delivered on 10 April 2025 (1)

Case C‑702/23 P

(Appeal – Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine – Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Prohibition on entry into and transit through the territories of the Member States – Freezing of funds and economic resources – Inclusion of the appellant’s name – Article 2(1) – Criteria under points (a) and (d) – Notion of ‘supporting, materially or financially’ Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine – Responsibility through a company in which the appellant is a shareholder – Failure to distance himself or herself publicly and passive attitude)

I.Introduction

This Opinion concerns an appeal brought by Mr Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko, the appellant in the present case, seeking to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑252/22, the judgment under appeal, EU:T:2023:496).

By its judgment, the General Court dismissed the action brought by the appellant for annulment, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, of:

first, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/337 of 28 February 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 59, p. 1) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/336 of 28 February 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 58, p. 1); (2) and,

second, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1), (3)

in so far as those acts (4) concern the appellant. Pursuant to those acts, the Council of the European Union inter alia prohibited the appellant from entering into or transiting through the territories of the Member States and froze all his funds and economic resources in those territories. The General Court also dismissed the action in so far as it sought to obtain, pursuant to Article 268 TFEU, compensation for non-material damage which the appellant claimed to have suffered by reason of the adoption of those acts.

The General Court ruled that the Council had not made an error of assessment in holding that the appellant satisfied the criteria laid down in Article 2(1)(d) and (a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. (5) According to the General Court, the Council could consider the appellant, in his position as an influential shareholder in Bank Rossiya, to be responsible for supporting financially, through that bank, decision-makers responsible for the destabilisation of Ukraine, including Mr Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation. In addition, the General Court held that the Council was able to take the view that the appellant supported actions or policies undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine in view of the different actions taken by Bank Rossiya to establish branches in Crimea and to finance public infrastructure in that region.

The appellant criticises the General Court’s reasoning and alleges that it erred in law in interpreting the listing criteria laid down in Article 2(1)(d) and (a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. More specifically, the appellant claims that the General Court relied incorrectly on the fact that he had not distanced himself publicly from the actions of Bank Rossiya in order to include him in the acts at issue, whereas, in his view, that aspect was not among the reasons put forward by the Council to justify his inclusion. He also complains that the General Court did not ascertain whether the reasons justifying his inclusion by the Council had a sufficiently solid factual basis.

The present case concerns one of the first appeals brought before the Court of Justice concerning restrictive measures adopted by the Council in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. (6) It provides the Court with the opportunity to give consideration to the interpretation of the criteria laid down in Article 2(1)(d) and (a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, which relate, first, to persons supporting, materially or financially, Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine and, second, to persons responsible, in essence, for actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity of that country.

It should be added that this case has a connection with Case C‑703/23 P, which stems from the appeal lodged by Mrs Elena Petrovna Timchenko, the wife of the appellant in the present case. By that appeal, Mrs Timchenko is seeking to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑361/22, EU:T:2023:502), by which the General Court confirmed her inclusion on the lists of restrictive measures by reason of her association with her husband within the meaning of Article 1(1) in fine and Article 2(1) in fine of Decision 2014/145, as amended. The Opinion in that case is also being delivered today.

II.The facts giving rise to the dispute, the procedure and the forms of order sought

A.Background to the dispute

The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 18 of the judgment under appeal and may, for the purposes of this Opinion, be summarised as follows.

On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP (7) on the basis of Article 29 TEU. On the same date, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (8) on the basis of Article 215 TFEU.

Following the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, on 25 February 2022 the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1), and Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1), in order inter alia to amend the criteria by which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be made subject to the restrictive measures at issue.

Article 1(1) of Decision 2014/145, in the version amended by Decision 2022/329, (9) prohibits the entry into, or transit through, the territories of the Member States of natural persons who satisfy the criteria laid down, inter alia, in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 thereof. For its part, Article 2(1) of that decision provides for the freezing of funds and economic resources of natural persons who satisfy the criteria laid down, inter alia, in points (a) and (d) thereof. Those criteria are, in essence, the same as the criteria laid down in Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of that decision. (10)

Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, reads as follows:

‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:

(a)natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine;

…

(d)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine;

…

and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.’

12.On 28 February 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted the original acts at issue. By those acts, the appellant’s name was added, under number 694, to the list set out in the annex to Decision 2014/145, as amended, and, under the same number, to the list set out in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, for the following reasons:

‘[Mr] Gennady [Nikolayevich] Timchenko is a long-time acquaintance of the President of the Russian Federation [Mr] Vladimir Putin and is broadly described as one of his confidants.

He is benefiting from his links with Russian decision-makers. He is founder and shareholder of the Volga Group, an investing group with a portfolio of investments in key sectors of the Russian economy. The Volga Group contributes significantly to the Russian economy and its development.

He is also a shareholder of Bank Rossiya which is considered the personal bank of Senior Officials of the Russian Federation. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, Bank Rossiya has opened branches across Crimea and Sevastopol, thereby consolidating their integration into the Russian Federation.

Furthermore, Bank Rossiya has important stakes in the National Media Group which in turn controls television stations which actively support the Russian government’s policies of destabilisation of Ukraine.

He is therefore responsible for supporting actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

He is also responsible for providing financial and material support, and benefiting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’

13.On 1 March 2022, a Notice for the attention of the persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ 2022 C 101, p. 4).

14.By letter of 25 March 2022, the appellant requested that the Council grant him access to the file concerning him, which access was granted on 13 April 2022. Furthermore, following a request for disclosure of additional documents made by the appellant on 15 April 2022, the Council disclosed those documents to him on 28 April 2022.

15.By letter of 6 May 2022, the appellant sent the Council a request for reconsideration, which was supplemented by a letter of 31 May 2022.

16.On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted the maintaining acts at issue, which maintained the inclusion of the appellant’s name on the lists at issue for the same reasons as the contested reasons set out in the original acts at issue.

17.On 15 September 2022, the Council notified the appellant of the maintaining acts at issue, referring him to its defence and informing him, in essence, that, in view of the fact that he was a long-time friend of Mr Putin and at the head of an ‘economic empire’ involved in sectors of the Russian economy, the Council considered that he benefited from the President of the Russian Federation and that he supported the actions and policies pursued against Ukraine through Bank Rossiya, which had established branches in Crimea and was associated with the National Media Group, which supported the policy pursued by the President of the Russian Federation.

18.On 31 October 2022, the appellant submitted a request for reconsideration to the Council.

B. The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

19.By application of 9 May 2022, the appellant requested that the General Court annul the original acts at issue in so far as they included his name on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures. He also requested that the General Court award him compensation for non-material damage which he claimed to have suffered as a result of the adoption of those acts. Moreover, on 25 November 2022, the appellant lodged a statement of modification in order to amend the form of order sought in his application so as to include an application for annulment of the maintaining acts at issue.

20.In his action for annulment, the appellant alleged inter alia that the Council had made an error of assessment in finding that he satisfied the criterion relating to supporting, materially or financially, Russian decision-makers laid down in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and the criterion relating to supporting actions or policies undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine, contained in Article 2(1)(a) of that decision.

21.On 6 September 2023, after rejecting all the appellant’s claims, the General Court dismissed the action in its entirety.

22.As regards, in the first place, the alleged error of assessment concerning the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, (11) the General Court held, first, in the light of, in its view, a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence, that Bank Rossiya was the bank of senior officials of the Russian Federation, including its President, Mr Putin, and that, consequently, the bank supported him financially. (12) Second, the General Court held that a natural person may be subject to restrictive measures for acts committed by a company in which that person is a shareholder where he or she exerts a substantial or even decisive influence over that company. (13) In the case at issue, the General Court found that the appellant, a friend of Mr Putin and the second largest shareholder in the bank, formed, together with three other friends of Mr Putin, the stable block of majority partners of Bank Rossiya within which the appellant was a very influential shareholder. On that basis, the General Court concluded that the Council was entitled to consider that the appellant was himself responsible for the financial support provided by Bank Rossiya to Mr Putin and that, in those circumstances, he could be subject to restrictive measures under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. (14) In its reasoning, the General Court also stated that the appellant could have distanced himself publicly from the financing of Mr Putin or could have divested his shareholding in the bank, which he did not do, even after the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. (15)

23.As regards, in the second place, the alleged error of assessment concerning the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, (16) the General Court stated that that criterion applies to any person who, by his or her conduct, is responsible for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. (17) In the present case, the evidence examined by the General Court in the judgment under appeal led it to find that, by establishing itself in the newly conquered region of Crimea and by financing public infrastructure in that region, Bank Rossiya had supported the policy of annexation pursued by the authorities of the Russian Federation. More specifically, such establishment was, according to the General Court, illustrated by the opening of branches of Bank Rossiya in Crimea, by the conferral on that bank of the management of an airport in Crimea and by the grant of a loan to the Crimean railway company by that bank. (18) Because, for the reasons mentioned in connection with the analysis of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the appellant could himself be held personally responsible for actions carried out by Bank Rossiya and in view of the fact that the appellant had not taken any positive steps to ensure that the bank ended its policy of integration in Crimea, the General Court concluded that the Council had not made an error of assessment in applying to the appellant the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. (19)

24.By his appeal, lodged on 16 November 2023, the appellant claims that the Court should:

–set aside the judgment under appeal;

–dispose of the action on the merits and annul the acts at issue in so far as they concern him, and

–order the Council to pay the costs.

25.The Council contends that the Court should:

–dismiss the appeal as partially inadmissible and as unfounded as to the remainder, and

–order the appellant to pay the costs.

III.Legal analysis

26.In support of his appeal, the appellant relies on two grounds of appeal alleging, first, an error of law in the interpretation of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended; and, second, an error of law in the interpretation of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of that decision. (20)

A.The first ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in the interpretation of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended

27.The appellant claims that the General Court erred in law by interpreting the notion of ‘supporting, materially or financially’ within the meaning of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, too broadly and in a manner contrary to the case-law. That ground of appeal consists, in essence, of two parts.

28.Under the first part, the appellant complains that the General Court held that the material or financial support provided for in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, can be demonstrated by a lack of opposition by the person concerned to the decisions taken by the entity considered directly responsible for supporting Russian decision-makers. In particular, he denies that his failure to distance himself from Bank Rossiya constitutes at least tacit approval of the policy of financial support pursued by that bank. The appellant maintains in that regard that the Council did not adopt similar reasoning either in the statement of reasons for the acts at issue or in its written submissions before the General Court. In those circumstances, he asserts that the General Court substituted its own assessment for the Council’s reasoning in the acts at issue, going beyond its judicial functions and thereby infringing his rights of defence.

29.Under the second part, the appellant submits that the General Court’s interpretation of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, does not comply with the principles governing the interpretation of EU law and that, furthermore, it is contrary to the case-law of the Courts of the European Union. He maintains that, according to that case-law, the material or financial support referred to in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, must be of a certain quantitative or qualitative significance in order to establish an effective contribution to the pursuit of Russia’s military activities in Ukraine in accordance with the objectives of that decision. That criterion cannot be applied to him, given that his alleged support is only indirect support, through Bank Rossiya, and is not based on actions taken by him, but on the fact that he allegedly failed to distance himself from the decisions taken by that bank. The appellant complains that the General Court based its reasoning on presumptions and did not ascertain whether the Council’s decisions were taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis.

30.The Council, whilst claiming that this ground of appeal should be declared partially inadmissible inasmuch as it seeks in part to call into question the General Court’s assessments of the facts, disputes the arguments put forward by the appellant, relying essentially on the reasoning in the judgment under appeal.

31.As a preliminary point, I would observe that, in so far as the Council contends that the first ground of appeal is inadmissible inasmuch as the appellant seeks to call into question the General Court’s assessment of the evidence before it and the factual findings made by the General Court in the judgment under appeal, that argument should be rejected.

32.It is clear, in the light of the specific arguments put forward in the appeal, that the appellant does not seek to challenge the factual findings which, according to the General Court, demonstrate that he financially supported Russian decision-makers in accordance with Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. On the contrary, the appellant complains that the General Court concluded that his failure to distance himself publicly from the actions of support taken by Bank Rossiya constitutes a factor which could be taken into account with a view to establishing his responsibility under that provision. He also disputes that his position as the second largest shareholder in Bank Rossiya, as part of the shareholder structure established by the Council, in itself allowed him to exert an influence such as to make him responsible, without further additional evidence, for the policy of financial support pursued by that bank in accordance with Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

33.It must therefore be held that the arguments put forward by the appellant in connection with this ground of appeal relate not to facts which the General Court considered at the outset to be correctly proven, in the light of the evidence provided by the Council, but to the legal characterisation of those facts – in particular the appellant’s failure to distance himself publicly – and the legal consequences to be drawn therefrom, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in appeal proceedings.

34.In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, according to settled case-law, whereas the assessment of the facts and evidence does not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, it has jurisdiction under Article 256 TFEU to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them. (21)

35.It follows that, contrary to the claim made by the Council, the first ground of appeal put forward by the appellant should be considered admissible.

36.As to the substance, with regard to the first part of this ground of appeal, the appellant challenges, in essence, the fact that the General Court took into consideration his failure to distance himself publicly from Bank Rossiya’s policy of financially supporting Russian decision-makers and to divest his shareholding in that bank in assessing whether he should be held responsible for that support in accordance with Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

37.It should be noted in that regard, first of all, that, in paragraphs 106 to 108 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that the Council was able to take the view that there was a body of evidence, examined in paragraphs 98 to 102 of that judgment, which established that Bank Rossiya was the bank of senior officials of the Russian Federation, including its President, Mr Putin, who thus benefited from financial support from that bank. Next, in paragraph 111 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that the appellant, who was a friend of Mr Putin and the second largest shareholder in the bank, was part of the stable block of majority partners of Bank Rossiya, within which he was therefore able to exert a substantial influence, in particular over decisions taken by that bank. On that basis, the General Court concluded that the Council did not make an error of assessment in considering the appellant himself to be responsible for the financial support provided by Bank Rossiya to Mr Putin in accordance with Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. Lastly, the General Court added, in paragraph 112 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant could have distanced himself publicly from the financing of Mr Putin by Bank Rossiya or even divested his shareholding in that bank, which he did not do even after the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

38.It follows from the foregoing that, as the appellant claims, the General Court did refer, in its reasoning, to his failure to distance himself from the policy pursued by Bank Rossiya and even to divest his shareholding in that bank in establishing his responsibility under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. However, such a reference is only one of the factors on which the General Court based its conclusion in paragraph 114 of the judgment under appeal that, in essence, the Council rightly considered that the appellant, through Bank Rossiya, financially supported Russian decision-makers responsible for the destabilisation of Ukraine.

39.It follows that even if, as the appellant argues, his failure to distance himself publicly or to divest his shareholding in that bank should not be regarded as constituent elements of the financial support referred to in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, reliance by the General Court on those factors to substantiate the appellant’s responsibility is not such as to call into question the General Court’s final conclusion, since it is based on other factors, in particular those set out in paragraphs 106 to 111 of the judgment under appeal. On this point, like the Council, I wish to draw the attention of the Court of Justice to the fact that, in his written submissions, the appellant himself describes both his failure to distance himself publicly from Bank Rossiya and his failure to divest his shareholding in that bank as ‘confirmatory factors’ of the financial support established by the Council.

40.The first part of the first ground of appeal put forward by the appellant should therefore be rejected as ineffective.

41.For the sake of completeness and in any event, I consider that the General Court did not err in holding, both in paragraph 112 and in paragraph 115 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant’s distancing himself publicly from the policy pursued by Bank Rossiya, and indeed the divestment of his shareholding in that bank, would have been factors capable of ruling out his responsibility under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

42.In so far as, in the light of the evidence examined by the General Court, the appellant was considered to be personally responsible for the financial support provided by Bank Rossiya to Mr Putin, mainly on account of his position as an influential shareholder within that bank, an expression of direct and unequivocal opposition to the policy pursued by the bank would have shown that the appellant did not approve of or support the decisions which the Council attributed to him. Against that background, his responsibility for financially supporting Mr Putin could have been dissociated from that of the bank and he might not have been listed under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

43.Furthermore, the General Court’s finding, far from being an autonomous, supplementary reason formulated solely on its initiative, as claimed by the applicant, seems to me to be the logical extension of the reasoning set out in the judgment under appeal. It is sufficient to note in that regard that, because, in paragraph 111 of that judgment, the General Court endorsed the Council’s assessment that the appellant could not have been unaware that Bank Rossiya financially supported Mr Putin and that he had the power to influence that bank’s decisions, any expression by the appellant of disagreement with those decisions could, by definition, have constituted exculpatory evidence in his favour. (22) The Court of Justice appears to have adopted the same approach in its case-law, as is shown by the judgment of 28 July 2016, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission (C‑330/15 P, EU:C:2016:601, paragraph 84), where it held, in essence, with regard to restrictive measures in respect of Zimbabwe, that those who held senior posts within that country’s government had to be regarded as being fully associated with the government ‘unless they have taken specific action demonstrating their rejection of the government’s practices’. (23)

44.Consequently, contrary to the claim made by the appellant, I take the view that the General Court did not go beyond its interpretative functions and that its reasoning remained within the bounds of the reasons set out by the Council in the acts at issue. In those circumstances, it also cannot be accepted that the General Court’s reasoning infringed the appellant’s procedural rights, as he claims.

45.It follows that, if the Court were not to consider the first part of the first ground of appeal to be ineffective, as I have proposed in point 40 above, it seems that it should, in any event, be rejected as unfounded.

46.With regard to the second part of the first ground of appeal, it challenges the General Court’s reasoning regarding the power of influence which, according to the judgment under appeal, the appellant was capable of exerting over decisions taken by Bank Rossiya and, in particular, over that bank’s policy of financially supporting Mr Putin. In essence, the appellant claims that, without further evidence, his position as the second largest shareholder in Bank Rossiya was not sufficient for him to be held responsible for financial support under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

47.According to the Court’s case-law, which was correctly referred to by the appellant in his written submissions, the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to list a given person or to maintain the restrictive measures listing of that person, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated. (24)

48.In the present case, it should be noted at the outset that none of the arguments put forward in the appeal seeks to challenge the analytical method advocated by the General Court in paragraphs 109 and 110 of the judgment under appeal for determining whether the appellant could be declared personally responsible for the financial support provided by Bank Rossiya to Mr Putin under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. It is, by contrast, the Council that requests the Court of Justice to substitute the grounds of the judgment under appeal in so far as the General Court interpreted the notion of ‘supporting … financially’ in the abovementioned article too strictly, limiting it solely to shareholders capable of exerting an influence over the company in which they have a shareholding.

49.It should be recalled that, in the abovementioned paragraphs of the judgment under appeal, the General Court stated that, since the restrictive measures were not criminal penalties, a natural person may be subject to such measures for acts committed by a company in which that person is a shareholder where he or she exerts a substantial or even decisive influence over that company. The same could hold true, according to the General Court, where, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case, relating inter alia to the shareholder structure and capital stock of the company in question, the shareholder in that company has sufficient power that the positions he or she adopts as a shareholder are capable of influencing the direction of decisions taken by the company.

50.In my view, even if, as the Council claims, the wording used by the General Court for determining the responsibility of a natural person for financial support which he or she has provided through a company might not cover all possible forms of support for Russian decision-makers responsible for the destabilisation of Ukraine, the judgment under appeal does not require a substitution of grounds since, on my understanding, such wording is not intended to be exhaustive.

51.I note in that regard that, as the Council submits, if the notion of ‘supporting … financially’ in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, were to be understood as applying solely to shareholders capable of exerting an influence within a company, the listing criterion laid down in that provision could not be applied, for example, to minority shareholders who, without having any real influence over that company’s decision-making, are nevertheless capable of supporting its policy through their financial investment. The possibility cannot be ruled out that support for the purposes of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, may be found to be provided by a minority shareholder in multiple undertakings, without any real influence within them, where those undertakings all pursue a policy favouring the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine.

52.The objectives of Decision 2014/145, as amended, which are to maximise pressure on the Russian authorities and the economy of the Russian Federation in order to weaken financially its destabilising ability in the territory of Ukraine and the military aggression suffered by Ukraine, (25) seem to me to support that interpretation. Furthermore, that interpretation can readily be based on the guidance derived from the judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council (C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128), in which a listing criterion similar to that at issue in the present case was interpreted by the Court. In essence, in that judgment, the Court found that the aspect to be taken into account in determining the existence of support of a material or financial nature is its quantitative or qualitative significance, even if that support has no direct or indirect connection with the ultimate aim pursued by the restrictive measures. (26) It is clear that the ratio decidendi behind that case-law, which is, in my view, applicable in the same manner to the system of restrictive measures in the present case, is to put an end to the actions targeted by those measures by reducing the financial resources available for that purpose, irrespective of their origin and, in particular, of a shareholder’s ability to exercise influence in the companies in which he has shareholdings.

53.It follows that the notion of ‘supporting … financially’ in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, cannot be confined to cases where the shareholder in question is capable of exerting a substantial or even decisive influence over the company or to cases where the positions adopted by the shareholder are capable of influencing the direction of decisions taken by the company. However, given that none of the statements made in the judgment under appeal limits the scope of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, to those two situations alone, I take the view, without prejudice to any clarification the Court of Justice might wish to proffer in its future judgment, that the General Court did not make an error of interpretation which needs to be rectified by the substitution of grounds requested by the Council.

54.As regards the appellant, his arguments invite the Court to consider that, in order to establish his responsibility for the actions of Bank Rossiya, the Council was obliged to put forward further evidence in addition to mere findings regarding the bank’s shareholder structure. That other evidence would have to be capable of demonstrating positive, specific decisions by the appellant in favour of financially supporting Russian decision-makers in accordance with Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

55.At the outset, in so far as, in accordance with the considerations set out in points 51 to 53 above, the central element in establishing the existence of financial support is the quantitative or qualitative significance of that support in maintaining actions undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the appellant’s investment in Bank Rossiya, in connection with that bank’s importance in terms of capitalisation, as was stated in paragraphs 98 and 105 of the judgment under appeal, seems to me to be enough to confirm the Council’s assessment in the acts at issue and that of the General Court in the judgment under appeal.

56.Furthermore and in any event, I take the view that the fact that the appellant is the second largest shareholder in Bank Rossiya, as part of a stable core of majority shareholders known to be close to Mr Putin, was also sufficient, as the General Court correctly held in the judgment under appeal, to support a finding that the appellant was able to exert a substantial influence over the decisions of Bank Rossiya, without the need for the Council to adduce other additional evidence. That reasoning is not based on a legal presumption, as the appellant claims, but on the application of the most basic principles of governance of undertakings and on the influential power of a shareholder such as the appellant in accordance with those principles.

57.In those circumstances, it must be concluded that all the facts and evidence underpinning the General Court’s reasoning in the judgment under appeal were correctly assessed by it and that, contrary to the appellant’s claims, the assessments by the Council and by the General Court were made on a sufficiently solid factual basis.

58.The second part put forward by the appellant as part of the first ground of appeal should therefore be rejected.

59.Having regard to the foregoing considerations, and in particular in the light of points 45 and 58 of the present Opinion, I take the view that the General Court did not err in law in interpreting the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, as the appellant claims.

60.The first ground of appeal should therefore be rejected.

B. The second ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in the interpretation of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended

61.The appellant claims that, in holding that he supported actions or policies undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine solely by reason of his passive attitude to the policy pursued by Bank Rossiya in Crimea, the General Court interpreted Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, in a manner incompatible with its objectives and contrary to the applicable case-law. In his view, even assuming that Bank Rossiya could be criticised for conduct on the basis of which it was responsible for actions or policies within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, that responsibility cannot be transposed as it stands to the appellant. First, his inclusion within the scope of the criterion laid down in that article would require positive, specific acts of support from him. Second, the notion of ‘action’ in Article 2(1)(a) of that decision cannot include a passive attitude or failure to act like that found by the General Court in the judgment under appeal.

62.The Council disputes those arguments.

63.As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, if the Court of Justice were to conclude, as has been proposed in point 59 of this Opinion, that the General Court did not err in upholding the decision to include the appellant in the acts at issue on the basis of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the second ground of appeal relied on by the appellant should be examined only for the sake of completeness. (27)

64.It should also be noted that, in paragraph 120 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that, in the context of the present case and for the reasons mentioned in its examination of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the Council did not make an error of assessment in holding that, by adopting a passive attitude to Bank Rossiya’s support for the policy of annexation of Crimea, the appellant himself was responsible for supporting actions and policies which undermined the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

65.It is therefore clear that, contrary to the appellant’s contention, the General Court did not establish his responsibility under Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, solely on the basis of his passive attitude to Bank Rossiya’s support for the policy of annexation of Crimea. On the contrary, in establishing that responsibility, the General Court expressly made reference not only to the context of the present case, but above all to the reasons set out in paragraphs 109 to 115 of the judgment under appeal.

66.It follows that, in line with the reasoning developed concerning Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the General Court held that the Council had legitimately based the restrictive measures adopted against the appellant under Article 2(1)(a) of that decision on the fact that, first, he was a very influential shareholder within Bank Rossiya and, second, he could not have been unaware of the actions and policies pursued by that bank which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

67.It must therefore be held, for reasons similar to those set out in connection with the examination of the first ground of appeal, that, since the General Court relied on other factors in establishing the appellant’s responsibility on the basis of Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the arguments put forward by the appellant claiming that his passive attitude was taken into consideration as the sole factor capable of justifying the application of the criterion laid down in that article to him should be rejected as ineffective.

68.In any event, it should be noted that, for the reasons set out in point 43 of the present Opinion, the appellant’s passive attitude to, or failure to distance himself from, Bank Rossiya’s support for the policy of annexation of Crimea, as noted in paragraphs 119 and 120 of the judgment under appeal, are factors which permitted the General Court, as part of its judicial review, to establish that that support by the bank could be attributed to the appellant. Once again, the Court finds that, even though that passive attitude did not formally appear as a factor in the acts at issue, it was necessarily part of the reasoning thereof.

69.It follows from the foregoing that the General Court’s reasoning correctly and adequately reflects the reasons adopted by the Council in the acts at issue to justify the adoption of restrictive measures against the appellant on the basis of Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended.

70.In the light of the foregoing, I conclude that it cannot be claimed that the General Court erred in law in interpreting the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, as the appellant claims.

71.The second ground of appeal should therefore be rejected.

72.Since none of the grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant in support of his appeal has been upheld, the appeal should be dismissed in its entirety.

73.Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs.

74.Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

75.Since the Council has applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful, the appellant must be ordered to pay the costs.

76.Having regard to the analysis set out in the present Opinion and in the light of the proposals set out in points 72 and 75 above, I propose that the Court should:

–dismiss the appeal;

–order Mr Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko to pay the costs.

—

(1) Original language: French.

(2) Together, ‘the original acts at issue’.

(3) Together, ‘the maintaining acts at issue’.

(4) Together, ‘the acts at issue’.

(5) See point 10 of this Opinion. The reference to the criteria for inclusion applied to the appellant is reversed so as to match the order in which the General Court conducted its examination.

(6) See also, in that regard, judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180).

(7) Council Decision of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).

(8) Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).

(9) ‘Decision 2014/145, as amended’.

(10) The freezing of funds and economic resources also follows, in similar terms, from a combined reading of Article 2(1) and Article 3(1)(a) and (d) of Regulation No 269/2014, in its version as amended by Regulation 2022/330 (‘Regulation No 269/2014, as amended’).

(11) Judgment under appeal, paragraphs 97 to 116.

(12) Judgment under appeal, paragraphs 106 to 108.

(13) Judgment under appeal, paragraph 109.

(14) Judgment under appeal, paragraphs 110 and 111.

(15) Judgment under appeal, paragraph 112.

(16) Judgment under appeal, paragraphs 117 to 124.

(17) Judgment under appeal, paragraph 117.

(18) Judgment under appeal, paragraph 118.

(19) Judgment under appeal, paragraphs 119, 120 and 124.

(20) In setting out those two grounds of appeal, the appellant also makes reference to Article 1(1)(b) and (a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. However, because, as stated in point 10 of this Opinion, the content of Article 1(1)(b) and (a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, is the same as Article 2(1)(d) and (a) of that decision, the analysis may be confined to the grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant in so far as they relate to the latter provision. It should also be borne in mind that similar inclusion criteria are provided for by Regulation No 269/2014, as amended.

(21) See, inter alia, judgment of 12 December 2024, Euranimi v Commission (C‑772/23 P, EU:C:2024:1025, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

(22) See, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 123).

(23)The consideration of the appellant’s failure to distance himself publicly as possible exculpatory evidence in his favour supports the conclusion in point 40 of the present Opinion, given that, by the first part of this ground of appeal, the appellant did not dispute the inculpatory evidence used by the Council to substantiate his inclusion in the list, as adopted by the General Court.

(24)See, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119).

(25)See, to that effect, judgments of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council (C‑729/18 P, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 59), and of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 123). See also, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council (T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 144), in which the General Court describes the objectives of Decision 2014/145, as amended, in a way which the Court of Justice could easily endorse.

(26)See judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council (C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraphs 85 to 87).

(27)See, in that regard, the case-law cited in footnote 21 to this Opinion.