22.5.2017

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/14

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(Case C-150/17 P)

(2017/C 161/18)

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Appellant: European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union (represented by: J. Inghelram and E. Beysen, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Kendrion NV, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court of Justice should:

—annul point 1 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal;

—reject Kendrion’s claim at first instance for compensation in respect of the material damage allegedly suffered or, in the furthest alternative, reduce that claim for compensation to EUR 175 709,87;

—order Kendrion to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the appellant puts forward three grounds.

The first ground alleges an error of law in the interpretation of the concept of a causal link, in so far the General Court found that the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable period was the decisive cause of the alleged material damage consisting in the payment of bank guarantee charges, whereas an undertaking’s own choice not to pay the fine during the course of the proceedings before the EU Courts is, according to settled case-law, the decisive cause of the payment of such charges.

The second ground alleges an error of law in the interpretation of the concept of damage, in so far as the General Court refused to apply to the alleged material damage — relating to the payment of the charges for bank guarantees — the same condition as that which it had formulated for the alleged damage in relation to the payment of interest on the amount of the fine, namely that the applicant at first instance had to show that the financial burden linked to that latter payment was greater than the benefit which it might have derived from not paying the fine.

The third ground alleges an error in law in the determination of the period in which the alleged damage occurred and an inadequate statement of reasons, in so far as the General Court, without setting out reasons for so finding, found that the period in which the material damage consisting in the payment of bank guarantee charges occurred could have differed from the period in which the General Court had situated the unlawful conduct that had allegedly resulted in that damage.

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