7 April 2025 (*)

( EU trade mark – Application for EU word mark JUST STEP IN – Absolute grounds for refusal – Descriptive character – No distinctive character – Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Obligation to state reasons – Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 – Equal treatment – Principle of good administration – Articles 20 and 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law )

In Case T‑205/24,

applicant,

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by M. Eberl, acting as Agent,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),

composed of A. Marcoulli, President, J. Schwarcz and V. Tomljenović (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

makes the following

1By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Skechers USA, Inc. II, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 27 February 2024 (Case R 2200/2023-4) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2On 17 February 2023, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the word sign JUST STEP IN, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), claiming the priority of American trade mark No 97 798 528, filed on 16 February 2023.

3The mark applied for covered goods in Class 25 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Footwear’.

4By decision of 3 October 2023, the examiner rejected the application for registration of the mark applied for on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 7(2) of that regulation.

5On 2 November 2023, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the examiner’s decision.

6By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods covered by that mark, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, and therefore was devoid of any distinctive character, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation. In essence, it found that the link between the sign applied for and the goods at issue was sufficiently close in that the mark applied for conveyed direct and specific information about the kind of goods at issue and how those goods are worn.

Forms of order sought

7The applicant claims that the Court should:

–annul the contested decision;

–order EUIPO to pay the costs.

8EUIPO contends that the Court should:

–dismiss the action;

–order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

9Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where an action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Court may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.

10In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking any further steps in the proceedings, notwithstanding that one of the parties has requested a hearing (order of 6 October 2015, GEA Group v OHIM (engineering for a better world), T‑545/14, EU:T:2015:789, paragraph 13).

11The applicant relies on five pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, second, failure to state reasons in breach of Article 94(1) of that regulation, third, infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation, fourth, breach of the principle of equal treatment, as enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), read in conjunction with Article 41 of the Charter, and fifth, breach of the principle of good administration, as enshrined in Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter.

The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001

12The applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal made an incorrect assessment of the descriptive character of the mark applied for.

13EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

14Under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service, are not to be registered. Under Article 7(2) of that regulation, Article 7(1) is to apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain in only part of the European Union.

15Those signs or indications are regarded as incapable of performing the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the commercial origin of the goods or services (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley, C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 30, and of 27 February 2002, Eurocool Logistik v OHIM (EUROCOOL), T‑34/00, EU:T:2002:41, paragraph 37).

16In order for a sign to be caught by the prohibition set out in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, there must be a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the sign and the goods or services in question to enable the relevant public immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services in question or one of their characteristics (see judgments of 12 January 2005,Deutsche Post EURO EXPRESS v OHIM (EUROPREMIUM), T‑334/03, EU:T:2005:4, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited, and of 22 June 2005, Metso Paper Automation v OHIM (PAPERLAB), T‑19/04, EU:T:2005:247, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

17A sign’s descriptiveness cannot be assessed other than by reference to the goods or services concerned, on the one hand, and by reference to the understanding which the relevant public has of it, on the other (see judgment of 25 October 2005, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM (Cloppenburg), T‑379/03, EU:T:2005:373, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

18It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine whether, as the applicant submits in the context of the present plea, the Board of Appeal infringed Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 when analysing, first, the arguments relating to the relevant public and territory, next, those relating to the meaning of the sign applied for and, lastly, those disputing the descriptiveness of the mark applied for in relation to the goods at issue.

The relevant public and territory

19In paragraph 14 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, as regards the goods at issue, namely footwear in Class 25, that the relevant public was the general public, whose level of attention is average. Furthermore, in paragraph 15 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated that, as the sign applied for was made up of English words, the absolute ground for refusal had to be assessed by reference not only to the English-speaking public of the European Union (namely that of Ireland and Malta), but also by reference to the public of countries in which English is widely understood, such as Denmark, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden.

20The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in that assessment in so far as the public targeted by the goods at issue, namely the general public in the European Union, has only a very basic knowledge, if any, of the English language, outside the States where the official language is English. In those circumstances, the applicant submits that the assessment that the mark applied for is descriptive in character can be made only by reference to the general public of Ireland and Malta, since the Board of Appeal did not provide evidence that the expression ‘just step in’ was composed of basic English terms which would therefore be understood by the public in EU Member States where English is not the official language.

21EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

22In the present case, as the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the relevant public is the general public with an average level of attention, it should not be called into question.

23As regards the applicant’s arguments disputing that the public of Member States other than Ireland and Malta was taken into account, it need only be recalled that, in accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, it is sufficient that an absolute ground obtains in part of the European Union for a mark to be refused registration and that part may be limited to a single Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2024, Bartex Bartol v EUIPO – Grupa Chorten (duch puszczy), T‑473/23, not published, EU:T:2024:458, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

24In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments relating to the definition of the relevant public must be rejected as ineffective, since the Board of Appeal was right to find that the relevant public in the present case consisted, inter alia, of the general public in the territories of Ireland and Malta.

The meaning of the sign applied for

25The Board of Appeal endorsed the examiner’s assessments relating to the meaning of the sign applied for and set out in paragraph 2 of the contested decision. In particular, it approved the definitions taken from a reputable dictionary and used by the examiner. Thus, first, as regards the expression ‘step in’, the Board of Appeal endorsed the approach taken by the examiner, who had noted that, when that expression is hyphenated, namely ‘step-in’, and used to designate garments or footwear, it indicated that the garments or footwear in question could be put on by being stepped into, or that they could be put on without fastenings. Secondly, the Board of Appeal endorsed the examiner’s definition of the word ‘just’, according to which, in relation to footwear, it serves to place an emphasis on the words that follow it, namely ‘step’ and ‘in’.

26The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment of the meaning of the sign applied for. First, it states that the Board of Appeal was wrong to break the sign down into two parts, namely ‘just’ and ‘step in’, since the sign applied for, considered as a whole (namely the expression ‘just step in’) has no meaning in English. Secondly, it complains that the Board of Appeal did not give enough weight to the various possible meanings of the sign applied for, such as that referring to the act of becoming involved, in particular in a difficult situation or a dispute in order to help find a solution, the act of entering or leaving, inter alia, a house, or the act of entering a vehicle. Thirdly, it states that the only dictionary definition that includes a reference to footwear relates to use of the expression ‘step-in’ with a hyphen, which is not present in the mark applied for. That particular feature adds ambiguity to the expression ‘step in’, which becomes a play on words. Fourthly, the Board of Appeal wrongly relied on screenshots of websites which make no reference to the expression ‘just step in’.

27EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

28In the first place, it must be borne in mind, as regards marks consisting of a number of word elements, that the issue of whether or not they are descriptive may be assessed, in part, in relation to each of those elements taken separately, but must, in any event, also be established in relation to the whole which they comprise. Accordingly, since the relevant public will perceive the mark applied for as a whole, it is any descriptiveness of the mark as a whole, and not of the various elements of that mark considered separately, which is important (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2022, Lotion v EUIPO (BLACK IRISH), T‑498/21, not published, EU:T:2022:543, paragraph 21).

29Furthermore, although the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details, the fact remains that, when perceiving a word sign, that consumer will break it down into word elements which, for him or her, have a specific meaning or which resemble words known to him or her (see judgment of 13 February 2019, Nemius Group v EUIPO (DENTALDISK), T‑278/18, not published, EU:T:2019:86, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

30Consequently, there is no need to call into question the approach followed by the Board of Appeal consisting of examining the definitions of the various word elements making up the sign applied for which are capable of being identified by the relevant public, before examining the meaning of the sign applied for as a whole, in the light of those definitions.

31In the second place, as regards the meaning of the English words ‘step in’ and ‘just’, it should be noted that the applicant does not dispute, as such, the meanings used by the Board of Appeal. The definitions used by the Board of Appeal are among the various English dictionary definitions put forward by the applicant. In those circumstances, there is no reason to call into question the definitions put forward by the Board of Appeal, as set out in paragraph 25 above, as possible meanings of the word elements making up the sign applied for.

32In the third place, in so far as the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal failed to take account of the other meanings of those words, or of the associations and concepts which might be perceived from the sign applied for as a whole, it must be borne in mind that the fact that the sign applied for may have several meanings does not preclude the application of the absolute ground for refusal provided for in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001. According to settled case-law, a word sign must be refused registration under that provision if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley, C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 32, and of 3 September 2020, achtung! v EUIPO, C‑214/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:632, paragraph 33).

33In the fourth place, it should also be noted that the fact that the words ‘step in’ in the sign applied for are not hyphenated does not prevent the relevant public from understanding that expression as a version of the expression ‘step-in’. Such a discrepancy is not such as to confer on the expression ‘step in’ a different meaning from that conveyed by the expression ‘step-in’, since the consumer is able to understand the meaning of that expression, even if the spelling is different.

34In the fifth place, as regards the applicant’s arguments concerning the screenshots of a website, set out in the examiner’s decision and referred to by the Board of Appeal, it is sufficient to note that the Board of Appeal relies on those screenshots only in order to illustrate that the possibility of putting shoes on without bending over is a marketable quality of those goods.

35Consequently, the Board of Appeal was right to find, in paragraphs 19 to 21 of the contested decision, that, in relation to the footwear covered by the mark applied for, the expression ‘just step in’ was likely to be perceived directly by the relevant public as conveying the information that those goods could be put on by stepping into them, without having to deal with fastenings.

Assessment of the descriptive character of the mark applied for in relation to the goods at issue

36The Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the mark applied for, taken as a whole in relation to the goods at issue, had a sufficiently direct link with those goods, with the result that it would convey direct and specific information about characteristics of those goods which are easily recognisable by at least a significant part of the English-speaking public of the European Union, and was therefore caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

37The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal wrongly held that the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods at issue. In that regard, it submits, in essence, that the sign applied for has no direct and specific link with the goods at issue and that it makes no reference to any of their characteristics. Furthermore, it submits that when the public perceives the sign applied for, a complex cognitive process is triggered in so far as there are several possible interpretations of that sign, which, given that it does not appear in any dictionary, is a fanciful expression.

38Moreover, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal failed to take into account the existence of numerous registrations of signs similar to the sign applied for as EU trade marks, and the registration of the sign applied for in the United Kingdom, the United States and India, which shows that that sign is not descriptive for the English-speaking public. Furthermore, extensive case-law relating to signs which have been found not to be descriptive shows that the Board of Appeal’s approach is incorrect in the present case.

39EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

40In that regard, it should be recalled, as has been stated in paragraph 31 above, that the applicant does not dispute as such the Board of Appeal’s assessments as regards the meaning of the English words ‘step in’ and ‘just’.

41Furthermore, as is clear from the case-law referred to in paragraph 17 above, a sign’s descriptiveness cannot be assessed other than by reference to the goods concerned and by reference to the understanding which the relevant public has of it.

42In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal cannot be criticised for finding that, upon encountering the expression ‘just step in’ in connection with footwear in Class 25, the English-speaking public of the European Union would establish a direct and specific link between the sign applied for and those goods, enabling it immediately to perceive, without further thought, the characteristic of allowing the user to step straight into them without having to bend over or deal with fastenings.

43Therefore, the Board of Appeal was right to find, in paragraph 24 of the contested decision, that a significant part of the relevant public would immediately and clearly understand that the sign applied for, in relation to footwear, describes easily recognisable characteristics of those goods.

44Contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, which disputes that the sign applied for refers to a characteristic of the goods at issue, the Board of Appeal was right to find that the possibility of putting on footwear without bending over or dealing with fastenings is capable of constituting a characteristic relating to the kind, quality or method of use of those goods. Moreover, as the Board of Appeal indicated, for illustrative purposes, by reference to screenshots from the applicant’s website which had also been referenced by the examiner, it is noteworthy that the applicant itself highlights the possibility of putting on footwear without bending over as a characteristic of the goods which it markets.

45In addition, as the Board of Appeal correctly stated in paragraph 20 of the contested decision, the relevant public’s perception of that characteristic is reinforced by the fact that the words ‘step’ and ‘in’ are preceded by the word ‘just’, which places the focus on the action of putting on the goods at issue. The Board of Appeal correctly found that the word ‘just’ serves to indicate to the relevant public of the goods at issue that the footwear need only be stepped into, without the wearer having to stoop to fasten them, or deal with fastenings.

46Moreover, the fact that the expression ‘just step in’, taken as a whole, does not appear, as such, in the dictionary does not mean that a cognitive process is triggered in the mind of the relevant public when it perceives the sign applied for. Since the various word elements of the sign applied for are words that can be found in English dictionaries, the English-speaking public will be able to recognise them and, therefore, understand their meaning without any effort, for the purposes of the case-law referred to in paragraph 29 above. In addition, and in any event, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, EUIPO is under no obligation to prove that the sign in respect of which registration is sought as an EU trade mark is included in dictionaries (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2018, Dermatest v EUIPO (ORIGINAL excellent dermatest 5-star-guarantee.de CLINICALLY TESTED), T‑802/17, not published, EU:T:2018:971, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

47Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant also submits, the fact that the expression ‘just step in’ has never been registered with EUIPO does not prove that it is fanciful. In any event, that fact has no bearing on the legality of the contested decision. As noted in paragraph 32 above, a word sign must be refused registration if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned (see judgment of 23 November 2022, Allessa v EUIPO – Dumerth (CASSELLAPARK), T‑701/21, not published, EU:T:2022:724, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

48As regards the applicant’s arguments based on the numerous registrations of signs similar to the sign applied for as EU trade marks, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the decisions concerning registration of a sign as an EU trade mark which EUIPO is led to take under Regulation 2017/1001 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the legality of the decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of that regulation, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice of those boards (judgment of 15 September 2005, BioID v OHIM, C‑37/03 P, EU:C:2005:547, paragraph 47; order of 11 February 2021, Klose v EUIPO, C‑600/20 P, not published, EU:C:2021:110, paragraph 21, and judgment of 21 February 2024, Roethig López v EUIPO – William Grant & Sons Irish Brands (AMAZONIAN GIN COMPANY), T‑756/22, not published, EU:T:2024:101, paragraph 46).

49As regards the arguments based on the registration, in the United Kingdom and India, of signs identical to the sign applied for and the application for registration of the sign applied for in the United States, it must be borne in mind that the EU trade mark system is an autonomous system with its own set of objectives and rules peculiar to it; it applies independently of any national system (see judgment of 6 September 2018, Bundesverband Souvenir – Geschenke – Ehrenpreise v EUIPO, C‑488/16 P, EU:C:2018:673, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). Consequently, the registrability of a sign as an EU trade mark must be assessed by reference only to the relevant EU rules. EUIPO and, if appropriate, the EU judicature are not bound by a decision given in a Member State, or in a third country, that the sign in question is registrable as a national mark (judgments of 27 February 2002, Streamserve v OHIM (STREAMSERVE), T‑106/00, EU:T:2002:43, paragraph 47, and of 11 May 2010, Abadía Retuerta v OHIM (CUVÉE PALOMAR), T‑237/08, EU:T:2010:185, paragraph 137). That is so even if such a decision was adopted in a country belonging to the linguistic area in which the word sign in question originated (judgments of 27 February 2002, STREAMSERVE, T‑106/00, EU:T:2002:43, paragraph 47, and of 14 June 2007, Europig v OHIM (EUROPIG), T‑207/06, EU:T:2007:179, paragraph 42).

50As regards the applicant’s arguments relying on case-law in which the General Court held that certain signs were not descriptive of the goods concerned, it is sufficient to note that the signs, goods and services and other circumstances which were relevant in the cases which gave rise to the judgments cited by the applicant are different from those which are relevant in the present case, and as a result of which the application for registration of the mark was refused, under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, in so far as at least one of the possible meanings of the sign applied for designated a characteristic of the goods at issue.

51It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal rightly concluded that the trade mark applied for was caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

52The first plea must therefore be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.

The second and third pleas in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and infringement of Article 94(1) of that regulation

53In support of its second plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal did not provide an adequate statement of reasons for the contested decision in finding that the trade mark applied for lacked distinctive character, even though it is required to provide reasoning for each absolute ground for refusal of registration, in accordance with the EUIPO examination guidelines.

54In support of its third plea, the applicant submits that the contested decision is vitiated by an error of law in so far as the Board of Appeal misapplied the criteria for assessing the distinctive character of a trade mark.

55EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

56It is clear from Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 that it is sufficient that one of the absolute grounds for refusal listed in that provision applies for the sign in question not to be registrable as an EU trade mark (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 September 2002, DKV v OHIM, C‑104/00 P, EU:C:2002:506, paragraph 29, and of 15 October 2020, Itinerant Show Room v EUIPO (FAKE DUCK), T‑607/19, not published, EU:T:2020:491, paragraph 67).

57In the present case, since it has been established that the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods at issue, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, it is not necessary to examine the merits of the applicant’s arguments relating to the distinctive character of the mark applied for, which concern the absolute ground for refusal provided for in Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

58It follows from the foregoing that the third plea must be rejected as ineffective and, consequently, the second plea, alleging a failure to state reasons for the examination of the absolute ground for refusal under Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must also be rejected.

The fourth and fifth pleas in law, alleging breach of the principles of equal treatment and good administration

59In support of its fourth plea, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal breached the principle of equal treatment, as provided for in Article 20 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 41(2) of the Charter, in that it deviated from EUIPO’s practice, as summarised in its guidelines, without any reason to do so.

60In addition, in support of its fifth plea, the applicant submits that, by breaching the principle of equal treatment, the Board of Appeal also breached the principle of good administration, within the meaning of Article 41 of the Charter.

61EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

62In that regard, it is worth recalling the case-law cited in paragraphs 48 and 49 above, according to which the legality of the decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of the decision-making practice of EUIPO or a previous national decision-making practice. Accordingly, EUIPO and, if appropriate, the EU judicature are not bound by a decision given in a Member State that a sign is registrable as a national trade mark.

63It is true that EUIPO is under a duty to exercise its powers in accordance with the general principles of EU law, such as the principles of equal treatment and good administration. In the light of those two principles, EUIPO must, when examining an application for registration of an EU trade mark, take into account the decisions already taken in respect of similar applications and consider with particular care whether it should decide in the same way or not. However, the way in which the principles of equal treatment and good administration are applied must be consistent with respect for legality. Consequently, a person who applies for registration of a sign as a trade mark cannot rely, to his or her advantage and in order to secure an identical decision, on a possibly unlawful act committed for the benefit of someone else. Moreover, for reasons of legal certainty and, indeed, of good administration, the examination of any trade mark application must be stringent and full, in order to prevent trade marks from being improperly registered. That examination must be undertaken in each individual case. The registration of a sign as a mark depends on specific criteria, which are applicable in the factual circumstances of the particular case and the purpose of which is to ascertain whether the sign at issue is caught by a ground for refusal (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM, C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraphs 73 to 77, and of 14 December 2018, Dermatest v EUIPO (ORIGINAL excellent dermatest), T‑803/17, not published, EU:T:2018:973, paragraphs 58 and 59).

64As noted in paragraph 51 above, the Court considers that the Board of Appeal correctly concluded that the mark applied for was caught by the ground for refusal laid down in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

65In those circumstances, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 63 above, the Board of Appeal did not breach the principles of equal treatment and good administration in finding that, despite the registrations of the mark outside the European Union and previous registrations of other trade marks with EUIPO, the absolute ground for refusal in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 precluded registration of the sign applied for.

66The fourth and fifth pleas must therefore be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.

67It follows from all of the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.

Costs

68Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

69Although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO applied for it to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened. Since no hearing was held, each party must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

hereby orders:

1.The action is dismissed.

2.The parties shall each bear their own costs.

Luxembourg, 7 April 2025.

Registrar

President

—

Language of the case: English.