Official Journal of the European Union

C series

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C/2024/7020

(Case C-576/24)

(C/2024/7020)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: TO (represented by: É. Boigelot, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 19 June 2024, TO v EUAA (T-831/22, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2024:404), notified on the same day, in so far as it, first, dismissed the appellant’s initial action seeking (i) the annulment of the EUAA’s decision of [confidential] terminating her fixed-term temporary agent contract and, (ii) compensation for the material and non-material damage she suffered as a result of that decision, and, second, ordered the appellant to pay the costs;

—order the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) to pay all the costs, including those incurred before the General Court of the European Union, in accordance with Article 184 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union;

—refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union for a ruling on the appellant’s initial action.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of her appeal, TO puts forward a single ground of appeal, alleging distortion of the facts in the judgment under appeal and manifest errors of assessment and contradictions resulting in imprecise legal reasoning, failure to take into account all the documents in the case file, disregard for the principle that evidence may be freely adduced and the concept of a body of consistent evidence and, consequently, disregard for the rules governing the burden of proof, and failure to take into account all of the appellant’s pleas.

First, the General Court manifestly distorted the evidence, facts and documents at its disposal by failing to draw the legal consequences from them and by failing to consider as evidence of harassment – which led to the adoption of the decision at issue – facts which had been established and which it had nevertheless found to be accurate and to be examples of malice.

Second, still in that context, the General Court failed to take into consideration all the relevant information in the file in order to assess a complex situation and draw the legal consequences from it, by ignoring in its analysis the facts and documents submitted to that Court and, consequently, drawing manifestly erroneous conclusions from the facts alone, which it arbitrarily retained. The appellant complains, in general, that the General Court did not respond to or examine a number of arguments and documents that she had put forward, even though they were relevant and effective.

Accordingly, and in particular, the General Court distorted the evidence in the case file and committed manifest errors of assessment, by holding the appellant responsible for the offensive comments and behaviour she allegedly suffered, and by analysing the evidence in a very incomplete and biased way, in order to deduce, clearly inaccurately, that no further mobility was possible once the appellant had exhausted her ‘second chance’, quod non.

The appellant also criticises the General Court for having analysed the case submitted to it solely in favour of the defendant, whose statements it systematically took for granted, whereas a complete and detailed analysis of the facts and evidence submitted should have led that Court to uphold a number of the complaints put forward.

The appellant criticises the General Court for giving a tendentious and patently false interpretation of a document in the file in order to deny the existence of an indirect identification of the appellant in the course of a process, which is nonetheless sufficient to consider the information as protectable personal data.

The appellant also complains that the General Court drew manifestly erroneous conclusions from the facts relating to her health and medical vulnerability, in a context in which she was asked inappropriate questions about her medical data, which were confidential, and the answers demanded by the Executive Director and her legal department at the hearing prior to the decision to terminate her contract early, even though those persons are not doctors and this was outside any statutory framework concerning medical aspects and/or respect for her personal data.

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ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7020/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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