2023, whereas the amount of DKK 37.22 million had been calculated by taking into account, for the same period, the value of the terminated agreements plus the rate of price growth provided for in those agreements;

–EUR 2.8 million, plus the inflation rate applicable for the period 2017-2023, on account of the time he had was required to spend, following the dismissal decision, in preparing his defence against EIOPA (‘the claim for compensation for the preparation of the defence’). In that regard, the applicant claimed that the amount claimed had been calculated by multiplying the number of hours he had spent preparing the actions initiated against EIOPA (approximately 7 000) by the hourly rate of EUR 400 which would have been applicable to him if he had worked as a consultant for EIOPA;

–EUR 1 by way of compensation for the excessive duration of the ethics review and the administrative investigation (‘the claim for compensation for the excessive length of the procedures’).

By email of 15 September 2023, the applicant informed EIOPA that the 2023 request had been submitted on the basis of Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’).

On 31 October 2023, EIOPA adopted the contested decision, by which it rejected the 2023 request as inadmissible. EIOPA considered, inter alia, that that request sought, in essence, to obtain a review of the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint, but that neither the EDPS decision nor the Ombudsman’s decision were substantial new facts that could entitle the applicant to request such a review.

By complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against the contested decision (‘the 2024 complaint’), in which he claimed, inter alia, that:

–in its recruitment process, EIOPA had infringed Article 11 of the Staff Regulations and breached the principles of sound administration and diligence, in so far as it had failed to produce a duly reasoned opinion on whether there could be a conflict of interest;

–in the ethics review and the administrative investigation, EIOPA had breached the principles of sound administration and diligence in that those procedures had been excessively lengthy, had resulted in him being asked to provide a large number of documents and had led to the appointment of an external investigator who did not have sufficient expertise to carry out the administrative investigation;

–in the ethics review and the administrative investigation, EIOPA had infringed Article 4(1)(a) and (c), Article 14, Article 15(1)(c) and (d) and Article 23(1) of Regulation 2018/1725, in so far as it had not guaranteed that his personal data would be processed fairly and in a transparent manner and that he would be duly informed of the modalities, reasons and recipients of the processing of his data.

In that context, in the 2024 complaint, the applicant sought compensation from EIOPA in the amount of:

–DKK 34.47 million, together with compensatory interest calculated from 2 July 2023 at the rate set by the European Central Bank (ECB), for the material damage resulting from having been required to terminate the client agreements which he had concluded directly or through the companies at issue;

–EUR 15 000, calculated ex aequo et bono, together with compensatory interest calculated from 2 July 2023 at the rate set by the ECB, for the non-material damage suffered as a result of the unlawful processing of his personal data in the ethics review and the administrative investigation.

On 24 May 2024, EIOPA adopted the decision rejecting the 2024 complaint, in which it considered, principally, that that complaint was inadmissible since it merely reproduced the content of the 2020 complaint and was not justified by substantial new facts and, in the alternative, that it was unfounded since no unlawful act had been committed which could entitle the applicant to compensation.

The applicant brought the present action on 29 August 2024.

Forms of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

–annul the contested decision and, in so far as necessary, the decision rejecting the 2024 complaint;

–order EIOPA to pay compensation for the material and non-material damage he has suffered;

–order EIOPA to pay the costs.

By separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 1 November 2024, EIOPA submitted a plea of inadmissibility pursuant to Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, in which it contended that the Court should:

–dismiss the action as inadmissible;

–order the applicant to pay the costs.

On 8 January 2025, the applicant filed his observations on the plea of inadmissibility submitted by EIOPA, in which he claims that the Court should:

–declare the action admissible and well founded;

–order EIOPA to pay the costs.

Law

Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure, if the defendant so requests, the Court may rule on inadmissibility without going to the substance of the case. In the present case, since EIOPA requested a ruling on the inadmissibility of the action, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information from the material in the file, has decided to rule on that application without taking further steps in the proceedings.

In its plea of inadmissibility, EIOPA submits that the action is inadmissible since it seeks, in essence, a review of the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint. EIOPA considers that, in so far as that decision was not the subject of an action before the General Court within the periods laid down in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, it has become final and there are no substantial new facts which would entitle the applicant to request a review. First, in accordance with settled case-law, the Ombudsman’s decision cannot be interpreted as being a substantial new fact. Secondly, the EDPS decision did not identify any of the infringements of Regulation 2018/1725 alleged by the applicant in his action. Accordingly, the EDPS decision does not constitute a substantial new fact. EIOPA contends that, in any event, even if the EDPS decision were to be interpreted by the Court as a substantial new fact, the action should be declared inadmissible, since the applicant did not submit either the 2023 request or the 2024 complaint within the three-month period laid down in the case-law, which ran from the adoption of the EDPS decision.

The applicant claims that the action is admissible. In that regard, he claims that the 2023 request was a new request which was unrelated to the decision to reject the 2020 complaint and did not require the existence of new substantial facts to be admissible. Furthermore, the applicant takes the view that, in so far as the 2023 request did not call into question the EDPS decision, he was not required to bring the present action within three months of the adoption of that decision.

As a preliminary point, it should be noted that it is settled case-law that an action brought by an official before the General Court must be declared inadmissible if the pre-litigation procedure has not been properly followed (see judgments of 19 September 2008, Chassagne v Commission, T‑253/06 P, EU:T:2008:386, paragraph 8 and the case-law cited; of 14 December 2018, TP v Commission, T‑464/17, not published, EU:T:2018:1006, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited; and of 7 September 2022, OE v Commission, T‑486/21, EU:T:2022:517, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited).

It is also settled case-law that the time limits for lodging complaints and bringing actions laid down in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, which are applicable to staff by virtue of Article 46 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, are a matter of public policy and are not subject to the discretion of the parties or the Court, since they were established in order to ensure that legal positions are clear and certain. Consequently, any exceptions to or derogations from those time limits must be interpreted restrictively (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2017, Gillet v Commission, T‑578/16, not published, EU:T:2017:590, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

Thus, according to the case-law, an official is not permitted to disregard the time limits for lodging a complaint or an appeal laid down in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations by indirectly calling into question, by means of a request, a previous decision which has become final since it was not challenged within the time limits (judgments of 1 December 1983, Blomefield v Commission, 190/82, EU:C:1983:358, paragraph 10; of 14 June 1988, Muysers and Tülp v Court of Auditors, 161/87, EU:C:1988:302, paragraph 11; and of 4 May 2005, Schmit v Commission, T‑144/03, EU:T:2005:158, paragraph 147). Only the existence of substantial new facts may justify the submission of a request for a review of such a decision (see judgments of 12 May 2021, Necci v Commission, C‑202/20 P, EU:C:2021:385, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited, and of 21 June 2023, UG v Commission, T‑571/17 RENV, EU:T:2023:351, paragraph 235 and the case-law cited).

In the present case, it is common ground that the applicant did not bring an action before the General Court within the time limits laid down in Article 91 of the Staff Regulations against the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint. Consequently, that decision became final on expiry of the three-month time limit for bringing an action after its adoption.

In addition, it is apparent from the file that, by relying on the irregularities identified in the EDPS decision and in the Ombudsman’s decision concerning his recruitment to EIOPA and the conduct of the ethics review and the administrative investigation, the applicant sent the 2023 request to EIOPA and lodged the 2024 complaint. The applicant brought the present action following the adoption of the contested decision and of the decision rejecting the 2024 complaint.

In that context, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 42 above, in order to rule on the admissibility of the action, it is necessary to assess whether, by means of the 2023 request, the applicant indirectly called into question the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint and, if so, whether that request was based on substantial new facts capable of justifying a review of that decision.

Whether the 2023 request indirectly called into question the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint

It should be recalled that, in the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint, EIOPA considered that complaint to be unfounded as regards the 2020 claim for compensation for loss of turnover. It should also be borne in mind that, in the 2023 request, after recalling the content of the EDPS decision and of the Ombudsman’s decision, the applicant submitted to EIOPA (i) the 2023 claim for compensation for loss of turnover, (ii) the claim for compensation for the preparation of the defence and (iii) the claim for compensation for the excessive length of the procedures.

In that context, it must be held that, first, when, in the 2023 request, the applicant made the 2023 claim for compensation for loss of turnover, he indirectly called into question the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint, in so far as, in that decision, EIOPA had rejected as unfounded the 2020 claim for compensation for loss of turnover contained in that complaint. It is apparent from the documents before the Court that both the 2020 claim and the 2023 claim for compensation for loss of turnover sought, in essence, compensation for the damage which the applicant claimed to have suffered as a result of his loss of turnover after EIOPA required him, in his view, to terminate the client agreements which he had concluded directly or through the companies at issue.

It is true that, in the 2023 claim for compensation for loss of turnover, the applicant quantified his alleged financial loss and claimed the payment of a precise amount, namely DKK 34.44 million or DKK 37.22 million, depending on the method of calculation chosen, whereas, in the 2020 claim for compensation for loss of turnover, he had merely claimed payment of the amount resulting from the sum of the value of the terminated agreements and the value of those he was about to sign when he starting working for EIOPA. However, in order to determine the amount of the 2023 claim for compensation for loss of turnover, he relied, as he had already done in respect of the 2020 claim for compensation for loss of turnover, on the value of the agreements which he had concluded directly or through the companies at issue, which he had been required to terminate in order to comply with EIOPA’s request, and he added to that value, depending on the method of calculation chosen, either the rate of inflation applicable over the period 2017-2023 or, for the same period, the rate of price growth provided for in the terminated agreements. However, neither that difference in the rate applied nor the difference relating to the taking into account, in 2020, of the value of the agreements which he was about to sign when he started working for EIOPA can call into question the finding that, by means of the 2023 claim for compensation for loss of turnover set out in the 2023 request, the applicant sought compensation from EIOPA for the loss of his turnover, as he had already done by means of the 2020 claim for compensation for loss of turnover, included in the 2020 complaint. It follows that the 2023 request indirectly called into question the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint.

Secondly, when the applicant submitted to EIOPA, in the 2023 request, the claim for compensation for the preparation of the defence, he took into account the costs corresponding to the working hours needed to prepare the numerous actions he had initiated against EIOPA following his dismissal. It is apparent from the documents before the Court, without being disputed, that since 2020 the applicant has sent EIOPA approximately 30 claims and complaints seeking, in essence, annulment of the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint and compensation for the damage which he claimed to have suffered as a result of its unlawful conduct. In that context, it may be concluded that, when he made the claim for compensation for the preparation of the defence, the applicant indirectly called into question the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint, in so far as that claim concerned the time spent preparing actions for annulment of that decision and compensation for damage allegedly suffered as a result of that decision.

Thirdly, the claim for compensation for the excessive length of the procedures indirectly called into question the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint. In that decision, EIOPA had already considered that the ethics review and the administrative investigation were necessary in order to verify whether there was a conflict of interest on the part of the applicant and that, moreover, the conduct of those procedures had been complicated and delayed by his lack of diligence, transparency and cooperation.

In the light of those considerations, it must be concluded that the 2023 request indirectly called into question the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint.

For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that, even if the case-law cited in paragraph 42 above could be interpreted as meaning that, in order to assess whether the applicant is calling into question the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint, reference must be made not only to the 2023 request but also to the 2024 complaint, it must be held that the 2024 complaint indirectly calls that decision into question. In the 2024 complaint, first, the applicant sought compensation from EIOPA, as he had already done in the 2023 request, for loss of turnover after EIOPA required him to terminate the client agreements which he had concluded directly or through the companies at issue. Secondly, he sought compensation from EIOPA for the non-material damage which he claimed to have suffered as a result of the unlawful processing of his personal data in the ethics review and the administrative investigation. Without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of that claim, which did not appear in the 2023 request, it should be noted that, in the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint, EIOPA had rejected an identical claim which had been made by the applicant in that complaint.

The existence of substantial new facts such as to justify a review of the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint

According to the case-law cited in paragraph 42 above, the existence of substantial new facts may justify the submission of a request for a review of a previous decision which has become final. As regards the question of the criteria which determine whether facts are to be classified as ‘substantial’ and ‘new’, it is clear from the case-law that, in order for a fact to be ‘new’, it is essential that neither the applicant nor the administration was aware of, or in a position to be aware of, the fact in question when the previous decision was adopted (see judgment of 12 February 2020, ZF v Commission, T‑605/18, EU:T:2020:51, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). In order to be ‘substantial’, the fact concerned must be capable of substantially altering the situation of the person making the initial request which gave rise to the previous decision which has become final (see judgment of 29 May 2018, Fedtke v EESC, T‑801/16 RENV, not published, EU:T:2018:312, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).

It is also settled case-law that, with regard to the time limits for a request for review of a decision which has become final, the reopening of the time limits provided for in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations cannot, for reasons of legal certainty, have the effect of granting longer time limits. The choice of any other approach would in fact amount to objectively unjustified discrimination between applicants who lodge a complaint against a decision which has not yet become final, in accordance with the time limit prescribed in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, and those who lodge a complaint against a decision which has become final, in the form of a request for review in the light of substantial new facts (see order of 9 December 2015, Van der Veen v Europol, F‑45/15, EU:F:2015:147, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

It follows, according to the case-law, that a request for review of a decision which has become final must, in so far as it can be classified as a complaint, be submitted within three months of the substantial new fact on which the official intends to rely or when he or she actually became aware of that fact, failing which it will be inadmissible since the period laid down in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations for lodging a complaint against a decision adversely affecting him or her is three months (see order of 9 December 2015, Van der Veen v Europol, F‑45/15, EU:F:2015:147, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

In the present case, in the 2023 request and in the 2024 complaint, the applicant referred to the Ombudsman’s decision and the EDPS decision and sought compensation from EIOPA for the damage which he claimed to have suffered as a result of the unlawful acts it had committed which had been identified in those decisions.

Accordingly, it is necessary to ascertain whether the Ombudsman’s decision and the EDPS decision constitute substantial new facts capable of justifying the re-examination of the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint and, if so, whether the applicant complied with the time limit laid down in the case-law cited in paragraph 55 above.

In the first place, according to settled case-law, complaints submitted to the Ombudsman do not interrupt time limits for bringing court proceedings. Consequently, a complaint submitted to the Ombudsman cannot have the effect of resetting the time limit for bringing an action once the time limit has expired. In that context, a complaint lodged with the Ombudsman cannot, in any instance, be regarded as a new substantial fact. The same is necessarily true for any recommendations made by the Ombudsman following an inquiry resulting from a complaint. Whatever they prescribe, such recommendations are merely the consequence of that complaint (see order of 1 October 2021, IJ v Parliament, T‑74/20, not published, EU:T:2021:671, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). It follows that, in the present case, the Ombudsman’s decision does not constitute a substantial new fact.

In the second place, it should be noted that the EDPS decision was adopted on 9 September 2022 and that there is nothing in the file to suggest that the applicant took cognizance of that decision at a later date. The 2023 request was sent to EIOPA on 2 July 2023, approximately 10 months after the adoption of the EDPS decision, and the 2024 complaint was sent to EIOPA on 25 January 2024, approximately 16 months after the adoption of the EDPS decision. Consequently, without it being necessary to assess whether the EDPS decision constitutes a substantial new fact, it must be held that the applicant did not comply with the three-month period laid down in the case-law cited in paragraph 55 above.

61That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that he was not required to submit the 2023 request within a period of three months from the adoption of the EDPS decision, since that request did not call it into question. The fact that the 2023 request did not challenge the EDPS decision is irrelevant for the purpose of assessing whether it was submitted within the time limits laid down in the case-law cited in paragraph 55 above, since that claim called into question the decision rejecting the 2020 complaint.

62In the light of all of the foregoing, the applicant’s claim for annulment must be rejected as inadmissible.

63It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, a claim for compensation for damage must be rejected where there is a close connection between that claim and a claim for annulment which itself has been rejected as unfounded or inadmissible (see judgment of 24 March 2021, BK v EASO, T‑277/19, not published, EU:T:2021:161, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited, and order of 23 January 2024, PS v EEAS, T‑4/23, not published, EU:T:2024:43, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

64In the present case, it must be stated that the applicant’s claim for compensation is closely linked to his claim for annulment, in that, by the claim for annulment, he seeks compensation for the same material and non-material damage alleged in the claim for compensation against EIOPA, which was rejected by the contested decision and by the decision rejecting the 2024 complaint. It is those decisions which are challenged by the applicant in his claim for annulment.

65In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed as inadmissible.

Costs

66Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by EIOPA.

On those grounds,

hereby orders:

1.The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

2.DR shall pay the costs.

Luxembourg, 5 May 2025.

Registrar

President

—

Language of the case: English.