10.7.2017

Official Journal of the European Union

C 221/11

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(Case C-223/17 P)

(2017/C 221/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Lubrizol France SAS (represented by: R. MacLean, Solicitor, A. Bochon, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—set aside the General Court’s judgment in Case T-191/14, Lubrizol France v Council of the European Union as it relates to the two pleas in the appellant’s application before the General Court;

—uphold both of those pleas as well-founded;

—exercise its powers to adjudicate itself on the two pleas in question and render final judgment;

—in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court so that it can decide upon the applicant’s two pleas on infringements in law and procedure; and

—order the Council and any interveners to pay the appellant’s legal costs and expenses of this procedure as well as the legal costs and expenses of the proceedings at first instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on three pleas in law.

1.First plea in law, alleging that the General Court failed to assess the Council’s application of the relevant test against the correct legal standard

The appellant avers that in failing to apply the relevant criteria contained in the Commission’s communication concerning autonomous tariff suspensions and quotas (Notice 2011/C 363/02 (1)) when assessing whether the autonomous duty suspension for BPA should be terminated, the General Court failed to properly assess the Council’s and the Commission’s submissions against the relevant legal test and in accordance with the correct legal standards to be applied in that situation.

2.Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court impermissibly substituted its own reasoning for that of the Council and manifestly distorted the evidence

The appellant avers, in the first instance, that the General Court impermissibly sought to substitute its own reasoning for that of the Council and the Commission and, in so doing, provided an impermissible reason of its own for supporting the notion that the merchandise offered by the objector could be considered identical, equivalent or substitutable materials for BPA.

In the second instance, it avers that the General Court assessed the evidence relevant to the objector’s ability to supply sufficiently available volumes of the allegedly comparable merchandise to BPA in a manner that was manifestly incorrect, thereby distorting the clear sense of the evidence and its application to the evaluation of the case at first instance.

3.Third plea in law, alleging that the General Court made manifest errors in the application of the relevant procedures and the adoption of contradictory reasoning

The appellant avers that the General Court erred in law by ruling that the Commission’s power to reject an objection because of a period of delay in replying significantly longer than the 15 working days prescribed in the Commission’s communication related only first contact between the objector and the requesting companies and not to subsequent communications which allowed the General Court to consider that delay irrelevant. In so doing, the General Court adopted contradictory reasoning relating to the nature, functioning and roles of the different parties to the procedure laid down by the Commission’s communication.

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(1) OJ 2011, C 363, p. 6.

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