21.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 357/36

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(Case T-529/19)

(2019/C 357/44)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: African Development Solutions (Adeso) (Nairobi, Kenya) (represented by: R. Martens, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

—annul, in its entirety, the contested decision, i.e. the Commission’s decision of 10 May 2019, and thus to declare that the claims for recovery in respect of Grant Agreements FED/2013/313-770 and FED/2013/316-291 in the amount of respectively EUR 3 298 703,59 and EUR 11 919,40 have no basis;

—order the defendant to pay all costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

1.First plea in law, alleging breach of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in which the principle of good administration is embedded: the right to be heard is manifestly disregarded, as well as the principle of legal certainty, because, despite the numerous and serious concerns raised by the applicant regarding the contested Audit report and the several meetings requested in order to clarify these important outstanding issues, the Commission refused to set up such meeting, whereas, in accordance with settled case-law, observance of the right to be heard is of general application and a condition of legality of any decision taken by the EU institutions, and must therefore be respected at all times and in all sort of procedures.

2.Second plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality, fairness and contractual good faith, as enshrined in Article 5(4) TEU, because, by immediately issuing a recovery order without giving the applicant the chance to give an adequate explanation of the contested Audit findings by means of an extensively elaborated management response and the proposed meetings, the defendant did not act in good faith and exceeded the limits of what is appropriate and necessary, whereas, an adequate amicable settlement could have been sufficient in first instance, as prescribed by the General Conditions of the Grant Agreement. It was thus not necessary nor essential for the defendant’s statement of the reasons for its decision to neglect the applicant’s request to pursue an amicable settlement in the first place. This is fully contrary to the principle of proportionality which implies that, if there are several appropriate measures, as is the case in the current matter, those that are the least invasive and burdensome must be chosen (quod non).

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