12 June 2019 (*1)

(Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Civil service — Member of the contract staff — Appointment — Classification in grade — Account taken of professional experience — General provisions for implementing Article 79(2) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (CEOS))

In Case C‑816/18 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 21 December 2018,

OY, member of the contract staff of the European Commission, residing in Auderghem (Belgium), represented by S. Rodrigues and N. Flandin, avocats,

appellant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

European Commission,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Eighth Chamber),

composed of F. Biltgen, President of the Chamber, C.G. Fernlund (Rapporteur) and L.S. Rossi, Judges,

Advocate General: P. Pikamäe,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to give a decision by reasoned order, pursuant to Article 181 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure,

makes the following

1By her appeal, OY seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 16 October 2018, OY v Commission (T‑605/16, not published, EU:T:2018:687; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which it dismissed OY’s action seeking, first, annulment of the decision of the European Commission of 2 October 2015 rejecting her request for a review of her classification in function group IV, grade 15, step 1, and, second, in so far as necessary, annulment of the decision of the Commission authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment of 29 March 2016 rejecting her complaint.

The appeal

2Pursuant to Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part.

3That provision must be applied in the present case.

4On 12 April 2019, the Advocate General took the following position:

‘1. For the following reasons, I propose that the Court should dismiss the appeal brought against the judgment under appeal by an order adopted under Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure and order the appellant, OY, to pay the costs, in accordance with Article 137 and Article 184(1) of those rules.

The first ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 21 of the Charter

3. By her first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court infringed Article 21 of the Charter, in particular the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment, in holding that the view cannot be taken, given the risk of collusion, so far as concerns the evidence which one spouse claims to provide for the benefit of the other spouse, that married persons are in a situation comparable to that of persons with no family or marital ties. According to the appellant, that approach of the General Court constitutes a difference in treatment between married persons and unmarried persons which is not objectively justified.

4. In particular, the appellant claims that, in applying the criteria used by the General Court, a relationship of friendship may also be interpreted as a stable relationship characterised by a bond of affection and shared interest and may also create a risk of collusion. According to the appellant, the situation of married persons and that of persons who are in a relationship of friendship are comparable. However, according to the reasoning followed by the General Court, married persons are treated differently to persons who have such a relationship of friendship.

5. This first ground of appeal must be rejected from the outset as being manifestly unfounded, since it is based on an incorrect reading of the entire judgment under appeal.

10. The General Court thus acted correctly in finding that the authority concerned had not infringed the appellant’s rights by attributing merely a weak probative force to that testimonial.

11. Consequently, the first ground of appeal, which is manifestly unfounded, must be rejected.

The second ground of appeal, alleging an inadequate statement of reasons in the judgment under appeal

13. Thus, by that reasoning, the appellant seeks, in reality, to challenge the merits of the ground adopted in paragraphs 73 and 74 of the judgment under appeal, according to which the authority concerned could grant a limited, or even weak, probative force to a witness statement or testimonial by her husband.

14. Since the second ground of appeal arises from the same misreading of the judgment under appeal as that on which the first ground of appeal is based, that second ground must also be rejected.

15. Consequently, the General Court cannot be criticised in any way on the ground that it breached its duty to state reasons.

The third ground of appeal, alleging, first, infringement of Article 41 of the Charter and of Article 6 of the ECHR and, second, a breach of procedure

17. By her third ground of appeal, the appellant invokes, first, an infringement of Article 41 of the Charter and of Article 6 of the ECHR and, second, a breach of procedure adversely affecting her interests, in particular the rights of the defence. This ground relates to the conclusion reached by the General Court, according to which the employment contract at issue was excluded from the proceedings as being inadmissible on account of its late submission.

21. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded.’

5For the same reasons as those given by the Advocate General, the appeal must be dismissed as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded.

Costs

6 Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. Since the present order has been adopted before the appeal had been served on the defendant and, therefore, before the latter could have incurred costs, OY must be ordered to bear her own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Eighth Chamber) hereby orders:

Luxembourg, 12 June 2019.

Registrar

President of the Eighth Chamber

ECLI:EU:C:2019:490

* Language of the case: English.