Provisional text

2 July 2025 (*)

( Civil service – Officials – Retirement pension – The 2004 and 2014 reforms of the Staff Regulations – Transitional measures relating to certain details in the calculation of pension rights – Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations – Members of the contract staff who have become civil servants – Annual rate of acquisition of pension rights – Retirement age – Scope of the law – Equal treatment )

In Case T‑131/24,

CR,

represented by S. Orlandi, lawyer,

applicant,

European Commission,

represented by A. Baeckelmans, M. Brauhoff and G. Niddam, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

European Parliament,

represented by S. Bukšek Tomac and M. Mão Cheia Carreira, acting as Agents,

and by

Council of the European Union,

represented by M. Bauer, J. Rurarz and X. Chamodraka, acting as Agents,

interveners,

THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of J. Svenningsen, President, C. Mac Eochaidh (Rapporteur) and J. Laitenberger, Judges,

Registrar: L. Ramette, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure,

further to the hearing on 14 January 2025,

gives the following

By its action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, CR, seeks the annulment of the decision of the European Commission of 4 May 2023 determining her pension rights (‘the contested decision’).

Legal framework

Before 1 May 2004, Article 77 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) provided, inter alia, that any official who had completed at least ten years’ service was entitled, from the age of 60, to a retirement pension, that the annual rate of acquisition of pension rights was, for each year of service, 2 % of the final basic salary carried by the last grade in which the official was classified for at least one year (‘the final basic salary’) and that the maximum amount of that retirement pension was 70 % of that final basic salary. Also, Article 39 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’) referred to Article 77 of the Staff Regulations regarding the retirement pension rights of temporary staff.

From 1 May 2004, the Staff Regulations and the CEOS were amended by Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 723/2004 of 22 March 2004 (OJ 2004 L 124, p. 1; ‘the 2004 reform’).

As part of the 2004 reform, the EU legislature amended Article 77 of the Staff Regulations, in particular by raising the retirement age to 63 years and fixing the annual rate of acquisition of pension rights at 1.9 % of the final basic salary for each year of service. The limit of 70 % of the final basic salary was maintained. That reform also applied to temporary staff and to a new category of staff, namely contract staff (Articles 39 and 109 of the CEOS).

From 1 January 2014, the Staff Regulations and the CEOS were amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 15; (‘the 2014 reform’).

In the 2014 reform, the EU legislature again amended Article 77 of the Staff Regulations, in particular by raising the retirement age to 66 years and establishing a new annual rate of acquisition of pension rights of 1.8 %. The limit of 70 % of the final basic salary was maintained. That reform also applied to temporary staff and to contract staff (Articles 39 and 109 of the CEOS).

According to the EU legislature, those amendments in the 2004 and 2014 reforms had been made necessary in order to ensure the short- and long-term actuarial balance of the pension scheme of the European Union institutions (‘PSEUI’) because of demographic changes and the changing age structure of the population concerned, which were imposing ever-increasing burdens upon that scheme (recitals 28 and 29 of Regulation No 723/2004; recitals 14 and 15 of Regulation No 1023/2013).

Also, although the 2004 reform aimed, in general, to observe budgetary discipline (recital 10 of Regulation No 723/2004), the 2014 reform occurred in a particularly difficult social and economic context as a result of an unprecedented financial crisis, which necessitated, inter alia, a consolidation of public finances in the short, medium and long term by every public administration (recitals 11 to 13 of Regulation No 1023/2013).

Moreover, by way of derogation from the provisions of Article 77 of the Staff Regulations and Articles 39 and 109 of the CEOS, Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations and the Annex to the CEOS contain transitional measures for the benefit of officials and other staff who were in service before the entry into force of the 2004 or 2014 reform.

The EU legislature adopted those transitional provisions to enable the new rules and measures to be applied gradually, whilst respecting the acquired rights and legitimate expectations of the staff in place (recitals 29 and 37 of Regulation No 723/2004; recitals 14 and 29 of Regulation No 1023/2013).

First of all, the first paragraph of Article 21 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations states that officials who entered the service before 1 May 2004 are entitled to 2 %, and not 1.8 %, of their final basic salary for every year of pensionable service. Although its current wording results from the 2014 reform, that provision has its origin in the 2004 reform (point 102 of Annex I to Regulation No 723/2004).

The second paragraph of Article 21 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations provides that officials who entered the service between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2013 are entitled to 1.9 %, and not 1.8 %, of their final basic salary for every year of pensionable service. That provision was added during the 2014 reform (point 73(f) of Article 1 of Regulation No 1023/2013).

According to Article 22(1), second to fourth subparagraphs, of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, the retirement age of officials who entered the service before 1 January 2014 is not fixed at 66 years, but ranges from 60 to 65 years depending on the age of those officials on 1 May 2014. Those provisions were added during the 2014 reform (point 73(g) of Article 1 of Regulation No 1023/2013).

Moreover, the EU legislature has stated that Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations was applicable by analogy to other servants employed on 30 April 2004 and that Article 21 and Article 22, with the exception of paragraph 4, of that annex were applicable by analogy to other servants employed on 31 December 2013 (the first and second sentences of Article 1 of the Annex to the CEOS).

Lastly, Article 28(1) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations provides that temporary staff whose contract is ongoing on 1 May 2004 and who are appointed as officials after that date and before 1 January 2014 will, on retirement, be entitled to an actuarial adjustment of the pension rights they acquired as temporary servants which takes into account the change in their pensionable age as referred to in Article 77 of the Staff Regulations. Although its current wording results from the 2014 reform, that provision also has its origin in the 2004 reform (point 102 of Annex I to Regulation No 723/2004).

Similarly, Article 28(2) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations provides that temporary staff, contract staff or auxiliary contract staff who were under contract on 1 January 2014 and were appointed as officials after that date will, on retirement, be entitled to an actuarial adjustment of the pension rights they acquired as temporary or contract staff which takes into account the change in their pensionable age as referred to in Article 77 of the Staff Regulations, in the event that they were at least 35 years old on 1 May 2014. Those provisions were added during the 2014 reform (point 73(j) of Article 1 of Regulation No 1023/2013).

The actuarial adjustments in question in paragraphs 15 and 16 above are calculated according to the coefficients laid down in Conclusion No 268/15 adopted by the Committee of Heads of Administration on 25 February 2016 relating to the actuarial adjustment of the rights acquired as temporary or contract staff (Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations).

Background to the dispute

On 16 June 2012, the applicant entered the service of the Commission as a member of the contract staff.

On 16 August 2015, the applicant was appointed as an official.

On 4 May 2023, the Office for the Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO) of the European Commission adopted the contested decision. The PMO informed the applicant that she was entitled to a retirement pension from 1 July 2023, at the age of 66 years. The PMO also informed her that, for her period of activity as a member of the contract staff (from 16 June 2012 to 15 August 2015), the annual rate of acquisition of her pension rights was 1.9 % and that, for her period of activity as an official (from 16 August 2015 to 30 June 2023), the annual rate of acquisition was 1.8 %.

On 11 May 2023, relying on the judgment of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission (C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984) and taking into account the fact that she had been affiliated and had contributed continuously to the PSEUI, the applicant requested the PMO to review the contested decision, such that her retirement age be set at 63 years and that the annual rate of acquisition of 1.9 % be applied to her throughout her career. Moreover, since she had remained in service until the age of 66 and she considered that her retirement age should have been set at 63 years, the applicant requested that she be granted a further increase of 2.5 % of her final basic salary for each of the years worked beyond 63 years.

On 15 May 2023, the PMO informed the applicant that she could file a complaint in the event of disagreement with the contested decision.

On 1 July 2023, the applicant retired.

On 25 July 2023, the applicant filed a complaint against the contested decision.

On 30 November 2023, the appointing authority rejected that complaint.

Forms of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

–annul the contested decision;

–order the Commission to pay the costs.

The Commission contends that the Court should:

–dismiss the action;

–order the applicant to bear her own costs and pay those incurred by it.

The European Parliament contends that the Court should:

–dismiss the action;

–order the applicant to pay the costs.

The Council of the European Union contends that the Court should dismiss the action.

In support of her action, the applicant puts forward two pleas in law.

The first plea in law, alleging breach of the scope of the law

The applicant claims that the PMO erred in law in finding that Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations was applicable to her. Following the judgments of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission (C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984), and of 14 December 2018, Torné v Commission (T‑128/17, EU:T:2018:969), Articles 21 and 22, and not Article 28, of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations should be applied to a situation such as that of the applicant. A combined reading of Articles 21, 22 and 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations and of those two judgments entails restriction of the scope of that Article 28 only to temporary or contract staff appointed as officials after 1 May 2004 or after 1 January 2014 whose affiliation to the PSEUI has been interrupted. Since the applicant has never ceased to be affiliated to the PSEUI, she cannot fall within Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations. Only Articles 21 and 22 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations are applicable to her situation.

The Commission, supported by the Parliament and the Council, disputes that line of argument.

In the present case, the Court notes that the annual rate of acquisition of pension rights adopted by the PMO for the applicant’s period of activity as a member of the contract staff, namely 1.9 %, does not follow from the application of Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, but from the combined application of the second paragraph of Article 21 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations and the second sentence of Article 1(1) of the Annex to the CEOS.

However, the PMO applied the provisions of Article 28(2) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, which refers to Article 77 of the Staff Regulations, in respect of the applicant’s retirement age, namely 66 years, and the annual rate of acquisition of her pension rights corresponding to her period of activity as an official, namely 1.8 %. Moreover, the applicant has benefited from an actuarial adjustment of her pension rights acquired as a member of the contract staff. In accordance with Conclusion No 268/15 (see paragraph 17 above), the PMO applied a coefficient of 1.152 to those pension rights. The application of that coefficient resulted in a 0.914 percentage point increase in the rate taken into account in determining her pension rights. That increase therefore amounts to a six-month extension of the period actually worked by the applicant as a member of the contract staff.

Only the aspects of the contested decision summarised in paragraph 34 above are criticised by the applicant. According to her, Article 21 and Article 22(1) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations must govern the whole of her career with the European Union, including her period of activity as an official, and she was entitled to retire from the age of 63. Therefore, the PMO erred in applying Article 28 of XIII to the Staff Regulations to her situation, but also failed to apply to her the provisions of Article 22(1) of that annex, by way of derogation from Article 77 of the Staff Regulations.

In that regard, the Court finds that the applicant fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 28(2) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations. She was a member of the contract staff between 16 June 2012 and 15 August 2015, she was appointed as an official on 16 August 2015 and she was over 35 years of age on 1 May 2014.

Although she fulfils those conditions, the applicant nonetheless maintains that Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations is not applicable to her because she has never ceased to be affiliated to the PSEUI. According to the applicant, Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations applies only to temporary or contract staff who fulfil the conditions laid down in that article and whose affiliation to the PSEUI was also interrupted before they were appointed as officials.

That argument must be dismissed, since that last condition, namely the interruption of affiliation to the PSEUI, is not clearly apparent from Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations. Accepting the applicant’s argument would mean limiting the scope of Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations by adding a condition which was not laid down by the EU legislature.

According to settled case-law, where the meaning of a provision of EU law is absolutely plain from its very wording, a court of the European Union cannot depart from that wording (see judgments of 19 October 2023, Sad Trasporto Locale, C‑186/22, EU:C:2023:795, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited, and of 29 July 2024, HDI Global

and MS Amlin Insurance, C‑771/22 and C‑45/23, EU:C:2024:644, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

41Consequently, to consider that the application of a provision of the Staff Regulations is subject to a condition which is not laid down therein constitutes a contra legem interpretation of that provision, and therefore that interpretation cannot be accepted (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 17 December 2020, De Masi and Varoufakis v ECB, C‑342/19 P, EU:C:2020:1035, paragraph 36, and of 8 November 2023, OA v Parliament, T‑39/22, not published, EU:T:2023:709, paragraph 69).

42That conclusion is all the more appropriate since the EU judicature, in the light of the principles of institutional balance and allocation of powers, as enshrined in Article 13(2) TEU, does not have the power to derogate from the provisions of the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2017, Commission v Council (WRC‑15), C‑687/15, EU:C:2017:803, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

43Lastly, in addition to the considerations set out in paragraphs 39 to 41 above, the addition to Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations of a condition which was not laid down by the EU legislature would also be contrary to the settled case-law according to which transitional provisions must be interpreted strictly owing to their exceptional nature and their budgetary implications (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2018, Torné v Commission, T‑128/17, EU:T:2018:969, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

44Therefore, the PMO did not err in law in finding that Article 28(2) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations was applicable to the applicant’s situation.

45That conclusion is not invalidated by the judgments of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission (C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984), and of 14 December 2018, Torné v Commission (T‑128/17, EU:T:2018:969), relied on by the applicant.

46In the judgments of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission (C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984), and of 14 December 2018, Torné v Commission (T‑128/17, EU:T:2018:969), the Court of Justice and the General Court did rule on the scope of Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations. There is no indication in those judgments that the Court of Justice or the General Court sought to call into question the choices of the EU legislature and amend the scope of Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations by reserving it only for temporary or contract staff whose contract was ongoing on 1 May 2004 or 1 January 2014 and whose affiliation to the PSEUI was interrupted before their appointment as officials.

47In the judgments of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission (C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984), and of 14 December 2018, Torné v Commission (T‑128/17, EU:T:2018:969), the Court of Justice and the General Court merely interpreted and applied Article 21 and Article 22(1) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, read together with Article 1(1) of the Annex to the CEOS, to situations falling within the scope of those articles.

48In that regard, the Court observes that, taken in isolation and according to the heading to Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, the provisions of that annex are applicable only to officials (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission, C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984, paragraph 65).

49It is important to point out that it is only by means of Article 1(1) of the Annex to the CEOS that Article 21 and Article 22, with the exception of paragraph 4 thereof, of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations are applicable by analogy to other staff (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission, C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984, paragraphs 66 and 80).

50Thus, first of all, as regards officials, Article 77 of the Staff Regulations, as amended by the 2004 reform, provides that, in principle, the annual rate of acquisition of pension rights is 1.9 % and that the retirement age is 63 years. That same article, as amended by the 2014 reform, provides that, in principle, the annual rate of acquisition of pension rights is 1.8 % and that the retirement age is 66 years.

51Article 21 and Article 22(1) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, as amended by the 2004 reform and as amended by the 2014 reform, expressly derogate from that general regime. Nevertheless, according to the very wording of those articles, the benefit of that derogation regime is limited only to ‘officials’ who entered the service, respectively, as regards the 2004 regime, ‘before’ 1 May 2004 or, as regards the 2014 reform, ‘before’ 1 January 2014.

52The Court also finds that Article 21 and Article 22(1) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations refer only to the date of ‘entry into service’, that is to say, the date of entry into service of officials and not, as is the case with Article 28 of the same annex (see paragraphs 52 and 53 below), to the date of their ‘appointment’.

53Moreover, Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations organises a special regime for ‘servants’ who were under contract on 1 May 2004 or 1 January 2014 and who were subsequently ‘appointed’ as officials.

54Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations therefore lays down two distinct and cumulative conditions. The first condition is entry into service as a servant, which had to be no later than 1 May 2004 or 1 January 2014, since, on one of those dates, that servant had to be under contract. The second condition is the appointment of that servant as an official, which necessarily postdates his or her entry into service, since, according to the letter of Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, that appointment had to be made ‘after’ 1 May 2004 or ‘after’ 1 January 2014.

55It is therefore apparent from a literal and systemic reading of Article 77 of the Staff Regulations and from Article 21, Article 22(1) and Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations that the EU legislature intended to restrict the benefit of Article 21 and Article 22(1), taken in isolation, to ‘officials’ who ‘entered the service’ in that capacity ‘before’ 1 May 2004 or ‘before’ 1 January 2014.

56On the other hand, officials who were ‘appointed’ ‘after’ 1 May 2004 or ‘after’ 1 January 2014 fall within Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations if they had previously entered the service as temporary or contract staff and they were under contract on 1 May 2004 or 1 January 2014.

57Next, as regards servants, the EU legislature has made it possible, by means of Article 1(1) of the Annex to the CEOS, for Article 21 and Article 22(1) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations to be applied by analogy to staff ‘employed’ or ‘in place’ on 30 April 2004 or 31 December 2013.

58However, such application by analogy of Article 21 and Article 22(1) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, according to the very letter of Article 1(1) of the Annex to the CEOS, concerns only other servants, and not officials (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission, C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984, paragraphs 66 and 80).

59That approach is also consistent with the very essence of the CEOS and its annex, which expressly and exclusively concern other servants. An official cannot therefore claim the benefit of the CEOS and its annex.

60As has already been stated in paragraph 52 above, the EU legislature nonetheless adopted a special regime, namely Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, for temporary or contract staff who were under contract on 1 May 2004 or 1 January 2014 and who were subsequently appointed as officials.

61It follows that the applicant’s situation, as regards her activity as a member of the contract staff, initially fell within the combined application of Article 77 of the Staff Regulations and Article 109 of the CEOS, as amended by the 2004 reform. However, her situation between 1 January 2014 and 15 August 2015 fell within the combined application of the second paragraph of Article 21 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations and the second sentence of Article 1(1) of the Annex to the CEOS. Under those provisions, the annual rate of acquisition of her pension rights was 1.9 % for her period of activity as a member of the contract staff.

62The applicant’s situation as regards her period of activity as an official, falls, since 16 August 2015, the date of her appointment, within the combined application of Article 77 of the Staff Regulations and Article 28(2) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, as amended by the 2014 reform. Under those provisions, the annual rate of acquisition of her pension rights is 1.8 % for that period and her retirement age is set at 66 years. Moreover, the raising of her retirement age is financially offset by an actuarial adjustment of the pension rights which she acquired as a member of the contract staff (see paragraph 34 above).

63Those conclusions do not infringe the principles laid down in paragraphs 76 and 80 of the judgment of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission (C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984). First of all, the applicant’s situation is different from that of Mr Picard. Mr Picard had concluded a new contract as a member of the contract staff, whereas the applicant was appointed as an official. Moreover, contrary to what Mr Picard was contesting, and irrespective of whether the applicant’s duties were substantially amended as a result of her appointment, the contested decision in the present case has not caused her to ‘lose’ the benefit of the transitional provisions contained in Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations. As stated in paragraph 61 above, the applicant’s period of activity as an official falls within the scope of Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations.

64Second, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Court of Justice did not state that continuous affiliation to the PSEUI was the only criterion for determining the beneficiaries of the transitional provisions laid down in Articles 21 and 22 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations. By using the adverb ‘inter alia’ in paragraph 76 of the judgment of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission (C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984), the Court of Justice indicated that it was only one criterion among others. The same approach must necessarily be adopted for Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, on which the Court of Justice did not, however, rule (see paragraph 45 above), since that article is placed, next to Articles 21 and 22 of that annex, amongst the transitional provisions.

65As is clear from paragraphs 54 and 55 above, the appointment of a servant as an official, after 1 May 2004 or after 1 January 2014, and the possession of an ongoing contract on one of those dates, are the criteria for applying Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations.

66For the sake of completeness, the Court notes that Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations may also be applicable if a servant’s affiliation to the PSEUI was interrupted before the 2004 reform or the 2014 reform provided that the servant was under contract on 1 May 2004 or 1 January 2014 and was appointed as an official subsequently. In other words, for the purpose of determining whether Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations is applicable, all that matters is that the conditions laid down in that article stated in paragraph 53 above have been fulfilled.

67Lastly, the Court notes that the conclusions in paragraphs 60 and 61 above reflect the EU legislature’s choices and that, in the context of the tasks assigned to it by the authors of the Treaties and contrary to what is sought by the applicant, it is not for the EU judicature to derogate from Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations by adding a currently non-existent condition (see paragraphs 37 to 43 above).

68Consequently, the first plea in law must be rejected.

The second plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment

69By the second plea in law, put forward in the alternative, the applicant raises an objection of illegality against Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, on the ground that it breaches the principle of equal treatment.

70In that regard, the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 18 April 2024, Dumitrescu and Others v Commission and Court of Justice, C‑567/22 P to C‑570/22 P, EU:C:2024:336, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

71In order to be able to determine whether or not there is a breach of that principle, it is necessary to take into account, inter alia, the subject matter and purpose of the provision which allegedly breaches that principle (see judgment of 18 April 2024, Dumitrescu and Others v Commission and Court of Justice, C‑567/22 P to C‑570/22 P, EU:C:2024:336, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).

72Furthermore, in a matter involving the exercise of discretionary powers, such as laying down transitional rules which seek to ensure a fair transition from previous Staff Regulations to new Staff Regulations, the principle of equal treatment is breached only where the EU legislature imposes a distinction which is arbitrary, or manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective pursued (judgment of 14 December 2018, GQ and Others v Commission, T‑525/16, EU:T:2018:964, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 18 April 2024, Dumitrescu and Others v Commission and Court of Justice, C‑567/22 P to C‑570/22 P, EU:C:2024:336, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

73According to the case-law, the Court is therefore required to confine itself to ascertaining whether the difference in treatment appears arbitrary or manifestly inappropriate having regard to the general-interest objective pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2021, Álvarez y Bejarano and Others v Commission, C‑517/19 P and C‑518/19 P, EU:C:2021:240, paragraphs 53 and 54).

74However, in view of that limited power of judicial review, it is not for the Court to ascertain whether it seems not unreasonable for the EU legislature to take the view that the difference in treatment established can be appropriate and necessary for the purposes of attaining the general-interest objective pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2022, Commission v VW and Others, C‑116/21 P to C‑118/21 P, C‑138/21 P and C‑139/21 P, EU:C:2022:557, paragraph 129, and order of 22 December 2022, Commission v KM and Council v Commission, C‑341/21 P and C‑357/21 P, EU:C:2022:1042, paragraph 64).

75It is in the light of that case-law that the Court will examine the first and second parts of the second plea in law.

The first part of the second plea in law

76The applicant claims that Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations breaches the principle of equal treatment by treating differently categories of persons in comparable situations. Merely on account of her appointment as an official and although she has never ceased to be affiliated to the PSEUI, the applicant has been treated less favourably than if she had become a member of the temporary staff rather than an official or if she had remained a member of the contract staff. The applicant further states that the Parliament has, for more than five years, adopted the same interpretation as hers of Article 21, Article 22(1) and Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations.

77The Commission, supported by the Parliament and the Council, challenges that line of argument.

In that regard, concerning the comparability of situations, the Court of Justice has already stated that the Staff Regulations and the CEOS established a pension scheme common to officials and other staff, namely the PSEUI. In view of the reference in Article 39(1) and Article 109(1) of the CEOS to the conditions laid down in Chapter 3 of Title V of the Staff Regulations, temporary staff and contract staff also contribute, under the conditions laid down in Article 83(2) of the Staff Regulations, to the financing of that pension scheme (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission, C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984, paragraphs 77 and 78).

Nevertheless, the Court of Justice also stated that there existed differences between officials and other staff (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission, C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984, paragraph 69).

On that point, the Court notes that, in principle, officials have the assurance of being able to remain in the service of the European Union until their retirement age. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as leave on personal grounds, if taken at the end of a career, leave in the interests of the service, voluntary resignation, compulsory resignation, retirement in the interests of the service, dismissal for incompetence, removal from post, death and compulsory retirement because of permanent invalidity, that their service is terminated before they reach retirement age (Articles 40, 42c, 47 to 51 and 53 of the Staff Regulations and Article 9(1)(h) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations).

By contrast, in general, and as the applicant herself recognises, other servants do not have such stability of employment. According to settled case-law, the duration of the employment relationship between an institution and a member of staff engaged for a fixed term is governed by the terms laid down in the contract concluded between the parties. Furthermore, the administration has a broad discretion in matters of contract renewal (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2022, SU v EIOPA, T‑296/21, EU:T:2022:808, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). Therefore, only the conclusion of a contract for an indefinite period creates a more stable link with no time limits between the institution and the staff member concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 November 2022, QM v Europol, T‑164/21, EU:T:2022:695, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).

Moreover, in view of their generally longer period of service with the European Union, but also on account of the automatic advancement in step and grade promotions from which they benefit, officials attain, at the end of their career, grades and steps which are normally higher than those attained by other staff. That higher classification customarily enjoyed by officials is accompanied by higher pay than that received by most members of staff, since that pay is directly linked to the grade and step.

That final point is decisive in the present case, since, in calculating the amount of retirement pension of an official or member of staff, only his or her final basic salary is taken into account (see paragraphs 4 to 16 above).

Furthermore, the amount of retirement pension does not depend only on the final basic salary. That amount is also dependent on the period of service of the official or member of staff, since the latter acquires, for each year of service, 1.8 %, 1.9 % or 2 % of his or her final basic salary (see paragraphs 4 to 16 above). Mechanically, in so far as, in general, officials have a longer period of service than other staff, they acquire more years of pensionable service than the latter.

In view of those objective differences, and as the Commission, the Parliament and the Council maintain, the overall impact on the EU budget of the 2004 and 2014 reforms is necessarily greater in the case of the pensions of officials than in the case of the pensions of other staff.

In those circumstances, in the light of the objective of preserving the actuarial balance of the PSEUI, without adversely affecting the acquired rights and legitimate expectations of the staff employed (Opinion of Advocate General Pikamäe in Picard v Commission, C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:582, points 44 and 51), as well as the more general objectives of budgetary discipline and consolidation of public finances in a difficult social and economic context (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), and in view of its broad discretion, the EU legislature was entitled to considers that officials appointed after 1 May 2004 or after 1 January 2014 had to be given different treatment from that which they would have received if they had retained their status as temporary or contract staff for at least 10 years.

In that regard, the Court notes that officials and members of staff contribute only one third of the cost of financing the PSEUI, whereas the payment of pensions, jointly guaranteed by the Member States, is charged to the budget of the European Union (Article 83(1) and (2) of the Staff Regulations). Given that structure for financing the PSEUI, which is primarily based on the resources allocated by the Member States to the European Union, the interests of officials benefiting from the special regime organised by Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations cannot be taken into account while totally ignoring the fact that those States were forced to adopt severe measures in order to deal with the lasting effects of a serious economic and financial crisis (recital 13 of Regulation No 1023/2013). Moreover, the actuarial balance of the PSEUI requires, specifically, the taking into account, in the long term, of economic developments and financial variables (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 13 December 2017, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, T‑482/16 RENV, EU:T:2017:901, paragraph 126 (not published) and the case-law cited). Therefore, in a society in which solidarity prevails, as stated in Article 2 TEU (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė, C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 71), and in the context of a serious economic and financial crisis, the EU legislature was entitled, among other measures, to establish that special regime in order to express the European civil service’s solidarity with the efforts which the Member States had to make at their own level.

Furthermore, it must be observed that the contributions of temporary and contract staff to the PSEUI are, in general, smaller than those of officials, whose basic salary may change as a result of the advancements in step and grade progression throughout their career. On that point, it is true that the PSEUI is organised on the basis of the principle of solidarity and that it is not intended to mean that the pension received by an official or staff member constitutes an exact counterpart for the contributions paid to that scheme (see judgment of 8 November 2023, OA v Parliament, T‑39/22, not published, EU:T:2023:709, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited). Nonetheless, the EU legislature was entitled to consider, in the exercise of its broad discretion, and in the light of the principle of solidarity which governs the PSEUI, that a staff member who was appointed as an official after 1 May 2004 or after 1 January 2014 cannot benefit from the annual accrual rate of retirement pension rights which was applicable to that person during his or her activity as a member of the temporary or contract staff, since that would have resulted in that person profiting disproportionately from that higher rate for calculating the amount of his or her pension on the basis of the final basic salary relating to the grade in which the official was classified before his or her retirement.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the difference in treatment contested by the applicant does not appear manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objectives pursued by the EU legislature. The EU legislature’s choice is, moreover, consistent with the principles of budgetary discipline and sound financial management (Articles 310 and 317 TFEU) and with that of preserving the actuarial balance of the PSEUI (Article 83a and Annex XII to the Staff Regulations).

That difference in treatment is also not arbitrary.

In that regard, the Court of Justice has already held that a provision of the Staff Regulations introduces an arbitrary distinction between officials and/or other staff where that distinction is based on a discriminatory criterion which has no connection with the objective pursued. In such a situation, considerations of a budgetary, administrative or staff policy nature cannot, in themselves, constitute an objective justification for a difference in treatment established between officials and/or other staff in comparable situations (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 April 2024, Dumitrescu and Others v Commission and Court of Justice, C‑567/22 P to C‑570/22 P, EU:C:2024:336, paragraphs 79 to 81, 93 and 94).

In the present case, unlike in the case of the second paragraph of Article 8(2) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations which the Court of Justice found to be unlawful in the judgment of 18 April 2024, Dumitrescu and Others v Commission and Court of Justice (C‑567/22 P to C‑570/22 P, EU:C:2024:336), the difference in treatment contested by the applicant is based not on a discriminatory criterion prohibited, in particular, by Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, but on the objective reasons referred to in paragraphs 78 to 84 above.

According to settled case-law, although the principle of equal treatment requires that officials and/or other staff who are in identical or comparable situations should be governed by the same rules, it does not, however, prevent the EU legislature from taking into account objective differences in the conditions or situations in which those concerned are placed (see judgments of 16 October 1980, Hochstrass v Court of Justice, 147/79, EU:C:1980:238, paragraph 7, and of 3 May 2018, SB v EUIPO, T‑200/17, not published, EU:T:2018:244, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

For the rest, according to equally settled case-law, it is not possible to question the differences in status between the various categories of persons employed by the European Union and the fact that some categories of persons employed by the European Union may enjoy guarantees under the Staff Regulations and social security benefits which are not given to other categories cannot, therefore, be regarded as discrimination (see judgment of 12 March 2020, XB v ECB, T‑484/18, not published, EU:T:2020:90, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited).

The Court also finds, as the Parliament noted, that the distinction between officials and other staff is not specific to Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations. The PSEUI itself, although common to officials and other staff, is nonetheless not uniform. Thus, unlike the case with officials, Articles 42 and 112 of the CEOS allow temporary and contract staff to request their authority to effect any payments they are required to make in order to constitute or maintain pension rights in their country of origin. Similarly, having regard to Article 3(d) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, where members of the contract staff become officials or where an official becomes a member of the contract staff, that change of status may result in a reduction of the years of pensionable service acquired under the previous scheme or in the reimbursement of surplus contributions corresponding to the difference between the number of years of pensionable service calculated and the number of years of actual service.

Although the differentiation criterion at issue in the present case is not, therefore, discriminatory and although it is based on objective reasons, the Court notes that, again unlike the findings with regard to the second paragraph of Article 8(2) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, that criterion also has ‘no connection’ with or is ‘unrelated’ to the objectives pursued. In adopting Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, and in accordance with the objectives of preserving the actuarial balance of the PSEUI, budgetary discipline and consolidation of public finances, the legislature intended the annual rate of acquisition of pension rights of the officials concerned, only in respect of their period of activity in that capacity, to be reduced and the length of their career to be extended precisely because the budgetary burden of the pensions of officials is greater than that of the pensions of other staff (see paragraphs 7, 8 and 84 above).

Moreover, even though the Court does not rule out that, in certain particular situations, a member of other staff can have a career similar to that of an official, whether in terms of length, grade, pay or duties, the fact remains that, in general, that is not the case. According to settled case-law, although in border-line cases fortuitous problems must arise from the introduction of any general and abstract system of rules, there are no grounds for taking exception to the fact that the EU legislature has resorted to categorization, provided that it is not in essence discriminatory having regard to the objective which it pursues (judgments of 16 October 1980, Hochstrass v Court of Justice, 147/79, EU:C:1980:238, paragraph 14, and of 15 April 2010, Gualtieri v Commission, C‑485/08 P, EU:C:2010:188, paragraph 81).

Thus, far from being arbitrary, the difference in treatment challenged by the applicant is based on an objective and non-discriminatory criterion, and it is also justified by the objectives of preserving the actuarial balance of the PSEUI, budgetary discipline and consolidation of public finances.

Furthermore, where the differentiation criterion is neither discriminatory nor completely unrelated to the objectives pursued, as is the situation in the present case, the Court of Justice has already acknowledged, in essence, that budgetary restriction measures affecting officials and/or public servants, in particular by reducing their benefits, may be justified by the objectives of budgetary discipline and consolidation of public finances (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 April 2024, Dumitrescu and Others v Commission and Court of Justice, C‑567/22 P to C‑570/22 P, EU:C:2024:336, paragraph 81; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė, C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraphs 67, 69 and 71).

Furthermore, no arbitrary or manifestly inappropriate distinction may be inferred from Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations in relation to the objective pursued by the EU legislature of preserving affecting the acquired rights and legitimate expectations of the officials concerned, since, like the other members of staff in place on 1 May 2004 or 1 January 2014, their acquired rights and legitimate expectations are respected.

In fact, their pension rights acquired during their period of activity as other members of staff are maintained. Moreover, quite logically, before their appointment, they had not yet acquired pension rights as officials. The officials concerned acquired pension rights in that capacity only upon appointment.

Furthermore, when they were still other members of staff, they did not receive any precise and unconditional assurance that, if they chose to become officials, the annual rate of acquisition of their pension rights and their retirement age would remain unchanged.

In addition to the fact that, as is the case with other members of staff in place on 1 May 2004 or on 1 January 2014, their acquired rights and legitimate expectations are respected, the Court also notes that, according to Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, the raising of the retirement age of the officials concerned is financially offset by an actuarial adjustment of the pension rights they acquired when they were other servants. In practice, a coefficient of between 1 and 1.178, depending on the personal situation of each of the officials concerned, is applied to their pension rights acquired as temporary or contract staff (see paragraph 17 above), as was the case for the applicant (see paragraph 34 above). Therefore, in reality, far from being breached, those acquired rights are maintained (coefficient equal to 1), or increased (coefficient higher than 1) by applying that coefficient.

In any event, the Court finds that, before her appointment as an official, the applicant had no guarantee of being able to receive a retirement pension since, on that date and contrary to the requirements in the first paragraph of Article 77 of the Staff Regulations, she had not yet completed 10 years of service with the European Union.

Lastly, the applicant’s assertion that the Parliament, for more than five years, adopted the same interpretation as that which she proposes for Article 21, Article 22(1) and Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations to the benefit of other staff who have become officials is irrelevant. According to the settled case-law, the principle of equality of treatment must be reconciled with the principle of legality, according to which no person may rely, in support of his claim, on an unlawful act committed in favour of another (see judgment of 16 October 2019, Palo v Commission, T‑432/18, EU:T:2019:749, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

Consequently, the first part of the second plea in law must be dismissed.

The second part of the second plea in law

The applicant claims that Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations breaches the principle of equal treatment by treating all servants who became officials after 1 May 2004 or 1 January 2014 in the same way, without taking into account any interruption of their affiliation to the PSEUI before their appointment. The applicant’s situation cannot be likened to that of a member of staff whose affiliation to the PSEUI was interrupted and who was then appointed as an official. The applicant herself has never ceased to be affiliated to the PSEUI.

The Commission, supported by the Parliament and the Council, disputes that line of argument.

108In that regard, the Court notes that the principle of equal treatment does not require the situations to be exactly identical for the same treatment to be capable of being applied. It is only necessary for those situations to be comparable (judgment of 15 October 2020, Coppo Gavazzi and Others v Parliament, T‑389/19 to T‑394/19, T‑397/19, T‑398/19, T‑403/19, T‑404/19, T‑406/19, T‑407/19, T‑409/19 to T‑414/19, T‑416/19 to T‑418/19, T‑420/19 to T‑422/19, T‑425/19 to T‑427/19, T‑429/19 to T‑432/19, T‑435/19, T‑436/19, T‑438/19 to T‑442/19, T‑444/19 to T‑446/19, T‑448/19, T‑450/19 to T‑454/19, T‑463/19 and T‑465/19, EU:T:2020:494, paragraph 257).

109Having regard to the subject matter of Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations and the objectives pursued by the EU legislature, all the officials concerned by that article must be regarded as being in a comparable situation, since they have all been members of staff previously and they have all been appointed after 1 May 2004 or after 1 January 2014.

110On the other hand, in examining the comparability of their respective situations, it is irrelevant whether or not those officials’ affiliation to the PSEUI was interrupted before their appointment. That circumstance relates to their period of activity as other servants, whereas the application of the provisions of Article 28 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations depends on their appointment as officials. Therefore, at most, that circumstance will mean in practice that officials whose affiliation and, correspondingly, whose payment of contributions to the PSEUI was interrupted before their appointment will complete less years of pensionable service relating to their period of activity as other servants alone than if there had not been such an interruption.

111Moreover, as regards the protection of their acquired rights, other servants who became officials after their affiliation to the PSEUI was interrupted and other servants who became officials without that affiliation being interrupted are in a comparable situation. In both cases, those staff members paid contributions to the PSEUI with a view to a lower retirement age than that which will be finally applicable to them. Their acquired rights are therefore of the same kind, the only difference being the number of years of pensionable service which each of them has obtained. Accordingly, other servants who have become officials must be able to benefit from an actuarial adjustment irrespective of whether or not their appointment as officials was preceded by an interruption of their affiliation to the PSEUI.

112Similarly, as regards their legitimate expectations, other servants who became officials after an interruption of their affiliation to the PSEUI and other servants who became officials without their affiliation to that scheme being interrupted are in a comparable situation. Since they became officials after 1 May 2004 or after 1 January 2014, they could not legitimately expect Article 21 and Article 22(1) of Annex XIII to the Staff regulations to be applied to them immediately after their appointment when those two articles contain transitional measures designed solely to preserve acquired rights and legitimate expectations which existed prior to the entry into force of the 2004 reform or the 2014 reform.

113In any event, as has already been stated in the examination of the first plea in law, the continuity, or not, of affiliation to the PSEUI is not the only criterion for determining the beneficiaries of the transitional provisions contained in Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations (see paragraphs 63 and 64 above).

114The uniform treatment contested by the applicant does not therefore breach the principle of equal treatment, since it applies to categories of persons in comparable situations.

115In those circumstances, the second part of the second plea in law must be dismissed.

116Therefore, the second plea in law must be dismissed and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

117Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the Commission.

118Furthermore, under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, institutions that have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. It follows that the Parliament and the Council are each to bear their own costs.

On those grounds,

hereby:

1.Dismisses the action;

2.Orders CR to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

3.Orders the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union each to bear their own costs.

Svenningsen

Mac Eochaidh

Laitenberger

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 July 2025.

[Signatures]

Language of case: French.