5.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 42/4

(Case C-633/17)

(2018/C 042/07)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Gmalieva s.r.o., Manfred Naderhirn

Authorities concerned: Landespolizeidirektion Oberösterreich, Bezirkshauptmann von Linz-Land

Interveners: Mag. Jungwirth and Mag. Fabian OHG and others, Gunhild Mayr, Mag. Übermaßer KG

Question referred

Is a combination of procedural system and court structure such as established in Austria, for jurisdiction in matters of public law, in Articles 133(4) and 144(1) of the Bundesverfassungsgesetz (Federal Constitutional Law) in conjunction with Paragraphs 41, 42 and 63 of the Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetz (Law on the Supreme Administrative Court), on the one hand, and with Paragraph 87 of the Verfassungsgerichtshofgesetz (Law on the Constitutional Court), on the other hand —

namely:

in either case simple annulment (Kassation) by the highest instance court, which in effect is not the same as resolving the case on the merits but is merely equivalent to a formal referral back to the lower instance court, i.e.

1)setting aside the contested decision,

2)with an obligation on the part of the lower instance court to reach a new resolution of the case on the merits, with

3)an obligation to be bound by the legal opinion of the highest instances,

whereby this binding effect is generally ordered by statute, i.e. in particular also for those situations in which it is not guaranteed ex lege that the higher courts, in proceedings meeting in every respect the requirements of Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (but rather characterised in particular by

1)the prohibition on making new claims and defences or presenting new facts and evidence (Neuerungsverbot),

2)the binding nature of the facts of the case found by the lower court,

3)reference to the relevant factual and legal situation existing at the time of the lower court’s decision, and

4)the scope of the power to rule being limited simply to fundamental legal questions (Supreme Administrative Court), on the one hand, and violations of the sphere of fundamental rights (Constitutional Court) on the other),

have conducted both an autonomous assessment of consistency and proportionality and an assessment based on the current factual situation

compatible with the freedom of establishment guaranteed in Article 49 TFEU and the freedom of services guaranteed in Article 56 TFEU?

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