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Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl delivered on 11 October 1977. # Azienda di Stato per gli interventi sul mercato agricolo (AIMA) v Rocco Michele Greco. # Reference for a preliminary ruling: Corte suprema di Cassazione - Italy. # Case 36-77.

ECLI:EU:C:1977:149

61977CC0036

October 11, 1977
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OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL REISCHL

DELIVERED ON 11 OCTOBER 1977 (*1)

Mr President,

Members of the Court,

My opinion today concerns a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling which relates to the common organization of the market in oils and fats.

This organization of the market was introduced by Regulation No 136/66/EEC of the Council of 22 September 1966 (OJ, English Special Edition 1965-1966, p. 221). It covers oil seeds and oleaginous fruit as well as vegetable fats and oils and fats and oils of fish and marine mammals. A characteristic of this market is that the Community's own production is insufficient and that there is therefore a great demand for imports. For this reason it was necessary to adopt measures which give an incentive to the expansion of domestic production, inter alia, to olive growing, which is the subject-matter of the main action. In addition it is characteristic of the market in oils and fats that the market price orients itself according to the relatively low level of the price of oils from oil seeds, that is, of a product the raw materials for which can be imported duty-free from the world market with its low price level.

Since these prices would not ensure a fair income for producers of olive oil the organization of the market provides for the grant of a subsidy in this connexion. It corresponds to the difference between the production target price applicable to olive oil, that is, the price which ensures a fair income, and the market target price, in other words, the price which permits normal marketing.

In this respect Article 10 (1) of Regulation No 136/66 is the relevant provision. It provides that:

‘Where the production target price is higher than the market target price ruling at the beginning of the marketing year, a subsidy equal to the difference between these two prices shall be granted to producers of olive oil extracted within the Community from olives harvested within the Community …’

Article 10 (2) further provides that the principles governing the grant of the subsidy provided for in paragraph 1 shall be defined by the Council acting in accordance with the voting procedure laid down in Article 43 (2) of the EEC Treaty on a proposal from the Commission and that the Council, acting in accordance with the same procedure, shall adopt measures to ensure that olive oil producers receive this subsidy only in respect of oils which meet the conditions set out in paragraph 1. Moreover, under Article 10 (3) detailed rules for the application of the article shall be adopted in accordance with the Management Committee procedure laid down in Article 38.

Regulation No 754/67/EEC of the Council on the subsidy for olive oil was adopted on 26 October 1967 in application of these provisions (JO, No 260 of 27. 10. 1967, p. 2). It will later be necessary to discuss the provisions thereof, which were applicable until 31 October 1968. At present I should like to mention only that it provided in particular for the introduction of administrative control by the Member States. Corresponding regulations by means of which the control was refined were also adopted in the subsequent marketing years.

In addition the Commission adopted on 9 November 1967 Regulation No 830/67/EEC on the procedure concerning the olive oil subsidy (JO No 272 of 10. 11. 1967, p. 18) on the basis of Article 10 (3) of Regulation No 136/66. I shall also return to this regulation in a later connexion.

The defendant in the main action, the managing director of an oil mill situated in Southern Italy, leased olive groves with ripe olives in the 1967/68 marketing year and manufactured oil from the olives, which he had harvested. In this connexion he applied to the plaintiff in the main action, the Italian intervention agency, for the subsidy provided for in Article 10 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC. This was refused him on the ground that he is not an olive producer. In this connexion AIMA apparently relied in particular on the Italian Decree Law No 1051 of 21 November 1967 which became, with amendments, Law No 10 of 18 January 1968. This law in fact not only restated several provisions of Regulation No 136/66/EEC and Regulation No 754/67/EEC; it also laid down the criteria for the payments of the subsidy for olive oil which was produced in the 1967/68 marketing year and provided that the aid was to be granted to olive producers.

As a result of the plaintiff's application the Tribunale di Lecce ordered AIMA to pay the subsidy. The appeal court in Lecce upheld this decision in July 1972 on the ground that the plaintiff had participated in the olive production at a second stage.

Upon appeal to the supreme court, the Combined Civil Chambers of the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Appeal) at first doubted whether certain articles of the abovementioned Italian laws were constitutional. They referred to Articles 10 and 11 of the Italian Constitution and to earlier judgments of the Constitutional Court (No 183 of 27. 12. 1973 and No 232 of 30. 10. 1975) according to which where complete Community regulations exist, because such regulations are directly applicable Community law prohibits later national measures which restate their contents or replace them and derogate therefrom. The Combined Civil Chambers therefore referred a corresponding question to the Italian Constitutional Court in December 1975. By judgment of 28 July 1976 that court declared that the abovementioned laws were unconstitutional because they had replaced the directly applicable Regulations Nos 136/66/EEC and 754/67/EEC in breach of Articles 177 and 189 of the EEC Treaty. It thus became necessary to decide the dispute on the basis of Community law alone. There were and are two opposite views with regard to the interpretation of the relevant provisions: the oil mill takes the view that under the Community regulations the subsidy must be granted to oil manufacturers. On the other hand AIMA argues that olive producers are entitled to claim; moreover if it is impossible to state which persons are entitled to claim with sufficient precision under Community law the Member States may specify them in accordance with the principles of the control system to be established by them.

The Supreme Court stayed the proceedings by order of 9 December 1976 and referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty:

(a) whether the expression ‘producers of olive oil’ is equivalent for the purposes of the provisions laid down in Regulation No 136/66/EEC and Regulation No 754/67/EEC to that of ‘olive producers’ and

(b) whether a person who, having acquired olives from the tree which are already ripe, has them harvested and extracts the oil from them, is also a producer of olive oil.

In addition, the supreme court declared that the question of the invalidity of the Community provisions issued in implementation of the abovementioned regulations, to which AIMA referred in support of the interpretation of the Community provisions which it sought, should be examined in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in so far as is necessary as a result of the arguments put forward by the parties.

I adopt the following viewpoint on these questions:

(a) At the hearing the question whether the Community regulations in fact specify sufficiently precisely the person who receives the subsidy was discussed and, in case it was necessary to answer that question in the negative, the assumption that the task of specifying that person was in reality left to the Member States was considered.

I am convinved that there can be no question of such a power on the part of the Member States.

In this connexion it is necessary to recall first the second and third paragraphs of Article 10 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC. The second paragraph provides that the principles governing the grant of the subsidy shall be defined by the Council acting in accordance with the voting procedure laid down in Article 43 (2) of the Treaty on a proposal by the Commission; the third paragraph stipulates that detailed rules for the application of this article must be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 38, the so-called Management Committee procedure. In this situation it seems to me inconceivable that an essential feature of the system, the person who receives the subsidy, should not be defined in Community law but that the definition of that person should rather be reserved to national rules.

On the other hand the representative of the defendant correctly recalled principles laid down in the judgment in Case 23/75 (Rey Soda v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero, judgment of 30 October 1975, [1975] ECR 1279). It was as you know emphasized in that case, primarily in order to preclude thereby a discriminatory application of Community law in the Member States, that essential basic rules may not be drawn up by the Member States under the guise of implementing measures but that the Community regulations themselves must rather (this was the actual problem in that case) fix the categories of persons liable and the basis of the calculation of the tax to be paid by the undertakings. The argument that the Member States are empowered to determine those persons who are to receive subsidies under the organization of the market in oils and fats would be difficult to reconcile with those findings and the result of this must be that, if in fact indications in favour of such an argument were found in the relevant regulations, these regulations would be declared invalid in that respect.

However Regulation No 754/67/EEC of the Council, which was adopted under Article 10 (2) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, only states in fact that every producer Member State must introduce an administrative control until the introduction of a Community control. It must, as expressly provided in Article 3, ensure that the product referred to in Article 1, that is olive oil which complies with the definitions under items 1 and 4 of the annex to Regulation No 136/66/EEC, is qualified for the subsidy. In this connexion it is necessary to enable it to be established that the quantity of olive oil for which a subsidy is applied for corresponds to the quantity of olives harvested in the Community used to produce it. In my view nobody can seriously maintain that the power and duty to introduce such controls has anything to do with the determination of the criteria defining those persons entitled to claim. It is therefore necessary in any case to ascertain which persons are to receive subsidies by interpretation of the Community regulations, even if the existing indications in this respect are sparse and in some cases perhaps even contradictory.

(b) The second statement which must be made at the outset relates to an argument which the Italian Government put forward in support of its view that those persons who should have received the subsidy were the olive growers. It pointed out that in both Italy and in France, the only two olive-producing countries in the Community, the practice of granting the olive growers the subsidy has existed from the beginning. In particular, the Italian practice and the rules upon which it was based were notified to the Commission. The Commission has however made no observations thereon and no decision of amendment was adopted under Article 38 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC.

I am convinced that this too is of no importance with regard to the interpretation of the Community regulations. So far as the abovementioned notification is concerned, it is based upon Article 5 of Regulation No 754/67/EEC. According to that article Member States shall notify the Commission of the measures which they have adopted in accordance with this regulation, in other words of the provisions relating to the administrative control. If these provisions are not capable of enabling the objective mentioned in Article 3 to be attained, in other words the administrative control, a decision is taken on the amendments which the relevant Member State must make to them according to the procedure provided for in Article 38 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC. Since what is involved in this connexion is therefore only the administrative control by the Member States and not the determination of the conditions for the grant of the subsidy, it is no wonder that the notification of the Italian Government did not lead to an amendment procedure under Article 38 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC. I am convinced that this does not justify the conclusion that the Commission was in agreement with the Italian Government's interpretation of the Community regulations. In addition it must be said that even if it were necessary to interpret in that way the Commission's reaction, which was not to introduce a procedure under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, it would not make legal a practice which is illegal according to the provisions laid down by the Council.

The same applies to the other fact mentioned, that such a practice also existed in France, quite apart from the fact that it seems doubtful from the statements of the defendant's representative whether the French rules corresponded in essence to the Italian rules. It was correctly pointed out that any practice in another Member State which is equally incompatible with the Treaty can naturally supply no legal justification for it. At this point I shall merely refer to quite clear findings reached by the Court of Justice on this problem very early on, in fact in Joined Cases 90 and 91/63 (Commission of the EEC v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom of Belgium, judgment of 13 November 1964, [1964] ECR 625).

2. With regard to the observations made during the procedure it seems to me appropriate to make first two statements which do not raise any special difficulties.

(a) At the hearing the question whether the Community regulations in fact specify sufficiently precisely the person who receives the subsidy was discussed and, in case it was necessary to answer that question in the negative, the assumption that the task of specifying that person was in reality left to the Member States was considered.

I am convinved that there can be no question of such a power on the part of the Member States.

In this connexion it is necessary to recall first the second and third paragraphs of Article 10 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC. The second paragraph provides that the principles governing the grant of the subsidy shall be defined by the Council acting in accordance with the voting procedure laid down in Article 43 (2) of the Treaty on a proposal by the Commission; the third paragraph stipulates that detailed rules for the application of this article must be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 38, the so-called Management Committee procedure. In this situation it seems to me inconceivable that an essential feature of the system, the person who receives the subsidy, should not be defined in Community law but that the definition of that person should rather be reserved to national rules.

On the other hand the representative of the defendant correctly recalled principles laid down in the judgment in Case 23/75 (Rey Soda v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero, judgment of 30 October 1975, [1975] ECR 1279). It was as you know emphasized in that case, primarily in order to preclude thereby a discriminatory application of Community law in the Member States, that essential basic rules may not be drawn up by the Member States under the guise of implementing measures but that the Community regulations themselves must rather (this was the actual problem in that case) fix the categories of persons liable and the basis of the calculation of the tax to be paid by the undertakings. The argument that the Member States are empowered to determine those persons who are to receive subsidies under the organization of the market in oils and fats would be difficult to reconcile with those findings and the result of this must be that, if in fact indications in favour of such an argument were found in the relevant regulations, these regulations would be declared invalid in that respect.

However Regulation No 754/67/EEC of the Council, which was adopted under Article 10 (2) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, only states in fact that every producer Member State must introduce an administrative control until the introduction of a Community control. It must, as expressly provided in Article 3, ensure that the product referred to in Article 1, that is olive oil which complies with the definitions under items 1 and 4 of the annex to Regulation No 136/66/EEC, is qualified for the subsidy. In this connexion it is necessary to enable it to be established that the quantity of olive oil for which a subsidy is applied for corresponds to the quantity of olives harvested in the Community used to produce it. In my view nobody can seriously maintain that the power and duty to introduce such controls has anything to do with the determination of the criteria defining those persons entitled to claim. It is therefore necessary in any case to ascertain which persons are to receive subsidies by interpretation of the Community regulations, even if the existing indications in this respect are sparse and in some cases perhaps even contradictory.

(b) The second statement which must be made at the outset relates to an argument which the Italian Government put forward in support of its view that those persons who should have received the subsidy were the olive growers. It pointed out that in both Italy and in France, the only two olive-producing countries in the Community, the practice of granting the olive growers the subsidy has existed from the beginning. In particular, the Italian practice and the rules upon which it was based were notified to the Commission. The Commission has however made no observations thereon and no decision of amendment was adopted under Article 38 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC.

I am convinced that this too is of no importance with regard to the interpretation of the Community regulations. So far as the abovementioned notification is concerned, it is based upon Article 5 of Regulation No 754/67/EEC. According to that article Member States shall notify the Commission of the measures which they have adopted in accordance with this regulation, in other words of the provisions relating to the administrative control. If these provisions are not capable of enabling the objective mentioned in Article 3 to be attained, in other words the administrative control, a decision is taken on the amendments which the relevant Member State must make to them according to the procedure provided for in Article 38 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC. Since what is involved in this connexion is therefore only the administrative control by the Member States and not the determination of the conditions for the grant of the subsidy, it is no wonder that the notification of the Italian Government did not lead to an amendment procedure under Article 38 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC. I am convinced that this does not justify the conclusion that the Commission was in agreement with the Italian Government's interpretation of the Community regulations. In addition it must be said that even if it were necessary to interpret in that way the Commission's reaction, which was not to introduce a procedure under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, it would not make legal a practice which is illegal according to the provisions laid down by the Council.

The same applies to the other fact mentioned, that such a practice also existed in France, quite apart from the fact that it seems doubtful from the statements of the defendant's representative whether the French rules corresponded in essence to the Italian rules. It was correctly pointed out that any practice in another Member State which is equally incompatible with the Treaty can naturally supply no legal justification for it. At this point I shall merely refer to quite clear findings reached by the Court of Justice on this problem very early on, in fact in Joined Cases 90 and 91/63 (Commission of the EEC v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom of Belgium, judgment of 13 November 1964, [1964] ECR 625).

With regard to the actual problem in this case, that of the interpretation of Community law in relation to the question which persons have the right to the subsidy which is mentioned in Article 10 (1) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, it is necessary to emphasize at the outset that because the main action relates to the 1967/68 marketing year the provisions which were in force at that time, in other words the basic Regulation No 136/66/EEC, Regulation No 754/67/EEC of the Council and Regulation No 830/67 of the Commission are of particular importance. Regulations which were subsequently adopted, which were also discussed at the hearing, can on the other hand play only a very secondary part, if at all, so far as the interpretation is concerned.

(a)If the abovementioned regulations are analysed on the basis of their wording and of the recitals in the preambles thereto, it is necessary to admit that important arguments emerge in favour of the view put forward by the defendant in the main action that the manufacturers of the end product, oil, are entitled to the subsidy. Olive growers who process their products themselves or have them processed under contract may also be entitled to the subsidy but not olive growers who sell their products and leave the manufacture of the oil to other persons for the account of those persons.

(aa)The focal point of Regulation No 136/66 is the wording of the basic provision laid down in Article 10. It states that a subsidy will be granted to ‘producers of olive oil’. Article 10 (2) states that olive-oil producers shall receive this subsidy only in respect of oils which meet the conditions set out in paragraph 1. It is thus clearly linked to the end product. According to the generally accepted meaning of these expressions, and it is necessary to use them as the starting-point for the purposes of interpretation, the assumption that ‘oil producers’ must, as the Italian Government considers, be understood in a very broad sense, that is, including producers of the raw material who do not themselves process it into oil or have it processed for their own account, seems accordingly to be excluded.

(bb)Regulation No 754/67/EEC of the Council which was adopted in accordance with Article 10 (2) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC confirms this interpretation. Article 1 thereof provides that the subsidy is granted for olive oil; it therefore also focuses on the end product. Article 3 likewise provides, in so far as a right to a subsidy is concerned, that a subsidy for olive oil is applied for. The recitals of the preamble to the regulation are quite clear to this effect. In fact, they point out that the subsidy is of considerable importance to olive-oil producers; in addition they speak of the need to define principles according to which the subsidy is granted to olive-oil producers and of measures which are to ensure that that subsidy is granted only for olive oil; finally, they also mention that the grant of subsidies must be restricted to the quantities of oil to which the applications made in the oil producing areas refer.

(cc)Regulation No 830/67/EEC also runs along these lines though it must be admitted that it is less important in this connexion because it is a regulation of the Commission. It is possible to quote from that regulation the expression ‘the quantity of oil for which the subsidy is requested’ contained in Article 1, the words ‘oil which does not qualify for aid’ contained in Article 2, and Article 7, which also mentions quantities of oil for which the subsidy has been requested and quantities of oil which have been established as qualifying for the subsidy. So far as the recitals of the preamble to the regulation are concerned it is significant that it also mentions olive-oil producers to whom the subsidy is granted. In addition it contains the statement that applications for the subsidy must be accompanied by documents in support establishing the correlation between the quantity of oil for which the subsidy is requested and the quantity of product from which it was extracted and that these documents must be based on the stock records of the mills and undertakings extracting oil from residual oil pulp.

As I have already said, all this is certainly of considerable importance for the purposes of reinforcing the view put forward by the defendant in the main action.

(b)The interpretation of this Court cannot however restrict itself to this finding. It is of course necessary in addition to examine the significance of the arguments put forward by the Italian Government in support of their counter-argument.

(aa)Thus reference was made to Article 27 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC according to which under certain conditions a subsidy is granted for oil seed harvested and processed within the Community. It claims that it follows clearly from this provision in conjunction with Article 21, which defines oil seeds, and from the recitals of the preamble to the regulation, that the rules on the subsidy apply to the growers. Since however the objective of these rules corresponds to that of Article 10 a corresponding interpretation must also apply to the latter. This conclusion does not seem to me to be compelling and I am on the contrary of the opinion that it is possible to derive from Article 27 arguments in favour of the view put forward by the defendant.

(bb)Thus it is necessary to bear in mind that the systems for oil seeds on the one hand and olives on the other take different forms. In the first case the price rules relate to the raw material and in the second to the processed product'oil. This also explains the difference in the rules on the subsidy. On the other hand it may correctly be said that the only conclusion which may be drawn from the fact that Regulation No 136/66/EEC refers expressly to the raw material in the context of the rules on the subsidy for oil seeds whilst in the case of olives, which are repeatedly mentioned as such in the regulation, it does not focus so clearly on the raw material but mentions the processed product, is that in the latter case those persons who are to receive the subsidy are not in fact the producers of the raw material.

(cc)The Italian Government has in addition referred to the recognizable objective of the subsidy scheme, in other words assistance to agricultural production so as to provide an incentive for its maintenance and expansion. In fact the recitals of the preamble to Regulation No 136/66/EEC state that olive growing and olive-oil production are of special economic importance in certain regions of the Community and that it is therefore necessary to support these activities by appropriate measures. They further provide that the marketing of Community crops of these products must ensure producers a fair income and that in view of the price situation it is necessary to grant subsidies in order to obtain the desired objective. It must be concluded from this, in view of the wording of the objectives of the Treaty laid down in Article 39 thereof, that olive growers must benefit from the subsidy.

(dd)It is in principle impossible to contradict this argument. It must however be added that it is of course necessary to distinguish between the pursuit of a certain objective and the choice of the legal means appropriate thereto. If the legislature had intended that the subsidy should in every case be granted directly to the olive growers, even if they are not at the same time oil manufacturers in the sense defined above, it would have been easy for it to express this clearly and indeed otherwise than in Article 10 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC. The fact that it did not do so is certainly of importance for the purposes of interpretation. It can moreover be explained without difficulty.

As the Commission has stated, it was evidently the normal situation at that time for the same person to be both olive producer and oil producer. In most cases the oil manufacture was carried out for the account of the olive growers; it was very rare for the olives to be sold to oil mills, that is to say, in those places in which there were few oil mills and in which, on the other hand, the olive growing was on a small scale. Accordingly it was possible to assume that the objective which the Italian Government pointed out would also be attained if provision were made for the subsidy to be granted to the oil manufacturers. It was indeed possible to assume this even with regard to the rare exceptional cases in which the olives were sold, since there were many indications that the oil mills, which also had an interest in the expansion of production would pass on at least part of the subsidy to the growers.

Only when the economic circumstances changed, first because of a reorganization of the processing industry — the need for this reorganization, in other words, the need to concentrate the many oil mills, is already mentioned in the report by the Parliament on the proposal for a regulation on the establishment of a common organization of the market in oils and fats —, and secondly because of the increase in olive sales linked thereto, in the course of which it became apparent that the position of the growers was not always strong enough, was it expressly provided in a subsequent implementing regulation (Regulation No 3209/73 of the Council of 27. 11. 1973, OJ L 327 of 28. 11. 1973, p. 15) that the olive growers are entitled to the subsidy. The fact that this was considered necessary in 1973, and I refer in particular to Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the abovementioned regulation, and that earlier regulations did not contain this precise statement must certainly be taken to mean that according to the wording of the original regulations oil manufacturers were to be considered as those entitled to the subsidy.

Moreover the Italian Government referred to the statement of the European Parliament on the draft regulation on the common organization of the market in oils and fats. According to this statement, the regulation should be completed so as to provide for the conclusion of special contracts between olive producers and olive processers in order to ensure that the subsidy would actually benefit the olive growers. This is also evidence of the fact that it was considered important to regard the olive growers as those who were actually benefiting.

It is necessary to observe in addition that this proposal was not in fact incorporated into the regulation and in my opinion it is in no way compulsory to draw from this omission conclusions along the lines of those drawn by the Italian Government.

It is in fact not certain whether the Council failed to adopt such rules because it began with a wide concept of ‘oil manufacturer’ and assumed that olive growers are in any case the persons who benefit. If that had been the case it would more probably have used in Article 10 wording similar to that of Article 27. It is much more conceivable that no such provision was adopted because of the economic fact that in general the olive producer and the oil manufacturer were the same person, and because in the other cases reliance was placed on the market mechanism, in other words on the fact that the subsidy would be passed on, at least in part, to those for whom it was in fact intended. It is however also conceivable that the consideration that such details would be settled in an implementing regulation as soon as the need for it clearly appeared was paramount.

If therefore one wishes to attach value at all for the purposes of the argument to the statement of the Parliament and its treatment by the Council it should in my opinion at least be attached in favour of the argument put forward by the defendant in the main action. For it must in any case be regarded as significant that the Council adhered to the words ‘oil producers’ although its attention had clearly been drawn by the intervention of the Parliament to the problem that in some circumstances the actual objective of the rules could not be attained.

So far as the first implementing regulation adopted by the Council is concerned, Regulation No 754/67/EEC, the Italian Government considers that it can deduce from several of its provisions a clarification in support of its argument, a clarification which it considers necessary on the basis of the assumption that the concept of ‘oil producer’ is indeterminate.

It claims therefore that it is of interest that under Article 2 applications for subsidies must be made in the olive-oil producing areas of the Community. This would have had no proper meaning if it had not been intended to express thereby that the application had to be made by the olive growers. Article 3 moreover emphasizes the need for a control which permits it to be established that the quantity of oil for which a subsidy is applied for corresponds to the quantity of olives harvested in the Community used to produce it. Therefore data concerning olive growing is necessary and it can only — in so far in any case as the right to make an application is of interest — be supplied by the olive growers.

Quite apart from the fact that I am convinced that the expression ‘oil producers’ used in Article 10 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC is not so imprecise as the Italian Government would suppose, these arguments too seem to me to be unconvincing.

There again it can be pointed out that it would have been easy for the legislature, if that had been the intention, to speak of olive growers in Article 2 of Regulation No 754/67/EEC instead of speaking quite generally of the interested persons. It is necessary to state further with regard to the fact that applications for the subsidy had to be made in the olive oil producing areas that this is quite easily explained by the fact that in any case controls had to be carried out in these areas concerning the correlation between the declared quantity of oil for which a subsidy is granted and the quantity of olives from which the oil is supposed to have been obtained. The efficacy of these controls is certainly increased if the applications for subsidy are not made in the processing centres but are concentrated in the olive-oil producing areas. Finally, in my opinion nothing decisive can be gained from the fact that, in connexion with the grant of the subsidy, data which must come from the olive growers are required. This does not preclude oil producers from obtaining such data, for example by imposing corresponding conditions when the olives are sold. In addition these are factors which are only of importance within the context of the control procedure; it however in no way follows conclusively from the system that all such facts must be supplied by the person making the application. In any case it should be borne in mind that under Regulation No 3209/73, according to which the olive growers are entitled to the subsidy, documents provided by the oil mills (the keeping of stock books) are of importance but that this could not justify the conclusion that the oil mills are in fact the persons who make the applications.

(ee)

Finally it is still necessary to discuss an argument which I grant is at first sight quite capable of making a certain impression. It is based on the fact that it may clearly be deduced from the abovementioned Regulation No 3209/73, in particular from Articles 2, 3 and 8 thereof, that the olive growers are entitled to make applications and to receive the subsidy. On the other hand it is of interest that in the recitals of the preamble to the regulation words are used similar to those in the recitals of the preamble to Regulation No 136/66/EEC. Thus it states that the principles under which the subsidy referred to in Article 10 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC will be granted to olive-oil producers must be laid down and it is also mentioned that the subsidy is of considerable importance for producers of olive oil. This indicates that the expression ‘olive-oil producers’ is in fact an indefinite expression which also covers the olive growers and it therefore seems necessary to take into consideration other factors for the purposes of the clarification and interpretation of Article 10 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC. If this view were not followed but it were assumed that the expression ‘olive-oil producers’ used in Regulation No 136/66/EEC is precise in the sense put forward by the defendant it would then be necessary to state that Regulation No 3209/73, which is based upon Article 10 (2) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, derogates therefrom. The question of the validity of the former regulation would arise because the basic regulation was laid down by a procedure different from that by which Regulation No 3209/73 was laid down.

In addition it is however necessary to observe that it seems open to objection in principle to take into consideration regulations which were adopted subsequently for the purposes of the interpretation of a regulation which was adopted in 1966. In principle it is necessary to interpret legislative texts on the basis solely of their own wording, perhaps taking into consideration circumstances which existed at the time at which they were laid down. In addition, I doubt whether Regulation No 3209/73 may be regarded as an authentic interpretation of expressions contained in the basic regulation which, as I have said, was adopted by another procedure, because expressions are used in the recitals of the preamble thereto which are also found in the recitals of the preamble to Regulation No 136/66/EEC. In fact the abovementioned recitals should serve only to indicate the general objectives which, with regard to the grant of the subsidy, were already expressed in the basic regulation. I do not therefore consider that the argument which I am now discussing gives occasion to revise the opinion expressed above with regard to the interpretation of the expression ‘olive-oil producers’.

In addition I would also like to add, because the idea was put forward at the hearing even if it is not of decisive importance with regard to the main dispute, that I can see no occasion to doubt the validity of Regulation No 3209/73. It is true that it resulted in an amendment of the subsidy system in details because according thereto olive growers must be regarded as those benefiting therefrom. This is however unobjectionable because it clearly comes within the objective of the basic regulation and because its purpose is, what is more, to reinforce the guarantees for the attainment of that objective. In addition it may also be said that this certainly comes within the broad framework of the establishment of the principles relating to the grant of the subsidy which the Council is empowered to do under Article 10 (2) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, especially since, as the recitals of the preamble to Regulation No 136/66/EEC show, the definition of oil producers as those benefiting was not intended in a strict, invariable sense, but rather in the sense of an arrangement in principle appropriate to the situation at that time.

(ff)

Therefore none of the arguments put forward by the Italian Government — this may be stated finally — is capable of undermining the interpretation reached at the outset of the examination on the basis of the wording and the recitals of the preambles to the relevant regulations.

(a) The expression ‘producers of olive oil’ within the meaning of Article 10 (1) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC and Regulation No 754/67/EEC must be understood as having its customary meaning (manufacturers of the processed product), but not as including olive producers who leave the processing thereof to other persons for the account of those others.

(b) This reply to the first question makes the second question purposeless.

* * *

(*1) Translated from the German.

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